Yevamot 54a — the Talmud in English

A sleeping man did not acquire his yevama,

since, as he is sleeping, he is not possessed of awareness, and his acquisition is not an acquisition.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that it should be explained

as one who was thrust,

who became erect for his wife or through reflection, and fell from the roof and was thrust into his yevama.

This too cannot be said, for in this manner also he would not acquire his yevama. For:

But Rabba said:

one who

fell from the roof and was thrust

into a woman

—this is the version of the Gemara in Bava Kamma 27a:

he is

liable

for injuring her, when he fell through a common wind, which makes him close to deliberate, Rashi, Bava Kamma there,

for four matters

out of the five matters for which one who injures his fellow is liable.

But concerning the fifth matter, payment of compensation for humiliation, he is not liable, as the Gemara explains below.

And

if he was thrust in this fall

into his yevama—

he did not acquire

her, since he did not intend for intercourse.

Rather,

necessarily, this is the meaning of “under coercion” in our Mishna:

for example, he intended for his wife,

and became erect for her,

but his yevama overcame him and he had intercourse with her,

as she pressed him against herself; [this was explained according to the Tosafot].

Now the Gemara explains what Rabbi Hiyya taught, “even

both were under coercion,”

in the

beraita of the school of Rabbi Hiyya

above—

What are the circumstances?

For it cannot be explained as his yevama overcoming him so that he would have intercourse with her, since this beraita deals with a case in which both were under coercion!

For example, he intended to

have intercourse with

his wife,

and became erect for her,

but gentiles overpowered him and pressed

him and his yevama

against one another, and he had intercourse with her.

And here the Gemara returns to explain the principal law of our Mishna: one who has intercourse with his yevama, whether inadvertently, deliberately, under coercion, or willingly, acquires her:

From where are these matters

that the yavam acquires his yevama in every circumstance, even inadvertently and under coercion?

For the Sages taught:

It is written in the passage concerning yibbum: “Her brother-in-law shall have intercourse with her, take her to himself as a wife, and perform yibbum with her. But if the man does not desire to take his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gate to the elders, and she shall say: My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother in Israel; my yavam does not desire me! And his yevama shall approach him before the eyes of the elders, and remove his shoe from upon his foot.”

And we expound:

“Her brother-in-law shall have intercourse with her

and take her to himself as a wife, and perform yibbum with her”—the verse teaches that there is

a mitzva

to have intercourse with her initially and take her as a wife, more than to release her through halitza.

Another matter: “Her brother-in-law shall have intercourse with her,”

and the Torah did not say, “Her brother-in-law shall take her to himself as a wife.” It follows that his intercourse with her is itself his act of taking her in marriage, and it makes no difference what his intention or desire is in this intercourse.

The verse teaches that

whether

he had intercourse with her

inadvertently, whether

he had intercourse with her

deliberately, whether under coercion or willingly,

his yevama becomes acquired to him through his intercourse.

And we object:

But you have already derived it,

for you have already extracted and used this verse in order to learn from it

that

there is

a mitzva

in yibbum more than in halitza; how can you learn two laws from one verse?!

And we answer:

For

the matter of

the mitzva

in yibbum more than in halitza, there is no need to learn from the verse “Her brother-in-law shall have intercourse with her.” For this matter

from

what is written,

“But if the man does not desire

to take his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gate, and he shall remove her shoe”—

is derived!

For it implies that only if he does not desire yibbum should he perform halitza;

but

if he

desires,

it is more a mitzva for him that he

perform yibbum

and not perform halitza.

And

since we have learned from that verse that there is a mitzva in yibbum more than in halitza, therefore

when the verse comes

“Her brother-in-law shall have intercourse with her”—to teach that

whether

he had intercourse with her

inadvertently, whether deliberately, whether under coercion or willingly,

he has acquired his yevama.

Another beraita was taught:

The Torah said in the passage concerning yibbum: “Her brother-in-law shall have intercourse with her, take her to himself as a wife, and perform yibbum with her”:

And the Gemara derives several teachings from this verse:

a.

“Her brother-in-law shall have intercourse with her.”

Had the Torah said only “Her brother-in-law shall have intercourse with her,” I would have said that he acquires her only through intercourse

in the usual manner.

Therefore the Torah added the statement

“and take her,”

to teach you that even if he had intercourse with her

not in the usual manner,

he acquires her.

“And perform yibbum,”

that is, intercourse.

The verse repeated the law of intercourse here in order to teach you that intercourse is indispensable in her case [Rashi, Kiddushin 14a]:

Intercourse

alone

completes her

to acquire her as a fully married wife,

but money and a document do not complete her.

“And perform yibbum,”

therefore the Torah wrote “and perform yibbum,” and not “and he performed yibbum” [the Tosafot above, 8b], in order to teach you that the yavam acquires his yevama even

against her will.

The Master said [the Bach]:

Another matter: “Her brother-in-law shall have intercourse with her,” whether inadvertently

whether deliberately,

whether under coercion or willingly.

And we object:

But you have already derived it,

for we have already used this verse in order

to

learn from it that the yavam acquires her through intercourse

in the usual manner?!

And we answer:

That

learning—for the usual manner—

is derived from “to establish a name for his brother,”

which implies that yibbum is

in a place that establishes a name

[that is fit for him to father a son from her through this intercourse], and that is intercourse in the usual manner.

And

therefore,

when the verse comes,

“Her brother-in-law shall have intercourse with her,” it teaches that

whether

he had intercourse with her

inadvertently or deliberately, whether under coercion or willingly,

he acquires her.

The essential matter: Rav Yehuda said: A sleeping man did not acquire his yevama.

And the Gemara explains his reason:

for the verse says, “Her brother-in-law shall have intercourse with her,”

until he intends toward her

for the sake of intercourse.

And we object:

But it was taught:

The yavam acquires his yevama

whether awake or sleeping?!

And we answer:

Say

that the wording of the beraita is as follows:

whether

his yevama was

awake or

was

sleeping,

but a sleeping yavam does not acquire her.

But the Gemara still objects:

But it was taught:

The yavam acquires his yevama

whether he is awake or he is sleeping, whether she is awake or she is sleeping.

Thus, even a sleeping yavam acquires her!

And we answer:

Here,

in the beraita,

with what are we dealing,

not with one who was completely asleep, but

with one who is dozing.

But one who is completely asleep did not acquire her, in accordance with Rav Yehuda.

And we explain:

What are the circumstances of one who is dozing?

Rav Ashi said: He is asleep and not asleep, awake and not awake

[asleep and not asleep, awake and not awake; and as we translate, “And Jacob awoke from his sleep”: “and he awoke,” Rashi, Ta'anit 12a].

For example, they call him and he answers

[when they call him, he answers].

But

nevertheless,

he does not know how to return an argument

[to respond with an argument]; if something requiring reflection is asked of him, he does not know how to answer while he is dozing [there].

And when they remind him

[when they mention it to him] and say, “Did you hear such a thing?”,

he remembers

he recalls it [there].

The essential matter: Rabba said: One who fell from the roof and was thrust

into a woman, this is

liable for four matters.

And

if he was thrust

into his yevama—

he did not acquire

her as a wife through this:

And the Gemara explains: he is liable

for damage,

for pain and for loss of work

and

for medical expenses.

But

payment for

humiliation, he is not liable,

since he did not intend to humiliate her.

For the Master said: One is not liable for humiliation until he intends

to humiliate.

Rava said:

A yavam who

intended “to strike against a wall,”

that is, he did not intend for the sake of intercourse at all,

but struck against his yevama—

he did not acquire her.

But if he intended

to strike against an animal,

when he intended for the sake of intercourse,

but struck against his yevama—

he acquired her. For

he intended for the “sake of intercourse” in the world.

We learned in the Mishna:

Whether one who begins intercourse

and whether one who completes it, he acquires her. It did not distinguish between one intercourse and another. And likewise, one who has intercourse with any of the forbidden relations stated in the Torah:

Ulla said: From where is beginning intercourse

with forbidden relations prohibited

by Torah law?

As it is stated: “And a man who lies with a woman afflicted with menstrual impurity

[a menstruating woman],

and uncovers her nakedness;

he has uncovered her source.” —

From here it is derived that beginning intercourse

which is prohibited

by Torah law.

And we explain:

We find menstruation

in which beginning intercourse is prohibited.

As for the other forbidden relations, from where

do we know that beginning intercourse is also prohibited with them?

And if you would say,

perhaps you will say,

let us derive it from menstruation,

in which beginning intercourse is prohibited, for all the forbidden relations.

It can be refuted:

What is distinctive about menstruation,

which contains a novel stringency,

for

it

renders the one who has intercourse with her impure.

For one who has intercourse with a menstruating woman does not become impure merely because of touching her, like one who touches a menstruating woman, to become impure with impurity lasting until evening; rather, his intercourse renders him impure with impurity lasting seven days, like the menstruating woman herself. And one cannot learn from menstruation to other cases in which this novelty does not exist.

Rather, it comes

that beginning intercourse is included in all the forbidden relations

from the wife of a brother,

with whom beginning intercourse is prohibited, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

For it is written

concerning a brother’s wife:

“And a man who takes his brother’s wife -

she is a menstruant woman!”

And one must ask:

But is his brother’s wife forever a menstruant woman

and does she never cease, so that the Torah says, “she is a menstruant woman”!?

Rather,

the verse came to teach by this expression that the status of his brother’s wife is

like that of a menstruant woman -

Just as a menstruant woman

is forbidden even

by initial contact, so too a brother’s wife

is forbidden even

by initial contact.

And from a brother’s wife they learn by a mah matzinu derivation that all forbidden relations are forbidden even by initial contact.

And we challenge this:

What is different about a brother’s wife,

that there is a special matter in her that is not found in the other forbidden relations,

for it is in his power

of a man

to increase

many women for his brother under the prohibition of a brother’s wife,

for if he wishes, he betroths and goes on like

a thousand [

if the brother wishes, he betroths even a thousand women], and all of them are forbidden to his brother under the prohibition of a brother’s wife.

Therefore, you have no right to learn from a brother’s wife except the forbidden relations that are forbidden to him on account of marriage, which a man can increase, such as: a father’s wife, his daughter-in-law, his mother-in-law, and his wife’s sister. But you cannot learn from here concerning his mother, his sister, and his daughter, and the like, over which it is not in his power to increase the number.

Rather, it comes

initial contact in the other forbidden relations

from his father’s sister and his mother’s sister,

for with regard to them as well the Torah revealed that initial contact is forbidden in their case.

For it is written: “And the nakedness of your mother’s sister and your father’s sister you shall not uncover, for he has uncovered the nakedness of his close relative.”

You have thus learned from a mother’s sister and a father’s sister that initial contact is forbidden in their case, and from them you learn this for all the forbidden relations.

And we challenge this:

There is room to refute: What is different about a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, for

it is

a prohibition that comes on its own.

That is, it is a permanent prohibition, for they never had a time of fitness when they would be permitted to him, and no prohibition was added to them on account of an act that newly occurred in them; and they are not comparable to the women of the relatives, who were fit for him from the outset, but became forbidden on account of an act of betrothal that newly occurred in them.

And you can learn from here only to forbidden relations that are a prohibition that comes on its own, such as his mother, his sister, and his daughter. But you cannot resolve from here concerning forbidden relations that come through betrothal; and from where do you know that initial contact is forbidden in their case as well?

And we answer: indeed, by a mah matzinu derivation

from one

of the forbidden relations in which initial contact is forbidden

it does not come [one cannot learn from one of the three forbidden relations mentioned] by mah matzinu to all the forbidden relations, since in learning separately from each one of them there is a refutation.

[one cannot learn the law for all the forbidden relations from any one of the three relations mentioned], because a separate challenge can be raised against deriving it from each one.

However,

it can come,

there is a possibility of learning this for all the forbidden relations

from two [

from two of the three], by a derivation from the common factor in them, as he proceeds to explain.

And we inquire about it:

What can come,

which two of the three can we use to learn by the common factor for all the forbidden relations?

If you say:

Let all the forbidden relations come

from

a brother’s wife, a father’s sister, and a mother’s sister [

a father’s sister and a mother’s sister are considered one with regard to learning from them, since they are written in the same verse].

For if you refute: What is different about a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, since they are a prohibition that comes on its own - a brother’s wife proves otherwise, for her prohibition does not come on its own.

And if you refute: What is different about a brother’s wife, since it is in his power to increase it - a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, over which it is not in his power to increase, prove otherwise.

The common factor in them proves that they are forbidden to him as a forbidden relation, and he made initial contact with them equivalent to complete intercourse; so too I will bring all the forbidden relations under this rule.

We still will not know from here the prohibition of initial contact with a married woman!

For with regard to a married woman there is one refutation that applies equally to all of them:

What is different about these, for they are forbidden on account of kinship [

closeness], and you thereby learn only about all the forbidden relations that are on account of closeness. But a married woman, whose prohibition is not on account of closeness, from where do you know that initial contact is forbidden in her case!?

Rashba wrote that from Rashi’s words it appears that he does not have the following passage in his version.

And should you say:

Rather, let all the forbidden relations come

by the common factor

from a menstruant woman, a father’s sister, and a mother’s sister,

for you cannot refute them with one refutation that applies equally to all, since a menstruant woman too is not a prohibition of “kinship.”

You still have grounds to refute:

What is different about these, for they are a prohibition that comes on its own,

and a person does not bring it about!

And we conclude:

Rather, let it come

for all the forbidden relations

from a menstruant woman and a brother’s wife

together. Since

what can you refute,

what refutation can you bring against the learning from the common factor in both of them!

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, strongly challenges him:

I can refute this learning as well:

What is different about a menstruant woman [

whose flow of blood forbids her],

and a brother’s wife [

whom the brother forbids],

for they have no permission during the lifetime of those who forbid them!

For concerning a menstruant woman, as long as the blood that “forbids” her is “alive” [flowing], she is forbidden and has no permission. And concerning a brother’s wife, as long as the brother who “forbids” her is alive, she is forbidden even if he divorces her.

Say concerning a married woman,

whose husband is the one who “forbids” her,

that she has permission during the lifetime of the one who forbids her,

for if the husband gives her [the one who “forbids” her] a bill of divorce while he is still alive, she is permitted even during his lifetime!

He said

in astonishment

to him, Rav Aḥa of Difti, to Ravina,

concerning the words of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika:

Is it so

that

a menstruant woman and a brother’s wife

only

during the lifetime of those who forbid them do they have no permission, but afterward do they have permission?!

That is: From the wording of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, it appears that a menstruant woman and a brother’s wife have no permission during the lifetime of those who forbid them, but after the one who forbids them dies, they become permitted on their own; yet this is not so, for:

A menstruant woman

even after the one who forbids her has died—that is, her flow of blood has ceased—she is still not permitted, but rather: