Yevamot 50a (נ.) — the Talmud in English

These are “two generations",

the years allotted to a person at the time of his birth, which constitute the period of time called “his generation.”

If he merits—

they complete them for him,

so that he lives all the years allotted to him. This is the meaning of the verse’s promise: “I will fill the number of your days”: that the years of life will be completed and not diminished.

But if

he does not merit—

they reduce them

from the years apportioned to him.

These are the words of Rabbi Akiva.

And the Sages say: If he merits—

they add to him

beyond the years allotted to him,

because the “filling” mentioned in the verse, “I will fill the number of your days,” means an addition of years.

If he does not merit—

they reduce them.

The Sages said to him,

the

verse

the verse

says

in the promise to King Hezekiah,

“And I will add fifteen years to your days”!

This proves that through merit one can receive an addition to the allotted years of life!

Rabbi Akiva said to them:

These years—

they added to him from his own allotment!

Initially, they wished to reduce these years from him, but by virtue of his prayer they returned his years to him.

Know

that they added them from his own years,

for a prophet stood and prophesied

in the days of Jeroboam, many years before the episode with Hezekiah, about the birth of Josiah, the son of Manasseh, the son of Hezekiah.

As it is written [I Kings 13]:

“Behold, a son shall be born to the House of David; Josiah shall be his name”

And he had not yet been born

at that time,

Manasseh,

the son of Hezekiah, from whom Josiah would descend.

This proves that these years, during which Manasseh [the father of Josiah] was born to Hezekiah, were from his own allotment.

For according to the Sages, it is impossible that there should have been a prophecy about the birth of offspring to Hezekiah during years that he would merit beyond the years of his generation allotted to him. For prophecy is only concerning something that has been allotted, and not concerning a change from what was allotted.

And the Rabbis

maintain:

Is it written

that Josiah would necessarily emerge

from Hezekiah?

After all, in that prophecy

it is written, “to the House of David”—

and it makes no difference

whether he was born from Hezekiah or whether he was born from another person,

he was born.

We learned in the Mishna:

“His wife who died, etc.”

“His yevama who died, etc.”

Rabbi Yosef said: Here Rabbi taught an unnecessary Mishna,

for this is already the meaning of the verse: “And you shall not take a woman in addition to her sister, to uncover her nakedness, to make her a rival, during her lifetime”—that a wife’s sister is prohibited only during the lifetime of his wife!

We will return to you, chapter The One Who Performs Halitza

Four matters were stated concerning yibbum and halitza: two are from the Torah, and two are rabbinic. They are:

Yibbum or halitza, from the Torah.

A maamar or a get, by rabbinic ordinance.

The Sages instituted that the kiddushin of a maamar, performed with money or with a document, acquires the yevama, on the one hand,

and that a yevama can be disqualified from divorce by the yavam giving her a get, on the other hand.

The maamar that the yavam performs with his yevama has three effects:

A. It prohibits her to the other brothers.

B. It obligates her to receive a get, if he wishes to remove her [in addition to halitza].

C. It prohibits her female relatives to him, as is the law with the relatives of his wife.

The get that the yavam gives his yevama, by contrast, has two effects:

A. It rabbinically prohibits her to all the brothers.

B. The one who divorces her becomes prohibited to her relatives.

This Mishna first explains the dispute between the Sages and Rabban Gamliel concerning one yavam who repeated the same act with his two yevamot, or two yevamim who repeated the same act with one yevama who fell before them.

Afterward, the Mishna explains, according to everyone, the law governing one yavam who performed one of the four acts with one yevama and then performed another of the four acts with her: what is the force of the second act?

The Mishna explains the significance of the additional act when he performed a maamar with the yevama and afterward performed one of the other three acts with her:

He either gave her a get after the maamar, performed halitza with her after the maamar, or had intercourse with her after the maamar—what is the force of the second act?

The Mishna then explains the force of the second act when one gave a yevama a get and afterward performed one of the other three acts with her: he performed a maamar, had intercourse with her, or performed halitza with her.

The Mishna continues by discussing one who performed halitza with a yevama and afterward performed a maamar with her, gave her a get, or had intercourse with her.

It concludes with one who had intercourse with a yevama and then performed a maamar with her, gave her a get, or performed halitza with her.

In brief:

Maamar,

and after it: a get, halitza, or intercourse.

Get,

and after it: a maamar, halitza, or intercourse.

Halitza,

and after it: a maamar, a get, or intercourse.

Intercourse,

and after it: a maamar, a get, or halitza.

All this concerns one yavam and one yevama.

Before the Mishna begins to explain the law concerning one yavam who performs two acts with one yevama, it first introduces the dispute between Rabban Gamliel and the Rabbis concerning one who repeats the same act with two yevamot who fall before him from two brothers.

Or concerning one yevama who falls before two brothers, where one brother performs an act with her and the second brother then repeats that same act with her.

Mishna:

Rabban Gamliel says:

A.

No get

that the yavam gives a yevama has any effect

after

he has already given a

get

to the other yevama.

And the one who gives the get does not become prohibited to the relatives of the second yevama to whom he gave a get, as is the law of one who divorces his yevama, since his get had no effect whatsoever.

Rabban Gamliel's reasoning is that he is uncertain whether a get given to a yevama is effective in affecting the bond of levirate obligation.

Therefore, either way, the second one's get has no effect:

If the first get is effective in severing the bond, the bond to both yevamot was severed by the first get, and the second get accomplished nothing.

If the first get was not effective in severing the bond and did nothing to dismiss the yevama to whom he gave the get, then the second get likewise did not accomplish this.

Therefore, the second yevama is not his divorcee, and he does not become prohibited to her relatives.

Similarly, if there were two yevamim and one yevama, and the second repeated the act and gave her a get after his brother had already given her a get, she is not considered the second one's divorcee, because his get accomplished nothing, and he does not become prohibited to her relatives.

B. Rabban Gamliel is likewise uncertain whether a maamar acquires or does not acquire.

And

therefore,

no

effect is produced by a

maamar

that a man performs with his yevama

after a maamar

that he had already performed with the other yevama.

For if a maamar acquires, the second maamar does not acquire, since one can acquire one yevama but not two.

And if a maamar does not acquire, the second maamar has no greater effect than the first.

Therefore, he does not become prohibited to the relatives of the second yevama, and she does not require a get.

Similarly, if his brother then performed a maamar with her, she does not require a get from him, he does not prohibit her to his brother, and he does not become prohibited to her relatives.

C.

Nor

does any effect result from

intercourse

that the yavam has with his yevama

after intercourse

that he had with the other yevama, and he does not become prohibited to her relatives.

D.

Nor does halitza

have any effect

after halitza

with the other yevama.

And the Sages

disagree and

say:

A.

There is a get after a get,

because the get that he gives one yevama does not completely sever the entire bond, since she still requires halitza. Therefore, the second get, given to the second yevama, is effective in removing the bond that still remained toward her, and the one who divorces her is prohibited to her relatives.

Likewise, if there was a yevama who fell before two yevamim, the first one's get did not sever the entire bond, and it still remained toward the second yavam. Therefore, his get is effective in severing the bond toward him, and he too becomes prohibited to her relatives.

B.

And there is a maamar after a maamar.

The maamar with the second yevama is effective to require her to receive a get and to prohibit her relatives to him.

C.

But no

act is effective

after intercourse, nor after halitza—

at all!

The Mishna now moves to another matter, unrelated to the dispute between Rabban Gamliel and the Sages; rather, all agree concerning it [as explained in the introduction to this Mishna].

The Mishna explains

how

the law applies when there is one yavam and one yevama, and the yavam repeats and performs one act after another with her.

A. He performed an additional act after a maamar:

He performed a maamar with his yevama and gave her a get,

then the rabbinic principle, “Since he did not build, he may no longer build,” applies to him, and therefore he may not take her in yibbum; rather,

she requires halitza from him.

He

performed with her

a maamar and halitza—

she requires a get from him

for his maamar, in addition to halitza.

He performed a maamar and had intercourse with her—

this is in accordance with its mitzva.

B. He performed an additional act after a get:

He gave a get and performed a maamar—

she requires a get

for his maamar,

and halitza

to release her according to Torah law.

Even according to Rabban Gamliel, she requires a get from him, because if the get did not completely sever the bond, the maamar was effective.

He gave a get and had intercourse with her—

she requires a get

for his intercourse,

and halitza.

This is because he is prohibited to remain married to her by the principle, “Since he did not build, he may no longer build,” and his intercourse with her is not considered a complete acquisition because a get preceded it. It is therefore considered invalid intercourse, and she requires a get for that intercourse and halitza for the bond.

He gave a get and performed halitza—

nothing follows halitza.

Our Mishna follows Rabbi Akiva, who said that kiddushin does not take effect with those liable for prohibitions. Therefore, even if he betroths her by means of a maamar or has intercourse with her, the kiddushin does not take effect, because the prohibition of a woman who has undergone halitza is a prohibition of the Torah.

This is so even though it is “invalid halitza,” since if he wished to perform yibbum with her, he could not do so, because a get preceded it.

C. He performed an additional act after halitza:

He performed halitza and a maamar.

He performed halitza and

gave a get.

He performed halitza

and had intercourse with her.

Nothing follows halitza, as the tanna states below.

A maamar or intercourse is not effective with a woman who has undergone halitza, because our Mishna follows Rabbi Akiva, who holds that kiddushin does not take effect with those liable for prohibitions. A woman who has undergone halitza is prohibited to the yavam by a prohibition of the Torah, and therefore neither a maamar nor intercourse takes effect with her.

D. He performed an additional act after intercourse:

Or he had intercourse with her and performed a maamar.

Or he had intercourse with her and

gave a get.

Or he had intercourse with her

and performed halitza—

nothing follows intercourse.

Once he has had intercourse with her, he may divorce her with a get and remarry her, and halitza after intercourse has no effect in prohibiting her to him.

Here the tanna states the principle mentioned earlier [and the Gemara will explain why he delayed stating it until here]:

Nothing follows halitza!