Yevamot 44a (מד.) — the Talmud in English

One of the two yevamot

of the two yevamot

was fit

for marrying a kohen, and

one was unfit

, for example, because she had been divorced by a previous husband—

If he performs halitza—

he performs halitza with the unfit one,

and not with the fit one, so as not to disqualify her from marrying a kohen. Although he himself is not a kohen and this does not affect him, he must ensure that others do not suffer a loss on his account.

And if he performs yibbum—

he performs yibbum

both

with the fit one

and with the unfit one.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Four brothers were married to four women, and they died.

The wording of the Mishna implies that all four of them died.

And we raised a difficulty: Is it that

four brothers

alone

would it enter your mind

that were present here?

If so, it follows that all the brothers died and no brother remained alive; who, then, performs yibbum with all four yevamot!?

Rather, say

as follows: If

four

brothers died

from among

many

brothers—

the authority is his,

meaning that the eldest of the brothers may perform yibbum with all four yevamot.

And we raised a difficulty:

But

would they

leave

and give

him

permission to marry all of them for himself? We must surely consider how he will support them.

But it was taught: It is stated in the passage concerning yibbum [Deuteronomy 25]:

“And the elders of his city shall call to him”—

“they,” and not their agent.

“And they shall speak to him”—

this teaches that they give him advice appropriate for him.

If he was young and she was elderly,

or if

he was elderly and she was young, they say to him: What have you to do with a young woman?

What have you to do with an elderly woman?

Go to one like yourself, and do not introduce strife into your household!

And we answered: They did not permit every person to perform yibbum with all of them.

It is necessary

to state our Mishna only with regard to a wealthy man,

who is able

to support them all.

And we challenge this:

If so, even many more

women

as well

should be permitted for him to perform yibbum with; why, then, did the Mishna mention four yevamot!?

And we answer:

It teaches us sound advice: Four

women—

yes.

More

than four—

no!

So that each of them may receive

the fulfillment of the mitzva of

conjugal obligation

once

a month.

For the conjugal obligation of Torah scholars is once a week, from Friday night to Friday night, and there are four weeks in a month.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who was married

to two women and died: The intercourse or halitza of one of them exempts her rival.

And we raised a difficulty:

Let us perform yibbum with both of them, with both of them! And we answer:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: The verse states

[Deuteronomy 25]:

“Who does not build his brother’s house.”

He builds one house, but he does not build two houses.

We raised another difficulty:

Let us perform halitza with both of them!

And we answer:

Mar Zutra bar Toviyya said: The verse states

[Deuteronomy 25]:

“The house of the one whose shoe was removed.”

He removes the shoe from one house, but he does not remove it from two houses.

We raised another difficulty:

Let him perform yibbum

first

with one,

with one yevama,

and

afterward

perform halitza with the other!

The verses exclude only yibbum with two houses and halitza with two houses; but we have no exclusion indicating that yibbum with one of them exempts the other from halitza.

And we answer:

The verse states

[Deuteronomy 25] that

“If he does not desire

to take the yevama as a wife, to establish a name for his brother in Israel, he shall perform halitza.”

If he desires

to establish a name for his brother in Israel—

he performs yibbum.

The verse teaches that

everyone who is eligible

to come up to the gate, to the court,

for yibbum—

is eligible for halitza. And whoever is not eligible

for yibbum—

is not eligible for halitza!

Once the first woman has undergone yibbum, the second yevama is no longer eligible for yibbum, since he builds one house but does not build two houses.

And since she is not eligible for yibbum, she is also exempt from halitza.

Furthermore,

there is another reason not to perform yibbum with one and halitza with the other: so

people will not say

:

“The house is partly built and partly released.”

And we ask:

Let them say it!

That is, this is indeed what should be done; what concern is there that they might say, “One house is partly built and partly released”!?

And we answer:

If he performs yibbum

with one

and then performs halitza

with the other—

that is indeed so,

and we do not care that they will say this, since that is what must be done.

Rather,

the concern is

perhaps he performs halitza

with

one first,

and then

only afterward

performs yibbum

with the other.

And

then

he stands,

transgressing the yibbum of the second,

through “he shall not build.”

Since we expound: Once he did not build [when he first performed halitza], he may no longer build!

We still raise a difficulty: Since you expound, “He builds one house but does not build two houses”—

Then say,

that the meaning of the teaching is that “he does not build two houses”:

Only

when there is

one yevama,

one,

and he builds one house—only then

is the mitzva of yibbum fulfilled.

But

when there are two,

two yevamot, with whom he cannot build two houses—

the mitzva of yibbum is not fulfilled

at all! And we answer: If you say that the meaning of the verse is that wherever there are two yevamot from one house there is no mitzva of yibbum at all,

if so, “the rival of a forbidden relation,” which the Torah prohibited—

why do I need

a verse to exclude her from halitza and yibbum!?

Now,

if there were

two

yevamot

in general,

neither of whom was the rival of a forbidden relation,

you have said

that

they are not eligible for halitza and yibbum—

when one of the two is

the rival of a forbidden relation—

is it necessary!?

Would the verse have to state that they are not eligible for halitza and yibbum!?

And from the fact that the verse needed to prohibit the rival of a forbidden relation, it reveals to us that two yevamot who come from one house were not excluded from yibbum and halitza.

And we challenge this:

Why not?

It may be said that even if two ordinary yevamot are exempt from halitza and yibbum, nevertheless

it was necessary

for the verse specifically to exclude two yevamot, one of whom is the rival of a forbidden relation.

For

it might enter your mind

that

the forbidden relation

stands outside

the framework of yibbum, since she is forbidden to the yavam.

Thus there are not two houses awaiting yibbum here, but only one house.

And

I might say that

her rival should undergo yibbum,

since she is not excluded by the limitation, “He builds one house but not two houses.”

It teaches us

the verse concerning the rival of a forbidden relation

that she is prohibited

from yibbum by the separate rule of “the rival of a forbidden relation.”

If so, the question returns: From where do we know that the teaching, “He builds one house but does not build two houses,” does not exempt two yevamot from one house both from yibbum and from halitza?

And we answer:

Rather,

from here we know that the verse does not intend to exclude two yevamot who come from one house, since the verse repeated the words

“his yevama, his yevama,”

and thereby

included

two yevamot who come from one house as eligible for yibbum and halitza.

We learned in the Mishna:

One was fit

and one was unfit—he performs halitza with the unfit one!

Rav Yosef said: Here,

in our Mishna,

Rabbi taught

the following rule:

Rabbi

taught

“A person should not spill out the water of his well when others need it.”

Mishna:

One who remarries his divorced wife

after she had married another man, thereby violating the prohibition, “Her first husband, who sent her away, may not again take her”—

and one who marries the woman with whom he performed halitza,

thereby violating the prohibition, “Since he did not build, he may no longer build”—

and one who marries a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza —

must divorce

her,

and the offspring is a mamzer; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

And the Sages say:

he must divorce her, but

the offspring is not a mamzer.

And they agree

[the Sages]

with regard to one who marries a relative of his divorced wife, that the offspring is a mamzer.

For example, her sister. All of a wife’s relatives remain forbidden to him by a prohibition punishable by karet after her divorce, just as they were before her divorce. Offspring born from relationships forbidden by karet are mamzerim.

Gemara:

And we raise a difficulty:

But

does

Rabbi Akiva hold

that

one who marries a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza—

the offspring is a mamzer?

But Rish Lakish said: Here,

[in the earlier Mishna, on page 41a,]

Rabbi taught

the following:

the sister of a divorced woman—

is prohibited by Torah law; the sister of a woman with whom he performed halitza—

is prohibited by rabbinic enactment!?

And we answer:

Teach

in our Mishna, in place of “one who marries a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza”—one who marries

a relative of his divorced wife

[for example, her mother or sister], who is forbidden by a prohibition punishable by karet.

The Gemara adds proof that this is how the Mishna should be read:

This too is logically evident

that “a relative of his divorced wife” should be read in place of “a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza,” from

the fact that it teaches in the latter clause: “And they agree that one who marries a relative of his divorced wife, the offspring is a mamzer.”

Granted, if you say that it deals with her,

that our Mishna concerns a relative of his divorced wife, as in the emendation of the text of the Mishna,

this is why it teaches: “And they agree

[the Sages] that one who marries a relative of his divorced wife, the offspring is a mamzer.”

But if you say that it does not deal with her,

but the Mishna concerns a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza—

what is the meaning of “and they agree

that one who marries a relative of his divorced wife, the offspring is a mamzer”? We had not been discussing this at all!

And we challenge this: This does not prove that the text should be emended. The Mishna may indeed concern a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza.

Perhaps this is what it teaches us

by stating, “And they agree with regard to a relative of his divorced wife, that the offspring is a mamzer”: Although the Sages disagree with Rabbi Akiva, who considers offspring from relationships forbidden by negative commandments to be mamzerim, they agree

that there are mamzerim from relationships punishable by karet!

For this purpose, the tanna mentioned in the continuation the example of a relative of his divorced wife.

And we answer: The tanna should not have stated this here for that purpose.

For

it is taught later

[on page 49a]:

As we learned:

Who is a mamzer?

Anyone who is a blood relative with whom relations are prohibited by “he shall not enter,” this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Shimon HaTimni says: Anyone for whom one is liable to karet at the hands of Heaven.

And the halakha follows his statement.

Therefore, the proof returns: From the fact that the tanna stated that the Sages agree that there is a mamzer from a relative of a divorced woman, it follows that the earlier Mishna concerns a relative of a divorced woman and not a relative of a woman with whom he performed halitza.

And we ask:

Perhaps the tanna simply informs us

that the

tanna

in our Mishna [by stating this as an anonymous Mishna] rules

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon HaTimni,

and therefore mentioned that there is a mamzer from a relative of a divorced woman, who is subject to karet; this is what the tanna came to teach. But in the earlier clause the text should indeed read, “a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza.”

And we answer:

If so,

if the tanna came to state anonymously in the Mishna that the halakha is in accordance with Shimon HaTimni,

let him teach “the other relationships punishable by karet,”

and not specifically a relative of his divorced wife.

“A relative of his divorced wife,”

which the tanna mentioned specifically—

why do I need

him to mention it?

Rather, infer from this that he mentioned it because

he

was discussing her

earlier. It is thus proven that, in place of “a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza,” the text should read “a relative of his divorced wife.”

But it can still be challenged:

Perhaps he was in fact not discussing her

the tanna was not discussing a relative of his divorced wife, and the earlier clause should read “a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza.”

And as for your question why, in that case, the tanna mentioned specifically a relative of his divorced wife as an example of those subject to karet—

this is your answer:

And since the tanna taught

in connection with Rabbi Akiva

“one who remarries his divorced wife, one who marries the woman with whom he performed halitza, and a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza,”

and the Sages disagree with Rabbi Akiva, maintaining that offspring from relationships forbidden by negative commandments are not mamzerim—

he also taught

the converse, namely, that on the other hand they agree with regard to

a relative of his divorced wife

[as opposed to a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza] that the offspring is a mamzer!

On the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara offers a different resolution and reaches a new conclusion:

Rather, indeed, the offspring born from

a relationship with

a relative of the woman with whom he performed halitza, according to Rabbi Akiva—

is a mamzer!

The Gemara explains Rabbi Akiva’s reasoning:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: This is the reason for Rabbi Akiva’s opinion:

because

the verse states: “The house of the one whose shoe was removed.”

The verse calls

the man who performs halitza

“his house.”

The woman with whom he performed halitza is therefore considered as though she entered his house and left it through halitza.

Consequently, the relatives of the woman with whom he performed halitza are forbidden to him like the relatives of his divorced wife, and they may undergo neither halitza nor yibbum!

Rav Yosef said that Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi

[Rabbi’s son]: