Yevamot 42a — the Talmud in English

And if they performed halitza for her

after three —

she need not wait

after the halitza

three months.

It follows

that you have to learn from here:

the three months that the Sages said

that she must wait before marrying are counted

from the time of the husband’s death, and not from the time of the yavam’s halitza.

And we raised a difficulty against it:

What is different,

why is the waiting after halitza three months from the husband’s death, and not from the time of the halitza?

From

the waiting after receiving the

divorce document,

for according to Rav, a divorced woman must wait three months after receiving the divorce document, and it is impossible to count the three months from the time the divorce document was written, even though from the time of its writing her husband is already forbidden to be secluded with her, and if he was secluded with her, the divorce document is invalid.

For Rav said: from the time of delivery

of the divorce document she must wait three months.

And Shmuel said: from the time of writing

they count them.

And according to Rav, we should count the three months of waiting from the time of halitza, just as they count three months from the delivery of the divorce document.

And we answered:

Rava said,

the distinction between waiting after halitza and waiting after a divorce document follows by means of

a kal va-chomer,

which we make from the permission for yibum:

For behold, the yevama is forbidden to undergo yibum within three months, lest she be pregnant with a viable fetus, and she is forbidden to the yavam by a prohibition punishable by karet, that of the wife of a brother who has children.

And once three months have passed, he is permitted to perform yibum with her, relying on the majority of women whose pregnancies become recognizable at one-third of the gestation period. And this woman, whose pregnancy was not recognized, is not pregnant.

And since after three months of waiting

the prohibition punishable by karet

of the wife of a brother

is permitted

through waiting three months from the husband’s death —

the prohibition of a negative commandment

of a yevama to the outside world [“The wife of the dead shall not be outside, to a strange man”],

all the more so

that you must permit her after waiting three months from the husband’s death, and there is no need to wait three months from the halitza.

For if we permit her to undergo yibum immediately after three months, but if she wishes to undergo halitza we forbid her to marry someone outside until she waits three months from the time of the halitza, the matter would appear as mockery and absurdity.

Therefore, the Sages distinguished between delivery of the divorce document and halitza of the yevama, and permitted a yevama for whom halitza was performed to marry three months after the husband’s death.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise all the other women

may not become betrothed and may not marry until they have three months.

And now the Gemara comes to discuss the reason for the waiting:

And we raised a difficulty against it:

Granted, a yevama

may not undergo yibum or halitza and marry until three months have passed from the husband’s death,

as we said

on the previous page.

But all the other women —

why

must they wait after the deaths of their husbands, and cannot marry immediately?

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: because Scripture said:

Genesis 17

“To be a God for you and for your offspring after you” —

the verse teaches that the Divine Presence rests only upon certain offspring, whose lineage is clearly attributed after you, and not upon offspring whose lineage is uncertain.

Therefore they must wait three months, in order

to distinguish between the offspring of the first and the offspring of the second.

Rava raised an objection

from a beraita, in which we learned:

Therefore, a convert and a female convert

who had been married to one another in their gentile state and converted

must

separate from one another, and

wait three months.

And if you say that the waiting is necessary in order to distinguish between the offspring of the first and the offspring of the second,

here

in the case of conversion —

what “distinguishing” is there!?

For here the offspring is from the same man, both in his gentile state and in his Jewish state!

And we answered:

here too there is

a need “to distinguish” —

to distinguish between offspring conceived in sanctity,

after the conversion,

and offspring not conceived in sanctity,

at the time of their gentile state.

Rava said:

the reason for the waiting is because of

a decree:

For if the widow or divorcee marries within three months, and she is pregnant by the first without knowing of her pregnancy, and she marries the second, and gives birth to a son after seven months, and they think that he is the son of the second, whereas in truth he is the son of the first, born after nine months — there is concern:

a.

Perhaps he will marry his paternal sister.

Perhaps the son, who is considered by people to be the son of the second, will go and marry the daughter of the first husband [from another woman].

In truth, she is his paternal sister! b.

And

there is likewise concern that perhaps

he will perform yibum with his maternal brother’s wife.

Perhaps she will subsequently give birth to another son, and everyone will think that the first son as well, who was born seven months after her marriage to the second husband, is the son of the second husband, and that the two sons are paternal and maternal brothers, through the second husband.

In truth, they are only maternal brothers and not paternal brothers, and the mitzva of yibum does not apply to them.

And if one of them marries a woman and dies without children, the second will perform yibum with the first one’s wife, and it will be found that he has transgressed a prohibition punishable by karet, that of his maternal brother’s wife, with whom yibum is not permitted.

c.

And he will release his mother to the outside world.

And if his mother does not give birth to another son for the second husband, but they think that he is the son of the second husband, and the second husband dies without children, they will permit her to the outside world, as one whose husband died and who has children.

In truth, she is a yevama who requires halitza in order to marry someone outside!

d.

And he will exempt his yevama to the outside world.

Since they think that he is the son of the second and not of the first husband, if he has a paternal brother [from his mother’s first husband, who in truth is his father], and that brother dies without children, and there are no additional brothers, they will permit the yevama to the outside world, since they will think that there is no brother here who obligates her in yibum.

In truth, he is the dead man’s brother, and she requires yibum from him.

Of all those four concerns, in the case of a convert and a female convert who converted, they must separate from one another and wait only because of one concern: perhaps the son will come to perform yibum with his maternal brother’s wife.

For if they do not wait three months from the day of their conversion, there is concern that perhaps she became pregnant in her gentile state.

And an ordinary gentile woman is presumed to be promiscuous while with her husband, and it is possible that this fetus is not from her husband.

And if a child is born to them after seven months from their conversion, they will err and think that he was born in sanctity, from a pregnancy that began after the conversion.

In truth, she became pregnant in her gentile state, and it is possible that the fetus is not from the husband.

And if she gives birth to another son, they will consider the two sons paternal and maternal brothers, whereas in truth he is only his maternal brother and not his paternal brother.

And if one of the brothers marries a woman and dies without children, the second brother will come to perform yibum with her, and he will transgress a prohibition punishable by karet, since she is forbidden to him as the wife of his maternal brother, with whom the mitzva of yibum does not apply.

Rav Ḥananya raised an objection

to Rava, who explained the waiting as concern lest he encounter the nakedness of his maternal brother, from that which was taught:

In all of them,

in all the women whom the Sages forbade to marry or to undergo yibum without a time limit,

I read concerning them

that the reason is

because of the rectification concerning forbidden relations.

And

if

here,

in the decree of waiting three months, I read concerning them that the reason is

because of the rectification concerning the child,

to distinguish whose son he is.

And if it is so

as Rava said in explaining the reason for the distinction, then

all of them,

the enactments of the Sages, including the enactment of waiting, have as their reason

the rectification concerning forbidden relations!

And the Gemara answers the difficulty against Rava from the beraita:

The beraita thus distinguishes between all the enactments of the Sages and the enactment of waiting:

This,

the enactment of waiting, is

because of the rectification concerning the child, so that

the child born to the woman

not encounter them

through prohibitions of

forbidden relations.

That he will not transgress the prohibition of his maternal brother’s wife, mistakenly performing yibum with her.

Whereas the other enactments are for the rectification of the man and the woman, to save them from transgressing a forbidden relation, and are not for the rectification of the child.

And now the Gemara discusses the details of the enactment of waiting:

Granted, let her wait two months and marry —

what you said is proper:

let her not

marry!

For that is a doubt, whether

the child is

one of nine

months

to

the first

or one of seven

months

to

the

second.

But,

this is difficult: why should she not

wait one month and marry

then, and there will be no doubt whose son the child is, since the woman gives birth either in the seventh month or in the ninth month:

And if she gives birth in seven

months

and gives birth —

then

this

child is

one of seven

months

to

the

second.

And if she gives birth at eight

—at eight months—

and gives birth —

this one is one of nine

months

to the first!

For a woman does not give birth to a viable fetus in the eighth month.

And we answer: there will not be a distinction through this. For

even if

at eight

months

she gives birth,

there is no proof that he is the son of the first.

For

it is possible to say

also

that

his son

is the second’s,

because

perhaps she delayed one month

until she conceived,

and

only after one month

she conceived, and it is found that he is seven months from the second.

And the Gemara still asks why she must wait three months.

And she should wait only

two and a half months and marry.

And there will be a distinction through this.

For if she gives birth at seven —

this one is the second’s seven-month child.

And if she gives birth at six and a half

this one is one of nine

months, necessarily

the first’s, for if he is the second’s —

he would be six and a half,

a child of six and a half months,

would not live!

And we answer: there will not be a distinction through this, because

even if she gives birth at six and a half,

there will be no proof that he is the son of the first, because

it is possible to say that

he is the son of the

second.

And this is as Mar Zutra said:

even according to the one who says

that every

woman who gives birth at nine

months

does not give birth in incomplete periods,

partial months, but only in complete months.

Nevertheless, a woman who

gives birth at seven

months

gives birth

even

in incomplete periods,

such as six and a half months!

As it is stated

concerning the birth of the prophet Samuel [I Samuel 1], that his mother conceived,

“And it came to pass at the cycles of the days”;

Samuel was born.

The minimum of “cycles”

is

two

cycles.

The minimum of “days”

is

two

days.

And every “cycle” of pregnancy is three months; it follows that Samuel was born after six months and two days of his mother’s pregnancy.

And the Gemara still asks:

And let her wait

only

a little,

such as a week or two,

and marry.

And when three months have elapsed

from her husband’s death,

let them examine her

to see whether she is pregnant, by examining her breasts.

And if she is then found to be pregnant, it is certainly from the first and not from the second. For the fetus becomes recognizable at one-third of its period, at the end of the third month. And this woman, who waited a week or two and only afterward had intercourse, her fetus is not yet recognizable if it is from the second.

And if the fetus is not recognizable now, and will become recognizable only afterward, it is certainly from the second.

And we answer:

Rav Safra said: We do not examine married women

whether they are pregnant by their first husbands, so that

they should not become repulsive

through this examination

to their husbands.

And we refute this: there is no need to examine her breasts,

and

let her be examined by her manner of walking!

In the third month, it is recognizable from the manner of her walking [see Rashi], when she walks on loose earth, whether she is pregnant or not, and through such an examination she does not become repulsive to her husband.

And we answer:

Rami bar Hama said: the Sages were concerned not to rely on this examination, since it is the practice of the world that

“a woman conceals herself,”

making herself appear as though she is not pregnant if she is pregnant by the first,

so that her son will inherit

this

the property of her husband

the second.

Therefore the Sages were stringent that she may not marry at all within three months, so that they will not come to concealment and deception.

But it is still possible to ask:

In a case where we know that she is pregnant

from the first, and there is no longer concern for concealment,

let her marry

immediately, and she will not need to wait!?

For what reason,

and why

was it taught: A man may not marry his fellow’s pregnant woman or his fellow’s nursing woman. And if he married —

he must divorce her, and may not

take her back ever!

And we answer: this prohibition against a man marrying his fellow’s pregnant woman is for a completely different reason:

a decree lest

she become pregnant with an additional pregnancy, and from the pressure of the two fetuses

her fetus become a sandal,

a flattened fetus without the form of a face.

And we refute this:

If so, since there is concern lest she become pregnant with an additional fetus, and therefore she may not marry — every man,

his own

wife,

also

should not have intercourse with her while she is pregnant, lest she become pregnant with an additional pregnancy and her fetus become a sandal!?

And we answer: every man who has intercourse with his pregnant wife — the tannaim already disputed the matter, how he does so:

If according to the one who says

that a pregnant woman engages in intercourse

with a barrier,

which she places in that place, and the barrier prevents the semen from entering the woman’s womb, and she does not become pregnant — then she engages in intercourse

with a barrier,

and there is no concern for her becoming pregnant.

And if according to the one who says

that she engages in intercourse without a barrier, and can rely on the fact that

“Heaven will have mercy,” so that

the fetus will not be harmed — then

Heaven will have mercy,

and the fetus will not be harmed.

And we refute this:

Here too,

one whose husband died while she was pregnant by him should marry immediately, and we need not be concerned lest she become pregnant with an additional fetus:

If according to the one who says

that every pregnant woman engages in intercourse

with a barrier —

let this one also engage in intercourse

with a barrier.

If according to the one who says

that they rely on the fact that

Heaven will have mercy —

here too, let us rely on the fact that

Heaven will have mercy!?

And we answer:

Rather, the reason that a pregnant woman may not marry is

because of “pressure,”

the pressure upon the fetus during intercourse, which can endanger the life of the fetus.

And we refute this:

If so, with a pregnant woman

of his own,

also we should forbid intercourse, lest through the pressure of intercourse the fetus die.

And we answer: regarding the fetus

of his own,

which belongs to him —

he has compassion for it,

and we do not fear that he will press forcefully during intercourse until he kills his fetus.

But it is still possible to ask:

Here too, when marrying his fellow’s pregnant woman, for a person does not kill a living being, and

he has compassion for it,

and will not press during intercourse with pressure capable of killing the fetus, why do they forbid him to marry her until three months have passed!?

And we answer:

Rather, this is the reason for the prohibition against marrying his fellow’s pregnant or nursing woman:

An ordinary pregnant woman —

is destined to nurse!

i ne opasayutsya, chto pri polovom akte on budet davit slishkom silno i pogubit svoy plod.

No vse eshche mozhno vozrazit:

zdes tozhe, kogda on zhenitsya na beremennoy zhenshchine drugogo, ved chelovek ne ubivaet zhivuyu dus hu,

i

proyavlyaet zabotu o ney,

tak chto ne budet davit pri polovom akte s siloy, sposobnoy pogubit plod; pochemu zhe emu zapreshcheno zhenitsya na ney do okonchaniya trekh mesyatsev!?

I otvetili:

no, vot prichina zapreta zhenitsya na beremennoy i kormyashchey zhen ke drugogo:

Obychno beremennaya zhenshchina —

prednaznachena dlya kormleniya!