Yevamot 42a (מב.) — the Talmud in English

And if they performed ḥalitza for her

after three months—

she need not wait

after the ḥalitza

three months.

This means

[you can infer from here] that

the three months that the Sages stated

that she must wait before marrying are counted

from the time of the husband’s death, and not from the time of the yavam’s ḥalitza.

And we raised a difficulty:

What is different—

why is the waiting period after ḥalitza three months from the husband’s death, and not from the time of the ḥalitza?

From

the waiting period after receiving a

divorce document,

as, according to Rav, a divorcee must wait three months after receiving the divorce document, and the three months cannot be counted from the time the document was written, even though from the time of its writing it is already forbidden for her husband to be secluded with her, and if he was secluded with her, the divorce document is invalid.

For Rav said: From the time of delivery

of the divorce document she must wait three months.

And Shmuel said: From the time of writing

they count them.

And according to Rav, we should count the three months of waiting from the time of the ḥalitza, just as the three months are counted from delivery of the divorce document.

And we answer:

Rava said,

the distinction between waiting after ḥalitza and waiting after a divorce document follows from a

kal va-chomer

that we derive from the permission to perform yibbum:

For the yevama is forbidden to undergo yibbum during the first three months, lest she be pregnant with a viable fetus, in which case she is forbidden to the yavam by the prohibition punishable by karet of a brother’s wife who has children.

Once three months have passed, he may perform yibbum with her, relying on the majority of women whose pregnancies become recognizable after one-third of the gestation period. Since her pregnancy was not recognizable, she is not pregnant.

And since after three months of waiting, the

prohibition punishable by karet

of a brother’s wife is

removed

by waiting three months from the husband’s death—

the prohibition of a negative mitzva

that applies to a yevama who wishes to marry someone outside the levirate bond [“The wife of the deceased shall not marry outside to a stranger”]—

is it not all the more so

that she should be permitted after waiting three months from the husband’s death, with no need to wait three months from the ḥalitza?

For if we permit her to undergo yibbum immediately after three months, but if she wishes to undergo ḥalitza we prohibit her from marrying outside the levirate bond until she waits three months from the time of the ḥalitza, the matter would appear ridiculous and absurd.

Therefore, the Sages distinguished between delivery of a divorce document and ḥalitza of a yevama, and permitted a yevama who underwent ḥalitza to marry three months after the husband’s death.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise, all other women

may not become betrothed or marry until they have waited three months.

The Gemara now discusses the reason for this waiting period:

And we raised a difficulty:

Granted, a yevama

may neither undergo yibbum nor ḥalitza and marry until three months have passed from the husband’s death,

as we said

on the previous page.

But all other women—

why

must they wait after the deaths of their husbands, and why can they not marry immediately?

Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: Because the verse says: [Genesis 17]

[Genesis 17]

“To be a God to you and to your offspring after you”—

the verse teaches that the Divine Presence rests only upon certain offspring, whose lineage after you is clearly established, and not upon offspring whose lineage is uncertain.

Therefore, they must wait three months in order

to distinguish between the offspring of the first husband and the offspring of the second.

Rava raised an objection

from a beraita, in which we learned:

Therefore, a convert and a female convert

who were married to one another when they were gentiles and then converted

must

separate from one another and

wait three months.

And if you say that the waiting is necessary in order to distinguish between the offspring of the first and the offspring of the second,

here,

in the case of conversion—

what “distinguishing” is there!?

After all, here the offspring is from the same man, both when they were gentiles and when they were Jews!

And we answer:

Here too there is

a need for “distinguishing”—

to distinguish between offspring conceived in sanctity,

after the conversion,

and offspring not conceived in sanctity,

when they were gentiles.

Rava said:

The reason for the waiting period is due to a

decree:

If a widow or divorcee were to marry within three months, and she were pregnant from the first husband without knowing that she was pregnant, and she then married the second husband and gave birth after seven months, people might think that the child was the son of the second husband, whereas in truth he was the son of the first husband, born after nine months. There is concern that:

a.

He might marry his paternal sister.

The son, whom people regard as the second husband’s son, might go and marry the daughter of the first husband [from another woman].

In truth, she is his paternal sister! b.

And

there is likewise concern that

he might perform yibbum with his maternal brother’s wife.

She might subsequently give birth to another son, and everyone might think that the first son, born seven months after her marriage to the second husband, was also the second husband’s son, and that the two sons were paternal and maternal brothers through the second husband.

In truth, they are only maternal brothers and not paternal brothers, and the mitzva of yibbum does not apply to them.

If one of them marries a woman and dies childless, the other will perform yibbum with the first one’s wife, and will thereby incur the prohibition punishable by karet of a maternal brother’s wife, with whom yibbum is not permitted.

c.

And he might permit his mother to marry outside the levirate bond.

If his mother does not give birth to another son from the second husband, but people think that he is the second husband’s son, and the second husband dies without children, they will permit her to marry outside the levirate bond, as one whose husband died leaving children.

In truth, she is a yevama who requires ḥalitza in order to marry outside the levirate bond!

d.

And he might permit his yevama to marry outside the levirate bond.

Since people think that he is the second husband’s son and not the first husband’s son, if he has a paternal brother [the son of his mother’s first husband, who in truth is his father], and that brother dies childless with no other brothers, they will permit the yevama to marry outside the levirate bond, since they will think that there is no brother here who obligates her in yibbum.

In truth, he is the deceased man’s brother, and she requires him for yibbum.

In the case of a convert and a female convert who converted, because of all these four concerns they must separate from one another and wait only because of one concern: lest the son come to perform yibbum with his maternal brother’s wife.

For if they do not wait three months from the day of their conversion, there is concern that she became pregnant while still a gentile.

An ordinary gentile woman is presumed to have been promiscuous while married, and it is possible that this fetus is not from her husband.

If they have a child after seven months from their conversion, people will mistakenly think that he was conceived in sanctity, from a pregnancy that began after the conversion.

In truth, she conceived while still a gentile, and it is possible that the fetus is not from her husband.

If she gives birth to another son, people will regard the two sons as paternal and maternal brothers, whereas in truth he is only their maternal brother and not their paternal brother.

If one of the brothers marries a woman and dies childless, the other brother will come and perform yibbum with her, thereby violating a prohibition punishable by karet, since she is forbidden to him as his maternal brother’s wife, with whom the mitzva of yibbum does not apply.

Rav Ḥananya raised an objection

to Rava, who explained the waiting period as a concern lest one encounter the nakedness of his maternal brother, from that which was taught:

With regard to all of them,

all the women whom the Sages prohibited from marrying or undergoing yibbum without a time limit,

I apply to them

that the reason is

for the betterment concerning forbidden relations.

And

if

here,

in the case of the decree requiring a three-month waiting period, I apply to them that the reason is

for the betterment of the child,

to distinguish whose son he is.

And if it is so

as Rava said in explaining the reason for the distinction, then

all of them,

all the enactments of the Sages, including the waiting period, are for the reason of

the betterment concerning forbidden relations!

The Gemara resolves the difficulty against Rava from the beraita:

The beraita distinguishes as follows between all the enactments of the Sages and the enactment requiring the waiting period:

This,

the enactment requiring the waiting period, is

for the betterment of the child, so that

the child born to the woman

will not encounter them

in the prohibitions of

forbidden relations.

That is, he will not violate the prohibition of a maternal brother’s wife by mistakenly performing yibbum with her.

The other enactments, however, are for the benefit of the man and the woman, to save them from violating a prohibition of forbidden relations, and are not for the benefit of the child.

The Gemara now discusses the details of the enactment requiring the waiting period:

Granted that she should wait two months and marry—

what you said is proper:

she should not

marry!

That is a doubt whether

the child is

a nine-month

child

of the

first

husband, or a seven-month

child

of the

second

husband.

But

this is difficult: Why should she not

wait one month and marry

then? There would be no doubt whose child it is, since a woman gives birth either in the seventh month or in the ninth month:

And if she gives birth after seven

months

—

then

this

child is

a seven-month

child

of the

second

husband.

And if she gives birth after eight—

after eight months—

she gives birth

to this child, a nine-month

child

of the first husband!

For a woman does not give birth to a viable fetus in the eighth month.

And we answer: This would not provide a distinction. For

even if

after eight

months

she gives birth,

there is no proof that he is the first husband’s son.

For

it is possible

also

that

the son

is the second husband’s,

because

perhaps she delayed conception for one month

until she conceived,

and

only after one month

she conceived, so it turns out that he is a seven-month child of the second husband.

And the Gemara still asks: Why must she wait three months?

Gemara vse eshche sprashivaet: zachem ey zhdat tri mesyatsa?

Let her wait

only

two and a half months and marry.

This would provide a distinction.

If she gives birth after seven months—

this child is certainly a seven-month child of the second husband.

And if she gives birth after six and a half months,

six and a half months,

she gives birth—

this is a nine-month child,

necessarily

of the first husband, since if he were the second husband’s son—

a six-and-a-half-month child,

a child born after six and a half months,

would not survive!

And we answer: This would not provide a distinction, because

even if she gives birth after six and a half months,

there would be no proof that he is the first husband’s son, since

it is possible that

he is the son of the

second husband.

And this is

as Mar Zutra said: Even according to the one who says

that every woman who

gives birth after nine

months

does not give birth in incomplete months,

but only after full months have elapsed,

nevertheless, a woman who

gives birth after seven

months

can give birth

even

in an incomplete month,

such as after six and a half months!

As it is stated

with regard to the birth of the prophet Samuel, after his mother conceived:

“And it came to pass at the completion of the periods of days”—

Samuel was born.

The minimum of “periods”

is

two

periods.

The minimum of “days”

is

two

days.

Each “period” of pregnancy is three months; it follows that Samuel was born after six months and two days of his mother’s pregnancy.

The Gemara still asks:

Let her wait

only

a short time,

such as a week or two,

and marry.

And when three months have elapsed

from her husband’s death,

let them examine her

to determine whether she is pregnant by examining her breasts.

If she is then found to be pregnant, it is certain that the pregnancy is from the first husband and not the second, since a fetus becomes recognizable after one-third of its gestation, at the end of the third month. In the case of a woman who waited a week or two and was then intimate with the second husband, her pregnancy would not yet be recognizable if it were from the second husband.

And if the fetus is not recognizable now but becomes recognizable only later, it is certainly from the second husband.

And we answer:

Rav Safra said: We do not examine married women

to determine whether they are pregnant by their first husbands, so that

they will not be disgraced

by this examination

in the eyes of their husbands.

And we refute this: There is no need to examine her breasts;

but

instead

let her be examined by her gait!

In the third month, pregnancy is recognizable from the manner of her walking [see Rashi], when she walks on soft, loose earth. Such an examination would not disgrace her in the eyes of her husband.

And we answer:

Rami bar Ḥama said:

The Sages were concerned not to rely on this examination, since ordinarily

“a woman conceals herself,”

presenting herself as though she were not pregnant when she is pregnant by the first husband,

so that her son will inherit

this

from the estate of her husband

the second.

Therefore, the Sages were stringent and prohibited her from marrying at all during the first three months, so that no concealment or deception would occur.

But there is still a difficulty:

In a case where it is established for us that she is pregnant

by the first husband, and there is no longer any concern that she will conceal it,

let her marry

immediately, without needing to wait!?

Why, then,

and why

was it taught: A man may not marry his fellow’s pregnant wife or his fellow’s nursing wife. And if he married—

he must divorce her, and may not

take her back ever!

And we answer: The prohibition against marrying his fellow’s pregnant wife is for an entirely different reason:

a decree lest

she become pregnant again, and from the pressure of the two fetuses

her fetus become a sandal,

a flattened fetus lacking the form of a face.

And we refute this:

If so,

if there is concern that she may become pregnant again and therefore she may not marry, every man should likewise not have intercourse with

his own

wife,

also,

when she is pregnant, lest she become pregnant again and her fetus become a sandal!?

And we answer: With regard to every man who has intercourse with his pregnant wife, the tannaim already disagree about how he does so:

If it is according to the one who says

that a pregnant woman has intercourse

with a barrier,

which she places in that place, and the barrier prevents the semen from entering the woman’s womb so that she does not become pregnant—then she has intercourse

with a barrier,

and there is no concern that she will conceive.

And if it is according to the one who says

that she has intercourse without a barrier and can rely on the fact that

“Heaven will have mercy,” so that

the fetus will not be harmed—then

Heaven will have mercy,

and the fetus will not be harmed.

And we refute this:

Here too,

when a woman’s husband dies while she is pregnant by him, she should marry immediately, and there should be no concern that she may become pregnant with an additional fetus:

If it is according to the one who says

that every pregnant woman has intercourse

with a barrier—

let this woman also have intercourse

with a barrier.

If it is according to the one who says

that we rely on the fact that

Heaven will have mercy—

here too, let us rely on the fact that

Heaven will have mercy!?

And we answer:

Rather, the reason that one may not marry a pregnant woman is

because of

“pressure,”

the pressure exerted on the fetus during intercourse, which could endanger the fetus’s life.

And we refute this:

If so,

with a pregnant woman

of his own,

intercourse should likewise be prohibited, lest the fetus be killed by the pressure of intercourse.

And we answer: Regarding

his own

fetus, which belongs to him,

he takes care concerning it,

and we do not fear that he will press too forcefully during intercourse, to the point of killing his fetus.

But there is still a difficulty:

Here too,

when one marries his fellow’s pregnant wife, a person does not kill another person, and

he takes care concerning it,

so he will not exert pressure during intercourse that could kill the fetus. Why, then, is he prohibited from marrying her until three months have passed!?

And we answer:

Rather, this is the reason for the prohibition against marrying his fellow’s pregnant or nursing wife:

An ordinary pregnant woman—

is destined to nurse!