Yevamot 37a — the Talmud in English

Indeed,

in the evening—

in the evening—

Rava said so:

as you said, that you stated in his name, that even the wife of a kohen performs chalitza and becomes forbidden to her husband.

But

on the following day,

in the morning—

in the morning—

he retracted it!

Rava retracted what he had said in the evening, and I heard from him that he held that the wife of a kohen is permitted to remain with him without chalitza, on the basis of this child, in accordance with the Rabbis.

Rav Mesharsheya said to

Ravina:

You have permitted

—you are permitting the wife of a kohen whose child died within thirty days to remain without chalitza, and you are not concerned for the doubt of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel!

If so,

may it be the will of Heaven

may it be the will

that you permit even forbidden fat!

that you permit even the eating of forbidden fat! That is to say, the prohibition in this matter is obvious, like the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, and nevertheless you permit it!

Thus far is the discussion concerning a non-viable fetus with regard to chalitza: whether they were lenient concerning the wife of a kohen so as not to forbid her to her husband.

And from here the Gemara comes to discuss the case of a woman pregnant with another man's child and a woman nursing another man's child.

And we raised the issue:

here, concerning a woman pregnant with another man's child and a woman nursing another man's child, who is married to a kohen—

what?

Did

perhaps

the Rabbis institute a remedy for a kohen

who married a pregnant woman or a nursing woman, to be lenient so that he separates from her without a bill of divorce, so that he can take her back after the period of nursing has passed,

or not

did they institute this remedy, and he must divorce her, and he will not be able to take her back!?

He said to him: How can you compare these cases!?

What comparison is there between the “remedy” of refraining from chalitza in the case of the wife of a kohen who gave birth to a child and the child died, and the case of a pregnant woman and a nursing woman!?

Granted, there

was a child who was born, but it died within thirty days—

even though in the case of the wife of an Israelite we were stringent with her, requiring her to perform chalitza, in order to take into consideration the view of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that the child is a doubtful non-viable fetus, and that its mother requires chalitza because of the doubt—

since there is

there

the view of the Rabbis, who dispute Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

For

the Rabbis say:

even though it did not remain alive

for thirty days, but died, nevertheless, since most women give birth to a viable child, and we established it on the basis of this majority as

a proper child—

therefore

in the case of the wife of a kohen, since it is impossible

to perform chalitza for her without disqualifying her,

we act in accordance with the Rabbis,

who hold that she does not require chalitza.

But here,

in the case of one who married a woman pregnant with another man's child or nursing another man's child—

in accordance with whom shall we act

to be lenient with her, so that he need not divorce her, but only separate from her?

If in accordance with Rabbi Meir—

he said

that

he must send her out and may never take her back.

And if in accordance with the Rabbis—

they say:

he must send her out

with a bill of divorce.

And therefore it is impossible to be lenient in her case; rather, her husband the kohen must divorce her, and she becomes forbidden to him forever.

It was stated: If he betrothed her

a widow or a divorcee

within three

months,

and

afterward

he fled

from his city—must the court endeavor to compel him to give a bill of divorce, as is the law concerning one who transgressed and betrothed a woman within three months?

Or, since he fled, we need not trouble ourselves to have him divorce her—

Rav Aḥa and Rafram disputed this.

One said:

The court

places him under a ban,

excommunicating him in order to force him to come and give a bill of divorce.

And one said: His fleeing is sufficient.

His flight is sufficient.

For by fleeing he has revealed his intention that he is not going to take her into his household within the prescribed period, and the court need not place him under a ban.

There was an incident

involving one who betrothed a woman within three months and fled,

and Rafram said to them: His fleeing is sufficient.

We learned in the latter clause of the Mishna: The brother of the deceased who takes his yevama in levirate marriage for the sake of the mitzva of levirate marriage, and she was found to be pregnant and gave birth to a viable child,

and the child is

doubtfully the nine-month child

of the first, doubtfully the seven-month child of the last—

he must send her out, and the child is fit [either way], and both are liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

Why are they liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering, which is an offering brought for a doubtful sin? And why should we not obligate them to bring a sin-offering, as is the law concerning one who certainly sinned inadvertently?

For since she has a child,

let us say: Follow the majority of women

who give birth.

And the majority of women

give birth after nine months!

And this woman, who gave birth seven months after the levirate marriage, certainly did not conceive her child from the second, but from the first.

It follows that he was a son of the deceased brother, and both of them—the levir and the yevama—inadvertently transgressed the prohibition of the wife of one's brother who has children, and they should be liable to bring a sin-offering!

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman: This majority, that women give birth after nine months, does not concern us, since

our women

give birth after seven months!

Rava said to him,

Rav Naḥman: But are

your women the majority of the world!?

Rav Naḥman said to him:

I

meant this: The majority of women

indeed

give birth after nine months, and the minority—

after seven.

But one must add to this rule and say:

every

woman who gives birth after nine months—

her pregnancy is recognizable by one-third of her term,

after three months.

And

therefore this woman,

who

entered into levirate marriage after three months, because her pregnancy had not then become recognizable—for if the pregnancy had become recognizable by one-third of her term, there would have been no doubt—

since her pregnancy did not become recognizable by one-third of her term—

the majority was impaired for her.

There is a “defect” in her case, a flaw that weakens following the majority with regard to her.

Rather, she remains doubtful whether she gives birth like most women, after nine months, or like the minority of women, who give birth after seven months.

And therefore they do not bring a sin-offering, but a provisional guilt-offering.

And we refute this:

If every woman who gives birth after nine months—

her pregnancy is recognizable by one-third of her term,

this

woman,

since her pregnancy did not become recognizable

by

one-third of her term—

then

her pregnancy, certainly—

is that of a seven-month child belonging to the latter

her last husband,

is it!

It follows that the levirate marriage was in accordance with the law, and if so, why do they bring an offering!?

And we answer:

Rather, say

the following:

the majority of women who give birth after nine months—

their pregnancy is recognizable by one-third of their term.

And this one, since her pregnancy did not become recognizable

her pregnancy

by one-third of her term—

the majority was impaired for her.

But the matter remains doubtful, and therefore they bring a provisional guilt-offering.

The Sages taught:

The brother of the deceased took his yevama in levirate marriage, and she was found to be pregnant and gave birth to a viable child, but it is not known whether this child is the son of the deceased brother or of the brother who performed the levirate marriage. And the levir kept her with him and did not send her out, and afterward a second son was born to the levir and the yevama.

The

first

son is entirely fit, either way: whether he is the son of the first or whether he is the son of the second, and he is

fit to become High Priest.

And

if the

second

son who was born to them is

a mamzer—

because of the doubt!

For if the first is the son of the deceased brother, then the second is the son of a woman subject to a prohibition punishable by karet, namely the wife of one's brother who has children, and he is a mamzer.

But if the first is the son of the brother who performed the levirate marriage, then the second is a fit son.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: There is no doubtful mamzer.

And we raised the issue:

What does he say—

how is it that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said that he is not even a doubtful mamzer?

And we answer:

Abaye said: This is what

the first tanna meant:

The first is fit to become High Priest.

And the second,

he is

a doubtful mamzer.

And

a doubtful mamzer

is forbidden—

both

to a mamzeret

and to a fit woman.

But

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:

The second

is not a “doubtful mamzer”,

with regard to his being forbidden to a mamzeret.

Rather,

his law is the law of a

definite mamzer;

he is,

and

he is

permitted to a mamzeret.

Since according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov a doubtful mamzer is permitted to marry a definite mamzeret.

Rava said: This is what

the first tanna meant:

The first is fit to become High Priest.

And the second

has the status of a

“definite mamzer,”

by

the force of the

doubt!

That is to say, according to Rava, it is the first tanna, and not Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, who holds that a “doubtful mamzer” has the status of a definite mamzer,

and is permitted to a mamzeret.

And Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: There is no

status of a doubtful mamzer equivalent to that of a

“definite mamzer,”

by

the force of the

doubt.

Rather,

a doubtful mamzer is

“a doubtful mamzer,”

he is,

and is forbidden to a mamzeret.

And they disagree

Abaye and Rava, who dispute whether Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov is the one who permits a doubtful mamzer to a definite mamzeret, or whether he is the one who forbids it and the first tanna is the one who permits it—

they disagreed

about the

words of

Rabbi Elazar,

which the Gemara cites to be lenient, whether the halakha follows him or whether the halakha does not follow him.

And on the basis of this dispute, they each interpreted the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov according to his own position.

For they all hold that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, since his teaching is “a measure and pure.”

Therefore, one who rules in accordance with Rabbi Elazar interprets the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov in a manner that accords with the words of Rabbi Elazar.

But one who disputes Rabbi Elazar interprets the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov in a manner that opposes the words of Rabbi Elazar.

As we learned, Rabbi Elazar says:

This is the law of those disqualified from the congregation:

Their definite ones with their definite ones,

a definite mamzer may marry a definite mamzeret—

permitted.

Their definite ones with their doubtful ones,

a definite mamzer may marry a doubtful mamzer—forbidden.

And their doubtful ones with their definite ones,

a doubtful mamzer may marry a definite mamzeret—forbidden.

And their doubtful ones with their doubtful ones—

forbidden!

A doubtful mamzer must take into consideration that perhaps he is fit, and therefore he is forbidden to another doubtful mamzer, because perhaps the other one is disqualified.

And these are their doubtful ones:

A shetuki,

for when he calls his father “Father,” his mother silences him, thereby indicating that he is not his father, and he is a mamzer.

And an asufi,

who was gathered from the marketplace, and there is concern that his mother conceived him from a disqualified man.

And a Samaritan,

for they are doubtful mamzerim, since they do not recognize betrothal with money or a document, which are not written in the Torah but are derived by a gezera shava from the field of Ephron.

Therefore, if someone betrothed a woman with money or a document, they do not refrain from taking her as a wife, even though she is a married woman. It follows that her sons from the second man are mamzerim.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi

Elazar,

who holds that a doubtful mamzer is forbidden to a definite mamzer, and is also forbidden to another doubtful mamzer.

And Rav Yehuda added:

When I said it

when I stated Rav's words, that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

before Shmuel—

he said to me,

Shmuel:

Behold,

Hillel taught: Ten classes of lineage ascended from Babylonia:

Priests, Levites, and Israelites.

Disqualified priests, converts, and emancipated slaves [

freed slaves].

Mamzerim and Netinim [

Gibeonites who converted deceitfully in the time of Joshua],

a shetuki, and an asufi.

And all of them—

are permitted to enter into marriage with one another!

And if we hold that a doubtful mamzer is permitted to a doubtful mamzer and to a definite mamzeret, Hillel said properly that “all of them are permitted to enter into marriage with one another.”

For we would divide his statement and say that Hillel's intention was as follows:

a. Priests, Levites, and Israelites are permitted to enter into marriage with one another.

b. Levites, Israelites, disqualified priests, converts, and emancipated slaves are permitted to enter into marriage with one another.

c. Converts and emancipated slaves, mamzerim and Netinim, a shetuki, and an asufi -

are permitted to enter into marriage with one another. Since the congregation of converts is not called a “congregation,” mamzerim and the other disqualified persons may enter into it.

And

if

you were to say

in the name of Rav that

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

who holds that all doubtful persons are forbidden to one another—a doubtful mamzer is forbidden to a doubtful mamzer and is forbidden to a shetuki, and a shetuki is forbidden to a shetuki, and a shetuki is forbidden to an asufi—how can all of them be permitted to enter into marriage with one another!?

It follows that Rav and Shmuel disputed whether the halakha is ruled in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, who holds that a doubtful mamzer is forbidden to a doubtful mamzer, and certainly is forbidden to a definite mamzer, or not.

And now the Gemara explains the dispute between Abaye and Rava, who disputed whether the halakha is in accordance with Rav, who ruled in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, or in accordance with Shmuel, who ruled in accordance with Hillel.

And in light of this they disputed how to interpret the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

Abaye held like Shmuel, who said that the halakha is in accordance with Hillel,

who holds that a doubtful mamzer is permitted to a doubtful mamzer and is permitted to a definite mamzer.

And

therefore he

interprets it

the words of

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov according to the halakha,

that a doubtful mamzer is like a definite mamzer, and permits him to a definite mamzeret—

so that the halakha

in accordance with Hillel

not conflict with the halakha

in accordance with the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

But

Rava held like Rav, who said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

who holds that a doubtful mamzer is forbidden to a doubtful mamzer, and all the more so to a definite mamzer.

And

therefore he

interprets the

words of

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov according to the halakha,

that a doubtful mamzer is forbidden to a mamzeret,