Yevamot 37a (לז.) — the Talmud in English

Indeed,

in the evening,

in the evening,

Rava said this,

as you said, that he said in his name, that even the wife of a kohen performs halitza and becomes forbidden to her husband.

But

on the following day,

in the morning,

in the morning—

he retracted it!

Rava retracted what he had said in the evening, and I heard from him that he held that the wife of a kohen is permitted to remain with him without halitza, relying on this child, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

Rav Mesharsheya said to

Ravina:

You have permitted it

, you permit the wife of a kohen whose child died within thirty days to remain without halitza, and you are not concerned for the doubt raised by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel!

If so,

may it be the will

may it be the will

that you also permit fat!

that you permit even the eating of forbidden fat! That is to say, the prohibition in this matter is obvious, just like the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, and nevertheless you permit it!

This concludes the discussion concerning a stillborn child with regard to halitza, and whether they were lenient regarding the wife of a kohen so as not to forbid her to her husband.

From here the Gemara proceeds to discuss the case of a pregnant woman or nursing woman of another man.

We raised the issue:

Here, with regard to a pregnant woman or nursing woman of another man who is married to a kohen—

what

is the ruling? Do

they

the Rabbis institute a provision for a kohen

who married a pregnant or nursing woman, allowing him to separate from her without a bill of divorce, so that he could take her back after the nursing period had passed?

Or not

did they institute such a provision, in which case he must divorce her and may not take her back!?

He said to him: Is that comparable!?

What comparison is there between the “provision” of avoiding halitza in the case of a kohen’s wife who gave birth to a child that died, and the case of a pregnant or nursing woman!?

Granted, there

she gave birth to a child, but it was killed within thirty days—

For although, in the case of the wife of an Israelite, we were stringent and required her to perform halitza, out of concern for the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that the child is possibly a stillborn and that its mother requires halitza due to the doubt—

since there is

the opinion of

the Rabbis, who dispute Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

as they say

the Rabbis:

Although the child did not survive

for thirty days, but was killed, nevertheless, since most women give birth to a viable child, and we established its status on the basis of this majority, that

it is a fully viable child—

therefore,

with regard to the wife of a kohen, since it is impossible

to have her perform halitza without disqualifying her,

we act in accordance with the Rabbis,

who hold that she does not require halitza.

But here,

in the case of one who married a pregnant or nursing woman of another man—

in accordance with whom shall we act

to be lenient with her, so that he need not divorce her but only separate from her?

If in accordance with Rabbi Meir—

he said

that

he must divorce her and may never take her back.

And if in accordance with the Rabbis—

they say:

He must divorce her

with a bill of divorce.

Therefore, it is impossible to be lenient in her case. Rather, her husband the kohen must divorce her, and she becomes forbidden to him forever.

It was stated: If he betrothed

a widow or divorcee

within three

months,

and

afterward

he fled

from his city—is the court required to exert itself to compel him to give her a bill of divorce, as is the law concerning one who transgressed and betrothed a woman within three months?

Or, since he fled, need we not trouble ourselves to have him divorce her—

Rav Aḥa and Rafram disagreed about this.

One said:

The court

places him under a ban,

excommunicating him in order to force him to come and give her a bill of divorce.

And one said: His fleeing is sufficient.

His flight is enough.

By fleeing, he has revealed his intention that he does not intend to take her into his household during the period, and there is no need for the court to place him under a ban.

There was an incident

involving one who betrothed a woman within three months and fled,

and Rafram said to them: His fleeing is sufficient.

We learned in the latter clause of the Mishna: The deceased man’s brother, who consummated a levirate marriage with his yevama for the sake of the mitzva of yibbum, and she was found to be pregnant and gave birth to a viable child,

and the child is

possibly a nine-month child

of the first husband, and possibly a seven-month child of the latter—

he must divorce her, and the child is fit [in either event], and both of them are liable to bring an asham talui.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

Why are they liable to bring an asham talui, which is an offering brought for a doubtful sin? Why should we not obligate them to bring a sin-offering, as one who certainly sinned unwittingly must do?

After all, since she has a child,

let us say: Follow the majority of women

who give birth.

And the majority of women—

give birth after nine months!

And this woman, who gave birth seven months after the yavam took her in levirate marriage, certainly did not bear the child of the second husband, but that of the first.

It follows that the child was the son of the deceased man, and both of them—the yavam and the yevama—unwittingly transgressed the prohibition of a brother’s wife who has children, and they should be liable to bring a sin-offering!

Rav Naḥman said to him:

This majority—that women give birth after nine months—does not apply to us, since

our women—

give birth after seven months!

Rava said to him

Rav Naḥman: Is that so?

Are your women the majority of the world’s women!?

Rav Naḥman said to him:

I

meant this: Most women

indeed

give birth after nine months, and a minority—

after seven.

But one must add to this general rule and say:

And every

woman who gives birth after nine months—

her pregnancy is discernible by the third of her gestation,

after three months.

And

therefore, this woman,

this one,

who entered into levirate marriage after three months, because her pregnancy had not been discernible then—for had the pregnancy become discernible by the third of her gestation, there would have been no doubt—

since her pregnancy was not discernible by the third of her gestation—

the majority is weakened in her case.

There is a “disqualifying factor,” a flaw that weakens the application of the majority in her case.

Rather, it remains doubtful whether she gives birth like most women, after nine months, or like the minority of women, who give birth after seven months.

Therefore, they do not bring a sin-offering, but an asham talui.

And we challenge this:

If every woman who gives birth after nine months—

her pregnancy is discernible by the third of her gestation,

this

woman,

since her pregnancy was not discernible

her pregnancy

by the third of her gestation—

then

her pregnancy is certainly—

that of a seven-month child of the latter,

her last husband,

is it not!?

It follows that the levirate marriage was lawful, and if so, why do they bring an offering!?

And we answer:

Rather, say

the following:

Most women who give birth after nine months—

their pregnancy is discernible by the third of their gestation.

And this one, since her pregnancy was not discernible

her pregnancy

by the third of her gestation—

the majority is weakened in her case.

But the matter remains doubtful, and therefore they bring an asham talui.

The Sages taught:

The deceased man’s brother consummated a levirate marriage with his yevama, and she was found to be pregnant and gave birth to a viable child, but it was unknown whether this child was the son of the deceased brother or of the brother who performed yibbum. The yavam kept her as his wife and did not divorce her, and afterward a second son was born to the yavam and the yevama.

The

first

son is entirely fit, in either event, whether he is the son of the first or the son of the second, and he

is fit to become a High Priest.

And

if the

second

son born to them is

a mamzer—

due to the doubt!

For if the first is the son of the deceased brother, then the second is the son of a woman subject to karet, namely, a brother’s wife who has children, and he is a mamzer.

But if the first is the son of the brother who performed yibbum, then the second is a fit child.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: There is no doubtful mamzer.

We raised the issue:

What does he mean

? How could Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov say that he is not even a doubtful mamzer?

And we answer:

Abaye said: This is what

the first tanna means:

The first is fit to become a High Priest.

And the second

is

a doubtful mamzer.

And

a doubtful mamzer

is forbidden—

both

to a mamzeress,

and to a woman of unblemished lineage.

Whereas

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:

The second

is not a “doubtful mamzer”,

with regard to the fact that he would be forbidden to a mamzeress.

Rather, his law is that of

a

certain mamzer;

he

is

therefore

permitted to a mamzeress.

Since, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, a doubtful mamzer is permitted to marry a certain mamzeress.

Rava said: This is what

the first tanna means:

The first is fit to become a High Priest.

And the second

has the law of a

“certain mamzer,”

by

the force of the

doubt!

That is, according to Rava, it is the first tanna, and not Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, who holds that a “doubtful mamzer” has the status of a certain mamzer,

and is permitted to a mamzeress.

And Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: There is no

law of a doubtful mamzer equivalent to that of a

“certain mamzer,”

by

the force of the

doubt.

Rather, a doubtful mamzer

is a

“doubtful mamzer”

and

is forbidden to a mamzeress.

And they disagree

Abaye and Rava, who disagreed whether Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov permits a doubtful mamzer to a certain mamzeress or forbids him, while the first tanna permits it—

they disagreed

about the

words of

Rabbi Elazar,

whose statement the Gemara cites in order to establish a leniency, whether the halakha follows him or not.

On the basis of this dispute, they interpreted the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, each according to his own position.

For all agree that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, since his teachings are “a measure and pure.”

Therefore, one who rules in accordance with Rabbi Elazar reads the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov in a manner consistent with the words of Rabbi Elazar.

Whereas one who disputes Rabbi Elazar reads the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov in a manner opposed to the words of Rabbi Elazar.

As we learned: Rabbi Elazar says:

This is the law governing those disqualified from entering the congregation:

A certain one with a certain one,

a certain mamzer may marry a certain mamzeress—

permitted.

A certain one with a doubtful one,

a certain mamzer may marry a doubtful mamzeress—prohibited.

A doubtful one with a certain one,

a doubtful mamzer may marry a certain mamzeress—prohibited.

And a doubtful one with a doubtful one—

prohibited!

A doubtful mamzer must take into consideration that he may be fit, and therefore he is forbidden to a different doubtful mamzer, because perhaps the other is disqualified.

And these are the doubtful ones:

A shetuki,

for when he calls his father “Father,” his mother silences him, thereby indicating that this man is not his father, and he is a mamzer.

And an asufi,

who was collected from the marketplace, and there is concern that his mother conceived him from a disqualified man.

And a Kuti,

who are doubtful mamzerim, since they do not recognize betrothal through money or a document, which is not written explicitly in the Torah but is derived by a gezerah shavah from the field of Ephron.

Therefore, if someone betroths a woman through money or a document, they do not refrain from taking her as a wife, even though she is a married woman. It follows that her children from the second man are mamzerim.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi

Elazar,

who holds that a doubtful mamzer is forbidden to a certain mamzer, and is also forbidden to another doubtful mamzer.

And Rav Yehuda added:

When I stated this,

when I stated Rav’s ruling that the halakha follows Rabbi Elazar,

before Shmuel,

he said to me,

Shmuel:

But

Hillel taught: Ten classes of lineage ascended from Babylonia:

Kohanim, Levites, and Israelites.

Disqualified kohanim, converts, and freed slaves [

freed slaves].

Mamzerim, Netinim [

Gibeonites who converted deceitfully in the days of Joshua],

shetukim, and asufim.

And all of them—

are permitted to marry one another!

And if we hold that a doubtful mamzer is permitted to a doubtful mamzer and to a certain mamzeress, Hillel’s statement is properly understood: “They are all permitted to marry one another.”

For we would divide his statement and say that Hillel intended the following:

A. Kohanim, Levites, and Israelites are permitted to marry one another.

B. Levites, Israelites, disqualified kohanim, converts, and freed slaves are permitted to marry one another.

C. Converts and freed slaves, mamzerim and Netinim, shetukim and asufim -

are permitted to marry one another, because the congregation of converts is not called a “congregation,” and therefore mamzerim and the other disqualified persons may marry into it.

And

if

you had said

in the name of Rav that

the halakha follows Rabbi Elazar,

who holds that all doubtful persons are forbidden to one another—a doubtful mamzer is forbidden to a doubtful mamzer and to a shetuki, a shetuki is forbidden to another shetuki, and a shetuki is forbidden to an asufi—how could they all be permitted to marry one another!?

It follows that Rav and Shmuel disagreed as to whether the halakha follows Rabbi Elazar, who rules that a doubtful mamzer is forbidden to a doubtful mamzer, and certainly forbidden to a certain mamzer, or not.

The Gemara now explains the dispute between Abaye and Rava: whether the halakha is in accordance with Rav, who ruled in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, or with Shmuel, who ruled in accordance with Hillel.

Accordingly, they disagreed about how to read the statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

Abaye held like Shmuel, who said that the halakha follows Hillel,

who holds that a doubtful mamzer is permitted to a doubtful mamzer and permitted to a certain mamzer.

And

therefore he

interprets it

the words of

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov in accordance with the halakha,

as stating that a doubtful mamzer is like a certain mamzer, and is permitted to a certain mamzer—

so that the halakha

in accordance with Hillel

should not conflict with the halakha

in accordance with the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

Whereas

Rava held like Rav, who said that the halakha follows Rabbi Elazar,

who holds that a doubtful mamzer is forbidden to a doubtful mamzer, and all the more so to a certain mamzer.

And

therefore he

interprets the

words of

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov in accordance with the halakha,

as stating that a doubtful mamzer is forbidden to a mamzeress,