Yevamot 35b — the Talmud in English

The Sages instituted two safeguards concerning a woman who underwent chalitza:

One safeguard is that she should be considered [by rabbinic enactment] as though she had been the wife of the one who removed the shoe, with regard to the fact that he is forbidden to her relatives [the same relatives who would have been forbidden to him had she indeed been his wife], and likewise she is forbidden to his relatives [the same relatives who would have been forbidden to her had she indeed been his wife].

And a second safeguard is that the woman who underwent chalitza should be forbidden to the priesthood.

Above, on folio 24a, the source of the prohibition of a woman who underwent chalitza to the priesthood was explained: it is only an asmachta from the verse, “And a woman divorced from her husband they shall not take,” from which the woman who underwent chalitza was included through the letter vav, so that she should be forbidden to a priest like a divorced woman. But this derivation is only an asmachta, and she is forbidden to the priesthood only by rabbinic enactment.

And these two safeguards, together with the enactments associated with them, are explained below in the Mishna:

Mishna:

The one who removes the shoe

after the fact

from his yevama, and she was found to be pregnant,

without knowing that she was pregnant,

and she gave birth:

When the child is viable,

the matter has thereby been clarified, at the time of its birth, that she was the wife of a brother who had children. And it has been clarified that she was not in need of yibbum, and her chalitza is not chalitza.

Therefore, the two safeguards that the Sages instituted concerning chalitza do not apply here, but:

a.

He,

the one who removed the shoe,

is permitted to her relatives.

And he was not forbidden to them by virtue of the enactment that the one who removes the shoe from his yevama should be forbidden to her relatives, because her chalitza is nothing.

And

for the same reason, she too

is permitted to his relatives.

b.

And

likewise, she

is not disqualified

by the chalitza that he performed for her

from the priesthood.

For she was not disqualified because of the enactment that a woman who underwent chalitza is forbidden to a priest, since she gave birth to a viable child, and it became clear that she did not require chalitza. And the act of chalitza that he performed is nothing!

But if

the child is not viable,

for it was a stillbirth, and it has now become clear that she is in need of chalitza, the two safeguards that the Sages instituted concerning a woman who underwent chalitza apply to her—

a. She is

forbidden to his relatives,

according to the law of one who removes the shoe from a yevama.

And she is forbidden to his relatives,

according to the law of a yevama who underwent chalitza.

b.

And he disqualifies her from the priesthood,

with the rabbinic disqualification of a woman who underwent chalitza.

And now the Mishna explains the law of the yavam who came upon his yevama while she was pregnant:

It is forbidden for the yavam to come upon his yevama until three months have been completed from the brother’s death, lest she be pregnant and his brother have a son, in which case she is forbidden to yibbum.

But after three months, it is permitted for him to perform yibbum with her, since most women’s pregnancies become recognizable by the third month of their pregnancy.

One who takes his yevama

after the fact, within three months,

and she was found to be pregnant,

and neither of them knew that she was pregnant,

and she gave birth

to a child.

When the child is viable,

the matter has thereby been clarified that she is the wife of a brother who has children, and she had been forbidden to the yavam by the erva prohibition of the wife of a brother who was not permitted for yibbum. Therefore—

He shall send her out,

the yavam shall send her away from him.

And they are liable,

he and she,

for a sacrifice

of a sin-offering for an inadvertent transgression: uncovering the nakedness of a brother’s wife not in the place of the mitzva of yibbum.

And if the child is not viable—

he shall maintain

the yavam shall maintain his yevama as his wife.

And the Mishna explains another law:

If the child was born when it was:

uncertain

whether it was

a nine-month

pregnancy, and it belonged

to

the

first

brother who died, and it is found that he had children, and she was not in need of yibbum.

Uncertain

whether it was

a seven-month

pregnancy, and it belonged

to

the

last

brother, and it is found that the deceased brother had no children, and she is in need of yibbum—

he shall send out

the living brother shall send away the wife of the deceased whom he had taken through yibbum, because perhaps she did not require yibbum, and she is forbidden to him according to the law of the wife of a brother who has children.

And the child is fit,

either way: whether it is the son of the first or the son of the second.

And they are liable,

the brother and the woman,

for a conditional guilt-offering,

because perhaps the child born is the son of the first, and she had been forbidden to him by the prohibition of the wife of a brother who has children.

Gemara:

In the Mishna it was explained that chalitza performed in the intermediate period, while she is pregnant, is considered chalitza [if the yevama miscarried her child], with regard to the two safeguards that the Sages instituted concerning a woman who underwent chalitza:

a. The relatives of the one who removed the shoe are forbidden to the woman who underwent chalitza, and the relatives of the woman who underwent chalitza are forbidden to the one who removed the shoe.

b. The woman who underwent chalitza is disqualified from the priesthood.

But it was not explained in the Mishna whether this chalitza also served to permit the yevama to marry in the market. Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish disagreed about this.

It was stated: One who removes the shoe from a pregnant woman, and she miscarried—

Rabbi Yohanan said: She does not require chalitza from the brothers,

because her chalitza while she was pregnant is valid chalitza, since when she miscarried, it became clear retroactively that she was fit for chalitza.

Resh Lakish said: She requires chalitza from the brothers,

because the chalitza of a pregnant woman is not valid chalitza.

And the Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yohanan said, she does not require chalitza from the brothers,

because Rabbi Yohanan held that

the chalitza of a pregnant woman is called chalitza, and intercourse with a pregnant woman is called intercourse—

if it later becomes clear that her fetus was a stillbirth.

And Resh Lakish said, she requires chalitza from the brothers,

because he held that

the chalitza of a pregnant woman is not called chalitza, and intercourse with a pregnant woman is not called intercourse.

And we raise an objection against it:

With what

—what is the reason over which

do Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish disagree?

Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish?

And we answer:

If you wish, say

that they disagreed concerning a

verse,

through a derivation from the verse.

And if you wish, say

that they disagreed concerning

reasoning.

And first the Gemara explains their disagreement according to reasoning:

If you wish, say

that they disagreed concerning this

reasoning

:

Rabbi Yohanan held:

After she miscarried, it became clear that all that was lacking for us while she was pregnant was only knowledge that she would miscarry.

And if we had indeed had this knowledge while she was pregnant, she could have performed chalitza, and even undergone yibbum, while she was still pregnant!

For

if Elijah would come and say

to us while she was pregnant,

that indeed

the fetus

with which she became pregnant—

will certainly miscarry,

she is destined to miscarry it—

Would

she not be

fit for chalitza and yibbum

even while she was pregnant!?

And if so,

now also,

even now, when at the time of the pregnancy it was not known that she would miscarry her child, but this became known only when she miscarried, nevertheless we must say

the matter will be revealed retroactively,

that it will become clear retroactively that she indeed was fit for chalitza while she was pregnant, and the chalitza that the yavam performed for her at the time of her pregnancy was effective to permit her to marry in the market, and she does not need to return and perform chalitza.

And Resh Lakish said: “The matter will be revealed retroactively”—

we do not say so!

And if you wish, say

that they disagreed over the exposition of a

verse.

Rabbi Yohanan held: [Deuteronomy 25]

“And he has no son,” the Merciful One said, and this one has no son

—a son!

And it makes no difference whether the matter was known at the time of the pregnancy or not.

For what do we care if at the time of the pregnancy the matter was not known? Now it is known that this brother did not have a son, and she required chalitza; therefore the chalitza that her yavam performed for her while she was pregnant was effective.

And since she has already undergone chalitza, the brothers no longer need to perform chalitza for her.

And Resh Lakish held:

The verse says

“And he has no son,”

the verse could have said, “And he has no son” in another formulation, but it said “he has no,” to teach you:

Examine him

whether he has a son!

That is, as long as the wife of the deceased is pregnant, there is room for “examination” as to whether he has a son, and during that period of “examination” she cannot perform chalitza, because she is in a state of “examination.”

And even if in the end it becomes clear that he has no son, this is not a revelation concerning the period of examination, since the very examination of whether he has a son requires him to act [because of uncertainty] as though he has a son.

Therefore the chalitza that she underwent while pregnant is not effective for her.

And now the Gemara brings how Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish raised two objections against one another from our Mishna: one objection from the first clause and a second objection from the latter clause.

And how each of them answered them according to his position.

However, concerning each objection two formulations were stated: whether the one who raised the objection was Rabbi Yohanan and the one who answered was Resh Lakish, or conversely, the one who raised the objection was Resh Lakish and the one who answered was Rabbi Yohanan:

The first objection, from the first clause of the Mishna:

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Resh Lakish

from the first clause of our Mishna: One who removes the shoe from his yevama, and she was found to be pregnant, if

the child is not viable—

he is forbidden to her relatives, she is forbidden to his relatives, and he disqualifies her from the priesthood.

And Rabbi Yohanan proves against Resh Lakish from the disqualification from the priesthood:

Granted, according to me, for I say that the chalitza of a pregnant woman is called chalitza—

that is why she is disqualified

from the priesthood when he removed the shoe from her.

But according to you, for you say that the chalitza of a pregnant woman is not called chalitza—

why does she become disqualified

the yavam

from the priesthood

through his removal of the shoe?

He said to him

Resh Lakish: This disqualification does not come from the asmachta teaching from which the Sages learned to disqualify a woman who underwent chalitza like a divorced woman.

Rather, it is only a disqualification

by rabbinic enactment

that it is,

and merely as a stringency

they enacted a decree concerning her, that she should be disqualified from the priesthood through her chalitza while pregnant, because of observers who would not know that she had been pregnant and would see a woman who underwent chalitza marrying a priest, and would come to err and say that a woman who underwent chalitza is permitted to a priest.

And this objection was stated in another formulation, and in the opposite manner:

Some say,

that, conversely, the objection was from the first clause of the Mishna.

It was not Rabbi Yohanan who raised the objection from it to Resh Lakish; rather, Resh Lakish raised the objection from it to Rabbi Yohanan!

Resh Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yohanan,

from our Mishna:

One who removes the shoe from his yevama and she was found to be pregnant, if

the child is not viable—

he is forbidden to her relatives, she is forbidden to his relatives, and he disqualifies her from the priesthood.

And Resh Lakish infers as follows:

Granted, according to me, for I say that the chalitza of a pregnant woman is not called chalitza—

it is well;

this is why it teaches

that through his removal of the shoe he

“disqualifies her from the priesthood.”

And this disqualification is

as a stringency

merely, because of observers, so that they should not err and permit a woman who underwent chalitza to a priest.

But it does not teach

explicitly in our Mishna the basic law, that

“she does not require chalitza from the brothers.”

Since according to my position the law is not so: her chalitza was not effective for her, but she still needs to perform chalitza after she miscarries, in order to be permitted to the market.

But according to you,

Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that the chalitza of a pregnant woman is valid chalitza, why does the tan in the Mishna mention only the law that her chalitza disqualifies her from the priesthood?

For according to your words, the basic law, that her chalitza is valid, and

“she does not require chalitza from the brothers” —

should have been stated,

the tan should have taught us this!

And we would know on our own that since she underwent valid chalitza, the laws of a woman who underwent chalitza apply to her: she is forbidden to his relatives, and she is disqualified from the priesthood.

He said to him:

Rabbi Yohanan to Resh Lakish:

Indeed, that is so!

Indeed, according to my words, the tan should have said that her chalitza while pregnant is valid chalitza, and that she no longer requires chalitza from the brothers.

And the reason that the tan mentioned only the language of disqualification from the priesthood, and did not state the basic law that she does not require chalitza from the brothers—

Since he taught in the first clause “One who removes the shoe from his yevama and she was found to be pregnant, and she gave birth to a viable son,

and there the tan could not say, “and she requires chalitza,” since she gave birth to a viable son—

he did not disqualify her

“from the priestly family,” and in that case the tanna could not mention that she requires halitza—

he taught

also

the latter clause

concerning the same matter of disqualification from the priesthood, and said: if the child was a stillbirth,

“he disqualifies her

from the priesthood.” And he did not speak concerning chalitza, since it was not mentioned in the first clause.

But this is not a stringency; rather, it is the basic law. Since her chalitza was chalitza, she now does not require chalitza from the other brothers.

And now the Gemara brings the second objection, from the latter clause of the Mishna, and states it in two formulations, in opposite ways, as with the objection from the first clause:

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Resh Lakish

from the latter clause of the Mishna:

We learned: One who takes his yevama and she is found to be pregnant, when the child is viable, he shall send her out.

And if

the child is not viable—

he shall maintain

her, the yavam.

And Rabbi Yohanan infers:

Granted, according to me, for I say that the chalitza of a pregnant woman is called chalitza, and intercourse with a pregnant woman is called intercourse—

that is why it teaches

well: if the child is not viable,

he shall maintain

her, the yavam!

For the meaning of “he shall maintain” is language of permission to maintain her. And this is in contrast to the language of prohibition stated earlier, that if the child is viable, he shall send her out!

That is, he is permitted to maintain her, since he came upon her and had already acquired her while she was pregnant, and now, once she miscarried, he is permitted to continue maintaining her as his wife in every respect; and if he wishes to send her away of his own accord, he can do so only through a bill of divorce.

But according to you, who say, “The chalitza of a pregnant woman is not called chalitza, and intercourse with a pregnant woman is not called intercourse,” it follows that the yavam did not acquire her through his intercourse when she was pregnant, and she is still not his wife.

it follows that the yavam did not acquire her through his intercourse with her while she was pregnant, and she is still not his wife.

And if so, it is not fitting to say the expression “he shall retain,” for there is nothing for him to retain, but

“he shall again have intercourse, and he shall retain”—

mibayi lei

to have the tanna say!

And we answer: Reish Lakish said:

What is “he shall retain”

that the tanna said?

His intention is not as you said, that “he shall retain” means that he is permitted to continue retaining her under him as his wife.

Rather, the tanna said “he shall retain” in the language of obligation, that

he shall again have intercourse

with her after she miscarries,

and

only through this

“he shall retain”

her.

That is, the “retaining” stated here [through additional intercourse] is not permission to continue keeping her, but is an obligation—

for it is not sufficient:

it is impossible otherwise to treat her as his wife in every respect and to permit her to marry the market through a bill of divorce alone, without her having intercourse with him a second time.

For it is impossible that she should be his yevama on account of the first intercourse, because intercourse with her while she was pregnant does not acquire her.

And likewise, he cannot now remove her through halitza alone, since, in any event, he had intercourse with her while she was pregnant, and she does not go out to the market without a bill of divorce.

But a bill of divorce cannot permit her, since she is still not his wife in every respect, so that she can go out through a bill of divorce.

Therefore, he is obligated to return and have intercourse with her after she miscarries, in order to acquire her through this intercourse.

In another formulation, we state the objection in the reverse manner:

Ika de-amrei,

Reish Lakish is the one who raises an objection to Rabbi Yohanan from the latter clause:

Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yohanan

from the latter clause of our Mishna:

There is no viable offspring—

he shall retain!

And Reish Lakish infers:

Granted, according to me, for I say

“the halitza of a pregnant woman is not halitza, and intercourse with a pregnant woman is not intercourse”—

it is well;

this is why it teaches “he shall retain”

whose meaning is:

he shall again have intercourse, and he shall retain—

for it is not sufficient otherwise!

For he is obligated to return and have intercourse with her after she miscarries, in order to retain her or in order to remove her through a bill of divorce.

But according to you,

that his intercourse or his halitza is effective while she is pregnant [if afterward she miscarries her fetus], and from then she is already a woman who underwent halitza or a yevama—

why did the tanna use the obligatory expression “he shall retain”?

For now the levir has no obligation to retain her, but if

he wishes, he shall remove

her through a bill of divorce, like any woman, and if

he wishes, he shall retain

her with him—so

mibayi lei

the tanna should have said!

And Rabbi Yohanan answers:

ein hakhi nami,

according to my words, indeed this is how the tanna should have expressed himself.

And the reason that he did not say it in this wording is

aidei,

since

tana reisha

at the beginning of his statement, that one who consummated levirate marriage with his yevama and she was found to be pregnant, when the offspring is viable,

he shall remove!

And there it is an obligation to remove her—

he also taught

in the

latter clause

of his statement, where the offspring is a miscarriage—

he shall retain!

in the language of obligation.

But the intention is not that he is obligated to retain her; rather, if he wishes, he shall remove her, and if he wishes, he shall retain her.

And now the Gemara brings an objection from a beraita against Rabbi Yohanan:

Meitivi

to Rabbi Yohanan from that which was taught:

One who consummated levirate marriage with his yevama, and she was found to be pregnant—

this one’s rival wife shall not marry, lest the offspring be viable.

But the wording of the beraita as it stands is puzzling, because

on the contrary, when the offspring is viable—

her rival wife is exempt!

For if she has offspring, neither she nor her rival wife requires halitza, since the deceased brother has a son!

Rather,

necessarily,

say

this in the wording of the beraita:

One who consummated levirate marriage with his yevama and she was found to be pregnant, her rival wife shall not marry—

lest the offspring not be viable,

and it is found that she requires levirate marriage, while intercourse with a pregnant woman is not considered intercourse for acquiring her through levirate marriage.

And if it enters your mind

according to Rabbi Yohanan, that

intercourse with a pregnant woman is considered intercourse

for levirate marriage, here, since the levir consummated levirate marriage with his yevama—

why should her rival wife not marry?

She should be exempt

the rival wife

through the intercourse of her fellow wife!

Abaye said: With regard to intercourse—

everyone does not dispute that it does not exempt

the rival wife through intercourse with a pregnant woman.

When they disagree—

with regard to halitza.

Rabbi Yohanan holds: The halitza of a pregnant woman is halitza; intercourse with a pregnant woman is not intercourse.

Reish Lakish holds: Intercourse with a pregnant woman is not intercourse, and the halitza of a pregnant woman is not halitza.

He said to him,

questioning and asking

Rava

to Abaye: According to your words, according to Rabbi Yohanan, who distinguishes between intercourse with a pregnant woman and her halitza, the following objection arises:

what is your reasoning?

If intercourse with a pregnant woman is considered intercourse—

the halitza of a pregnant woman is halitza.

And if intercourse with a pregnant woman is not considered intercourse—

the halitza of a pregnant woman also is not halitza.

For we have established: