Yevamot 29b (כט:) — the Talmud in English

And if it enters your mind that

a

ma’amar, according to Beit Shammai, effects a complete acquisition—

this one should perform ma’amar and acquire her

through a complete acquisition.

For the prohibition that the Sages instituted against the sister of a woman bound to him by zikah is a prohibition involving close relatives: he is forbidden to have relations with her, but it does not include a prohibition against performing ma’amar with her, which is an acquisition instituted by rabbinic decree.

And once he performs ma’amar with her, her sister becomes completely forbidden to him as the sister of a wife, and she is no longer bound to him by zikah. Consequently, the woman with whom he performed ma’amar is no longer forbidden to him as the sister of a woman bound to him, and he would be permitted to marry her.

And

likewise,

this one,

his brother,

should perform

he too

a ma’amar, and acquire her.

The Gemara rejects this:

Rather, what

do you have in mind to say—that ma’amar does not effect a complete acquisition, but nevertheless, according to you, it

effects a complete rejection?

The difficulty you raised still applies:

This one should perform ma’amar and reject her, and this one should perform ma’amar and reject her!

Rather, what can you say

to resolve the matter? Only

a ma’amar performed in a permitted situation effects rejection: only where it is permitted to perform yibbum with her can the ma’amar completely remove her, as in our Mishna, where he performed ma’amar with her when she fell before him, before her sister fell before him, and at that time it was permitted for him to perform yibbum with her. But a ma’amar

that only where it is permitted to perform levirate marriage can the ma'amar completely remove the bond, as in our Mishna, where he performed the ma'amar with her when she fell before him in levirate marriage, before her sister fell before him, and at that time it was permitted for him to perform levirate marriage with her; but a ma'amar

performed in a prohibited situation,

where it is forbidden to perform yibbum with her, as in that Mishna, where the two sisters fell before the ma’amar was performed,

does not effect rejection.

If so,

here too,

you must likewise say that

with regard to ma’amar, even according to the one who says, “ma’amar effects a complete acquisition,”

only

a ma’amar performed in a permitted situation effects a complete acquisition,

but a ma’amar

performed in a prohibited situation does not effect a complete acquisition,

a complete acquisition.

But

Rav Ashi taught

the statement of Rabbi Elazar

as follows:

Rabbi Elazar said: Do not say that a ma’amar, according to Beit Shammai, effects a complete rejection, and that the rival wife

of the woman with whom he performed ma’amar—[the reference here is to her sister who fell before him from another brother, who is called her “rival wife” in this context]

also does not require halitza

from him, as is the law with the forbidden relation of the sister of a wife, who is released without requiring halitza.

Rather, the

ma’amar

does reject

her rival wife [her sister], preventing the woman with whom he performed ma’amar from becoming forbidden to him as the sister of a woman bound to him by zikah,

but

nevertheless

it leaves

the ma’amar with an element of acquisition: if the sister of the woman with whom he performed ma’amar wishes to marry someone outside the levirate bond, she requires halitza from him. [The Gemara will later ask: But did we not learn that her sister leaves on account of the law of the sister of a wife?]

Rav Avin said: We too have learned

in accordance with Rav Ashi’s words, in the Mishna concerning four brothers, where, if they preceded the other events and married the women:

Beit Shammai say: They may remain married.

And it follows:

“They may remain married”

after the fact;

no,

but

initially

they may not

marry them.

And if it enters your mind

that

a ma’amar, according to Beit Shammai, effects a complete rejection—

this one should perform ma’amar and reject her, and this one should perform ma’amar and reject her.

Rather, one must raise a difficulty:

But didn’t it teach

explicitly in our Mishna that if a brother performed ma’amar with the first sister, and the second sister subsequently fell before him:

Beit Shammai say: His wife remains with him, and the other one leaves on account of the sister of a wife!

This indicates that she leaves without halitza, since according to Beit Shammai a ma’amar effects a complete rejection!

Rather,

it must necessarily be said that the ma’amar always has the power to effect a complete rejection, but that it does not have this power in every situation.

And the distinction is as follows:

A yevama who is fit for all of them,

who is fit for all the laws of yibbum, both for yibbum and for halitza—

is fit

she is also fit

for part of it: that is, the ma’amar, which is not a complete yibbum but only “part of yibbum,” has the power to reject her rival wife completely.

This is the law that we learned in our Mishna, that the sister leaves on account of the sister of a wife.

A yevama who is not fit for all of them,

a yevama who is not fit for all of them,

who is fit only for halitza and not for yibbum—

is not fit for part of it.

The ma’amar does not have the power to reject her sister completely.

Therefore, in the case of four brothers, where the two sisters fell before the two brothers, and it is impossible to perform yibbum with both of them because of the prohibition against the sister of a woman bound to him by zikah, the two brothers cannot each perform ma’amar and reject the other sister.

Rava raised a dilemma: Does a ma’amar, according to Beit Shammai,

create the status of

marriage,

or does it create the status of

betrothal?

Abaye said

to Rava:

For what halakhic purpose

are you uncertain about this?

If you say it is with regard to inheriting from her

as a married husband,

and becoming impure for her

if he is a kohen, since a kohen becomes impure for his wife but not for his betrothed,

and annulling her vows

as a husband does—

but

now, even with regard to

a

mere betrothed woman,

whose kiddushin is from the Torah,

Rabbi

Hiyya

taught:

His betrothed wife—

he does not become an onen [

he is not forbidden to eat sacrificial meat as an onen]

and

if he is a kohen,

he does not become impure for her.

And likewise, she does not become an onenet [

rather, she may eat sacrificial meat]

and she does not become impure for him [

on the eve of a Festival, when Israelites are commanded to purify themselves in order to bring their sacrifices on the Festival].

And if

she dies—

he does not inherit from her.

And if

he dies—

she collects her marriage settlement,

when he wrote her a marriage settlement from the time of betrothal.

He performed ma’amar with her,

which is kiddushin instituted by the Sages, who enacted that he should betroth her through the ma’amar of a yevama; although according to Beit Shammai it takes effect with her by Torah law, it cannot give her any greater status than that of an ordinary wife.

And is it

necessary

to say that she does not have any of all these rights?

Rather,

it must necessarily be that your uncertainty is

with regard to bringing her into the huppa:

you are uncertain whether, after the ma’amar, the yavam may have relations with her against her will, as though she were already married, or whether he requires her consent, in which case her status is like that of a betrothed woman, whom he may not marry without her consent, and he must also bring her into the huppa with her consent before having relations with her.

What

are the two sides of the dilemma?

Does the ma’amar create the status of

marriage

and

does not require her being brought

by her own initiative

into the huppa,

but he may have relations with her against her will without a huppa, thereby acquiring her as a wife through yibbum in every respect, even through intercourse against her will, after which she requires no halitza and leaves him only through a bill of divorce?

Or perhaps the

ma’amar creates the status of

betrothal, and requires her being brought into the huppa,

and without her consent she is not completely acquired by him; and if he has relations with her against her will, she still requires halitza in order to leave him.

And

he said

Abaye rhetorically: What is there to be uncertain about?

Now,

even

if he did not perform ma’amar with her, it is written

with regard to her [Deuteronomy 25]

“the yevama shall come to him”—

against her will.

Now that he

performed ma’amar with her—

is it

necessary

to say that he can perform yibbum with her against her will?!

He said

Rava to Abaye: Indeed, there is a distinction, and the ma’amar diminishes his rights.

Because

I say: Whoever performs ma’amar with his yevama—

the zikah of the yevamin departs from him, and the zikah of betrothal takes effect upon her

as with any woman who is betrothed.

Nevertheless, he still needs to have relations with her in order to fulfill the mitzva of yibbum, and so that he will be able to release her with a bill of divorce alone.

But their marital status now is that of a husband and wife who are not yevamin, and not that of a woman awaiting yibbum.

The dilemma therefore remains:

What

does the ma’amar create—the status of betrothal or of marriage?

The Gemara brings a proof:

Come and hear: A woman awaiting yibbum, whether

she was awaiting

one yavam or two yevamin—

Rabbi Eliezer says: He may annul

the vows of one of the yevamin, as a husband annuls the vows of his wife.

Rabbi

Yehoshua

says:

A yavam may annul her vows only when she is awaiting yibbum

from one and not from two

yevamin.

Rabbi Akiva says:

A yavam may not annul her vows,

not

when she falls

to

one

and not to two yevamin.

And we raised the following difficulty: Granted, Rabbi Akiva—

he holds that there is no zikah

of a yavam to his yevama in the form of a marital relationship,

even

when she falls

to one

brother,

alone,

and therefore the yavam cannot annul her vows.

And granted,

according to Rabbi Yehoshua—

there is zikah to one,

because she is certainly designated for him for yibbum;

there is no zikah to two,

because it is unknown for which of them she is designated, and therefore the zikah of both of them is weak, and they cannot annul her vows even jointly.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer—

even if he holds that “there is zikah,”

the matter still requires examination:

Granted,

when she is bound only

to one,

it is reasonable that he

may annul her vows.

But when she is bound

to two—

why

should only one annul her vows, rather than requiring both of them to annul them jointly, since she is bound to both of them?!

should only one annul her vows, and should she not require that both of them annul them jointly, since she is bound to both of them?!

And

with regard to this

Rav Ami said: Here, with what are we dealing?

For example, one of them performed

a

ma’amar with her, and it is the opinion of Beit Shammai, who says: “Ma’amar effects a complete acquisition!”

And it may be inferred from here:

Granted, if you say that the ma’amar

that the maamar

creates the status of marriage, that is why he may annul

the vows, like a husband.

But if you say that the ma’amar

creates a betrothal status—

creates the status of betrothal—

how can he annul

the vows, when the yavam who performed the ma’amar is alone?

But didn’t we learn: A betrothed young woman—

her father and her husband annul her vows!

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said: What does “he may annul”

mean, as we have been saying?

He may annul

the vows—

jointly

with her father.

The matter still requires clarification:

And according to Rabbi Elazar, who says that a ma’amar, according to Beit Shammai, effects an acquisition only to reject the rival wife—

why may he annul

the vows, the yavam,

jointly

with her father?

Rabbi Elazar can say to you: Granted that I say that a ma’amar

effects an acquisition only to reject the rival wife—

it is not sufficient

that

she requires not only a bill of divorce but also halitza,

since she is not acquired by him as a complete yevama who has the status of a married woman.

But with regard to

annulling her vows

as a betrothed woman, jointly with her father—

who says that the ma’amar does not effect an acquisition?

that the maamar does not effect an acquisition?

And if you wish, say instead: Rabbi Elazar can say:

And according to Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak,

who said that the yavam annuls her vows jointly with her father—

is that satisfactory?

Does it teach “they shall annul

” in the plural?

It teaches “he shall annul

” in the singular,

it teaches!

Rather, here,

with regard to the annulment of vows,

with what are we dealing?

Without a ma’amar.

Rather,

she stood before the court

and demanded that the yavam either marry her or perform halitza for her,

and they ruled that she receive sustenance from his property.

Once the yavam became obligated to provide her sustenance, he can annul her vows,

in accordance with Rav Pinhas in the name of Rava.

For Rav Pinhas said in the name of Rava: Whenever a woman takes a vow—

she takes it with her husband’s דעת in mind.

For an explanation of the dispute among the tannaim concerning the annulment of vows, see Tosafot, s.v. “For example.”