Yevamot 29b — the Talmud in English

And if it enters your mind

that

a maamar according to the House of Shammai effects a complete acquisition—

this one should perform a maamar and acquire her

with a complete acquisition.

For the prohibition that the Sages decreed against the sister of his zekuka is a prohibition of close relatives: it is forbidden for him to have relations with her, but it does not include a prohibition against performing a maamar with her, which is a rabbinic acquisition.

And after he performs a maamar with her, her sister becomes for him a complete forbidden relation as the sister of a wife, and she is no longer zekuka to him. It follows that the recipient of the maamar is no longer forbidden to him as the sister of a zekuka, and it would be permitted for him to take her in marriage.

And

likewise,

this one,

his brother,

should perform

he too

a maamar, and acquire her.

The Gemara rejects this:

Rather, what

do you have in mind to say—that a maamar does not effect a complete acquisition, but nevertheless, according to you, it

effects a complete rejection?

The difficulty that you raised still remains:

“This one should perform a maamar and reject her, and this one should perform a maamar and reject her!”

Rather, what do you have to say

in explanation? Only

a maamar of permissibility rejects,

for only where it is permitted to perform yibum with her can the maamar reject her completely—for example, in our Mishna, where he performed the maamar with her when she fell before him, before her sister fell, and at that time it was permitted for him to perform yibum with her. But a maamar

of prohibition,

where it is forbidden to perform yibum with her, as in that Mishna, where the two sisters fell before the maamar,

does not reject.

If so,

here too,

you must likewise say that

a maamar, even according to the one who says, “A maamar effects a complete acquisition,”

only

a maamar of permissibility effects

a complete acquisition, but a maamar

of prohibition does not effect

a complete acquisition.

But

Rav Ashi teaches

the words of Rabbi Elazar

as follows:

Rabbi Elazar said: Do not say that a maamar according to the House of Shammai effects a complete rejection, and that the rival

of the recipient of the maamar—[the reference here is to her sister who falls before him from another brother, who is called in this regard “her rival”]—

also does not require chalitza

from him, as is the law of the forbidden relation of the sister of a wife, who leaves without the need for chalitza.

Rather, a

maamar

rejects

her rival [her sister], from prohibiting the recipient of the maamar to him on account of the sister of his zekuka,

but

nevertheless

it leaves over

the maamar in its acquisition: if the sister of the recipient of the maamar wishes to marry outside, she requires chalitza from him. [And below the Gemara will ask: did we not learn that her sister leaves by the law of the sister of a wife?]

Rav Avin said: We, too, have learned

in accordance with the words of Rav Ashi, in the Mishna of the four brothers, where, if they preceded and married them:

The House of Shammai say: They may remain married.

And it is inferred:

“They may remain married”—

after the fact,

yes.

But

initially—

no,

they may not marry them.

And if it enters your mind

that

a maamar according to the House of Shammai effects a complete rejection—

this one should perform a maamar and reject her, and this one should perform a maamar and reject her.

Rather, there is a difficulty:

But did it not teach

explicitly in our Mishna that if the brother performed a maamar with the first sister, and afterward the second sister fell before him,

“The House of Shammai say: His wife is with him, and this other one leaves because of the sister of a wife!”

And it is implied that she leaves without chalitza, since according to the House of Shammai a maamar rejects her completely!

Rather,

it must necessarily be said that a maamar always has the power to effect a complete rejection, but it does not have the power to reject completely in every place.

And this is how one must distinguish:

A yevama who is fit for all of them,

who is fit for all the laws of yibum, both for yibum and for chalitza—

is fit

she is also fit

for part of it,

that is, a maamar, which is not complete yibum but “part of yibum,” has the power to reject her rival completely.

And this is the law that we learned in our Mishna: that the sister leaves because of the sister of a wife.

A yevama who is not fit for all of them,

who is fit only for chalitza and not for yibum—

is not fit for part of it.

A maamar does not have the power to reject her sister completely.

Therefore, in the case of the four brothers, where the two sisters fell before the two brothers, and it is impossible to perform yibum with both of them because of the sister of a zekuka, the two cannot each perform a maamar and reject his sister.

Rabba inquired: Does a maamar according to the House of Shammai—

a status of

marriage create, or

a status of

betrothal create?

Abaye said

to Rabba:

For what halakhic purpose

were you uncertain about this?

If you say, to inherit from her

like a married husband,

and to become impure for her

if he is a kohen, who becomes impure for his wife but not for his betrothed,

and to annul her vows

as is the law of a husband—

Behold,

now, even with

a

an ordinary betrothed woman,

whose betrothal is by Torah law,

Rabbi

Hiyya

Hiyya taught:

His betrothed wife—

he does not observe aninut [

he is not forbidden to eat sacred food as an onen ]

and

if he is a kohen he

does not become impure for her.

And she likewise does not observe aninut [

rather, she eats sacred food ]

and does not become impure for him [

on the eve of the Festival, when Israelites are commanded to purify themselves in order to bring their offerings on the Festival ].

And if she

dies—

he does not inherit from her.

And if

he dies—

she collects her marriage settlement,

when he wrote a marriage settlement for her from the betrothal.

He performed a maamar with her,

which is a betrothal that the Sages instituted, that he should betroth her with a maamar of yevamin; although according to the House of Shammai it takes effect with her by Torah law, he cannot do more with her than with an ordinary wife.

And

is it necessary

to say that she does not have all these matters?

Rather,

necessarily,

with regard to handing her over to the bridal canopy

you were uncertain: whether the yavam may have relations with her after the maamar against her will, as though she were already married, or perhaps he requires her consent for this, and her law is like that of a betrothed woman, whom he cannot marry without her consent, and he must also bring her into the bridal canopy with her consent before having relations with her.

What?

These are the two sides of the uncertainty:

Whether the maamar is a status of

marriage

that it

creates, and she does not require being handed over

on the part of the yevama

to the bridal canopy,

but he has relations with her against her will without a bridal canopy, and acquires her as a wife by the law of yibum in every respect, even through intercourse against her will, and she no longer requires chalitza, but leaves him only through a bill of divorce—

Or perhaps the maamar

creates a status of

betrothal, and she requires being handed over to the bridal canopy,

and without her consent she is not fully acquired by him; and if he has relations with her against her will, she still requires chalitza in order to leave him.

And

he said to him

Abaye, incredulously: What is there to be uncertain about in this?

Now,

even

if he did not perform a maamar with her, it is written

concerning her [Deuteronomy 25]:

“The yevama shall come to him”—

against her will.

Now that he

did perform a maamar with her—

and is it

necessary

to say that he can perform yibum with her against her will!?

He said to him

Rabba to Abaye: Indeed, there is a distinction, and the maamar diminishes his power.

Because

I say: Anyone who performs a maamar with his yevama—

the zekat yevamin departs from him, and the zekat betrothal takes effect upon her

of every woman who is betrothed.

Except that he still has to have relations with her in order to fulfill the mitzva of yibum, and so that he can cause her to leave through a bill of divorce alone.

But the status of marriage between them now is the status of a husband and wife who are not yevamin, and not the status of a woman awaiting yibum.

And the uncertainty remains:

What,

does the maamar create—a betrothal or a marriage?

And the Gemara brings a proof:

Come and hear: A woman awaiting yibum, whether

she was awaiting

one yavam or two yevamin—

Rabbi Eliezer says: He may annul

the vows of the woman awaiting yibum, one of the yevamin, just as a husband annuls the vows of his wife.

Rabbi

Yehoshua

Joshua says:

The yavam can annul only when she is awaiting yibum

for one but not for two

yevamin.

Rabbi Akiva says:

The yavam does not annul her vows,

not

when she falls

to

one

and not to two.

And we raised the following difficulty: Granted, Rabbi Akiva—

he holds that there is no zekika

of a yavam to his yevama in the status of marriage,

even

not when she falls

to one yavam

levir

alone,

and therefore the yavam cannot annul her vows.

And granted,

with regard to Rabbi Joshua—

for one there is zekika,

because she is certainly designated for him for yibum;

for two there is no zekika,

because it is not known for which of them she is designated, and therefore the zekika of both of them is weak, and they cannot annul even in partnership.

But with regard to Rabbi Eliezer—

even if he holds, “There is zekika,”

the matter still requires examination:

Granted,

when she is zekuka only

to one,

it is properly that he

may annul.

But

when she is zekuka

to two—

why

may one annul alone, and does she not require that both of them annul in partnership, since she is zekuka to both of them!?

And

concerning this

Rav Ami said: Here with what are we dealing—

for example, that one yavam performed with her

a

maamar, and it is the House of Shammai, who says: “A maamar effects a complete acquisition!”

And it can be inferred from here:

If it is acceptable to you

that the maamar

creates a marriage status, that is why he may annul

the yavam, like the husband.

But if you say that the maamar

creates a betrothal status—

how can he annul

the yavam who performed the maamar by himself

?

But we learned: A betrothed young woman—

her father and her husband annul her vows!

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said: What does “he may annul”

mean, as we are saying?

He may annul

the husband of the maamar

in partnership

with the father.

And it still requires clarification:

And according to Rabbi Elazar, who says that a maamar according to the House of Shammai effects an acquisition only to reject the rival—

why may he annul

the yavam

in partnership

with the father?

Rabbi Elazar can say to you: Granted that I say that the maamar

effects an acquisition only to reject the rival—

it is not sufficient for her

that it is not enough for her

to have a bill of divorce alone, but she also requires chalitza

because she is not acquired by him as a complete yevama who is like a married woman.

But

to annul her vows

like a betrothed woman, in partnership with the father—

do we say

that the maamar does not effect an acquisition?

And if you wish, say instead: Rabbi Elazar can say:

And as for Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak,

who said that the yavam annuls in partnership with the father—

is it satisfactory?

Does it teach “they shall annul”

in the plural?

“He shall annul”

in the singular

it teaches!

Rather, here,

in the matter of the annulment of vows,

with what are we dealing—

without a maamar.

Rather,

she stood before the court

and demanded that the yavam either marry her or perform chalitza for her,

and they ruled that she receive sustenance from his property.

And from the time that the yavam became obligated to provide her sustenance, he can annul her vows,

and this is like Rav Pinhas in the name of Rava.

For Rav Pinhas said in the name of Rava: Every woman who vows—

she vows with her husband’s knowledge.

And for an explanation of the dispute among the tannaim concerning the annulment of vows, see Tosafot, s.v. “For example.”