Yevamot 27b (כז:) — the Talmud in English

It was asked of them:

His brother died, and he had two wives; with one of them he performed maamar, while to the other he gave a get—

Once he gave a get to one of his two yevamot, he became prohibited from performing yibbum with either of them, because the verse, “Since he did not build, he shall no longer build,” applies to both of them. Rather, he must perform halitza with one of them, thereby freeing her and her rival. And now the question is:

the recipient of the get, and the recipient of the maamar—

which of them takes precedence

for halitza? Which of them is fit for him to perform halitza with, thereby freeing her rival?

And the two sides of the question are:

The halitza of either of them is inferior halitza:

The recipient of the get, because he divorced her, cannot be taken in yibbum, and in this respect her halitza is inferior.

As for the recipient of the maamar, her halitza alone is not sufficient; she also requires a get, and in this respect her halitza is inferior.

If

the recipient of the get is preferable—

because he began with her

in her divorce, in removing her from his authority, which is a process of

halitza.

Her get therefore has greater force than the maamar of her fellow, and the maamar of her fellow is no longer significant.

And since he began the act of divorce with her, it is preferable that he be the one to continue what he began and perform halitza with her.

Or perhaps

the recipient of the maamar is preferable—

because, by performing maamar with her, she is

closer to consummation.

The maamar is therefore superior to the get, and the closeness between the yavam and the yevama remains as it was; the force of the get cannot impair this closeness.

And since her closeness to the yavam is greater than that of the other yevama, her halitza is also more suitable than the other’s.

Rav Ashi said: Come and hear

a proof from a beraita that we learned:

If a yavam divorces his yevama with a get before taking her in, the divorce does not take effect by Torah law. Rather, the Sages instituted that the divorce should take effect insofar as he may no longer take her in, neither he nor his brother.

They further instituted that once he has divorced her, he is prohibited from her female relatives, analogous to the relatives of his wife whom he divorced.

In light of this, the Sages and Rabban Gamliel disagreed concerning a case in which the yavam divorces one of his yevamot and then returns and divorces his second yevama: Are the relatives of the second yevama also prohibited to him?

Rabban Gamliel maintains that “there is no get after a get,” since in either case there is no basis for prohibiting the relatives of the second: If the get was effective in removing the bond, then it removed the bond from the second as well. Therefore, if he returns and gives a get to the second, her divorce has no significance, since once he gave a get to the first there was no longer a bond, and there was nothing left to divorce. The second is not considered his divorcee, and consequently he is not prohibited from her relatives.

And if the first get was not effective in removing the bond, and it is therefore possible to return and divorce the second as well, then since the get did not remove the bond, and it still exists even after the get, she cannot be considered divorced in such a manner as to prohibit her relatives.

And Rabban Gamliel agrees,

who disagrees with the Sages and maintains that “there is no get after a get”—

a.

that there is a get after a maamar.

For if two yevamot from one brother fell before him, and he performed maamar with the first and gave a get to the second, the get that he gave to the second was effective in disqualifying the first [with whom he performed maamar] by virtue of “Since he did not build, he shall no longer build.” A get given to one is considered, by rabbinic law, like halitza with one, which disqualifies both of them to him by virtue of “he shall no longer build.”

This get is likewise effective in prohibiting her relatives to him.

We do not say that the maamar he performed with the first makes her so much like one taken in by the yavam [by rabbinic law] that the rabbinic get given to the second could not disqualify the first’s being taken in.

That is, the Sages equated the force of a rabbinic get with the force of a rabbinic maamar, and neither one can interfere with the other.

b.

and

that there is

a maamar after a get.

For if he gave a get to the first and performed maamar with the second, his maamar was effective in making her require a get from him [in addition to halitza], and in prohibiting her relatives to him.

We do not say that the get is considered like halitza, to the extent that after it a maamar cannot take effect with the second.

Rav Ashi proves from here that the Sages equated the force of the maamar and the get:

For

if a get were superior

to a maamar, severing her connection so that a maamar would no longer be effective with her—

the maamar should not be effective

when performed with the second

after it,

after the get.

And if a maamar were superior

to a get, so that the maamar takes her in by rabbinic law, with the result that a subsequent get given to the second cannot disqualify the first’s being taken in—

the get should not be effective

when given to the second

after it,

after the maamar performed with the first, to disqualify the maamar of the first.

Rather, is it not that we may conclude

that the get and the maamar are

equivalent?

The Gemara concludes: Indeed,

we may conclude.

And since they are equal, it follows that the halitza of the recipient of the get and the halitza of the recipient of the maamar are equal. Since both are equally inferior, he may perform halitza with whichever one he wishes.

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: Two sisters who were yevamot and fell

from two brothers

before one yavam—

At the time the first fell, she was permitted for yibbum. There are four laws in this matter, concerning two cases.

The first case is when both yevamot are alive.

a.

If he performed halitza with the first,

with the sister who fell first—

the first is permitted

to marry outside the levirate bond.

b.

If he performed halitza with the second—

the second is permitted

to marry outside the levirate bond.

But the second is prohibited for yibbum, since she is the sister of a woman with whom he performed halitza.

The same law applies if he first performs halitza with the second and afterward with the first: she is permitted to marry outside the levirate bond.

The second case is when one of the yevamot dies:

a.

If the sister

who fell

first

dies without having undergone halitza—

he is permitted

from then on

with the second.

For she is no longer the sister of his wife.

And this is so even though at the time she fell she was prohibited for yibbum, since her sister, who had fallen first, was present and bound to him for yibbum, and the second was prohibited to him as the “sister of a bound woman.”

Rav innovated that with regard to the prohibition of the sister of a bound woman, which is only rabbinic, the principle does not apply that “any yevama concerning whom I cannot say at the time of her falling, ‘the yavam shall take her,’ is prohibited to him forever.”

b.

And it is unnecessary to say

that if

the second dies, he is permitted with the first.

Because she was

the first,

a yevama who was permitted

for yibbum at the time she fell,

and became prohibited

afterward, when her sister fell and prohibited her as the “sister of a bound woman,”

and became permitted again

when the second died—

so

she should return to her original permitted status!

And Rabbi Yohanan said: If the second dies—

he is permitted

with the first,

since she returns to her former permitted status, the status she had at the time of her falling.

But if the first dies—

he is prohibited with the second.

What is the reason?—

Because

any yevama,

even one whose prohibition is due to the bond,

concerning whom I cannot say at the time of her falling, “the yavam shall take her,”

is like the wife of a brother who has children, and is prohibited

to him forever.

The Gemara asks:

And

if

Rav does not hold this reasoning,

this principle—did he not himself state it?

But Rav said

Any woman concerning whom I cannot say at the time of her falling, “the yavam shall take her,”—

“she is like the wife of a brother who has children, and is prohibited”

forever!?

The Gemara answers:

And we answer:

This applies

when Rav accepts the law of “once prohibited,”

where it stands in her way,

when opposing the yibbum there stands

the prohibition of a wife’s sister,

which is a prohibition

from Torah law.

For example, when two brothers were married to two sisters, one of them died, and his wife became prohibited at the time she fell to the second brother, who was married to her sister; afterward, the wife of the second brother died.

But here,

the bond is

rabbinic—

it is rabbinic!

The entire prohibition of the sister of a bound woman is only rabbinic. Therefore, once the first dies, the second does not become prohibited forever because she was prohibited by virtue of the bond at the time she fell.

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina raised an objection to Rabbi Yohanan

and likewise to Rav, according to Rashi, from our Mishna:

Four brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and the husbands of the sisters died—

these women must perform halitza and may not undergo yibbum.

And why

do both perform halitza? One of them—the one who fell first—can even undergo yibbum, by

having one

stand,

one of them

of the two brothers, and

perform halitza with the

woman who fell

second; then the first would no longer be prohibited for yibbum as the sister of a bound woman.

so that the first woman would no longer be forbidden for levirate marriage as the sister of a woman bound to him.

And let

the

first, with regard to the other,

be permitted with the second brother,

like

a

a yevama who was permitted, became prohibited, and became permitted again—

so

she should return to her original permitted status!

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan: This Mishna concerning

“sisters”—

I do not know who taught it!

That is, this is not a Mishna.

The Gemara wonders:

And let him say to him,

Rabbi Yohanan:

What is the meaning of “must perform halitza,” as it is also taught

in our Mishna?—

One performs halitza

and the other indeed undergoes yibbum!

The Gemara answers:

“Must perform halitza”

is taught in the plural

form.

The Gemara still wonders:

And let him say to him,

Rabbi Yohanan:

What is the meaning of “must perform halitza”?—

the ordinary meaning of “must perform halitza”!

For in every place where such a situation occurs, one performs halitza, and together they are referred to in the plural.

The Gemara answers:

“These

must perform halitza”

is taught,

implying that these two women described in the Mishna are the ones who must perform halitza.

The Gemara asks further:

And let

Rabbi Yohanan say to him that our Mishna is speaking of a case where

it

happened that he advanced and

performed halitza with the

sister who fell

first, initially,

before the second; consequently, the first can no longer undergo yibbum, while the second is prohibited on account of “once prohibited.”