Yevamot 12a (יב.) — the Talmud in English

He said to him:

Rabbi Ami, and he resolved the problem for him according to both versions:

We have learned it:

We learn this law below, in the Mishna [44a]:

If one

of the yevamot

was fit, and one

of the yevamot

was unfit,

If he performed ḥalitza—

he performs ḥalitza with the unfit one,

and if he performed yibbum—

he performs yibbum with the fit one.

And we raised a question concerning it:

What is meant by “

yevama

fit,” and

what is meant by “

yevama

unfit”?

If you say that the yevama who is

“

fit” is

is

fit for everyone,

meaning that she is eligible to marry any man,

and that the yevama who is

“

unfit” is

unfit for everyone,

meaning that she is not eligible to marry any man—for example, a divorcee, who is unfit to marry a priest—

but the yavam himself is not a priest, and the divorcee’s disqualification with regard to a priest is irrelevant to him.

If so,

since with regard to him,

this yavam,

she is fit,

she is eligible for him both for yibbum and for ḥalitza—

what difference does it make to him,

what relevance is it to him which one he must take through yibbum and which one he must take through ḥalitza? Both are equally permitted to him; why, then, should he perform ḥalitza specifically with the divorcee and perform yibbum only with the woman who is not a divorcee?

Rather, is it not

the case that the yevama who is

“

fit” was

fit for him, the yavam himself, while the yevama who is

“

unfit” was

unfit for him,

the yavam himself?

unfit for him,

And what is that?

And what is that?—

A man who remarries his divorcee—

she had been forbidden to his brother, and she is likewise forbidden to the yavam.

The case must be understood as one involving a man who remarries his divorcee, and not the other women forbidden by prohibitions, because with regard to the other women forbidden by prohibitions there would be no novelty in permitting the rival wife to undergo yibbum.

Rather, the entire novelty concerns a man who remarries his divorcee, since the Torah calls her a “defilement,” as it does the women forbidden by karet; one might therefore have said that her rival is like her and may not undergo yibbum.

And it teaches: If he performed yibbum—

he performs yibbum with the fit one.

This proves that she is forbidden while her rival may undergo yibbum.

This resolves the problem according to both versions.

And we reject this:

No,

the Mishna there is not speaking of the rival of a woman who remarried her divorcee.

Rather, it is speaking of a case in which one yevama was

fit for everyone,

eligible to marry any man, and one yevama was

unfit for everyone,

for example, she was a divorcee and could not marry a priest.

And as you said, since with regard to him,

the yavam,

she is fit,

she is eligible—

what difference does it make to him,

what concern of the yavam is it which one should undergo ḥalitza and which one should undergo yibbum?

Your answer is:

Because of Rav Yosef.

For Rav Yosef said: Here,

in our Mishna,

Rabbi taught: A person should not pour out the water of his cistern while others need it.

Therefore, he should perform ḥalitza specifically with the divorcee, and not with the other woman.

For if he performed ḥalitza with the woman who is not a divorcee, she would become disqualified through her ḥalitza from marrying a priest.

Come and hear

from what we learned in a beraita:

A man who remarries his divorcee after she had married—

both she and her rival undergo ḥalitza.

And we infer: Is it possible that

both she and her rival

undergo ḥalitza

—could it enter your mind!?

Only one of them undergoes ḥalitza!

Rather, say: Either she or her rival!

This implies that there is here only the possibility of ḥalitza, and that her rival may not undergo yibbum either!

And we reject this:

Did you not merely amend it?

Did you not correct the wording of the beraita? If so,

amend

also

as follows:

She,

the divorcee whom he remarried after she had married,

undergoes ḥalitza.

Her rival—

either undergoes ḥalitza or undergoes yibbum.

Rav Lili bar Memel said that Mar Ukva said that

Shmuel:

If two women, one an adult and the other a minor, fell before him for yibbum from one brother, and the minor, whom her mother and brothers had married off through a rabbinic kiddushin, performed refusal with the yavam and therefore may not undergo yibbum with him, leaving her adult rival—

the rival of a woman who performed refusal

is forbidden.

And we raised a question concerning it:

To whom

is she forbidden?

If you say: To the brothers—

this cannot be said.

For

now,

even

she herself,

the woman who performed refusal,

is permitted

to the brothers, and they may perform yibbum with her, since she performed refusal only with this brother and not with them.

And this is as

Shmuel said:

A minor who

performed refusal with

a

particular

yavam—she is

permitted to

that

particular yavam!

If so,

her rival,

the rival of the woman who performed refusal,

is it necessary to state this!?

Is it necessary to say that she is permitted to the brothers?

Rather, it necessarily follows that the rival of a woman who performed refusal is forbidden

to him,

the yavam with whom she performed refusal, though she is permitted to his brothers.

The reason she is forbidden to the man with whom she performed refusal, even though by performing refusal with him she is considered to have uprooted the marriage to his deceased brother and is not considered his brother’s wife with regard to him, is that at the time of the fall to yibbum, when she had not yet performed refusal, she appeared to be his brother’s wife. The refusal severs the bond, and if he were to take her after she performed refusal with him, it would appear as though he were taking a brother’s wife with whom he has no bond of yibbum.

And we raised a question concerning it:

And what is different about the woman who performed refusal,

herself,

who is permitted to the brothers,

because

she did not perform an act with them,

refusal?

If so,

the rival also

should be permitted to all the brothers, even to the brother with whom the other, minor yevama, performed refusal, because

she did not perform an act with them; after all, the rival did nothing!

the rival wife did not perform any act at all!

And we answer: The Sages prohibited every rival of a woman who performed refusal

as a decree due to the rival of a daughter who performed refusal.

And we challenge this:

And is the rival of a daughter who performed refusal

forbidden!?

But we learned: And all of them,

all the women forbidden as forbidden relations,

if they died

before the brother’s death,

or performed refusal—

their rivals are permitted.

And we must clarify with regard to whom the woman performed refusal:

She performed refusal—

with whom?

If you say that she performed refusal with her husband—

that is a divorcee!

There would be no need to mention a woman who performed refusal.

Rather, is it not that she performed refusal

with the yavam!

It is thus proven from the Mishna that the rival of a woman who performed refusal is permitted. How, then, did Shmuel say that she is forbidden?

And we reject this:

No,

the Mishna is not speaking of a woman who performed refusal with the yavam, for in that case her rival is forbidden.

Rather,

actually,

it is speaking of a woman who performed refusal

with her husband.

And

the tanna mentioned

two forms of divorce, ordinary divorce and refusal.

And we raised the following question about it:

And we raised a question concerning it:

And what is different when she performed refusal with her husband,

in which case her rival is permitted, because

by

performing refusal with her husband

she uprooted her marriage,

with the result that at the time of her husband’s death she did not fall from him to yibbum, and her rival was not the rival of a forbidden relation at the time of the fall to yibbum, and therefore she is not forbidden.

When she performed refusal with the yavam as well—

the

initial

marriage

to her deceased husband—she

uproots it retroactively!

It follows that retroactively she did not fall to yibbum, and if so, her rival should not be considered the rival of a forbidden relation at the time of the fall. Why, then, is she forbidden, according to Shmuel?

And we answer: The reason Shmuel prohibited the rival of a woman who performed refusal is

because of what Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught.

For Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught:

A minor who

performed refusal with her husband—

is permitted to his father,

since her marriage to his son was uprooted retroactively, and it is as though she had never been his daughter-in-law.

But if she performed refusal

with the yavam—

she is forbidden to his father.

Apparently,

since

from the time of the fall

she

“appears” as his daughter-in-law,

even if she subsequently performs refusal and retroactively uproots her marriage, there is concern about those who see the matter, who do not know of her refusal and will think that he is marrying his daughter-in-law.

Here too, from the time of the fall—

she “appears” as the rival of his daughter.

Therefore, even if the minor performs refusal, her rival is forbidden, since she appears as the rival of his daughter. The Sages consequently decreed that every rival of a woman who performed refusal is forbidden, because of the rival of a daughter who performed refusal.

Rav Asi said: The rival of an aylonit is forbidden

to undergo yibbum.

As it is stated: [Deuteronomy 25]

“And it shall be that the firstborn whom she bears”—

excluding an aylonit, who does not give birth.

Since she herself may not undergo yibbum, she is like the wife of a brother who has children, and she is forbidden to the yavam by karet. Her rival is therefore the rival of a forbidden relation—that of a brother’s wife subject to karet—and she too is exempt from both ḥalitza and yibbum.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection

to Rav Asi from what we learn below, in the Mishna [31b]:

Three brothers

who were

married to three unrelated women, and one of them died, and the

second brother

performed “maamar” with her,

a rabbinic betrothal, as the Sages instituted that the yevama be betrothed before he has relations with her,

and

the brother who performed maamar with her died.

From this point, the wife of the first brother falls before the third brother on account of both brothers:

From the first brother, her fall continues by Torah law, and she remains “bound” to him by virtue of the first brother, since by Torah law she requires ḥalitza or yibbum to sever her bond with him, and this was not done.

From the second brother, who performed maamar with her, she falls by rabbinic law.

The wife of the second brother, by contrast, falls only from the second brother to the third brother, by Torah law.

These women undergo ḥalitza but may not undergo yibbum!

The wife of the first brother may not undergo yibbum, because

it is stated [Deuteronomy 25]:

“When brothers dwell together,

and one of them dies …

the yevama shall come to him.”

Only with regard to

one who has “the bond of one yavam”,

who falls from one yavam, do I apply the phrase “the yevama shall come to him.”

But not with regard to one who has

“the bond of two yevamim,”

who falls to him from two brothers.

This is the case here, where her fall to the third brother is on account of two brothers, and he has a double bond with her: a bond resulting from her fall from the first brother [by Torah law], and a bond resulting from her fall from the second brother while she was still bound to the first brother.

For the second brother did not perform yibbum with her or sever her bond; he merely performed maamar with her [by rabbinic law].

Since she has a double bond, she may not undergo yibbum and may only undergo ḥalitza.

The wife of the second brother thereby became the rival [by rabbinic law] of the wife of the first brother, as a result of the maamar that her husband performed with the wife of the first deceased brother.

She too undergoes ḥalitza but may not undergo yibbum, since she now falls from the second brother together with the wife of the first brother [by virtue of his maamar], like the rival of a forbidden relation.

That is, since the wife of the first brother, with whom the second brother performed maamar, may not undergo yibbum [because of the restriction of “the bond of two yevamim”], the wife of the second brother becomes the rival of a forbidden relation—the “wife of a brother” who may not undergo yibbum [by rabbinic law].

Therefore, she too undergoes ḥalitza and may not undergo yibbum, like the “forbidden relation.”

Obviously, the derivation from the verse is merely an asmachta, since the kiddushin of maamar, which created the situation of “the bond of two yevamim,” is only rabbinic kiddushin!

And it teaches concerning this: Rav Yosef said: This is the novel case of “the rival of a paternal brother’s wife”

that is

caused by the “prohibition of the fall”,

the “paternal brother’s wife” is prevented from undergoing yibbum, and by virtue of this she also prohibits her rival from undergoing yibbum, as though she were a brother’s wife subject to a Torah prohibition of forbidden relations.

For only because of the double fall—she fell a second time [by rabbinic law] to yibbum while still bound—was she rendered forbidden [by rabbinic law] as a brother’s wife who has children, and her rival is likewise forbidden to undergo yibbum as the “rival of a forbidden relation, the wife of a brother.”

A case such as this is not found anywhere in the entire Torah!

A double bond cannot exist by Torah law, because the kiddushin of maamar does not take effect by Torah law. Moreover, as long as she has not undergone yibbum or ḥalitza, she cannot be betrothed to one of the brothers; and once one of the brothers performs yibbum with her or performs ḥalitza with her, she no longer has a bond.

Here, however, a halakha has been innovated that does not apply elsewhere:

A brother’s-wife forbidden relation that does not itself prevent yibbum, but results from the restriction that prevents the fall to yibbum, nevertheless prohibits her rival from undergoing yibbum as the “rival of a forbidden relation”!

For here, the fact that she is a brother’s-wife forbidden relation is not the reason that prevents yibbum. Rather, it is the Torah’s restriction against performing yibbum with one who has the bond of two yevamim that causes her to be forbidden as a brother’s wife.

Nevertheless, it is innovated here that her rival may not undergo yibbum, since she is the rival of a brother’s-wife forbidden relation!

And Rav Sheshet asks about what Rav Yosef said:

“This is” the

“rival of a forbidden relation, the wife of a brother”—

to exclude what?

Is it not

that he means

to exclude the rival of an aylonit,

who is the rival of a brother’s-wife forbidden relation, where the brother’s-wife forbidden relation itself does not prevent yibbum; rather, it is her being an aylonit that prevents it,

and her rival is permitted

to undergo yibbum despite being the rival of a brother’s-wife forbidden relation who may not undergo yibbum? And the Gemara rejects this:

No.

Rav Yosef meant

to exclude the rival of an aylonit,

and to say

that she is forbidden!

And what is meant by “This is”?

This is the case in which she has the bond of two yevamim, and

the one upon whom there is the bond of two yevamim,

the prohibition of the fall,

from the two brothers,

caused her

not to undergo yibbum—

her rival requires ḥalitza.

But

an aylonit—

even ḥalitza is not required of

her rival.

What is the reason?

This,

the rival of an aylonit, is forbidden to undergo yibbum

by Torah law, because she is the rival of a brother’s-wife forbidden relation, and her exemption from yibbum by Torah law exempts her from ḥalitza as well.

But

this, the case of the “bond of two yevamim,” is only a restriction

by rabbinic law, since maamar acquires her only by rabbinic law, and the prohibition involving the brother’s wife is only rabbinic. Therefore, she and her rival are obligated to undergo ḥalitza.

since maamar acquires her only by rabbinic law, and the prohibition of the brother’s wife is only by rabbinic law, and therefore she and her tzara are obligated in halitza.

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rav Asi from our Mishna:

We learned: And all of them—

all fifteen women forbidden as forbidden relations, who exempt their rivals from ḥalitza and yibbum—

if they died,

the forbidden women, before the brother died,

or performed refusal

with him,

or were divorced

by him,

or were found

to be

aylonit—

their rivals are permitted!

The Gemara assumed that she was found to be an aylonit before her betrothal, and it follows that the rival of an aylonit is permitted.

And we answer:

It is not difficult:

Here, the statement of Rav Asi that an aylonit exempts her rival refers to a case in which

the case in which Rav Asi said that an infertile woman exempts her rival wife, is one in which

he knew about her,

the deceased brother knew that she was an aylonit. Her kiddushin took effect, and at the time of his death she was a brother’s-wife forbidden relation and exempted her rival.

Here, our Mishna is speaking of a case in which

our Mishna is speaking of a case in which

he did not know about her

that she was an aylonit. His purchase was therefore a mistaken transaction, and the kiddushin of the deceased brother did not take effect with her; consequently, her rival is not the rival of a forbidden relation.

It is precise as well,

the wording of our Mishna also indicates that it is speaking of an aylonit whose kiddushin was a mistaken transaction,

as it teaches that they “were found”

to be aylonit, implying that only after her marriage was it discovered that she was an aylonit. Only for this reason is the rival of the aylonit permitted.

And it does not teach that they “were”

aylonit, with the brother having known this at the time of kiddushin, in which case it would have implied that the rival of an aylonit is permitted.

And we conclude:

Conclude from it.