Yevamot 107b — the Talmud in English

And it uproots it!

For Beit Hillel said that she can perform refusal with the yavam, just as she performs refusal with the husband.

And if, after the yavam’s intercourse, which takes place against her will, and after the yavam has already acquired her, she can perform refusal with him and leave his intercourse without a bill of divorce, then all the more so can she perform refusal with his zikah, despite the fact that she is bound to him against her will, and leave him without chalitzah!

Rather,

necessarily, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Oshaya: whether

intercourse

of the yavam

or

whether

an utterance of betrothal

of his,

which he,

the yavam himself,

does

can uproot it—she can uproot, through her refusal with the yavam, the acts that he performed with her.

She can uproot through her refusal with the yavam the acts that he performed with her.

But

the zikah, which the Merciful One imposed upon her,

for with the betrothal of an adult woman by Torah law, the zikah of the yevama to the yavam takes effect without an act of the yavam; rather, the Torah imposed the zikah upon her. And similarly, with the betrothal of a minor by rabbinic law, the zikah takes effect automatically, without an act on the part of the yavam—

she cannot uproot it

through her refusal, the zikah that took effect automatically.

Ulla

disagrees with Rabbi Oshaya,

said: She performs refusal even with respect to his zikah,

and she does not require chalitzah from the yavam.

And Ulla explains his words:

What is the reason

that she can perform refusal with respect to her zikah to the yavam, which took effect automatically, without an act of the yavam?

Since she is not performing refusal with respect to the zikah—for indeed it is impossible to perform refusal with respect to it, since it took effect automatically—but she is now performing refusal with respect to the marriage of her husband who died, and

the marriages of the first ones,

her first marriage to her husband, which her husband performed with her,

it uproots

she now uproots, through her refusal with respect to them.

And since her marriage is uprooted retroactively from this point onward, she has no zikah to the yavam.

Rava raised an objection to Ulla

from the words of the first Mishna in tractate Yevamot:

Every

minor whose husband died, and she is a forbidden relative to his brother, the yavam,

who was able

to

perform refusal

with her husband during his lifetime—that is, she married him through her mother or her brothers while she was a minor, and she was married to her husband only by rabbinic law—

and did not perform refusal

with her husband during his lifetime, and her husband died, and now she falls together with another woman, her rival wife, who had been married to her deceased husband [even] by Torah law. Behold—

her rival wife,

who is a rival wife of a forbidden relative by rabbinic law—

performs chalitzah

by Torah law,

but does not undergo levirate marriage,

since she is a rival wife of a forbidden relative by rabbinic law.

And Rava asks Ulla:

But why

can her rival wife not undergo levirate marriage?

Let

the minor forbidden relative

now

perform refusal with respect to the marriage of her deceased husband,

and let it uproot them

retroactively from this point onward,

with respect to the marriages of the first ones, and

her rival wife will no longer be the rival wife of a forbidden relative, and

her rival wife should undergo levirate marriage!

And since it follows from the words of the Mishna that there is no remedy allowing her rival wife to undergo levirate marriage, it is proven that the yevama cannot uproot through her refusal the marriage of her deceased husband, unlike what you said—that she uproots the deceased man’s marriage, and therefore the zikah does not take effect with the yavam.

Ulla said to Rava: In fact, she can uproot through her refusal even the marriage of her deceased husband, and then the zikah to the yavam will be nullified.

Rather,

a rival wife of a forbidden relative

is different!

Its law is different—and for another reason.

Because

Rami bar Yehezkel taught:

If

she performed refusal

the minor

with her husband

during his lifetime, her marriage is uprooted retroactively from this point onward, and from now on she is like one who was never betrothed to him at all, and she is

permitted to his father,

as though she had never been his daughter-in-law, and likewise she is permitted to his other relatives.

But if during her husband’s lifetime she did not perform refusal with him, and only after his death she performed refusal

with the yavam—

she is

forbidden to his father.

Apparently,

it is proven from here that in a case of levirate marriage, the Sages prohibited the one who performs refusal to her husband’s father, so that the matter would not be considered as though her betrothal had been uprooted retroactively, since

at the time of the falling

to levirate marriage she

appears

in the eyes of people

as his daughter-in-law.

That is, as long as her husband is alive, and people see that he is married to a minor woman, her marriage does not appear in people’s eyes as a complete marriage. And if she performs refusal and leaves without a bill of divorce, and his father takes her, this does not appear in people’s eyes as someone taking his daughter-in-law.

But from the time that the husband dies, and she did not perform refusal with him, and she falls to levirate marriage by virtue of his marriage, and is forbidden to the outside world without chalitzah, it appears to people that his marriage to this woman was effective as though it were a complete marriage, since she did not leave him through refusal during his lifetime.

Therefore, at the time of the falling, people see her as his father’s daughter-in-law.

And even if now, after her falling to levirate marriage, she performs refusal with respect to her husband’s marriage, and her betrothal is indeed uprooted retroactively, the matter does not appear so in the eyes of people.

Therefore they prohibited her husband’s father from taking her, since now she appears as his daughter-in-law.

Here too,

when a minor who is a forbidden relative to the yavam falls to levirate marriage together with her rival wife—even if she now performs refusal, thereby uprooting her marriage to her husband retroactively, and in truth her rival wife was not a rival wife of a forbidden relative at the time of the falling—

nevertheless, the rival wife is forbidden to undergo levirate marriage, according to the law of a rival wife of a forbidden relative who does not undergo levirate marriage.

Because, since she did not perform refusal during his lifetime, and she fell together with her rival wife to levirate marriage, and performed refusal only after her husband’s death and her falling to levirate marriage—

at the time of the falling

she

appears

to people

as her daughter’s rival wife,

and she no longer has permission [just as at that time she appears to people as his father’s daughter-in-law, and she no longer has permission].

And now the Gemara brings a dispute between Rav and Shmuel: if there were two yevamim, and the minor yevama performed refusal only with one of them—

Rav said: If she performed refusal with

the yavam

this one,

she is forbidden

also

to

the yavam

this one. That is, refusal with one of the yevamim forbids her to all of them. And the reason for the matter is—

And the reason for the matter is—

Is it not

like

it was

a yevama

who received a bill of divorce?

A yevama who received a bill of divorce from one of the brothers is disqualified for levirate marriage, by rabbinic law, with all the brothers; and similarly, one who performs refusal with one of the yevamim is disqualified from all the brothers.

A yevama

“who received a bill of divorce,”

who received a bill of divorce from one of the brothers,

is it not

the case that

since she has become forbidden to one

of her yevamim, the one who gave her the bill of divorce—

she has become forbidden to all of them,

the yevamim?

Here too,

her refusal with one of the yevamim disconnects her from him, like the giving of a bill of divorce by him, and therefore

it makes no difference,

refusal is no different from a bill of divorce, and her refusal with one forbids her to all the brothers, just as a bill of divorce from one forbids her to all of them.

And

if

Shmuel said: If she performed refusal with

the yavam

this one,

she is permitted to

the yavam

this one, the second one, since

and since

it is not comparable

a yevama who performed refusal

to

a yevama

who received a bill of divorce—

because

one who received a bill of divorce

the yavam

is the one who performs an act upon her

of divorce, when he gives her the bill of divorce.

But

here,

with refusal—

she

is the one who

performs the act upon him

through this,

saying: “I do not want you, and I do not desire you!”

I do not want you, and I do not desire you.

And the meaning of this expression is: only

you,

this yavam—

I do not want.

I do not want you.

But your fellow

I do want;

I desire him!

And since she performed refusal only with him, she is forbidden only to him.

But a bill of divorce that one of the brothers gives her disqualifies her by rabbinic law from all the brothers.

Because a bill of divorce from one of the brothers damages her zikah by rabbinic law, just as the chalitzah of one of the brothers uproots the zikah from all the brothers by Torah law.

But

Rav Asi

disagrees both with Rav and with Shmuel, and

said:

If she performed refusal with this one

she is permitted even to him,

the one with whom she performed refusal.

And the Gemara discusses the words of Rav Asi:

Shall we say,

does Rav Asi

hold in accordance with Rabbi Oshaya, who said that she does not perform refusal with respect to his zikah,

and therefore she is permitted even to the yavam with whom she performed refusal?

The Gemara rejects this: In fact,

in

a place where there is only

one yavam, here too

according to Rav Asi it is possible

that she can uproot

the zikah through her refusal with the yavam, since the entire zikah is only to the sole yavam.

But

here,

what Rav Asi said—that if she performed refusal with this one she is permitted even to him himself—

we are dealing with two yevamim.

And the reason that her refusal is not effective is because

there is no refusal for half a zikah.

And this yevama, who performed refusal only with one yavam, is performing refusal with respect to half a zikah, and it is impossible to remove half the zikah—that is, from one yavam out of two.

When Ravin came, he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: If she performed refusal with this one

she is permitted to the brothers.

And they did not agree with him

with Rabbi Yohanan.

And the Gemara explains:

Who

is the one who

“did not agree with him”?

Abaye said: Rav;

he is the one who disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan and did not agree with his words.

And as we learned above, Rav said: If she performed refusal with this one, she is forbidden to this one.

Rava said: Rabbi Oshaya

is the one who disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan, and as we learned above, Rabbi Oshaya said: She performs refusal with respect to his maamar, but she does not perform refusal with respect to his zikah.

And some say

and there are those who say:

Rav Asi

also disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan, and as we learned above, according to Rav Asi, one who performs refusal with this one is permitted even to him himself, whereas Rabbi Yohanan holds [according to the understanding of those who say so!] that she is forbidden to him himself.

And all the more so Rabbi Oshaya disagrees with him.

We learned in the Mishna:

Beit Shammai say:

She performs refusal

in his presence

and not in his presence.

It was taught: Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: But Pishon the camel-driver

the leader of camels,

his wife performed refusal not in his presence!

And the Sages regarded her refusal as refusal.

Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: Pishon the camel-driver

measured with a crooked measure!

He was causing the nichsei melog of his minor wife to be lost while consuming them, and thereby he was ungrateful: on the one hand, he consumed the produce of her property, and on the other hand, he damaged the property for her.

Therefore, they measured him

the Sages punished him, measure for measure,

with a crooked measure.

That is, the Sages accepted the refusal of his minor wife even when it was not in his presence, and permitted her, despite the fact that according to the essential law the refusal should be specifically in his presence.

And we ask: How could Beit Shammai state this reason for punishing him, to accept his wife’s refusal when it was not in his presence?

But

since he was consuming

Pishon the camel-driver

the produce,

it is obvious

that his wife who performed refusal

was married,

for if she had been betrothed, Pishon the camel-driver would not have been entitled to consume the produce of her property.

And

if so, the question is:

would Beit Shammai say that a

married woman

does not perform refusal!

does not perform refusal!

And we answer:

Two knots

they made upon him.

The Sages “tied” two “knots” to his disadvantage, in order to penalize him—

the first: they accepted his wife’s refusal even though she was married.

And the second: they accepted the refusal when it was not in his presence.

Beit Shammai say:

She performs refusal

in the presence of a court.

We learned there

in the chapter “The Mitzva of Chalitzah” [page 101b]:

The chalitzah and the refusals

are with three.

And we inquire about it:

Who is the tanna,

who is the tanna who taught the Mishna above, that refusal must be before a court of three?

Rabba said: It is Beit Shammai,

who require that the refusal be before a court, and an ordinary court consists of three judges.

Abaye said: You may even say

that this Mishna is according to the words of

Beit Hillel,

who do not require that refusal be before a court.

For

Beit Hillel stated only here

in our Mishna that a court is not required,

but that we do not require

that there be judges who are

ordained.

But three

judges—

we do require,

they too hold that they must be present at the time of the refusal.

As it was taught

explicitly:

Beit Shammai say:

Refusal—

in the presence of a court.

And Beit Hillel say: In the presence of a court and not in the presence of a court. And both of them agree that it is necessary

that the refusal be in the presence of

three

judges.

Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon validate it with two

judges.

Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said in the name of Rav Naḥman: The halakha is in accordance with that pair.

We learned at the end of the Mishna two words that have no meaning by themselves:

Beit Shammai say:

The daughters of Israel are not ownerless [and therefore she cannot perform refusal and marry several times].

Rather, she performs refusal [only once, and afterward she] waits until she reaches maturity.

And she should perform refusal and marry!

And these two words are apparently incomprehensible!

But

she already

performed refusal

with her husband

once!

And now she waits only until she reaches maturity, when she can marry on her own by Torah law; what need is there for an additional refusal?

Shmuel said:

This is what Beit Shammai said: She must wait

until she reaches maturity and says: “I want the earlier refusals!”

For we must be concerned lest she retract her first refusal.

Ulla said:

Beit Shammai do not mean that she must return and perform refusal when she reaches maturity, but rather

two things

two different possibilities

it teaches:

Either she performs refusal

and

waits and does not become betrothed to a second man, lest she also perform refusal with him, with the result that the daughters of Israel would be ownerless; rather, she waits until she

reaches maturity, and

only then

becomes betrothed

with betrothal by Torah law.

Or she performs refusal

and does not return to become betrothed to a second man, for then she could also perform refusal with the second man; rather—

she marries immediately,

immediately after her betrothal, and she does not wait between her betrothal and her marriage. And after she marries, she can no longer perform refusal according to Beit Shammai.

And the Gemara asks:

Granted, according to Ulla,

who says that he stated two things, it is well—

this is why it teaches: “until she reaches maturity

and performs refusal and marries.”

But according to Shmuel,

who says that he stated one matter,

“until she reaches maturity and says

that she wants the earlier refusals”—

it should have had to say

that!

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult!

Mishna:

Which is the minor who must perform refusal?

Every

minor

whom her mother or her brothers married off with her consent.

But if

they married her off,

her mother or her brothers,

without her consent—

she does not need to perform refusal.

Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: Every girl who is unable to safeguard her betrothal

[as will be explained in the Gemara, whether the intention is safeguarding the money of the betrothal or safeguarding the betrothal itself, conducting herself as a betrothed woman]—

does not need to perform refusal.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The act

of the betrothal of a

minor is nothing!

For Rabbi Eliezer holds that the enactment allowing a minor to be married off by her mother or her brothers did not make her like a married woman to him by rabbinic law,

but

only

like a seduced woman

alone, as one who is destined for intercourse.

But if she wishes to separate from him, she must perform refusal with him.

Therefore, if she is a minor

Israelite woman

who is married

to a priest—

she may not eat teruma,

not even teruma by rabbinic law, since she is not married to him at all.

And likewise, if she is a minor

daughter of a priest

who is married

to an Israelite—

she may eat

under him

teruma,

since she is not considered one who married a stranger.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:

Every impediment that is from the man,

where she is held back with him on his account, is considered

as though she is his wife.

And

every impediment that is not from the man

is as though she is not his wife.

And the amoraim disputed in the Gemara concerning the explanation of his words:

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said, and some say

and there are those who say that

in a baraita

[in a beraita]

a tanna taught

it:

At first, they would write

in

a get of refusal,

which the court would write for the woman who refuses, so that she would have in her possession a document of the court confirming her refusal according to halakha: “Before us the woman said

I do not want him

I have no desire for him

and I do not desire him

and I have no desire for him

and I do not want to marry him

and I do not want to marry him.

Since they saw that the words were numerous.

Since they saw that the words written in the get of refusal were numerous—

They said,

the Sages were concerned, and said: