Yevamot 106a (קו.) — the Talmud in English

The Sages taught: An erroneous chalitza is valid.

What is an erroneous chalitza?

Reish Lakish said: Any case in which they say to him,

perform yibbum:

Remove the shoe

from your yevama,

and through this you will marry her.

They are thereby misleading him, since through the chalitza she becomes forbidden to him for yibbum.

Rabbi Yohanan said to

Reish Lakish,

I learned

as follows:

Whether he intended

[the yavam] for chalitza,

but she did not intend

[the yevama] for chalitza,

or whether she intended

for chalitza,

but he did not intend it, the chalitza is invalid,

until both of them intend it simultaneously

for the sake of chalitza, for only then is her chalitza valid.

And you say

that in an erroneous chalitza he not only does not intend it for the sake of chalitza, but intends it for the sake of yibbum, and nevertheless

her chalitza is valid!?

Rather,

such a chalitza is indeed invalid, since he did not intend to perform chalitza.

This is the erroneous chalitza:

Any case in which they say to him: Remove the shoe from her

your yevama,

on the condition that

she

give you two hundred zuz.

For even if she ultimately does not give it to him, her chalitza is valid.

The reason is explained in tractate Ketubot [74a]: All the laws of conditions are derived from the condition that Moses our teacher made with the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. One of the rules is that the condition must be something that can be carried out through an agent, as Moses appointed Joshua as his agent to give them the land of Gilead. But a condition that cannot be carried out through an agent, such as chalitza, is not effective in it.

It was likewise taught: An erroneous chalitza is valid. What is an erroneous chalitza? Any case in which they say: Remove the shoe from her on the condition that she give you two hundred zuz.

And there was an incident involving a woman who fell before an unsuitable yavam, and

they did not want her to perform yibbum with him, and therefore they misled the yavam and

said to him: Remove the shoe from her on the condition that she give you two hundred zuz. And the case came before Rabbi Hiyya,

and he declared it valid.

A certain man came before Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba

in order to marry his yevama.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said to her,

the yevama:

My daughter, stand

and perform yibbum with him!

She said to him,

to Rabbi Hiyya,

Mother,

[the yevama’s mother]:

Her sitting

my daughter’s refusal to perform yibbum with him

is her standing

and her remedy.

He said to her: Do you know him?

Do you know of anything disreputable about this yavam?

She said to him: Yes! He saw that she has money, and he wants to consume it from her.

The yavam saw that she possessed money, and he wants to take it from her; therefore he now wants to perform yibbum with her and afterward divorce her.

Rabbi Hiyya said

to the yevama:

Do you not wish

to perform yibbum?

She said to him: No!

Rabbi Hiyya said

to the yavam:

Remove the shoe from her, and through this you will marry her.

After he removed the shoe from her, he said to him,

the yavam:

Now,

after you have removed the shoe from her,

she is disqualified from you,

and you can no longer perform yibbum with her.

Remove the shoe from her

now

with a proper chalitza, so that she will be permitted to everyone

[meaning, so that she will be permitted to marry anyone].

The daughter of Rav Pappa’s father-in-law

[his father-in-law’s daughter]

fell before an unsuitable yavam. She came before Abaye. He said to him,

Abaye said to the yavam:

Remove the shoe from her, and through this you will marry her.

Rav Pappa said to him: Does the Master not accept the statement of Rabbi Yohanan

that it is not chalitza until both of them intend it for the sake of chalitza?

Abaye said to him:

Then how should I tell him

the yavam, in order to mislead him so that he will agree to remove the shoe from her?

He said to him:

Tell him this:

Remove the shoe from her on the condition that she give you two hundred zuz.

After he removed the shoe from her,

the yavam,

Abaye said

to the yevama:

Go, give it to him

the two hundred zuz that you promised him.

Although the chalitza is not invalidated because of the condition, nevertheless she ultimately undertook to give him two hundred zuz and is obligated to fulfill the condition, like any ordinary payment for hired work.

Rav Pappa said to him:

Since he was obligated to remove the shoe from her but did not wish to do so,

she applied to him, “I was merely stringing you along,”

and she said she would give it to him only to deceive him so that he would remove the shoe from her. Therefore, she is not obligated to give it to him.

Was it not taught: If one was fleeing from prison, and a ferry was before him

in order to cross the sea, and it was extremely necessary for him to cross so that the prison guards would not catch him,

and he said

to the ferryman,

“Take a dinar

[which is much more than the usual amount charged for a ferry crossing]

and take me across

the sea

!”—the ferryman has no claim

to the ferryman

except his usual fee

.

Evidently,

he can

say to him, “I was merely stringing you along,”

and I did not intend to give you such a large sum.

Here too,

in the case of chalitza,

she was merely stringing him along

and did so to him.

Abaye said

to Rav Pappa:

Where is your father?

He said to him: In the city

[in town].

Where is your mother?

He said to him: In the city.

That is, I presume that you have a father and mother nearby to provide for your needs; therefore your learning is so sharp.

He cast his eyes upon them

[he directed his eyes toward them]

and they died,

Rav Pappa’s father and mother.

The Sages taught: An erroneous chalitza is valid,

but an erroneous bill of divorce is invalid.

The reason is that a condition is effective with regard to a bill of divorce, since it can be carried out through an agent, like the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. If one says to two men, “Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife,” they may write it and give it. Therefore, if the condition was not fulfilled, the bill of divorce does not take effect.

A coerced chalitza,

meaning one performed under compulsion,

is invalid.

But

a coerced bill of divorce is valid.

What are the circumstances?

If he ultimately says

in the end

“I wish to do so,” even a coerced chalitza

[performed under compulsion]

also

would be valid!

And if he does not ultimately say

in the end

“I wish to do so,” a

coerced

bill of divorce also is not

valid! And we explain it:

This is what it means:

An erroneous chalitza is always valid, and an erroneous bill of divorce is always invalid.

A coerced chalitza and a coerced bill of divorce are sometimes

[at times]

valid and sometimes invalid.

This

which is valid is specifically where

he says

ultimately

“I wish to do so.”

But

this

which is invalid applies where

he did not say, “I wish to do so.”

As it was taught:

It is written with regard to a voluntary offering:

“He shall offer it,”

and this wording implies against his will;

this teaches that he is compelled

to bring his vow.

One might have thought

that he should bring it

against his will,

as the verse implies.

The verse therefore states,

as it is written there:

“According to his will,”

which implies that he brings it specifically willingly.

How, then,

is it possible for him to bring it both against his will and willingly?

Rather,

he is compelled

as implied by the verse, “He shall offer it,”

until he says: “I wish to do so!”

and what is written, “According to his will,” is fulfilled.

And you find the same with bills of divorce,

in the case of those whom he is compelled to divorce, such as one afflicted with boils or one with a foul-smelling growth [as stated in tractate Ketubot 77a], for

he is compelled until he says, “I wish to do so.”

Rava said that Rav Seḥora said that Rav Huna said: One performs chalitza

with a yavam and a yevama who came before a court to perform chalitza,

even though

the court

does not know

that they are the yavam and yevama, except on the basis of their own statements.

Likewise,

they perform mi’un,

the court deals with the refusal,

even though it does not know

the man and the woman.

Since this is so—that the court deals with them even though it does not know them—

therefore,

the witnesses who observe the chalitza or mi’un

do not write

and give her

a chalitza document

to retain as evidence,

unless they know

that they are the yavam and yevama.

And

likewise,

they do not write a mi’un document unless they know.

Because

we are concerned about mistaken courts,

which do not know that one performs chalitza and mi’un even without recognizing the parties, and they will see the document and rely on what is written in it—that so-and-so is the yavam of so-and-so—without checking whether the yavam written in the document is in fact the yavam. They would then permit her to marry on the basis of the document. But in truth one cannot rely on what is written in it, since one performs chalitza even without recognition. Now, however, when a document is written only when the parties are recognized, even if the man who removed the shoe from her is not her actual yavam, no harm will result, since they will not permit her to marry as long as she does not possess a chalitza document.

But Rava himself says: One does not perform chalitza

unless

the court

knows

that the yavam is the woman’s yavam,

and

likewise,

one does not perform mi’un unless they know.

Therefore,

since the court must necessarily recognize the yavam and yevama, the witnesses who saw the chalitza

write a chalitza document, even though they do not recognize

the yavam and yevama.

And

likewise,

they write a mi’un document even though they do not recognize them.

And we are not concerned about mistaken courts,

which might perform chalitza without recognizing the parties and remove the shoe from a man who is not her yavam.