Yevamot 102b (קב:) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

And is there such a case?

Is such a situation common, that a person walks with two pairs of shoes on his feet?

And we say:

Yes,

indeed.

For the Sages saw [

that they saw him]

Rav Yehuda go out to the marketplace wearing five pairs [

five pairs of shoes]

of shoes.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A yevama who grew up [

who was raised]

among the brothers

of her deceased husband, upon whom the obligation rests either to perform yibbum with her or to perform ḥalitza with her,

is permitted to marry

that is, to undergo yibbum,

one of the brothers, and we are not concerned that perhaps she performed ḥalitza

once

with one of them,

and ḥalitza was thereby completed, as a result of which she became disqualified for yibbum.

And we raise an objection: It is implied that

the reason

she is permitted to the brothers is

that we did not see [

that we did not see] her perform ḥalitza with one of them. And we are not concerned that perhaps she performed ḥalitza once, but we do not know about it.

But

if

we saw

that she performed ḥalitza,

we are concerned,

and she is forbidden to them, even though the yevama and the yavam did not intend to perform the mitzva of ḥalitza!

But it was taught in a beraita: Whether he intended

to perform ḥalitza

but she did not intend, or whether she intended

to perform ḥalitza

but he did not intend, her ḥalitza is invalid, until both of them intend together

to perform the mitzva of ḥalitza!

And we explain:

This is what

Rav

said: Even though we saw

that she performed ḥalitza with one of them,

we are not concerned that they intended

to perform the mitzva of ḥalitza, and therefore they are permitted to perform yibbum with her.

There are those who say

as follows:

The reason is that we did not see

her perform ḥalitza.

But if we saw it, we are concerned,

and she is forbidden to undergo yibbum.

And as for what the beraita taught

in the beraita that

intention is required,

which implies that we must know that they intend to perform ḥalitza ,

that applies to permitting her to marry others,

for in order for her to be permitted to marry others, we must know that they intended to perform ḥalitza.

But she is disqualified for the brothers

even if we do not know that they intended to perform ḥalitza, because we are concerned that they did intend it.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Regarding a sandal sewn with

cloth

of linen ,

one may not perform ḥalitza with it ,

as it is stated: “And I shod you with taḥash.”

It follows that it is called a shoe only if it is made entirely of leather .

And

we challenge this: If so,

say:

Leather

of a taḥash—yes,

only taḥash leather is called a shoe, but

not anything else,

and a shoe made from the hide of another animal would be excluded by this verse!

And we say: Since the word

shoe is written twice,

two times, it

includes

even the hide of another animal.

And we challenge this:

If “shoe” and “shoe” serves to include,

then let us say that

even everything else

is also valid for ḥalitza, including a sandal sewn with linen!

And we say:

If so,

if everything is included, what benefit is there from the word written in the verse

“taḥash”? [

what purpose does it serve], for nothing would have been excluded?

Rabbi Elazar asked Rav:

If

it,

the sandal,

is made of leather, and its straps [

its straps ]

are made of hair [

goat hair],

what is the law?

Is it valid for ḥalitza or not?

He said to him: Do we not read in its regard, “And I shod you with taḥash”?

After all, this too is called a shoe!

He said to him:

If so,

even

one made entirely of hair

should also be valid for ḥalitza!

He said to him:

That

which is made entirely of hair

is called

a karka,

and is not included in the term “shoe” mentioned in the passage.

Rav Kahana said to Shmuel: From where do we know that this

which is written concerning the yevama,

“And she shall remove his shoe from upon his foot,” means removing it,

to remove the shoe from his foot,

from what is written: “And they shall remove the stones in which the plague is,”

that is, they must remove them from the wall?

But say

that ḥalitza is an expression of

arming, as it is written: “Arm yourselves from among you men for the army,”

and if so, here too the intention would be that she should take the shoe from the ground and put it on his foot!

And we explain:

There too,

in the matter of those armed for battle, the expression “arm yourselves” is an expression of removal, namely,

removing themselves from the house for battle [

that they leave their homes for battle].

But it is written: “He will deliver the poor in his poverty,”

that is, he will encourage him and give him strength?

And we answer: There too, “he will deliver” is an expression of removal, and this is its meaning:

Because of the poverty

of the poor man, who atoned for him during his lifetime,

they will deliver him

and save him

from the judgment of Gehenna.

But what of that which is written: “An angel of the Lord encamps around those who fear Him and delivers them”?

Is this not an expression of encouragement, meaning that those who fear the Lord will regain their strength? And we say: No. This is its meaning:

On account of

the good deeds of

those who fear Him, He delivers them [

he delivers other people]

from the judgment of Gehenna .

But what of that which is written: “And your bones He will strengthen,” and Rabbi Elazar said: This is the choicest of blessings. And Rava said: Strengthening the bones [

giving strength to the bones]!

And we say:

Yes,

indeed so.

It implies this,

an expression of removal,

and it implies

also

this,

an expression of encouragement.

Nevertheless, the expression of ḥalitza written concerning the yevama is certainly an expression of removal,

for here, if it entered your mind

that the expression

means encouragement,

that is, that she should put a shoe on him,

then let the Merciful One write: “And she shall put his shoe on his foot”!

And we reject this: There is no proof from here.

Had the Merciful One written, “on his foot,” it might have been understood: On his foot, yes,

but

on his lower leg,

that is, if his foot was amputated and only his lower leg remained,

no!

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote, “from upon his foot,”

which implies

even from his lower leg,

which is above his foot, one may perform ḥalitza.

And we say that there is nevertheless proof from here. If the verse came only to teach that ḥalitza from his lower leg is valid,

then let the Merciful One write “

And she shall remove his shoe

from above his foot.”

Why

did it write

“from upon his foot”? We learn from this

that the ḥalitza of a yevama

means removing.

A certain sectarian [

that sectarian]

said to Rabban Gamliel: You are the people whose Master has removed Himself from you!

That is, you are a people from whom your God has removed Himself .

As it is written: “With their flocks and cattle they will go to seek the Lord, but they will not find Him; He has removed Himself from them”!

He said to him,

Rabban Gamliel:

Fool! Is it written, “He has removed Himself from them”?

After all,

“they have removed themselves from Him” is written!

That is, they removed themselves from Him.

But as for a yevama with whom the brothers performed ḥalitza, is there any substance to it?

Does it have any validity?!

We learned in our Mishna:

And if she wore an anpileya, her ḥalitza is invalid, etc.

And we say:

Does this mean

that it is evident from our Mishna

that an anpileya [

a cloth shoe]

is not a shoe.

And we also learned

as follows:

The one who collects [

who comes to remove the money collected in the collection boxes in the chamber]

may not enter

the chamber

wearing a garment with a hem,

that is, a tunic with a sewn hem, so that people would not suspect him of hiding money inside the hem.

And

likewise

he may not

enter

wearing an anpileya,

lest people suspect him of hiding money in it.

And it is unnecessary to say

that he may not enter there

wearing a shoe or sandal,

which is forbidden even without concern for suspicion,

because one may not enter the Temple courtyard wearing a shoe or sandal,

as it is written: “Who asked this of you, to trample My courtyards?”

Since we learned in that same Mishna, “And it is unnecessary to say, wearing a shoe,” it follows that the anpileya mentioned earlier in that Mishna is not included in the category of a shoe!

And we raise a contradiction from a beraita: Whether a shoe, a sandal, or an anpileya, one may not walk in them

on Yom Kippur,

neither from house to house nor from bed to bed,

because wearing a sandal is forbidden.

It is evident from here that an anpileya too is considered a sandal!

Abaye said:

In fact, an anpileya is not considered a shoe, and it is permitted to walk in it on Yom Kippur.

But here, in the beraita, it is speaking

when it contains

the anpileya

soft padding,

thin pieces of felt and soft leather placed inside it,

and

it is forbidden to walk in it

because of pleasure,

and not because of the prohibition against wearing shoes.

Rava said to him: And is pleasure without a shoe forbidden on Yom Kippur?

Is there a prohibition against pleasure if it is not considered a shoe?

But Rabba bar Rav Huna wrapped a cloth around his foot [

he wrapped a cloth around his foot]

and went out [

and went out in this manner] on Yom Kippur!?

Rather, Rava said: It is not difficult: Here,

the statement that an anpileya is forbidden on Yom Kippur is speaking

of a leather anpileya,

which is indeed considered a shoe.

But

here,

in our Mishna and in the Mishna concerning the collection of the chamber, it is speaking

of a cloth anpileya.

For with regard to ḥalitza, it is not considered a shoe, because it does not protect the foot.

Likewise, with regard to the collection of the chamber, it is not considered a shoe whose wearing would be forbidden upon entering the Temple courtyard, for there is no disgrace in entering the courtyard wearing it, since one would not ordinarily bring it in when it was soiled with mud, as one does not walk in it through mud. Therefore, it is forbidden there only because of suspicion.

And we say:

This too is reasonable. For if you do not say so, there is a difficulty

from another beraita that speaks about

Yom Kippur,

the beraita that we cited above concerning

Yom Kippur!

As it was taught: A person may not walk

on Yom Kippur

in kordakisin,

that is, thin shoes worn beneath thick shoes to protect against water,

inside his house. But he may walk in an anpileya,

that is, an anpileya,

inside his house!

But in the earlier beraita we learned that one may not walk in an anpileya on Yom Kippur!?

Rather, can one not infer

as we have distinguished:

Here,

in the beraita that teaches that it is forbidden to walk in an anpileya on Yom Kippur, it is speaking

of a leather anpileya.

But

here,

in the beraita that teaches that it is permitted to walk in an anpileya on Yom Kippur, it is speaking

of a cloth anpileya.

And we conclude:

Infer from this.

A beraita was taught in support of Rava:

If she performed ḥalitza with a shoe that was torn, which still covers

still

most of the foot,

or if she performed ḥalitza

with a sandal whose sole was perforated, which still receives

still

most of the foot,

or if she performed ḥalitza

with a sandal made of cork or fiber,

which is hard and provides protection,

and likewise

with a prosthetic

of

an amputee,

that is, when a person’s leg was amputated, a form resembling a foot is made for him, with a small receptacle into which he inserts the end of his lower leg. [He does not rely on this prosthesis; rather, he has another prosthesis tied to his lower leg, upon which he supports himself.]

or if she performed ḥalitza

with a felt shoe [

a type of shoe made of hard felt], which protects the foot,

or if she performed ḥalitza

with

a sandal of

support for the feet,

that is, when a person cannot walk on his feet and walks on his hands, dragging his feet behind him. He makes a support of wood or leather for his feet and inserts them into it, so that they will not become soiled with mud,

and likewise

with a leather anpileya,

and the woman who performs ḥalitza from an adult man,