Yevamot 101a (קא.) — the Talmud in English

We learned in the Mishna:

If both of them were kohanim

and he is exempt for striking and cursing both this one and that one:

The Sages taught:

If he struck

this one,

this one

the first husband, after they warned him, “Do not strike,”

and he returned and struck

this one,

this one

the second husband, after a warning, it follows that in any event he struck his father; however, neither warning was a definite warning, a “definite warning.”

Or if he

cursed

this one and

returned and cursed

this one,

this one,

it follows that in any event he cursed his father.

And all the more so if he

cursed

both of them

simultaneously,

or if he

struck

both of them

simultaneously,

as when he struck them with a staff in a single blow.

This uncertain one

is liable

for execution, as one who strikes his father or curses his father.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If he cursed or struck both of them

simultaneously,

he

is liable.

But if he cursed or struck both of them

one after the other,

he

is exempt,

because, since it is impossible to warn him about each blow with certainty, but only with doubt—a doubtful warning is not considered a warning, according to Rabbi Yehuda.

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says:

He

is exempt

even if he cursed or struck both of them

simultaneously!?

And we answer:

There are two tannaitic opinions in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda:

the tannaim disagreed regarding Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion as to whether he is liable or exempt.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason of the one who exempts

what is the reason for the one who exempts, according to Rabbi Yehuda?

Rabbi Hanina said:

Because

a curse

a cursing

is stated below,

with regard to one’s father and mother, as it is stated: “Whoever curses his father or his mother shall surely be put to death,”

and a curse

a cursing

is stated above,

as it is stated: “Any person who curses his God shall bear his sin.”

Just as

the curse

above does not involve partnership

with another person,

so too,

the curse

below does not involve partnership,

but if it involves partnership, he is not liable.

And striking is juxtaposed to cursing,

as it is stated in the passage of “And these are the ordinances” [Exodus 21:15–17]: “Whoever strikes his father or his mother shall surely be put to death. [And whoever kidnaps a person and sells him, and he is found in his possession, shall surely be put to death.] And whoever curses his father or his mother shall surely be put to death,” to teach: Just as one is liable for cursing only when it does not involve partnership, so too, one is liable for striking only when it does not involve partnership.

We learned in the Mishna:

He serves in the priestly division

of both this one and that one:

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But since he does not receive a share

of the sacred offerings,

why does he serve!?

The Gemara questions the question: Surely the uncertain one serves;

for he says

that uncertain one:

I desire to perform a mitzva,

I desire to perform the mitzva of the Temple service!?

Rather,

this is what is difficult:

“He goes up”

which implies that he serves if he wishes—

is not what it teaches; rather, it teaches “he serves,” against his will,

serving in the division of each one, even though he does not receive a share of the sacred offerings.

Rav Aha bar Ḥanina said that Abaye said that Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

Indeed,

because of concern for the blemish

of every

family,

the members of each family compel him to serve in their division, so that they will not say that he is disqualified.

We learned in the Mishna:

If both of them were in the same division,

he takes one share:

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

What is different

if the two husbands were from

two different divisions, that he does not

have the uncertain one take one share, for it is certainly because he

goes

the uncertain one goes

to this division

of the first husband,

and they reject him

to the division of the second husband;

and he goes to that division

of the second husband,

and

they too

reject him

to the division of the first husband.

If so:

The same should apply to one division,

for we should say that since the division was divided among several ancestral houses, each ancestral house serving on its assigned day:

The uncertain one goes

the uncertain one

to this ancestral house

of the first husband,

and they reject him

to the ancestral house of the second husband;

and he goes to this ancestral house, and they reject him!?

Rav Pappa said: This is what it means: If both of them were in one division and one ancestral house,

this uncertain one

takes one share.

We shall return to you, chapter “Those Who Marry the Raped Woman.”

It is written in the Torah, in the passage concerning levirate marriage [Deuteronomy, chapter 25]: “But if the man does not wish to take his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gate, to the elders, and say: ‘My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother in Israel; my yavam does not wish to perform yibbum with me.’ Then the elders of his city shall summon him and speak to him, and he shall stand and say: ‘I do not wish to take her.’ Then his yevama shall approach him before the elders, remove his shoe from his foot, spit before him, and respond and say: ‘So shall be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house.’ And his name shall be called in Israel: The House of the Removed Shoe.”

That is, if the yavam does not wish to marry his yevama, she must fulfill the mitzva of halitza, in order to sever the yavam’s bond to her and permit her to marry others.

The chapter before us deals with the mitzva of halitza: how it is performed in practice. These are the elements of halitza explained in this chapter:

a.

Recitation.

That is, the yevama’s recitation before the elders: “My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother, etc.”; the yavam’s subsequent recitation: “I do not wish to take her”; and the yevama’s recitation after the halitza has been performed: “So shall be done to the man, etc.”

b.

Removal of the shoe.

That is, removing the yavam’s shoe from his right foot. This chapter explains with what type of shoe halitza is performed, how it must fit on his foot, and how the yevama performs the removal.

c.

Spitting.

That is, the yevama must spit before the yavam. This chapter explains how the spitting is performed.

d. Reciting his name in Israel: “The House of the Removed Shoe.”

This chapter also explains when halitza is performed, before whom it is performed, and which yavam and yevama are fit for halitza.

Mishna:

The mitzva of halitza

is performed

before three judges, even if all three are laymen,

who are not members of the Sanhedrin.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: If halitza may be performed even by laymen, why does the Mishna begin by stating: “Before three judges”?

If she removed the shoe

made of soft leather, similar to our shoe,

her halitza is valid.

It will be explained below that this ruling—that halitza performed with a shoe is valid—applies only after the fact; but initially, one does not perform halitza with a shoe. Rather, the primary form of halitza is performed with a sandal, which is made of hard leather.

But if she removed the shoe

that is, a type of shoe made of cloth,

her halitza is invalid.

The reason is that the shoe must be an item that provides protection, as it is written: “And she shall remove his shoe,” and a shoe is an item that provides protection, as it is written in the Book of Ezekiel [16:10], where the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Jerusalem: “And I shod you with takhash.” That is, “I put on you a shoe made from the hide of a takhash,” which is a type of animal.

This proves that a shoe is made of leather.

If she removed the shoe

with a sandal that has a heel,

it is valid.

But

if she removed it with a sandal

that has no heel, it is invalid.

If the yavam’s foot was severed

from the knee

[that is, the knee]

and below,

that is, part of the leg below the knee remained, and she removed the shoe from that remaining part,

the halitza is valid.

But if his foot was severed

from the knee and above,

and she removed the shoe from him in this condition,

the halitza is invalid.

The reason for this ruling will be explained below in the Gemara.

If she removed a sandal that was not his

[that is, the sandal did not belong to the yavam],

or

if she removed it

from a wooden sandal,

or

if she removed it

from

a sandal

of

the

left

foot that was worn

on

the

right foot,

that is, he wore a left-foot shoe on his right foot and she removed it from him in this manner,

in all these cases

the halitza is valid.

But if she performed halitza from his left foot, the tanna’im dispute this in the Mishna below [104a].

Similarly, if

she removed

a sandal

larger

than the size of his foot,

with which he can

still

walk,

despite its being larger than his size,

or

if she removed

from

a sandal

smaller

than the size of the yavam’s foot,

which

still

covers most of his foot,

her halitza is valid.

Gemara:

And we ask:

Since even three laymen

are fit for halitza,

why do I need judges?

And we explain: In fact, judges are not specifically required.

And this

that it teaches: “Before three judges”

teaches us that we require

the halitza to be performed specifically

before three who know how to prompt the recitation

of the passage that the yavam and yevama must recite.

That is, the yevama must say: “My yavam refuses,” and “So shall be done to the man”; the yavam must say: “I do not wish to take her”; and finally they must all respond and say: “So shall be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house.” All these recitations must be in the Holy Tongue. That is, the three must be

like judges,

who know how to prompt the recitation in the Holy Tongue.

And we say:

We have learned this

in the beraita cited above.

As the Sages taught: The mitzva of halitza is performed before three who know how to prompt the recitation, like judges.

That is as we answered above.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The mitzva of halitza

is performed before five

people.

What is the reason of the first tanna?

As it was taught:

It is written in the passage concerning halitza: “And his yevama shall go up to the gate, to

the elders.”

The minimum number of elders is

two. And

since

a

court of

an even number

is not established, as it could be divided equally and a decision could not be reached by majority,

one is added to them,

to those two,

one

additional person.

There are therefore three here.

And Rabbi Yehuda,

from where does he derive that five are required? He derives it as follows: Since it is written there, “And the

elders

of his city shall summon him,” we learn that

two are required. And since

it is further written

“elders”

in the same verse from which the first tanna derived his ruling, we derive that an additional

two are required,

and

since

a

court of

an even number is not established, one more is added to them. There are therefore five here!

And the first tanna, what does he do with this

that is written

“elders”?

What does he derive from this verse?

And we explain:

He requires it to include

that

even three laymen

are fit for halitza.

And Rabbi Yehuda,

this ruling that

laymen

are fit for halitza,

from where does he derive it?

And we explain:

He derives it from

what is written: “Then his yevama shall approach him

before the eyes

of the elders.”

As the Master said:

Since it is written

“before the eyes

of the elders,” it excludes

the blind,

who are not fit for halitza.

And since it was necessary

to write

“before the eyes” to exclude the blind

from halitza,

conclude from it that even laymen

are fit.

For if it enters your mind

that specifically

the Sanhedrin is required

for the mitzva of halitza, then

why do I need

a special verse

to exclude the blind?

After all,

it follows from Rav Yosef’s teaching

that the blind are not fit for halitza!

For Rav Yosef taught: Just as a court

must be

free of any defect in justice,

as it is stated: “Judge your neighbor with justice,”

so a court

must be

free of every physical defect.