Yevamot 101a — the Talmud in English

We learned in the Mishna:

If both of them were kohanim

and so on, and he is exempt for striking and for cursing this one and that one:

The Sages taught:

If he struck

this

one

—the first husband—after they had warned him, “Do not strike,”

and he returned and struck

this

one

—the second husband—after a warning, and it emerges that, in either case, he struck his father, except that the warning was not a “certain warning.”

Or if he

cursed

this

one and returned and cursed

this

one,

and it emerges that, in either case, he cursed his father.

And all the more so if he

cursed

both of them

both of them at once,

or if he

struck

both of them

both of them at once,

for he struck them with a stick in a single blow.

This doubtful son

is liable

to death, according to the law concerning one who strikes his father and curses his father.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If he cursed or struck both of them

at once,

he

is liable.

But if he cursed or struck both of them

one after the other,

he

is exempt,

because since it is impossible to warn him concerning each blow with a certain warning, but only with a doubtful warning—a doubtful warning is not called a warning, according to Rabbi Yehuda.

But it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says:

He

is exempt

even if he cursed or struck both of them

at once!?

And we answer:

Two tannaitic opinions according to Rabbi Yehuda,

they are tannaim who disagreed concerning Rabbi Yehuda’s view, whether he is liable or exempt.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason of the one who exempts

—what is the reasoning of the one who exempts, according to Rabbi Yehuda?

Rabbi Hanina said:

For

“curse” is stated

—that is, cursing—

below,

with regard to his father and mother, as it is stated: “And one who curses his father and his mother shall surely be put to death”;

and “curse” is stated

—that is, cursing—

above,

as it is stated: “Any man who curses his God shall bear his sin.”

Just as

the curse

above has no partnership

with another,

so too

the curse

below has no partnership,

but where there is partnership, he is not liable.

And striking was linked to cursing,

as it is stated in the passage of “And these are the ordinances” [Exodus 21:15–17]: “And one who strikes his father and his mother shall surely be put to death. [And one who steals a man and sells him, and he is found in his possession, shall surely be put to death.] And one who curses his father and his mother shall surely be put to death,” to teach: just as for cursing he is liable only if there is no partnership in it, so too for striking he is liable only if there is no partnership in it.

We learned in the Mishna:

He goes up in the watch

of this one and of that one:

The Gemara is astonished:

And since he does not receive a share

of the sacred offerings,

why does he go up!?

The Gemara is astonished at the astonishment: surely this doubtful son goes up to perform the service, for

he says

that doubtful son:

I desire to perform a mitzva,

I desire the performance of the mitzva of the service!?

Rather,

this is what is difficult:

“He went up”

—which implies that if he wished, he would go up—

is not what it teaches, but rather “he goes up” against his will,

to serve in the watch of each one, even though he does not receive a share of the sacred offerings.

Rav Aha bar Hanina said, Abaye said, Rabbi Asi said, Rabbi Yohanan said:

Indeed,

because of the blemish

of every

family,

the members of each family compel him to serve in their watch, so that they should not say that he is disqualified.

We learned in the Mishna:

If both of them were in one watch,

he takes one share:

And the Gemara is astonished:

What is different

that if the two husbands were from

two watches, he does not

receive one share, for it is certainly because

he goes

—the doubtful son goes—

to this watch

of the first husband,

and they drive him away

to the watch of the second husband,

and he goes to this watch

of the second husband,

and

they too

drive him away

to the watch of the first husband.

And if so:

One watch also,

we should say that since the watch was divided among several ancestral houses, each ancestral house serving on its day:

He goes

the doubtful son

to this ancestral house

of the first husband,

and they drive him away

to the ancestral house of the second husband,

and he goes to this ancestral house and they drive him away!?

Rav Pappa said: This is what it means: If both of them were in one watch and one ancestral house,

this doubtful son

takes one share.

We have returned to you, chapter “They Marry the Raped Woman”

It is written in the Torah, in the section of Yibum [Deuteronomy, chapter 25]: “But if the man does not wish to take his brother’s wife, then his brother’s wife shall go up to the gate, to the elders, and say, ‘My husband’s brother refuses to establish a name for his brother in Israel; my husband’s brother does not wish it.’ Then the elders of his city shall summon him and speak to him, and he shall stand and say, ‘I do not wish to take her.’ Then his brother’s wife shall approach him before the elders, remove his shoe from upon his foot, spit before him, and answer and say, ‘So shall be done to the man who will not build his brother’s house.’ And his name shall be called in Israel, The House of the Removed Shoe.”

That is to say, if the yavam does not wish to marry his yevama, she must fulfill the mitzva of halitza, in order to remove the bond of the yavam and permit her to marry others.

The chapter before us deals with the mitzva of halitza, how it is performed in practice. These are the parts of halitza explained in the chapter before us:

a.

Reading.

That is, the reading of the yevama before the elders: “My husband’s brother refuses to establish a name for his brother, etc.”; the reading of the yavam afterward: “I do not wish to take her”; and the reading of the yevama after the halitza has been performed: “So shall be done to the man, etc.”

b.

Halitza.

That is, the removal of the yavam’s shoe from his right foot. And in this chapter it is explained with which shoe halitza is performed, how it must sit upon his foot, and how the yevama performs the halitza.

c.

Spitting.

That is, the yevama must spit before the yavam. And in this chapter it is explained how the spitting is performed.

d. The calling of his name in Israel: “The House of the Removed Shoe.”

It is likewise explained in this chapter when halitza is performed, before whom it is performed, and which yavam and yevama are fit for halitza.

Mishna:

The mitzva of halitza

is performed

by three judges, and even if all three of them are laymen,

who are not from the Sanhedrin.

[The Gemara asks: If it is performed even by laymen, why did the beginning of the Mishna teach: “By three judges”?]

If she removed [his shoe] with a shoe

made of soft leather, like our shoe,

her halitza is valid.

And below it will be explained that this law, that halitza with a shoe is valid, applies specifically after the fact; but initially one does not perform halitza with a shoe. Rather, the principal form of halitza is performed with a sandal, which is made of hard leather .

But if she removed [his shoe]

with an anpilya,

that is, a type of shoe made of cloth,

her halitza is invalid .

And the reason is that the shoe must be something that protects, as it is written, “And she shall remove his shoe,” and a shoe is something that protects, as it is written in the Book of Ezekiel [16:10], where the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Jerusalem: “And I shod you with tahash.” That is, I will put upon you a shoe made from the hide of a tahash, which is a type of animal .

And it is proven from here that a shoe is made of leather.

If she removed [his shoe]

with a sandal that has a heel

it is valid.

But

if she removed [his shoe] with a sandal

that has no heel, it is invalid.

If the yavam’s leg was cut off

from the knee

[the knee]

and below,

that is, some of the leg from the knee downward remained, and she removed the shoe from him there ,

the halitza is valid.

But if his leg was cut off

from the knee and above,

and she removed the shoe from him in this manner,

the halitza is invalid.

And the reason for this law will be explained below in the Gemara.

If she removed [his shoe] with a sandal that is not his

[that the sandal does not belong to the yavam],

or

she removed [his shoe]

with a wooden sandal,

or

she removed [his shoe]

with

a sandal

of

the

left

foot worn

on

the

right foot,

that he put a shoe for the left foot onto the right foot, and she removed it from him in this manner,

in all these cases

the halitza is valid.

But if she performed halitza for him with the left foot, the Mishna below [104a] contains a dispute concerning this.

And likewise if

she removed [his shoe] with a

sandal

larger

than the measure of his foot,

which he can

still

walk in,

despite its being larger than his measure,

or

she removed [his shoe]

with a

sandal

smaller

than the measure of the yavam’s foot,

which

still

covers most of his foot,

her halitza is valid.

Gemara:

And we are astonished:

Since even three laymen

are fit for halitza,

why do I need judges?

And we explain: In truth, judges are not specifically required, and

this

which it teaches, “by three judges,”

comes to teach us that we require

that halitza be performed specifically

by three who know how to prompt the reading

to the yavam and the yevama the passage that they must read .

That is, the yevama must say: “My husband’s brother refuses,” and, “So shall be done to the man”; and the yavam must say: “I do not wish to take her”; and at the end they must all answer and say: “So shall be done to the man who will not build his brother’s house.” And all these readings must be in the Holy Tongue . That is, the three must be

like judges,

who know how to prompt the reading in the Holy Tongue.

And we say:

We have learned this

which we stated above in the beraita.

For the Sages taught: The mitzva of halitza is with three who know how to prompt the reading, like judges.

That is, as we answered above.

Rabbi Judah says:

The mitzva of halitza

is performed with five

people.

What is the reason of the first tanna?

For it was taught:

It is written in the section of halitza: “And his brother’s wife shall go up to the gate, to the

elders.”

And the minimum number of elders is

two. And

since

they do not

make

an even court

that can be divided equally, so that a decision can be made according to the majority, therefore

they add to them,

to those two,

one

more person.

There are thus three here.

And Rabbi Judah,

from where does he derive that we require five? He derives it as follows: Since it is written there, “And the

elders

of his city shall summon him,” we learn that

two are required.

And since it is further written

“elders”

in the same verse from which the first tanna learns, we derive that another

two are required

. And

since

they do not

make

an even court, they add one more to them. There are thus five here!

And the first tanna, this

which is written,

“elders,” what does he do with it,

what does he learn from this verse?

And we explain:

He needs it to include

that

even three laymen

are fit for halitza.

And Rabbi Judah,

this matter, that

laymen

are fit for halitza,

from where does he derive it?

And we explain:

He derives it from

what is written: “And his brother’s wife shall approach him

before the eyes

of the elders.”

For the Master said:

Since it is written

“before the eyes

of the elders,” it excludes

the blind,

who are not fit for halitza.

And since it was necessary

to write

“before the eyes” to exclude the blind

from halitza,

learn from it that even laymen

are fit.

For if you were to think that specifically

that specifically

the Sanhedrin is required for the mitzva of halitza, then

for the mitzva of ḥalitza, then

why do I need

a special verse

to exclude the blind?

After all,

it follows from what Rav Yosef taught,

that the blind are not fit for halitza!

For Rav Yosef taught: Just as a court

must be

free of injustice,

as it is stated: “Judge your fellow with righteousness,”

so a court

must be

free of every defect.