Temurah 5a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara brings objections to Abaye’s statements and Abaye’s resolutions, and likewise to Rava’s statements.

It was objected from what we learned in a beraita:

from what we learned in a beraita:

the seducer,

the one who violates a virgin, and takes her for himself as a wife,

who divorced

his violated wife, and transgressed what the Torah said, “He may not send her away,”

if he is an Israelite—

he must take her back, but he is not flogged.

And the questioner held that he is not flogged because his actions did not take effect, since he is obligated to take her back. Now, granted, according to Abaye, who says that one is flogged only when it “takes effect,” when his actions are effective, here, where it “does not take effect,” he is exempt from flogging. But according to Rava it is difficult:

to take her back.

And if you say

that even where it “does not take effect,”

since he transgressed the statement of the Merciful One, he is flogged,

it is difficult:

let this one also be flogged!

For the seducer too should be flogged for having transgressed the prohibition, even though his actions were not effective. And

a refutation of Rava!

Rava could say to you:

And we resolve:

Rava could say to you:

Do not object to me, because

that case is different,

the seducer differs from the other commandments of the Torah, because

the verse says, “He may not send her away

all his days,”

and we expound,

all his days—

arise and take her back!

And we answer:

For it implies that he may not send her away with a sending of “all his days.” Therefore, since he can take her back, he did not send her away with a sending of “all his days,” and he did not transgress the statement of the Merciful One.

But with regard to the other commandments of the Torah, certainly he is flogged even though it “does not take effect,” since in any event he transgressed the statement of the Merciful One. According to this exposition, the objection from the seducer returns against Abaye’s statement: For what purpose did the Torah write “all his days,” to inform us that he is not flogged because “all his days he stands bound to take her back”? Surely, even if the Torah had not written this, we would likewise know that he is not flogged, as explained, because the act of divorce “does not take effect,” and according to Abaye one is flogged only when it “takes effect.”

And we resolve:

And according to Abaye, if the Merciful One had not said “all his days”—

I would have thought,

we would have said: If he divorced her,

it is only a prohibition that he performed for him,

and he transgressed the prohibition “He may not send her away,” and is flogged for it, since his actions were effective—

Now the matter would be in his hands:

if he wishes, he may take her back,

if he wants, he may take her back,

and if he wishes, he need not take her back,

and he would have no obligation to take her back. That is, if the Torah had said, “She shall be his wife… he may not send her away,” we would have said: It is a mitzva incumbent upon him to take her after he violated her, and it is forbidden to divorce her. If he divorced her, he transgressed the prohibition—and is flogged. Yet we still would not know that he is obligated to take her back if he divorced her. Therefore,

it teaches us,

the Torah teaches us “all his days,” to teach us that he is obligated to take her back if he divorced her. And since he is obligated to take her back and his actions were not effective, he is not flogged .

Another formulation:

It was objected: The seducer who divorced her—if he is an Israelite—

he must take her back and is not flogged; and if he is a priest—

he is flogged and does not take her back.

In any event, it teaches

“If he is an Israelite, he takes her back.”

And the questioner holds that he is obligated to take her back because his actions “do not take effect.” Now, granted, according to Rava, who holds concerning all the Torah’s prohibitions, “if one performed an act, it does not take effect,” he is properly obligated to take her back. But according to Abaye, who holds concerning all the Torah’s prohibitions, “if one performed an act, it takes effect,” it is difficult: here it is proven that it “does not take effect,” and he is obligated to take her back.

A refutation of Abaye!

And we resolve:

Abaye could say to you:

Indeed, with regard to the other prohibitions of the Torah it “takes effect,” but the reason that the seducer is obligated to take her back and it “does not take effect” is because

that case is different,

the seducer differs from all the Torah’s prohibitions, because

the Merciful One said, “all his days,”

and we expound,

all his days: arise and take her back.

Therefore, he is obligated to take her back, and there is no contradiction from here to the other prohibitions of the Torah, because here the Torah explicitly decreed that it “does not take effect.”

Now the objection returns against Rava, who holds concerning all the Torah’s prohibitions that it “does not take effect”: If so, why did the Torah write “all his days” to inform us that he is obligated to take her back? It is obvious! After all, also with regard to the other prohibitions of the Torah it “does not take effect.”

And we resolve:

And Rava could say to you: If the Merciful One had not written “all his days,” I would have thought,

we would have said:

let him be flogged,

let him be flogged for having transgressed the statement of the Merciful One, even though it “does not take effect,”

and let him take her back,

and afterward let him take her back. And why would we have said this? Because

the seducer would have been

an ordinary prohibition, as it is written, “He may not send her away,”

that is, a prohibition like all the Torah’s prohibitions, for one who transgresses them is flogged even though it “does not take effect.” And we would not know that it is a special prohibition conditioned upon not taking her back—

Therefore [because of this], the verse wrote “all his days,” in order

to make the seducer

subject to the law of a

prohibition

whose remedy is a positive commandment, for which one

is not flogged .

The Gemara continues to bring proofs concerning the dispute between Abaye and Rava. And we object: But there is the case of one who separates teruma, who designates teruma, from inferior produce for superior produce, for example, from pickling olives, which do not produce oil and are pickled in wine or vinegar in order to preserve them for eating, for oil olives, which are intended to have their oil extracted,

prohibition

whose violation is rectified by a positive commandment, for which one does not

receive lashes

. Rashi wrote here: “And according to this formulation, this is the entire conclusion of the discussion.” The commentators explain his words in several ways. a. The Gra explains that Rashi prefers the alternative formulation, whose conclusion exempts him from lashes on the grounds that it is a prohibition whose violation is rectified by a positive commandment, because it then accords with the sugya above [4b], where the Gemara also concluded in this manner. And the Gra slightly emends the wording of Rashi. b. The Hok Natan explains that Rashi prefers the alternative formulation because according to this formulation the question and the answer resemble the entire continuation of the Gemara’s back-and-forth. That is, the Gemara cites a Mishna or a beraita in which the act is effective in order to challenge Rava, or in which the act is not effective in order to challenge Abaye. According to the first formulation, however, this is not so. c. Rabbi Yedei Eliyahu explains that the formulations apparently contradict one another. Initially, the Gemara cited the beraita concerning the one who raped her to challenge Rava, and at the end it cited the same beraita to challenge Abaye. Therefore, Rashi preferred the alternative formulation. According to this formulation, the questioner knew that there was no difficulty against Rava as to why he is exempt from lashes, and knew well that the reason was that it is a prohibition whose violation is rectified by a positive commandment. The question was only against Abaye: Why was his act not effective? The fact that the Gemara subsequently discusses the matter according to Rava is because this is the Gemara’s usual method: it turns the resolution of one authority into a difficulty against the other. See the Tza’an Kedoshim .

for the Merciful One said

in the section of the teruma of the tithe [Numbers 18], “You shall raise the teruma of the Lord

from all its best,”

and we expound:

its best, yes, he shall separate from the superior, but from

inferior produce

for the superior—

no,

he shall not separate—

And one who separates from the inferior for the superior has transgressed a “prohibition derived from a positive commandment,” and has performed a matter that the Merciful One said not to do— And we learned, and we learned in tractate Terumot [chapter 2, Mishna 6]: One may not separate from the inferior for the superior, but if he separated, his teruma is teruma— Apparently, it is proven that it takes effect. A refutation of Rava! who holds that it “does not take effect.” And we resolve: Rava could say to you: There is no proof from there, because

as it is taught in tractate Terumot [chapter 2, Mishna 6]:

One may not separate teruma from inferior produce for superior produce; but if he did separate it, his teruma is teruma—

Apparently,

this proves that the action is

effective.

A conclusive refutation of Rava!

that case is different: with teruma there is a special exposition teaching us that it “takes effect,”

as

Rabbi Ilaa expounded—

For Rabbi Ilaa said: From where is it derived that one who separates from the inferior for the superior, his teruma is teruma?

As it is stated [there],

“And you shall not bear sin because of it when you raise its best portion from it,”

which implies that if he does not raise its best portion from it, “he shall bear sin.” And it is difficult:

If it is not sanctified,

why bearing sin?

That is,

it is not sanctified, so why should he bear sin?

But what of

one who separates teruma

Rather,

from here [A0206]]it can be learned

The Merciful One said [

that one who separates from the inferior for the superior, his teruma is teruma,

that is, he bears only sin, but in any event his teruma is teruma.

And from this exposition we learn that one who separates from the inferior for the superior: it “takes effect,” unlike the other prohibitions of the Torah, with regard to which it “does not take effect.”

Now the objection turns against Abaye. Why was it necessary for the Torah to write, “And you shall not bear sin because of it,” to teach us that his teruma is teruma? Surely, even without this exposition we would know that “if one performed an act, it takes effect.”

And we resolve:

And according to Abaye, if the Merciful One had not said, “And you shall not bear sin because of it,” I would have thought,

we would have said:

Thus said the Merciful One: Do [perform] the choicest mitzva, and separate from the superior! But if he did not do so

and separated from the inferior, and transgressed the Torah’s command—not performing the choicest mitzva, but nevertheless

he is not called a sinner,

he is not called a “sinner”—

It teaches us,

the Torah teaches us that he is called a “sinner.”

The Gemara continues to object to Abaye from one who separates from one species for another species.

But,

one who separates

from one species for another species,

for example, from wheat for wine,

for the Merciful One said [Numbers, there]:

“All the best of oil and all the best of wine

and grain,” and from the fact that the Torah wrote “best” “best” concerning oil and wine we expound:

to provide a best portion for this and a best portion for that. That is, he should separate from the best of oil for oil and from the best of wine for wine, and not from wine for oil or from oil for wine. And one who separates from one species for another species has transgressed the statement of the Merciful One [“a prohibition derived from a positive commandment”].

And we learned,

and we learned in tractate Terumot [there, Mishna 4]:

One may not separate from one species for another species, but if he separated—

his teruma is not teruma.

Apparently,

it is proven that it

does not take effect.

A refutation of Abaye,

who says it “takes effect”!

And we resolve:

Abaye could say to you:

With regard to the other prohibitions of the Torah, indeed it “takes effect,” but

that case is different,

and the law of one who separates from one species for another species differs, because

the verse says [there], “All the best of oil and all the best of wine and grain,

their first portion,”

and we expound:

a first portion for this and a first portion for that,

that is, from each species and species. Since the Torah returned and said that he should not separate from one species for another species, after it had already written “best” and “best,” this comes to teach us that it “does not take effect.”

And Rabbi Ilaa likewise said

that it does not take effect, because “

their first portion” was stated,

and we expound: to provide a first portion for this and a first portion for that.

not effective.

This is a refutation of Abaye

, who says that the act is effective!

And we answer:

Abaye could say to you: With regard to the other Torah prohibitions, indeed, the act is effective, but

that case is different

: the law of one who separates from one species for another species differs, because

Now the objection returns against Rava: Why did the Torah again write “their first portion”? Surely, with regard to all the Torah’s prohibitions, it “does not take effect.”

And we resolve:

And according to Rava, if the Merciful One had not said “their first portion,” I would have thought,

we would have said that the Torah wrote “All the best of oil and all the best of wine and grain” [but it did not say “the best of grain”]. Therefore,

wine and oil, concerning which “best, best” is written—

they

are what one may not separate one from the other. But wine and grain, concerning which one “best”

is written, as it is stated, “and all the best of wine and grain,” we would have said:

one may separate from this for that,

so that it would be permitted to separate from wine for grain, or from grain for wine, or from grain for grain, such as wheat for barley—

Now the difficulty returns against Rava: Why did the Torah repeat the word “their first portion”? With regard to all Torah prohibitions, the act is not effective.

And we answer:

And according to Rava, had the Merciful One not said “their first portion,” we would have thought

—we would have said that the Torah wrote “all the best of the oil and all the best of the wine and grain” [and did not say “the best of the grain”]. Therefore,

wine and oil, with regard to which “best” and “best” are written

—they

are what one may not separate from one for the other. But with regard to wine and grain, for which a single “best”

is written

, as it is stated, “and all the best of the wine and grain,” we would have said:

one may separate from this for that

—it would be permitted to separate from wine for grain, from grain for wine, or from grain for grain, such as wheat for barley—

Accordingly,

the Merciful One wrote, “their first portions,”

to teach us that one may not separate from grain for wine, from wine for grain, or even from one type of grain for another type of grain .

The Gemara continues to raise an objection against Abaye from the law of “consecrated property.”

One who consecrates his property by designating it as cherem, for example, by saying about his servant or his animal, “This is cherem”—it must be given to a kohein, a member of the priestly family who served in the Temple.

And we raise an objection:

But with regard to consecrated property, for the Merciful One said

[Leviticus 27]

“Any consecrated property that a man consecrates to the Lord, from all that is his, from man or animal or from the field of his holding, shall not be sold and shall not be redeemed.”

And we learned,

and we learned in tractate Arakhin [28b:

consecrated property for kohanim,

which Israelites consecrated in order to give to the kohanim,

has no redemption, but is given to the kohanim.

Thus,

for it is proven from what the Mishna said, “it has no redemption,” that

“it does not avail,”

and if he redeemed it, he accomplished nothing.

A refutation of Abaye,

who holds that “it avails”!

And we answer:

Abaye can say to you,

it is different there,

for the Torah revealed through a special revelation that “it does not avail,”

for the Merciful One said, “It is most holy,”

to teach us

“in its state it shall remain,”

that it does not leave the ordinary sphere through redemption.