Temurah 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

He does not cleanse him. But the earthly court administers lashes to him

forty lashes,

and cleanses him

and he attains atonement.

And we raise an objection:

Rav Pappa said to Abaye:

And from where does Rabbi Yohanan derive this interpretation?

And say

that it should be explained that

he has no cleansing at all,

and the earthly court does not administer lashes to him?

And we answer:

Abaye said

to Rav Pappa:

If so,

if it is as you say, that he has no cleansing at all,

the verse should have written: “He will not cleanse,” and stopped,

and it would not have said anything further.

“The Lord”—

why do I need this?

Why did the Torah write, “The Lord will not cleanse”? Rather, it is to teach us that only “the Lord,” that is,

the Heavenly Court, does not cleanse him. But the earthly court administers lashes to him and cleanses him.

The verse cited by the Gemara, “You shall not take the Name of the Lord your God in vain, for the Lord will not cleanse the one who takes His Name in vain,” concerns a vain oath, in which one swears to alter something known to people—for example, one swears concerning a stone pillar that it is made of gold. But there is also a false oath, such as when one swears that he will eat today, the day passes and he does not eat, or he swears that he will not eat and he eats. This is what is stated in Leviticus 5:4: “Or if a person swears, expressing with his lips to do evil or to do good.” This indicates that he swore concerning a future matter. Its law is explained there, in verse 5: “And it shall be, when he is guilty of one of these matters, that he shall confess that wherein he sinned, and bring his guilt-offering.” That is, if he did so inadvertently, he is liable to bring an adjustable offering [the offering of the poor or the wealthy].

Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree [Shevuot 25a] concerning one who swears about the past—for example, “I ate,” but he did not eat, or “I did not eat,” but he ate. Rabbi Akiva holds him liable to bring an offering, based on his interpretation of the verses. And Rabbi Yishmael exempts him.

One who deliberately takes a vain oath is liable to lashes. This is what the Gemara derives from the Torah’s statement, “For the Lord will not cleanse the one who takes His Name in vain,” interpreting it as follows: “But the earthly court administers lashes to him and cleanses him.”

And now the Gemara discusses the source for the rule that one is also lashed for a false oath. For from the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili it appears that one is lashed for every oath, both a vain oath and a false oath.

We have found

from the aforementioned exposition a source that one is lashed for

a vain oath,

but

with regard to a false oath, from where

do we know that one is lashed for it? And we conclude:

Rabbi Yohanan himself,

the author of the statement under discussion,

said:

The Torah stated [there],

“In vain” and “in vain” twice,

“You shall not take ... in vain, for the Lord will not cleanse ... in vain,” and we interpret this as follows:

if

the second occurrence of “in vain”

does not refer to a vain oath,

since the first “in vain” has already been stated with regard to a vain oath,

apply it to a false oath,

in order to derive

that he is lashed.

Rabbi Abbahu objects to this: What is the nature of a false oath?

Concerning which false oath did Rabbi Yohanan say that one is lashed for it even though it involves no action?

If you say

that this refers to one who

said: “

An oath

that I will not eat,”

and he violated his oath

and ate.

This cannot be said. For

there, he performed an action!

And for a prohibition that involves an action, one is certainly lashed!?

Rather,

perhaps you will say that this refers to one who

said: “

An oath

that I will eat

today,” and the day passed

and he did not eat,

and he performed no action—

This too cannot be said, for

would that person be lashed?!

But it was stated,

with regard to one who says,

“An oath that I will eat this loaf today,” and the day passed and he did not eat, Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish both said,

he is not lashed

for violating the prohibition of “You shall not take.”

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is not lashed

because

it is a prohibition that involves no action.

And one is not lashed for any prohibition that involves no action.

And Reish Lakish said: He is not lashed, because

the warning given to him is that he should eat in order to fulfill his oath;

it is an uncertain warning,

because the person who took the oath can say that he does not regard this warning as relevant, since he still has time until the end of the day. And even if the day passes and he does not eat, he can say that he forgot the warning and did not remember either the oath or the warning until the day had passed.

And any uncertain warning

in which, at the time of the warning, it is uncertain whether he will transgress or not, is not a valid warning, and

he is not lashed for it.

Rabbi Abbahu raises a difficulty: In what manner did Rabbi Yohanan say that one is lashed for a false oath?

Rather, Rabbi Abbahu said: Let it be

that this false oath of which Rabbi Yohanan spoke refers to one who swore and said, “

I ate,”

but he did not eat

. And

likewise, one who said, “

I did not eat,”

but in fact he ate. Both of these oaths concern the past, so that at the moment of the oath he lied and violated the prohibition of “You shall not take.” It was in this context that Rabbi Yohanan said that one is lashed for them, even though he performed no action. But one who swears that he will eat today and ultimately does not eat is exempt from lashes, because by refraining from eating he performed no action.

And the Gemara discusses this:

And what is different, that he includes “I ate” and “I did not eat”

more

than

the statement

“I will eat” -

and he did not eat?

That is, why is one liable to lashes for “I ate” and “I did not eat,” whereas in the future, when one swears, “I will eat,” and ultimately does not eat, is he not lashed even according to Rabbi Yohanan? In both cases he performs no action.

And we answer:

Rava said: The Torah explicitly included

the oath of

a false oath in the category of a vain oath,

in that the Torah included a false oath by stating “in vain” twice within the passage concerning a vain oath, in order to teach us:

Just as with a vain oath,

just as a vain oath is always an oath concerning

the past,

since when one swears concerning a stone pillar that it is made of silver, he swears about “the past,” concerning a stone pillar that was already a stone pillar before his oath, therefore

also

an oath of

falsehood

entails liability to lashes for a statement concerning

the past,

such as one who swears, “I ate,” when he did not eat. This is not so with one who swears that he will eat, which is an oath concerning the future, and ultimately does not eat: he is not liable to lashes, because by not eating he performed no action.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahu

from the Mishna in tractate Shevuot [27b], to challenge Rabbi Abbahu’s explanation of Rabbi Yohanan’s statement that one is lashed for “I ate and I did not eat.”

As we learned in the Mishna: One who says,

“An oath that I will not eat this loaf; an oath that I will not eat it; an oath that I will not eat it,” and he ate it,

even though he uttered three oaths,

he is not liable

except on account of

one oath.

And the Mishna concludes:

And this is an oath of expression

concerning which the Torah stated [Leviticus 5], “Expressing with the lips to do evil or to do good,”

for which one is liable

to an offering:

for its deliberate violation,

if he violates it deliberately, he is liable to

lashes

forty,

and for its inadvertent violation,

he is liable to

an adjustable offering.

And Rabbi Abbahu infers: What does the Mishna’s statement

“And this”—what does it exclude?

What does it come to exclude, such that one is not liable to lashes for its deliberate violation? Is it

indeed to exclude “I ate” and “I did not eat,” so that

even though it is an oath of expression, nevertheless,

he is not lashed,

because the Torah says “to do evil or to do good,” which refers to the future and not to the past, such as “I ate” and “I did not eat”?

The question returns: For which false oath did Rabbi Yohanan say that one is liable to lashes? And we reject this:

No!

For “I ate and I did not eat,” one is indeed lashed, in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan’s statement, because of the phrase “in vain” and “in vain.” Rather, this is how the Mishna is to be understood:

This is the case for which, for its inadvertent violation, he brings [

an offering,]

an offering. But for “I ate and I did not eat,” he does not bring an offering.

And whose opinion is this,

whose Mishna is it?

It is Rabbi Yishmael’s, who says that one is not liable to bring an offering

for a false oath

except

when he swears

concerning the future,

namely, “I will eat” or “I will not eat.”

But he is lashed,

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan’s statement.

And we raise a difficulty:

Consider the latter clause,

the continuation of the Mishna, where the Mishna elaborates on the laws of a vain oath, such as one who swears to alter something known to people, saying of a stone pillar that it is made of gold, and so forth. And the Mishna concludes:

This is a vain oath, for whose deliberate violation one is liable to lashes, while for its inadvertent violation he is exempt

from an adjustable offering.

And the Gemara infers: What does the Mishna’s statement

“This”—what does it exclude,

what does it come to exclude? Is it

indeed to exclude “I ate and I did not eat,”

and it comes to teach us

that he is not lashed?

This is difficult according to Rabbi Abbahu’s statement that one is lashed for “I ate and I did not eat”! And we reject this:

No!

For “I ate and I did not eat,” one is indeed lashed, in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan’s statement. Rather, this is how the Mishna is to be understood:

This is the case for which, for its inadvertent violation, he is exempt from an offering. But for “I ate and I did not eat,” he brings [

an offering,]

an offering.

And whose opinion is this,

whose Mishna is it?

It is Rabbi Akiva’s, who says: One brings an offering for

a false oath concerning

the past.

And we are astonished:

But you said that the first clause is Rabbi Yishmael’s

—is the first clause Rabbi Yishmael’s and the latter clause Rabbi Akiva’s?!

The Gemara retracts its previous explanation:

Rather, since the latter clause is Rabbi Akiva’s —

the first clause is also Rabbi Akiva’s—

And the first clause,

which states: “An oath that I will eat ... this is an oath of expression for which one is liable, for its deliberate violation, to lashes, and for its inadvertent violation, to an adjustable offering”—

it is not to exclude “I ate and I did not eat,”

for according to Rabbi Akiva, one indeed brings an offering for “I ate and I did not eat”—

Rather, it is to exclude

one who swears,

“I will eat”—

and

ultimately

does not eat,

who is not liable to lashes for his deliberate violation, in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan’s statement, because it is a prohibition involving no action, as explained. And this is how the Mishna is understood: “This” refers to one who says, “An oath that I will not eat,” violates his oath, and eats—for whom one is liable, for deliberate violation, to lashes, because he performed an action. But in the case of “An oath that I will eat,” and ultimately he does not eat, he is not lashed, because it is a prohibition involving no action.

And the Gemara discusses this:

And what is different

Why, in the first clause, do we exclude “I will eat” and he did not eat, for which he is not liable to lashes, whereas in the latter clause we exclude “I ate and I did not eat,” for which, according to Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring an offering? Could it not be that the first clause also excludes “I ate and I did not eat” from lashes, contrary to Rabbi Abbahu’s statement? It would be preferable to explain it this way, because then both the first clause and the latter clause exclude “I ate and I did not eat”: the first clause excludes it from lashes, while the latter clause excludes it from exemption from an offering, establishing that he is liable, in accordance with Rabbi Akiva?

And we answer:

It is reasonable ,

it is reasonable to interpret it in this manner,

because

the first clause

deals with “

I will not eat,” which is a false oath concerning

the future, and therefore it

excludes “

I will eat,” which resembles it, as it too concerns

the future—

future—

But since the first clause

deals with the future, how could it

exclude “

I ate and I did not eat,” which is an oath concerning

the past?!

We learned above: “Except for one who swears,”

and one who performs temura,

and one who curses his fellow using the Divine Name.

Rabbi Yohanan said to the tanna

who recited before him the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili:

Do not teach “and one who performs temura,”

do not list one who performs temura among the prohibitions that involve no action,

because through his speech he performs an action,

for he transforms non-sacred property into consecrated property.

We learned above that one is not lashed for a transgression that involves no action, except for three cases, one of which is:

one who curses his fellow using the Divine Name.

And the Gemara discusses this:

From where

do we know that he is lashed despite performing no action?

Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said: The verse states [

Deuteronomy 28:]

“If you will not be careful to perform all the words of this Torah that are written in this book, to fear this honored and awesome Name,

the Lord your God.”

That is, he does not fear the Lord, and therefore he utters His Name in vain. Likewise, one who curses his fellow using the Name of the Lord is uttering the Name of Heaven in vain.

And it is written,

later in that passage,

“Then the Lord will make your plagues extraordinary.”

And we derive:

This extraordinary punishment [“

and He will make extraordinary”],

I do not know what it means

or what its interpretation is. But

when it says

elsewhere [Deuteronomy 25], in the passage concerning lashes,

“The judge shall have him lie down and have him beaten before him,” it follows that “extraordinary punishment” refers to lashes.

But the Gemara raises a question: From where do we know that the verse is referring to one who curses another in the name of God

Perhaps say:

It is possible that this verse comes to teach that

even

one who swears

a true oath,

and does so in the name of God—is flogged. And regarding a true oath, the Torah warns that one should not swear by the name of God, and it says that when he transgresses the prohibition and swears by the name of God, he is liable to lashes, as it is stated: “And the Lord will make your plagues extraordinary.”

And the Gemara raises a difficulty against this question: Is it possible to say that one is liable to lashes for swearing by the name of God even when it is a true oath?

For it is explicitly written

in the section concerning bailees [Exodus 22],

“The oath of the Lord shall be between them,”

which indicates that the Torah permitted one to swear a true oath in the name of God. The one raising the difficulty explains his question:

Perhaps,

it is possible to say that a person is warned not to swear even a true oath in the name of God, and is flogged for a true oath when he swears it in the name of God. And when the Torah says, “The oath of the Lord shall be between them,”

that applies

only

to appeasing his fellow,

who is demanding the return of his deposit from him, while he does not wish to pay; in that case, he may discharge himself through an oath in the name of God.

But

nevertheless,

he is flogged

for his oath, because he brought himself to swear in the name of God, since he could have avoided taking an oath by paying the claimant the money. And the question returns: From where do we know that this verse came to warn against cursing another in the name of God, rather than to warn against a true oath?

And we answer:

You cannot say

that one is liable to lashes for a true oath in the name of God,

for it is written [Deuteronomy 6]

“And by His name shall you swear,”

which proves that the Torah did not warn against a true oath.

The Gemara rejects this: That

particular

verse, “And by His name shall you swear,”

is needed

for another exposition,

as taught by Rav Giddel in the name of Rav—

For Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav:

From where is it derived that one may swear to fulfill the mitzvot,

so that he will be unable to retract?

As it is stated [Psalms 119]:

“I have sworn and I will fulfill it, to observe the judgments of Your righteousness.”

And concerning this

the Torah said, “And by His name shall you swear”—that is, swear by His name to fulfill the mitzva.

And since the intent of that verse is to say that one may swear to fulfill the mitzvot, one cannot learn from it that it is permitted to swear a true oath in the name of God. Therefore, it is possible to say that the verse “And the Lord will make your plagues extraordinary” speaks of liability to lashes for one who swears a true oath in the name of God.

And we answer:

There is another verse written

that permits one to swear a true oath in the name of God, [Deuteronomy 10]

“And by His name shall you swear.”

Thus, one verse stating “And by His name shall you swear” teaches us the law of one who swears to fulfill a mitzva, while a second verse stating “And by His name shall you swear” teaches that it is permitted to swear a true oath in the name of God.

Rather,

what is the meaning of the Torah’s statement, “If you will not observe, and the Lord will make your plagues extraordinary,”

what does it come to teach?

It must come to teach liability to lashes

for one who curses another in the name of God.

That is, to make him liable to lashes even though he performed no action.

And we ask:

Perhaps say

that the verse, “If you will not observe, and the Lord will make your plagues extraordinary,” comes to impose liability to lashes

for one who utters the Divine Name in vain,

and does not come to impose liability on one who curses in the name of God?

And we challenge the words of the one raising the difficulty: How can one even entertain the possibility that one who utters the Divine Name in vain is flogged, whereas one who curses another in the name of God is not flogged?

And is he inferior?

Is one who curses

his fellow in the name of God

liable for less than one who utters the Divine Name in vain?!

Therefore, the Gemara explains its question:

This is what is difficult to us:

this is our question:

Perhaps one who utters the Divine Name in vain should suffice with lashes,

so that accepting the punishment of lashes would atone for his transgression.

But one who curses another in the name of God, since he has committed two offenses,

having committed two prohibitions: one,

for he utters

[that is, he utters]

the Divine Name in vain, and

the second, that he

also

thereby

causes his fellow pain—should lashes alone not suffice

to atone for his transgression?