Temurah 2b — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Meir, ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

derives,

learning the law of laying on of hands, which is

the end of consecration,

from

substitution, which is

the beginning of consecration.

Just as

“the beginning of consecration—the heir substitutes,”

as we learned from “and if he shall indeed substitute,”

so too the end of consecration: “the heir lays on [his hands].”

And the Gemara asks:

And Rabbi

Judah,

who holds that an heir does not substitute,

what does he do with this “and if he shall indeed substitute”?

For what exposition does the repetition of the wording come?

And we answer: From the repetition of the wording we expound

to include a woman,

so that her substitution is substitution, and she is flogged for the prohibition of “he shall not substitute.”

And as it was taught in a beraita, since the entire matter,

the entire passage of substitution,

speaks only in the language of

the masculine, as it is stated, “he shall not exchange it,”

in the masculine, and it was not stated “you shall not exchange it,” in the feminine. And likewise it is stated

“and he shall not substitute it,”

and it was not stated “she shall not substitute it.” If so,

what is the end of it,

from where do we know

to include a woman?

The verse says: “And if he shall indeed substitute.” The repetition of the wording comes

to include a woman.

And we object:

And according to Rabbi Meir,

who expounds “and if he shall indeed substitute” to include an heir,

from where does he derive a woman?

From where does he derive that if a woman substituted, it is substitution, and she is flogged for transgressing the prohibition of “he shall not substitute”?

And we answer:

He derives it,

he expounds to include a woman

from the vav.

The verse could have said “if he shall indeed substitute,” but it said “and if,” with the addition of a superfluous letter vav; the addition of the vav comes to include a woman.

And the Gemara discusses:

And Rabbi Judah,

for what purpose did the Torah write a superfluous vav?

And it explains:

He does not expound the vav.

Rabbi Judah does not hold that one learns from a superfluous vav.

And now, after a woman has been included in substitution—according to Rabbi Judah from “he shall indeed substitute,” and according to Rabbi Meir from the letter “vav”—the Gemara asks why a special exposition is needed to include a woman, and in what way substitution differs from all the prohibitions and punishments in the Torah, concerning all of which a woman is commanded in every respect like a man?

And both according to Rabbi Meir and according to Rabbi Judah, the reason,

the entire reason that a woman is flogged for substitution is because

the verse expounded,

that there is an inclusion in the Torah

for a woman.

And according to this,

had the verse not included her,

if the Torah had not included her,

one might have said, when she performs it,

when a woman performs substitution,

she is not flogged,

she is not flogged for this.

But Rav Judah said in the name of Rav. And likewise the tanna of the school of,

the tanna taught in the academy of

Rabbi Ishmael:

the Torah said [Numbers 5]

“a man or a woman, when they commit any sin of a person,”

to teach that

the verse equated a woman with a man regarding all punishments,

all prohibitions for which one is liable for punishment; that is, every negative commandment

in the Torah.

And it is difficult: why is a special inclusion needed to include a woman in the law of substitution?

And we answer: If it is because the verse equated a woman with a man regarding all punishments in the Torah,

what might you have said

we would have said that

these matters

apply only to

a prohibition involving an act,

such as desecrating Shabbat, for specifically in these the verse equated a woman with a man, since thus it is stated: “a man or a woman, when they commit any sin of a person.”

But a prohibition that involves no act,

such as substitution, where the prohibition depends upon speech,

say,

we would have said,

she is not flogged,

that the woman is not punished by lashes. Therefore

it teaches us,

the Torah teaches us a special inclusion to make a woman liable for the act of substitution.

And we object:

And according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says [

below, 3b] that the prohibition of substitution is not “a prohibition involving no act,” because the attachment is performed through his speech,

and speech is considered like an act,

and according to him, the law of substitution is included among all the prohibitions concerning which a woman is equal to a man, it is difficult:

for what does the verse come?

That is, the question returns: why is a special teaching needed to make a woman liable under the law of substitution?

And we answer:

It was necessary,

in substitution an explicit verse is needed to make a woman liable. For

what might you have said,

we would have said,

these matters,

these matters—that a woman is equal to a man—apply only

to a punishment that is equal

in all cases,

both for an individual and for the community.

But here,

in substitution,

since its punishment is not equal in all cases.

For we learned in the Mishna,

for we learned below [13a]:

“The community and partners do not

perform substitution” [

and the reason will be explained there]; therefore one might have thought that

a woman also, when she performs it,

when she performs substitution,

is not flogged,

she is not punished by lashes. Therefore

it teaches us,

the Torah teaches us a special inclusion to make a woman liable for her substitution.

Rami bar Hama asked: What is the law concerning a minor performing substitution?

And the Gemara clarifies:

What are the circumstances?

For which minor was Rami bar Hama uncertain?

If you say,

if it is said

of a minor who has not reached the “age of vows,”

at the age of twelve years and one day, when, if he knows for whom he vowed, his vow is a vow, then it is obvious! For

he cannot consecrate,

even if the minor consecrated, it is not consecrated,

can he substitute?!

Could it enter your mind that he can perform substitution?!

Rather, when it is asked of him,

for which minor Rami bar Hama was uncertain,

it is of a minor who has reached the age of vows.

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say, since the Master said,

that the Torah said,

“A man

when he expressly utters a vow according to your valuation of persons to the Lord”?

What does “when he expressly utters a vow” come to teach?

Why did the verse use the language of express utterance instead of the language of a vow?—

to include “one whose understanding has matured near adulthood,” whose consecration

is consecrated,

as explained.

Therefore it is uncertain whether

since he can consecrate, he consecrates,

since he can consecrate,

he likewise substitutes,

he can also perform substitution.

Or perhaps, since he is not subject to punishment

until he becomes thirteen,

with regard to substitution it does not become attached.

He cannot attach [an animal’s sanctity] through substitution, since the Torah juxtaposed the prohibition of substitution to the very attachment of the sanctity of substitution, as it is stated: “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute it. And if he shall indeed substitute, then it and its substitute shall be holy.” The juxtaposition teaches that only one who is subject to the prohibition and punishment of substitution, namely, an adult who is subject to punishment, is included in the attachment of substitution. But a minor, who is not included in punishment for substitution, is not included in the attachment of substitution, and the sanctity of substitution does not attach through his speech.

And the question was not resolved.

Rami bar Hama continues and is uncertain whether a gentile performs substitution. For when a gentile consecrates an offering through a vow or a voluntary offering [excluding a sin offering, guilt offering, and the like], his consecration is consecration, and it is offered, as will be explained. However, with regard to substitution, there is room to say that his substitute is not substitution.

And even

if you can establish,

and prove from a Mishna, a beraita, or reasoning, that

a minor performs substitution,

this is because although he is presently not subject to punishment, nevertheless

for he will come

he will indeed come

to the category of those subject to punishment,

on the day he completes thirteen years. Therefore it is possible to call him even now “one subject to punishment.” Accordingly, Rami bar Hama must ask:

What is the law concerning a gentile performing substitution,

does the sanctity of substitution attach through his saying, “This is in place of that”?

Can you say ,

is it possible to say:

since he can consecrate, he consecrates,

just as he consecrates,

for it was taught in a beraita,

as we learned in a beraita: The Torah said [Leviticus 22],

“Any man, any man

of the house of Israel who brings his offering,”

what does “any man, any man” come to teach?

It comes

to include gentiles, who vow vows and voluntary offerings like Israel,

accordingly,

he also substitutes,

he too performs substitution.

Or perhaps,

a gentile is inferior to a minor,

since he will not come,

for he will never come

to the category of those subject to punishment,

and there are no obligations of lashes upon him. Therefore

when he performs substitution, it does not become holy.

For the reason mentioned above: since the Torah juxtaposed the very attachment of substitution to the prohibition of substitution.

Rava said: Come and hear

to resolve the question from a beraita, which states that Rabbi Shimon holds that although gentiles vow vows and voluntary offerings, nevertheless their offering is not entirely like the offering of Israel with regard to several laws of offerings. The entire beraita is explained later in the passage.

For it was taught in a beraita: The consecrated offerings of gentiles—one may neither derive benefit from them nor commit sacrilege with them.

One who derives benefit from them does not bring a guilt offering for sacrilege, as does one who derives benefit from the consecrated offerings of Israel. Rather, the Sages prohibited deriving benefit from them.

And one is not liable on their account for piggul, notar, or ritual impurity.

If the offering became piggul, or the time for eating it passed, or it became impure, one who eats them is not liable to karet, as one who eats piggul, notar, or impurity from the consecrated offerings of Israel.

And they do not

perform substitution.

That is, one who performs substitution with his offering does not cause the substitute to become attached.

And they do not bring libations

by themselves, just as Israelites volunteer libations by themselves, not for a sacrifice.

But his sacrifice

of an idolater

requires libations,

the words of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Yosei said: In all of them I see grounds to be stringent,

for one commits misuse with the sacrifices of idolaters by Torah law, and all the more so it is forbidden to derive benefit from them. And one is liable on account of them for pigul, notar, and impurity. But concerning bringing libations by themselves, Rabbi Yosei concedes that they do not bring them .

And the beraita continues with the law of misuse:

When are these words spoken,

that in the case of these sacred objects of idolaters Rabbi Shimon said that one does not commit misuse with them?

With sacrificial sacred objects,

such as an olah that an idolater consecrated.

But with sacred objects for the repair of the Temple,

if idolaters consecrated money or an object for the needs of consecration,

one commits misuse with them.

And Rava resolves it:

It teaches, in any event,

that in the beraita we learned, at any rate, that

the

sacrifice

does not effect substitution. Let us resolve from this: just as their sacrifice does not effect substitution, so idolaters do not effect substitution .

And let us resolve that just as his sacrifice does not effect temura, so too gentiles do not effect temura .

And the question has been resolved: an idolater does not effect substitution .

He said to him

Rami bar Hama said to Rava:

When an idolater consecrates

a sacrifice

in order to achieve atonement

through it,

the idolater

himself,

I do not have a question,

I was not in doubt, and I knew that an idolater does not effect substitution.

What I do have a question about,

what, indeed, I was in doubt about, is:

when an idolater consecrates, and it achieves atonement

[so that atonement may be achieved through it]

for an Israelite.

For example, an alien consecrated it on behalf of an Israelite who is obligated to bring a sacrifice. And now the Israelite for whom atonement is achieved comes and says concerning another animal, “This is in place of that.” And I am in doubt whether substitution takes effect through this.

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Whether

we follow the consecrator,

and since the consecrator is an idolater, and he does not effect substitution, substitution is likewise not effected with a sacrifice that he consecrated.

Or we follow the one for whom atonement is achieved.

And since he is an Israelite, for whose atonement it was consecrated, substitution is effected with such a sacrifice.

And we raise an objection: What was Rabbi bar Hama's question?

Let him resolve it,

for it is possible to resolve his question

from

the words of

Rabbi Abbahu.

For Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

Three things were said concerning one who gives something of his own for the obligation of his fellow .

a.

The consecrator adds a fifth.

One who consecrated a sacrifice, and a blemish occurred in it, may redeem it from consecration with money, and the redeemer adds a fifth, as it is stated [Leviticus 27]: “And if the consecrator redeems it, he shall add a fifth of the money of your valuation to it, and it shall be his.” And we expound from the word “the consecrator” that only for the redemption of the first consecration must one add a fifth, but not “the one who effects substitution.” This teaches that when an animal of substitution develops a blemish, the one who redeems it need not add a fifth to its value .

b.

And the one for whom atonement is achieved effects substitution.

If an Israelite set aside a sacrifice so that his fellow Israelite might achieve atonement through it, the one for whom atonement is achieved through it effects substitution, and is flogged. Since it was set aside on his behalf, he is the owner of the sacrifice with regard to substitution. And below [10a] we expound that “the owner of the sacrifice,” namely, “the one for whom atonement is achieved,” is the one who effects substitution, and not the consecrator.

c.

And one who separates teruma from

untithed produce

of his own ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page position")

for

untithed produce

of his fellow—

the benefit of disposition is his.