Temurah 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Meir,

derives

the law of semikha, which is

the end of consecration

from

temura, which is

the beginning of consecration.

What

“the beginning of consecration: an heir performs temura”

as we learned from “and if he shall indeed exchange,”

so too, the end of consecration: “an heir performs semikha.”

And the Gemara asks:

And Rabbi

Yehuda,

who holds that an heir does not perform temura,

what does he do with this phrase, “and if he shall indeed exchange”?

For what exposition is the repetition of the wording needed?

And we answer: From the repetition of the wording, we derive

to include a woman,

so that her temura is valid, and she is liable to lashes for the prohibition “he shall not exchange.”

And as it was taught in a beraita: Since the entire passage

the entire passage concerning temura

speaks only in the wording of

the masculine, as it is stated, “he shall not exchange”

in the masculine, and it does not say “you shall not exchange it” in the feminine. Likewise, it is stated

“and he shall not exchange it,”

and it does not say “she shall not exchange it.” If so,

what is the purpose of the final wording,

how do we know

to include a woman?

The verse states, “and if he shall indeed exchange.” The repetition of the wording comes

to include a woman.

And we challenge this:

And according to Rabbi Meir,

who derives from “and if he shall indeed exchange” that an heir is included,

from where does he derive the inclusion of a woman?

From where does he derive that if a woman performs temura, the temura is valid and she is liable to lashes for violating the prohibition “he shall not exchange”?

And we answer:

He derives it

by expounding to include a woman

from the vav.

The verse could have said “if he shall indeed exchange,” but it says “and if,” with the addition of a superfluous letter vav; this additional vav comes to include a woman.

And the Gemara asks:

And Rabbi Yehuda,

for what purpose did the Torah write the superfluous letter vav?

And it explains:

He does not expound the vav.

Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that one derives a law from a superfluous vav.

Now, after a woman has been included in temura—according to Rabbi Yehuda through “he shall indeed exchange,” and according to Rabbi Meir through the letter vav—the Gemara asks why a special exposition is needed to include a woman, and how temura differs from all the prohibitions and punishments in the Torah, regarding which a woman is commanded in every respect like a man?

And according to both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, the reason

the entire reason that a woman is liable to lashes for temura is because

the verse included her,

there being an inclusion in the Torah

of a woman.

Accordingly,

had the verse not included her,

if the Torah had not included her,

we would have assumed, when she performed it,

when a woman performs temura,

she would not be liable to lashes,

she would not receive lashes for it.

But Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rav. And it was likewise taught in the school of

the tanna in the study hall of

Rabbi Yishmael:

The Torah states [Numbers 5],

“Whether man or woman commit any sin of a person,”

to teach that

the verse equated a woman with a man with regard to all punishments,

all prohibitions for which one is liable to punishment—that is, every “you shall not”

in the Torah.

And this is difficult: Why is a special inclusion needed to include a woman in the law of temura?

And we answer: If the reason is that the verse equated a woman with a man with regard to all punishments in the Torah,

what might you have said?

We might have said that

these matters

apply only to

a prohibition involving an action,

such as desecrating Shabbat, for it is specifically in such cases that the verse equated a woman with a man, as it is stated, “whether man or woman commit any sin of a person.”

But a prohibition that does not involve an action,

such as temura, where the prohibition depends on speech,

let us say,

we might have said,

she should not be liable to lashes,

and the woman should not be punished with lashes. Therefore,

it teaches us

that the Torah teaches us through a special inclusion to make a woman liable for performing temura.

And we challenge this:

And according to Rabbi Yohanan, who said

[below, 3b] that the prohibition of temura is not “a prohibition that does not involve an action,” because the designation is effected through his speech,

and speech is considered like an action,

according to him, the law of temura is included among all the prohibitions in which a woman is equated with a man. It is difficult:

For what purpose does the verse come?

That is, the question returns: Why is a special teaching needed to make a woman liable under the law of temura?

And we answer:

It is necessary.

With regard to temura, an explicit verse is necessary to make a woman liable. For

what might you have said?

We might have said that

these matters,

that a woman is equated with a man, apply only

to a punishment that is equally applicable

to everyone,

both to an individual and to the community.

But here,

in the case of temura,

since the punishment is not equally applicable to everyone.

As we learned,

for we learned below [13a]:

“The community and partners do not

perform temura.”

[The reason will be explained there.] Therefore, it might have occurred to one that

a woman too, when she performs it,

when she performs temura,

is not liable to lashes,

she should not be punished with lashes. Therefore,

it teaches us

that the Torah teaches us through a special inclusion to make a woman liable for her temura.

Rami bar Hama raised a question: What is the law regarding a minor performing temura?

The Gemara clarifies:

What are the circumstances?

With regard to which minor did Rami bar Hama raise his doubt?

If you say,

if it is said that the question concerns

a minor who has not reached the “age of vows,”

at the age of twelve years and one day, when, if he knows for whom he vowed, his vow is valid—then it is obvious! For

he cannot consecrate,

even if the minor consecrated an offering, it is not consecrated;

can he perform an exchange?!

Could it enter your mind that he can perform temura?!

Rather, when it is a question for him,

with regard to which minor Rami bar Hama raised his doubt,

it is a minor who has reached the age of vows.

The sides of the doubt are:

Do we say that, since the Master said,

that the Torah said,

“A man

who explicitly vows a valuation of persons to the Lord”?

What is the purpose of the verse saying, “when he explicitly vows”?

Why did the verse use the wording of explicit declaration rather than simply the wording of a vow?

—

to include a “mufla samukh le-ish,” whose consecration is consecrated,

as explained.

Therefore, the question is whether

since he can consecrate,

since he is able to consecrate,

he can likewise perform an exchange,

he is also able to perform temura.

Or perhaps, since he is not subject to punishments

until he becomes thirteen,

his designation does not take effect with regard to temura.

He cannot effect a designation through temura, since the Torah juxtaposed the prohibition of temura to the actual effecting of the sanctity of temura, as it is stated: “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute it. And if he shall indeed exchange, then both it and its substitute shall be sacred.” This juxtaposition teaches that only one who is subject to the prohibition and punishment of temura—namely, an adult who is subject to punishments—is included in the law of effecting temura. But a minor, who is not subject to punishment for temura, is not included in the law of effecting temura, and the sanctity of temura does not take effect through his speech.

The question remains unresolved.

Rami bar Hama continues and raises the question of whether a gentile can perform temura. For when a gentile consecrates an offering as a vow or a freewill offering [excluding a sin offering, guilt offering, and the like], his consecration is valid, and it is sacrificed, as will be explained. However, with regard to temura, there is reason to say that his temura is not valid.

And even

if you should say,

and prove from a Mishna, beraita, or logical reasoning that

a minor can perform temura,

this is because, although he is currently not subject to punishments, nevertheless,

for he will come

he will eventually come

within the category of those subject to punishments,

when he turns thirteen. Therefore, it is possible to call him even now “one subject to punishments.” Accordingly, Rami bar Hama asks:

What is the law regarding a gentile performing temura?

Does the sanctity of temura take effect through his declaration, “This shall be in place of that”?

Can you say

that it should be said:

since he can consecrate,

just as he can consecrate,

as it was taught in a beraita,

as we learned in a beraita: The Torah states [Leviticus 22],

“Any man, any man

of the House of Israel who brings his offering,”

what is the purpose of the verse saying, “any man, any man”?

This comes

to include gentiles, who make vows and bring freewill offerings like Jews,

and therefore

he can likewise perform an exchange,

he too can perform temura.

Or perhaps,

a gentile is inferior to a minor,

since he will not come

and will never come

within the category of those subject to punishments,

and he is not subject to lashes. Therefore,

when he performs temura, its sanctity does not take effect.

This is for the reason stated above: the Torah juxtaposed the actual effecting of temura to the prohibition of temura.

Rava said: Come and hear

to resolve the question from a beraita, which states that Rabbi Shimon holds that although gentiles make vows and bring freewill offerings, nevertheless, their offerings are not entirely like the offerings of Jews with regard to several laws of offerings. The entire beraita is explained later in the sugya.

As it was taught in a beraita: The sacred offerings of gentiles are neither subject to misuse nor permit deriving benefit from them.

One who derives benefit from them does not bring a guilt offering for misuse, as one who derives benefit from the sacred offerings of Jews does. However, the Sages prohibited deriving benefit from them.

And one is not liable on their account for piggul, notar, or impurity.

If the offering became piggul, or the time for eating it passed, or it became impure, one who eats it is not liable to karet, as one who eats piggul, notar, or an impure offering from the sacred offerings of Jews.

And they do not

perform temura.

That is, if one performs temura with regard to their offering, the temura does not take effect.

And they do not bring libations

by themselves, as Jews voluntarily bring libations by themselves, not in connection with a sacrifice.

However, his sacrifice

of a gentile

requires libations,

the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Yosei said: In all of them I see reason to be stringent,

as one commits sacrilege with the sacrifices of gentiles by Torah law, and all the more so, it is forbidden to derive benefit from them. One is liable for them on account of piggul, notar, and impurity. But with regard to bringing libations by themselves, Rabbi Yosei concedes that they do not bring them .

The beraita continues with regard to the law of sacrilege:

In what case are these words stated,

that Rabbi Shimon said that one does not commit sacrilege with the sacred property of gentiles?

With regard to sacrificial sanctity,

such as an olah that a gentile consecrated.

But with regard to sanctity for Temple maintenance,

if gentiles consecrated money or an object for consecrated use,

one commits sacrilege with them.

And Rava resolves the matter:

In any event it teaches,

we learn in the beraita that

the sacrifice of a gentile

does not

effect temura.

And let us resolve that just as his sacrifice does not effect temura, so too gentiles do not effect temura .

And the question is resolved: a gentile does not effect temura .

He said to him

Rami bar Ḥama said to Rava:

If a gentile consecrated

a sacrifice

in order that

a

gentile

himself should achieve atonement through it,

I have no question,

I had no doubt about this, and I knew that the gentile does not effect temura.

My question is,

what, indeed, was my doubt?

If a gentile consecrated a sacrifice, and

[in order]

that a Jew should achieve atonement through it.

For example, the gentile consecrated it on behalf of a Jew who was obligated to bring a sacrifice. And now the Jew who achieves atonement through it comes and says with regard to another animal, “This is in place of that.” And I am uncertain whether temura takes effect through this declaration.

The two sides of the doubt are:

Is it that

we follow the one who consecrated it,

and since the one who consecrated it is a gentile, and he does not effect temura, temura likewise cannot be effected with regard to a sacrifice that he consecrated?

Or do we follow the one who achieves atonement through it.

And since he is a Jew, and the sacrifice was consecrated for his atonement, one may effect temura with regard to such a sacrifice.

And we raise an objection: What was Rami bar Ḥama’s question?

Let him resolve it

as it is possible to resolve his question

from

the words of

Rabbi Abbahu.

For Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Three matters were stated with regard to one who gives something of his own for the obligation of another person.

a.

The one who consecrated it adds a fifth.

One who consecrated a sacrifice, and a blemish developed in it, may redeem it from the consecrated property for its monetary value, and the redeemer adds a fifth, as it is stated [Leviticus 27]: “And if the one who consecrated it redeems it, he shall add a fifth of the money of your valuation to it, and it shall be his.” And we expound from the word “the one who consecrated it” that a fifth is added only upon the redemption of the first consecration, but not by “the one who effects temura.” This teaches that if an animal of temura develops a blemish, the one who redeems it need not add a fifth to its value.

b.

And the one who achieves atonement through it effects temura.

If a Jew set aside a sacrifice so that another Jew would achieve atonement through it, the one who achieves atonement through it effects temura and is flogged. Since it was set aside for his sake, he is considered the owner of the sacrifice with regard to temura. And below [10a] we derive that “the owner of the sacrifice,” meaning “the one who achieves atonement through it,” is the one who effects temura, and not the one who consecrated it.

c.

And one who separates teruma from

untithed produce

of his own

for

untithed produce

belonging to another—

the benefit of the gift belongs to him.