Temurah 25b (כה:) — the Talmud in English

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi says:

one who emancipates half of his slave, the slave goes free;

he acquires himself with regard to the half, and he is half slave and half free man,

as his bill of emancipation and his legal capacity come into being simultaneously.

Rather,

if you say that

what he left over remains

and

the fetus is not considered the thigh of its mother,

and you maintain that if he emancipated the mother while leaving the fetus as a slave, the fetus remains a slave, then according to your view that they are two separate bodies, and are two slaves belonging to one master, there is a difficulty:

why did she acquire it for him?

How can the mother acquire the bill for the fetus? How can one slave acquire something for another slave, when “a slave’s legal capacity is the legal capacity of his master”? When his master gives him a bill on behalf of his fellow slave, while he himself is not being emancipated [for when he himself is emancipated, he acquires the bill together with the legal capacity to receive it], it is as though the bill has remained in the master’s possession, and there is no “transfer” from the master’s hand to the hand of the one being emancipated—

But it is taught in a beraita: It appears that

a slave can acquire a bill of emancipation on behalf of his fellow slave

a slave like him

from a master who is not his own.

For example, Reuven’s slave acquires it for Shimon’s slave from the master who is emancipating him. Since, with regard to Shimon, Reuven’s slave is like another legal capacity, it follows that the bill was “given” from the hand of Shimon, the emancipating master, and Reuven’s slave “received” the bill as an agent to emancipate Shimon’s slave.

But not

and he does not have a legal capacity to receive a bill

from his own master

for another slave of his own master, as explained—

And if, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says, the mother and the fetus are two separate slaves belonging to one master, how can the mother acquire a bill for the fetus?

Rather, conclude from it,

from the beraita, that

what he left over does not remain, and this is a refutation of Rabbi Yoḥanan!

And we conclude: Indeed, from this beraita there is

a refutation!

And the Gemara discusses:

Shall we say that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement,

that

what he left over remains,

is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im,

that it is stated as part of a dispute between tanna’im?

As it is taught in a beraita,

we learned in a beraita:

One who says to his maidservant

at the time he gives her a bill of emancipation:

“You are a free woman, but your fetus is a slave!”—

her fetus is like her,

and it goes free together with its mother. These are

the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

And the Sages say: The statement takes effect,

and the fetus does not go free.

And the beraita concludes:

Because it is stated

in the passage concerning a Hebrew slave who goes free, that if his master gave him a woman [a Canaanite maidservant] and he fathered children with her, then now, when the Hebrew slave goes free, [Exodus 21]

“The woman and her children shall belong to her master.”

The Gemara understood this conclusion to be a continuation of the words of the Sages, proving from the verse that the fetus does not follow the status of the mother. Therefore, the Gemara asks:

The verse,

this verse,

what textual basis does it provide for the Sages?!

After all, this verse, “The woman and her children,” seems more consistent with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, that the status of the fetus is the same as that of the woman?

Rava said: This verse

is referring to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. As it is taught,

in another beraita we learned the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili in this formulation:

“Her fetus is like her,” as it is stated:

“The woman and her children shall belong to her master,”

to teach us:

When the woman

belongs

to her master,

her fetus belongs to her master. When

the woman does not belong to her master,

her fetus does not belong to her master.

And Rava infers:

Is it not the case

that

this is the point of their dispute?

They disputed this matter:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that

what he left over does not remain,

and the fetus is considered the thigh of its mother, and it is impossible to separate them. Therefore, if he emancipates the mother, the fetus also goes free, like her.

And

whereas

the Sages hold that what he left over

left

remains,

and the fetus does not have the same status as the mother. Thus, the tanna’im disagree concerning whether what he left over remains.

And we reject this:

Rabbi Yoḥanan could say: Everyone

holds that

what he left over remains,

as he said. Therefore, the Sages said that the fetus remains separate and is not emancipated.

And here, this is the reason

for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili:

because the verse says,

“The woman and her children shall belong to her master,”

and this is a decree of the verse that applies only with regard to a maidservant, and not to other laws dependent upon the principle that “what he left over remains,” such as the status of offspring of consecrated animals.

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say,

that

these are those tanna’im,

and Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling depends upon this dispute between tanna’im, who disagree concerning the “fully formed fetus” of a consecrated animal?

A “fully formed fetus” is a live fetus found in its mother’s womb after the mother has been slaughtered. Its law is that the slaughter of its mother was effective for it while it was in her womb, so it is permitted for consumption and does not require slaughter of its own.

If it has completed its gestation [that is, its gestational period has ended: in a large animal, in the ninth month, and in a small animal, whose entire gestational period is five months, in the fifth month], Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree. According to Rabbi Meir, it is no longer permitted through the slaughter of its mother; according to the Sages, it is permitted through the slaughter of its mother. But concerning a live four-month-old fetus in a small animal, everyone agrees that it is permitted through the slaughter of its mother.

The following beraitot discuss one who slaughters a sin offering and finds in it a live four-month-old fetus: what is the law of that fetus?

As it is taught in a beraita: One who slaughters a sin offering and finds in it

a fetus

four

months old,

alive.

One tanna taught:

One beraita says that its status is that of a sin offering in every respect:

It may be eaten only by male members of the priesthood, and it may be eaten only for one day and one night,

and it may be eaten only within the curtains.

And another beraita teaches:

another beraita says that its status is entirely that of an ordinary animal:

It may be eaten by anyone, it may be eaten anywhere, and it may be eaten forever.

The Gemara assumed that this concerns an animal that became pregnant and was then consecrated.

Is it not the case that they disagree

about this,

that the tanna’im of the beraitot disagree concerning Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement:

The first tanna holds that

what he left over remains,

and the fetus is considered an animal in its own right. Just as he can leave it for ordinary use or for another sanctity, so too he can consecrate it separately as a sin offering. Therefore, it possesses the sanctity of a sin offering in every respect.

And

whereas

the latter tanna holds that if

“what he

what he left over does not remain,

since it is a limb of the mother’s limbs, it cannot be consecrated separately, and all its sanctity derives from the mother. Since it is in its mother’s womb and had no moment of “coming into existence” at which it could be consecrated [according to the one who says, “the offspring of consecrated animals are sanctified at the time of their coming into existence,”], once it is removed alive from its mother’s womb after the mother’s slaughter, having neither been born nor sanctified with the mother’s sanctity, it has the status of an ordinary animal.

This presents a difficulty to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Shall we say that his view is subject to a dispute between tanna’im?

And we reject this:

Rabbi Yoḥanan could say:

No!

Everyone,

the tanna’im of both beraitot, holds that

what he left over remains,

as he said. Indeed, if one consecrated a pregnant animal, he can leave the fetus for ordinary use, provided that he explicitly stipulates this, saying first, “The fetus is ordinary,” and afterward saying, “The mother is a sin offering.” But if he did not explicitly leave it over, the fetus becomes consecrated by virtue of the consecrator’s utterance, and its status is that of a sin offering in its own right, in all its laws.

Rather, the beraitot are not discussing one who consecrated a pregnant animal; they are discussing one who consecrated an animal as a sin offering and afterward it became pregnant. Therefore, it is entirely impossible to discuss whether he left the fetus over or did not leave it over, or whether he can leave it over, since at the time of the consecration the fetus had not yet been formed.

In what halakha, then, do the tanna’im of the beraitot disagree?

And these tanna’im disagree about this:

the

point of dispute:

One

the tanna of the second beraita,

holds that

the offspring of consecrated animals are sanctified at the time of their coming into existence.

Since the fetus did not “come into existence” but was removed alive from its mother’s womb, it was not sanctified with the mother’s sanctity by virtue of the mother; therefore, its status is that of an ordinary animal.

And

whereas

the other

the tanna of the first beraita,

holds that

the offspring of consecrated animals are sanctified while in their mothers’ wombs.

It was sanctified with the sanctity of a sin offering by virtue of the mother while it was in its mother’s womb, from the moment of its formation; therefore, its status is that of a sin offering.

And if you wish, say:

the tanna’im of both beraitot hold that “what he left over remains,” in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan, and they also hold that “the offspring of consecrated animals are sanctified at the time of their coming into existence.”

And there is no difficulty,

and nevertheless these beraitot do not contradict one another and do not represent the views of two different tanna’im; rather, they discuss two different circumstances:

Here,

the second beraita speaks

of

a case

in which he consecrated the animal and it subsequently became pregnant.

Therefore, the fetus is not sanctified through the sanctity expressed by the consecrator’s utterance, since it had not yet been formed at the time of the consecration; nor is it sanctified through the mother, since it had not yet “come into existence” from her. Consequently, its status is that of an ordinary animal.

Whereas

here,

the first beraita speaks

of

a case

in which the animal became pregnant and was subsequently consecrated.

He did not leave the fetus over at the time of the consecration, as he did not first say, “The fetus is ordinary.” Since it is fit to be consecrated in its own right, it became sanctified through the consecrator’s utterance with independent sanctity, and not through the mother. This consecration takes effect even while it is in its mother’s womb; therefore, its status is that of a sin offering.

We learned above that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: “If one separated a pregnant sin offering and it gave birth—if he wishes, he achieves atonement through it; if he wishes, he achieves atonement through its offspring.” The Gemara explained his reason: He holds that “what he left over remains” and that “the fetus is not considered the thigh of its mother.”

The Gemara cited the beraita “One who says to his maidservant,” and so forth, as a difficulty against Rabbi Yoḥanan, and the Gemara concluded: “A refutation of Rabbi Yoḥanan; a refutation.” The Gemara now discusses this entire give-and-take:

Rava raised an objection to him: From where

do we know

that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason

is

because

he holds that

what he left over remains,

and that these were the matters by which they challenged him and proved to him that the beraita concerning the maidservant holds that what he left over does not remain?

Perhaps

Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees that what he left over does not remain, and when one consecrates a pregnant sin offering, the fetus becomes sanctified automatically through the mother, and not through the consecrator’s utterance.

And this is Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason:

He said, “If he wishes, he achieves atonement through the offspring,” and the offspring is not sent to die, because he holds

that

a person achieves atonement through the increase in a consecrated object,

through the increase that occurred in the consecrated object after it was consecrated. Therefore, if he wishes, he achieves atonement through the offspring, which is an increase in the consecrated object. Indeed, if he achieves atonement through the mother, the offspring is sent to die, like any sin offering whose owner achieved atonement through another offering. Likewise, if he achieves atonement through the offspring, the mother is sent to die. Their law is not like that of one who separated two sin offerings for liability, in which case he achieves atonement through one and the other grazes. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s primary innovation is that he can achieve atonement through the offspring by virtue of the principle that “a person achieves atonement through the increase in a consecrated object.”

Why did the Gemara not explain Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words in this manner?

Rav Hamnuna said to Rava:

But

Rabbi Elazar

was

a disciple of Rabbi Yoḥanan and sat before him,

and while sitting before him he challenged him from our Mishna, which says that if a person says, “This is a peace offering and its offspring is an elevation offering,” the offspring is a peace offering, and he proved to him that what he left over does not remain.

And

Rabbi Yoḥanan

did not respond to him with this explanation:

He did not answer him as you say, nor did he tell him: “I personally hold that what he left over does not remain, and my principal innovation is that a person achieves atonement through the increase in a consecrated object.”

And

if

you were to say that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason is because a person achieves atonement through the increase in a consecrated object?!

This is certainly not so. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason is that he holds that what he left over remains.

We learned in our Mishna:

And if, after he said,

“This is a peace offering,”

he reconsidered and said,

“Its offspring is an elevation offering,”—

it is the offspring of a peace offering.

And we ask:

Is it obvious

that

its offspring is a peace offering?

He already consecrated it as a peace offering; what difference does it make that he subsequently reconsidered and said, “Its offspring is an elevation offering”?

Can he reconsider whenever he wishes?!

Can he retract his words whenever he wishes?!

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: It was necessary

to teach that he cannot retract his words after he paused and reconsidered,

but rather

the innovation of the Mishna is in a case where he

said

“Its offspring is an elevation offering”

within the time required for an utterance,

after only a brief pause equivalent to the time required for an utterance, after he said, “This is a peace offering.”

Lest you say

that one might say:

“Within the time required for an utterance is considered like an utterance,”

so that everything is considered one utterance, even though he paused briefly,

and this

—the reason he did not say “Its offspring is an elevation offering” immediately after saying “This is a peace offering,” but paused briefly—is that

he was merely contemplating,

thinking about the matter and deliberating whether to consecrate it separately as an elevation offering or leave it as a peace offering; therefore

it teaches us

that this is not so. Rather, he reconsidered. If he did not say “Its offspring is an elevation offering” immediately, its status is that of the offspring of a peace offering.

Mishna:

Our Mishna continues with the words of Rabbi Meir, who maintains, “One seizes the first expression,” and with the words of Rabbi Yosei, who maintains, “A person is also bound by the conclusion of his words.”

Two animals were standing before him —one a burnt-offering and one a peace-offering—and he placed a non-sacred animal beside them, and said concerning the non-sacred animal: “

This is the substitute for a burnt-offering, the substitute for a peace-offering”—

This is the substitute for a burnt-offering, according to Rabbi Meir,

who maintains, “One seizes the first expression”; thus, the sanctity of a burnt-offering, which was mentioned first, takes effect, and the second sanctity does not take effect.

Rabbi Yosei says:

If he initially intended this,

to consecrate it with two sanctities,

since it is impossible to assign two names simultaneously,

and he was therefore required to mention one before the other,

his words are valid.

Half of it is the substitute for a burnt-offering and half of it is the substitute for a peace-offering; it shall graze until it develops a blemish, and then it shall be sold, and with the proceeds from half of it he shall bring a substitute for a burnt-offering, and with the proceeds from the other half he shall bring a substitute for a peace-offering.

And if, once he had said

after he said] “This is the

substitute for a burnt-offering,”

he reconsidered and said, “

substitute for a peace-offering,”

this is the substitute for a burnt-offering.