Temurah 25b — the Talmud in English

For it was taught: Rabbi says: ![](pamud.bmp "

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one who emancipates half of his slave, he goes out to freedom,

he acquires himself for half, and he is half slave and half free man,

for his bill of emancipation and his hand come simultaneously.

Rather,

if you say

what he left remains left,

and

the fetus is not the thigh of its mother,

and you hold that if he emancipated the mother but left the fetus to remain a slave, the fetus remains a slave, then according to your view—that they are two separate bodies, and they are two slaves belonging to one master—this is difficult:

why did she acquire it for him,

how can the mother acquire the bill for the fetus? How can one slave acquire [something] for another slave, when “the hand of a slave is like the hand of his master”? And when his master gives him a bill on behalf of his fellow, while he himself is not emancipated [for when he himself is emancipated, he acquires the bill and the hand simultaneously], it is as though the bill has remained in the master’s possession, and there is no “giving” here from the master’s hand to the hand of the one being emancipated—

But was it not taught: the matter appears

that a slave can acquire the bill of emancipation of his fellow

[a slave like himself]

from a master who is not his own.

The slave of Reuben [can acquire it] for the slave of Simeon, the emancipating master. Since, with regard to Simeon, the slave of Reuben is like another hand, it follows that the bill is “given” from the hand of Simeon, the emancipating master, and the slave of Reuben “receives” the bill as an agent to emancipate the slave of Simeon.

But not

and he does not have a “hand” with which to receive a bill

from his own master

for another slave of his own master, as explained—

And if, as Rabbi Yohanan says, the mother and the fetus are two separate slaves belonging to one master—how can the mother acquire a bill for the fetus?

Rather, infer from here,

from the beraita, that

if he left it, it does not remain left; and this is a refutation of Rabbi Yohanan!

And we conclude: indeed, from this beraita it is

a refutation!

And the Gemara discusses:

Let us say

shall we say that Rabbi Yohanan’s statement,

“if he left it, it remains left,”

is a dispute between tannaim,

that it is stated as a dispute between tannaim?

For it was taught,

we learned in a beraita:

One who says to his maidservant

at the time of giving a bill of emancipation:

“Behold, you are a free woman, and your offspring is a slave!”—

her offspring is like her,

and it goes out to freedom together with its mother. These are

the words of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean.

And the Sages say: the words stand,

and the offspring does not go out to freedom.

And the beraita concludes:

because it is stated

in the passage concerning a Hebrew slave who goes out to freedom, that if his master gave him a woman [a Canaanite maidservant] and he fathered offspring from her, then now, when the Hebrew slave goes out free, [Exodus 21]

“the woman and her children shall belong to her master.”

And the Gemara understood that this conclusion continues the words of the Sages, to prove from the verse that the offspring does not follow the mother. Therefore the Gemara asks:

the verse,

this verse,

what teaching is there for the Sages!?

For this verse, “the woman and her children,” appears to imply more like Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, that the law of the offspring is like the law of the woman?

Rava said: This verse

stands for Rabbi Yosei the Galilean. For it is taught,

that in another beraita we learned the words of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean in this formulation:

“Her offspring is like her, as it is stated,

‘the woman and her children shall belong to her master,’

to teach us:

when the woman

belongs

to her master—

her offspring belongs to her master. There is no

[time when] the woman belongs to her master—

[that] her offspring does not belong to her master.”

And Rava infers:

Is it not so

shall we not say that

in this they disagree,

they dispute this law,

for Rabbi Yosei the Galilean holds

“what he left does not remain left,”

and the fetus is the thigh of its mother, and it is impossible to separate them; therefore, if he emancipated the mother, the offspring also goes out to freedom, like her.

And

whereas

the Sages hold, “what he

left

remains left,”

for the law of the offspring is not like the law of the mother. Thus, the tannaim disagree concerning “what he left.”

And we reject this:

Rabbi Yohanan can say: everyone

holds “if

he left it, it remains left,”

as I say. Therefore the Sages said that the offspring remains left, and is not emancipated.

And here, this is the reason

for Rabbi Yosei the Galilean: because

the verse says

“the woman and her children shall belong to her master,”

and it is a Scriptural decree concerning a maidservant alone, and not concerning other laws dependent upon the rule “what he left remains left,” such as concerning the offspring of consecrated animals.

And the Gemara discusses:

Let us say,

shall we say,

these tannaim

that Rabbi Yohanan’s law depends upon this dispute between tannaim, who disagree concerning the “son of a disemboweled animal” of a consecrated animal?

“Son of a disemboweled animal” is a live offspring found in its mother’s womb after the mother has been slaughtered. Its law is that its mother’s slaughter, since it was in her womb, is effective for it; it is permitted for consumption and does not require slaughter.

And if its months have been completed [that is, the days of its gestation have ended—in a large animal, in the ninth month, and in a small animal, whose entire gestation is five months, in the fifth month], Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree. According to Rabbi Meir, it is no longer permitted through the slaughter of its mother; according to the Sages, it is permitted through the slaughter of its mother. But a live four-month-old fetus in a small animal is, according to everyone, permitted through the slaughter of its mother.

The following beraitot discuss one who slaughters the sin-offering and finds in it a live four-month-old fetus: what is the law of that fetus?

For it was taught: one who slaughters the sin-offering and finds in it

an

four-month-old

fetus,

alive.

One [beraita] teaches,

one beraita says that its law is like that of a sin-offering in every respect:

it may be eaten only by males of the priesthood, and it may be eaten only for one day and one night,

and it may be eaten only within the curtains.

And another [beraita] teaches,

and another beraita says that its law is like that of entirely ordinary [non-sacred] meat:

it may be eaten by every person, it may be eaten everywhere, and it may be eaten forever.

And the Gemara assumed that this concerns an animal that became pregnant and afterward was consecrated.

Is it not so, in this

they disagree,

the tannaim of the beraitot disagree concerning the statement of Rabbi Yohanan:

for the first tanna holds

“if he left it, it remains left,”

and the fetus is considered an animal in its own right. Just as he can leave it for ordinary use or for another sanctity, so he can consecrate it as a sin-offering in its own right. Therefore it has the sanctity of a sin-offering in every respect.

And

whereas

the latter tanna holds, if

“what he

left does not remain left,”

for it is a limb of the limbs of the mother, and it is impossible to consecrate it in its own right; all its sanctity is by virtue of the mother. And since it was in its mother’s womb, and it did not have a moment of “coming into existence” in which to become consecrated [according to the one who says, “the offspring of consecrated animals become sacred at their coming into existence”], once they removed it alive from its mother’s womb after the slaughter of the mother, and it was not born and did not become consecrated with the mother’s sanctity, it has the status of ordinary meat.

And this is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan: shall we say [that it is a dispute between] tannaim?

And we reject this:

Rabbi Yohanan can say:

No!

Everyone,

the tannaim of both beraitot, holds

“if he left it, it remains left,”

as I say. Indeed, if one consecrated a pregnant animal, he can leave the fetus for ordinary use, if he explicitly stipulates this, saying first, “the offspring is ordinary,” and afterward saying, “and the mother is a sin-offering.” But if he did not explicitly leave it, the offspring becomes consecrated by virtue of the consecrator’s utterance of consecration, and its law is like that of a sin-offering in its own right, with regard to all its laws.

Rather, the beraitot are not dealing with one who consecrated a pregnant animal; they are dealing with one who consecrated an animal as a sin-offering, and afterward it became pregnant. Therefore it is entirely impossible to discuss whether he left the offspring or did not leave it, and whether he can leave it or cannot, since at the time of the consecration the offspring had not yet been formed.

And concerning what law do the tannaim of the beraitot disagree?

And these tannaim, in this

matter

they disagree:

One master,

the tanna of the second beraita,

holds

“the offspring of consecrated animals become sacred at their coming into existence,”

and since it did not “come into existence” but was removed alive from its mother’s womb, it did not become consecrated with the mother’s sanctity by virtue of the mother; therefore its law is like that of ordinary meat.

And

whereas

one master,

the tanna of the first beraita,

holds

“the offspring of consecrated animals become sacred in their mothers’ wombs,”

and it became consecrated with the sanctity of a sin-offering by virtue of its mother while it was in its mother’s womb, from the time of its formation; therefore its law is like that of a sin-offering.

And if you wish, say:

the tannaim of both beraitot hold that “if he left it, it remains left,” as Rabbi Yohanan says, and they also hold “they become sacred at their coming into existence.”

And it is not difficult,

and nevertheless these beraitot do not contradict one another and are not the views of two tannaim, but they deal with two different situations:

Here,

the second beraita speaks

of

a situation

in which he consecrated it and finally it became pregnant,

therefore the fetus is not sacred by virtue of the sanctity expressed by the consecrator, since at the time of the consecration it had not yet been formed; nor is it sacred by virtue of the mother, since it had not yet “come into existence” from her. Therefore its law is like that of ordinary meat.

Whereas

here,

the first beraita speaks

of

a situation

in which it became pregnant and finally he consecrated it, and he did not leave the offspring at the time of the consecration, for he did not first say, “the offspring is ordinary.” Since it is fit to become consecrated in its own right, it became consecrated through the consecrator’s utterance of consecration with independent sanctity, and not by virtue of the mother; and this consecration takes effect even while it is in its mother’s womb. Therefore its law is like that of a sin-offering.

The owner did not leave the fetus aside at the time of the consecration, since he did not first say, “The fetus is non-sacred.” Since the fetus is significant enough to be consecrated in its own right, it became sacred through the words of the one who consecrated it, with independent sanctity and not through the mother. This consecration takes effect even while it is in its mother’s womb. Therefore, its status is that of a sin-offering.

We learned above that Rabbi Yohanan said: “He separated a pregnant sin-offering and it gave birth—if he wishes, he gains atonement through it; if he wishes, he gains atonement through its offspring.” And the Gemara explained his reason: because he holds “what he left remains left,” and “the fetus is not the thigh of its mother.”

And the Gemara brought the beraita, “one who says to his maidservant,” and so forth, to raise a difficulty against Rabbi Yohanan; and the Gemara concluded, “a refutation of Rabbi Yohanan, a refutation.” Concerning all this give-and-take, the Gemara discusses:

Rava challenged him! From where,

do we know,

that the reason of Rabbi Yohanan

is

because

he holds

“if he left it, it remains left,”

and that they answered him on these matters and proved to him that the beraita concerning the maidservant holds “what he left does not remain left”?

Perhaps,

it is possible that Rabbi Yohanan admits that “what he left does not remain left,” and, when one consecrates a pregnant sin-offering, the offspring becomes sacred on its own by virtue of the mother, and not through the consecration of his utterance.

And this is the reason of Rabbi Yohanan,

who said, “if he wishes, he gains atonement through the offspring,” and the offspring does not go to death, because he holds

that

a person gains atonement through the increase of consecrated property,

through the increase that consecrated property acquired after it was consecrated. Therefore, if he wishes, he gains atonement through the offspring, which is the increase of consecrated property. Indeed, if he gains atonement through the mother, the offspring goes to death, like every sin-offering whose owner gained atonement through another one. And likewise, if he gains atonement through the offspring, the mother goes to death. Their law is not like that of one who separated two sin-offerings for responsibility, where he gains atonement through one and the other grazes. Rabbi Yohanan’s essential innovation is that he can gain atonement through the offspring by virtue of the principle “a person gains atonement through the increase of consecrated property.”

And why did the Gemara not explain Rabbi Yohanan’s words in this manner?

Rav Hamnuna said to him

to Rava: surely

Rabbi Elazar

was

a disciple of Rabbi Yohanan, and sat before him,

and sat before him, and raised a difficulty against him from our Mishna, which says that if a person said, “It is a peace-offering and its offspring is a burnt-offering,” the offspring is a peace-offering, and proved to him that “what he left does not remain left.”

And

Rabbi Yohanan

did not answer him with this resolution,

did not answer him as you say, and did not say to him: “As for me, I hold ‘what he left does not remain left,’ and my essential innovation is that ‘a person gains atonement through the increase of consecrated property.’”

And

if

you had said, ‘the reason of Rabbi Yohanan is because a person gains atonement through the increase of consecrated property’?!

surely this is certainly not so; rather, Rabbi Yohanan’s reason is that he holds “what he left remains left.”

We learned in our Mishna:

And if, after he said

“This is a peace-offering,”

he reconsidered and said

“Its offspring is a burnt-offering,”—

behold, this is its offspring’s peace-offering.

And we ask:

It is obvious,

that

its offspring is a peace-offering,

for he had already consecrated it as a peace-offering; what difference does it make that afterward he reconsidered and said, “its offspring is a burnt-offering”?

Rather, whenever he wants, he reconsiders!?

Can he retract whenever he wishes?!

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: it was not necessary

to state that he cannot retract when he waited and reconsidered,

rather,

the innovation of the Mishna is in a case

where he said

“its offspring is a burnt-offering”

within the time required for speech,

after a brief pause equal to “within the time required for speech,” after he said, “This is a peace-offering.”

It might have entered your mind to say,

there would be room to say,

“within the time required for speech is considered speech,”

everything is considered one utterance, even though he paused somewhat;

and this,

and the reason that he did not say “its offspring is a burnt-offering” immediately after saying “This is a peace-offering,” but paused somewhat, is that

he is merely considering,

he is thinking about the matter and wavering in his mind whether to consecrate it as a burnt-offering in its own right or leave it a peace-offering. Therefore,

it teaches us,

the Mishna teaches us that this is not so, but that he reconsidered. And if he did not say immediately, “its offspring is a burnt-offering,” its offspring is a peace-offering.

Mishna:

Our Mishna continues with the words of Rabbi Meir, who holds “seize the first expression,” and with the words of Rabbi Yosei, who holds “a person is also seized by his final words.”

There were standing before him two animals, one an olah and one a shelamim, and he placed a non-sacred animal beside them, and said concerning the non-sacred animal

“Behold, this is a substitution for an olah, a substitution for a shelamim” —

This is a substitution for an olah, the words of Rabbi Meir,

who holds “seize the first expression,” and the sanctity of the first olah was seized, and the second sanctity did not take effect.

Rabbi Yosei says:

If this was what he intended at first,

to consecrate it with two sanctities,

since it is impossible to call two names at once,

and he had to make one precede the other,

his words stand.

And half of it is a substitution for an olah and half of it is a substitution for a shelamim, and it shall graze until a blemish occurs in it, and it shall be sold, and he shall bring, with the money of its half, a substitution for an olah, and with the money of its half, a substitution for a shelamim.

And if, from the time he said [

after he said] “Behold, this is

a substitution for an olah,”

he changed his mind and said “

a substitution for a shelamim,”

this is a substitution for an olah.