Temurah 11b (יא:) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara cites a beraita in which a dispute between tannaim is explained concerning one who says, “The leg of this animal is an ola”: does the sanctity spread throughout the entire animal?

The Sages taught: Could it be that if one says, “The leg of this animal is an olah,” the entire animal becomes an olah?

The Sages taught: Could it be that one who says, “The leg of this animal is an ola,” causes the entire animal to be an ola?

The verse states:

“Now, if it is an animal from which they offer a sacrifice to the Lord

—anything that one gives of it to the Lord shall be sacred.”

And we derive: If one sanctifies a limb of an animal, it shall be

“of it to the Lord,”

meaning that only that limb that was consecrated shall be sacred to the Lord,

and not

shall

all

of it be sacred

to the Lord.

Could it be

that the animal from which one limb was consecrated can be redeemed by redeeming the sanctity of the limb, and

thereby become non-sacred? The verse states, “It shall be sacred,”

meaning that the limb shall remain sacred, without the possibility of redeeming it!

How, then, is this done?

What should be done with that animal? If he slaughters it in the Temple courtyard, this involves non-sacred meat in the Temple courtyard; and if he slaughters it outside, it is consecrated property.

It shall be sold

in its entirety

for the needs of olot,

that is, to someone who has vowed to bring an olah; this will be explained below.

Its proceeds are non-sacred—

“of it to the Lord,”

meaning that only that limb that was sanctified shall be sacred to the Lord,

and not

shall the whole animal be sacred to the Lord. Could it be that the animal from which a limb was sanctified can be redeemed through the redemption of the limb’s sanctity and thereby become non-sacred? The verse states, “It shall be sacred,” meaning that that limb shall be sacred, with no possibility of redemption! How so? What is to be done with that animal? If it is slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, this entails non-sacred meat in the Temple courtyard; and if it is slaughtered outside, it is sacrificial meat . It shall be sold in its entirety for the purposes of olot, that is, to someone who vowed to bring an ola [as will be explained below], and its proceeds are non-sacred— except for the value of that limb in it,

whose proceeds he may not take, since it has already been sanctified, does not belong to him, and he is not permitted to sell it. He may sell the remainder of the animal’s body, since it was not sanctified .

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi

the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: From where

do we learn

that one who says, “The leg of this animal is an ola,” causes the entire animal to be an ola? As it is stated: “Anything that one gives of it to the Lord,”

even if he sanctifies “of it,” meaning part of it. The Torah could have written, “Anything that one gives of it to the Lord is sacred.” But

when it says, “It shall be sacred,”

it teaches us

to include the whole of it,

so that the entire animal shall be sacred.

The Master said,

we learned in the beraita, in the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda:

It shall be sold for the purposes of olot.

And we raise a difficulty [according to the first version, which is the wording of the Babylonian Talmud]: How can the purchaser bring it as his obligatory offering?

But he brings

indeed he brings

an animal lacking a limb,

since that limb does not belong to him; rather, it is offered as part of the seller’s obligation. It follows that this person has not offered a complete ola. How, then, has he fulfilled his obligation with this ola? He vowed to offer an entire animal!

And we answer:

Rava said:

He does not sell it to one who vowed in an unspecified manner, “An ola is incumbent upon me,” whose intention is a complete animal. Rather,

when he says,

he sells it to one who said

“An ola is incumbent upon me in its living state,” that is, to offer all the limbs upon which the animal’s life depends [a limb upon which the soul depends ]. Indeed, when he offers this animal, he offers all the limbs upon which the animal’s life depends, since the seller sanctified only the leg from the hock downward , and that is a place where, if the leg is severed, the animal does not become a tereifa.

that is, to offer all the limbs upon which the animal’s life depends [a limb upon which the animal’s life depends]. Indeed, when he offers this animal, he offers all the limbs upon which the animal’s life depends, since the seller consecrated only the leg from the joint downward, which is a place where, if the leg is severed, the animal does not become a tereifa, an animal halakhically unfit for consumption.

Certainly, the case concerns one who sanctified a limb upon which the soul does not depend, since when one sanctifies a limb upon which the soul does depend, Rabbi Yehuda [and Rabbi Meir] agree that the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal; it is all sacred, and he cannot sell it.

Another version

(which is the wording of the Jerusalem Talmud):

But he brings,

this purchaser brings

an animal whose body was sanctified, although the entire animal is not his,

since the entire body does not belong to him? As explained.

And we answer:

Rava said:

The case is

for example, when

the seller said:

“A zuz

worth

of this animal

of this animal

for an olah.”

He did not vow to bring more than a zuz, and in the end he purchased more than a zuz worth. Therefore, he has fulfilled his obligation, since he did not vow to bring an entire olah. We learned above that Rabbi Yehuda agrees that when one consecrates “a limb upon which the animal’s life depends,” the entire animal is sacred and the sanctity spreads throughout it. The Gemara discusses the definition of “a limb upon which the animal’s life depends.”

Rav Hisda said: Rabbi Yehuda agrees

Rava said:

The case is

consecrates

something whose removal renders the animal a tereifa,

meaning that if this limb is removed, the animal is forbidden to eat because of the prohibition against a tereifa. In this case Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal.

Rava said:

Rabbi Yehuda does not agree concerning something whose removal renders the animal a tereifa. Rather, he agrees

concerning something

that, if it is removed from the animal,

renders it an animal carcass,

meaning that the animal is forbidden to eat because of the prohibition against an animal carcass and transmits the ritual impurity of animal carcasses—for example, when the thigh and its cavity are removed. The reason for their dispute will be explained below.

And Rav Sheshet said:

Rabbi Yehuda agrees

when

one consecrates

something that,

if it is removed from the animal,

causes it to die

immediately, such as the heart or the esophagus.

The Gemara asks:

What difference is there between Rav Hisda,

who says: something whose removal renders the animal a tereifa,

and

between

Rava,

who says: something whose removal renders it an animal carcass? In other words, in what do they disagree?

The difference between them

is that they disagree concerning the dispute of the Sages in Hullin 42a, whether

“a tereifa can live.”

That is, concerning all the conditions listed there as rendering an animal a tereifa: when an animal suffers from one of them, will it eventually die from that injury?

Rav Hisda follows the view of

one

who says, “A tereifa cannot live.”

Therefore, when one consecrates something whose removal renders the animal a tereifa, he has consecrated “a limb upon which the animal’s life depends,” and Rabbi Yehuda agrees.

But

if

Rava follows the view of one who says, “A tereifa can live,”

then it is not a limb upon which the animal’s life depends. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda agrees only when one consecrates something whose removal renders the animal an animal carcass.

And what difference is there between Rava and Rav Sheshet,

in what do they disagree?

The difference between them

is that they disagree concerning

the

words of

Rabbi Elazar: When the thigh is removed

for example, when the seller said

“For one zuz —worth one zuz— of this animal —of this animal — for an ola.” He did not vow to bring more than one zuz, and in the end he purchased more than one zuz . Therefore, he has fulfilled his obligation, since he did not vow to bring an entire ola. We learned above that Rabbi Yehuda agrees in the case of one who sanctifies “a limb upon which the soul depends,” that the entire animal is sacred and the sanctity spreads throughout it. The Gemara discusses the definition of “a limb upon which the soul depends ”. Rav Hisda said: Rabbi Yehuda agrees . When one sanctifies an item whose removal renders the animal a tereifa, meaning that if that limb is removed, the animal is forbidden to eat because of the prohibition against a tereifa. In this case Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal. Rava said: Rabbi Yehuda does not agree in the case of an item whose removal renders the animal a tereifa. Rather, he agrees in an item whose removal from it renders it a neveila, and the animal is forbidden to eat because of the prohibition against a neveila and conveys the ritual impurity of a neveila. For example, when the thigh and its socket are removed. The reason for their dispute will be explained below. And Rav Sheshet said: Rabbi Yehuda agrees when one sanctifies an item whose removal from it causes it to die immediately, such as the heart or the esophagus. The Gemara asks: What difference is there between Rav Hisda who says: an item whose removal renders it a tereifa, and between Rava who says: an item whose removal renders it a neveila? That is, in what do they disagree? There is a difference between them: They disagree in the dispute among the Sages [Hullin 42a] as to whether “a tereifa can live.” That is, with regard to all the forms of tereifa listed there, when an animal suffers one of them, will it ultimately die from that condition? Rav Hisda accepts the view of

to the point that the animal appears deficient when it crouches, it is

an animal carcass,

even though it is still alive; it is regarded as dead and transmits the ritual impurity of animal carcasses.

Rava follows the view of

the one

who says, “A tereifa cannot live,” and therefore, when one sanctifies an item whose removal renders the animal a tereifa, he has sanctified “a limb upon which the soul depends,” and Rabbi Yehuda agrees. And if Rava accepts the view of the one who says, “A tereifa can live,” then it is not an item upon which the soul depends. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda agrees only when one sanctifies an item whose removal renders the animal a neveila. And what difference is there between Rava and Rav Sheshet —in what do they disagree? There is a difference between them: They disagree regarding the statement of Rabbi Elazar: Rabbi Elazar said: When the thigh is removed together with its socket, until the animal appears deficient when it crouches , it is a neveila, even though it is still alive; it is considered dead and conveys the ritual impurity of a neveila. Rava accepts the view of the Rabbi Elazar ,

and therefore, if one sanctifies the thigh and its socket, it is an item upon which the soul depends, and Rabbi Yehuda agrees in this case.

And Rav Sheshet does not accept the view of Rabbi Elazar, and maintains that the animal can live, and this is not an item upon which the soul depends. Therefore, he defined it as “an item whose removal causes it to die,” such as the heart or the esophagus. Meytivi,

that the animal can live, and this is not a limb upon which its life depends. Therefore, he defined the matter by saying, “something whose removal causes it to die,” such as the heart or the esophagus.

They raise an objection from a source,

the Gemara cites a beraita to prove that Rabbi Yehuda did not agree in the case of “an item upon which the soul depends.”

For it was taught:

Rabbi Yehuda’s words appear correct

when he holds that only the limb is sacred and that the sanctity does not spread,

when

one consecrates

something upon which the animal’s life does not depend.

Rabbi said: The words of Rabbi Yehuda appear

to be correct, as he maintains that only the limb is sacred and the sanctity does not spread, when

the

words of Rabbi Yosei

appear correct, when he says that the entire animal becomes sacred,

when

one sanctifies

an item upon which the soul does not depend. And the words of Rabbi Yosei appear to be correct, as he says that the entire animal is sacred, when one sanctifies an item upon which the soul depends.

The questioner understood Rabbi’s statements—“the words of Rabbi Yehuda appear to be correct” and “the words of Rabbi Yosei appear to be correct”—to mean that Rabbi adopts an intermediate position, deciding on the basis of his own reasoning in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda with regard to an item upon which the soul does not depend, and in accordance with Rabbi Yosei with regard to an item upon which the soul depends. Therefore, he infers from the conclusion of Rabbi’s words: Is it

not

the meaning of his statement

that it follows that

the

words of Rabbi Yosei contradict Rabbi Yehuda

even with regard to an item upon which the soul does not depend, and that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Yosei even with regard to an item upon which the soul depends?

And now,

“Rabbi Yehuda’s words appear correct concerning something upon which the animal’s life does not depend,” since

Rabbi Yosei disagrees with him,

holding that the entire animal is sacred, and Rabbi decides in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

granted,

Rabbi’s decision is understandable when he says “The words of Rabbi Yehuda appear to be correct with regard to an item upon which the soul does not depend,” for Rabbi Yosei disagrees with him,

maintaining that the entire animal is sacred, and Rabbi decides in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

But,

Rabbi’s decision is difficult when he says

“The words of Rabbi Yosei appear to be correct with regard to an item upon which the soul depends,”

for what sort of decision is this? According to the statements of Rav Hisda, Rava, and Rav Sheshet, Rabbi Yehuda never disagreed with regard to an item upon which the soul depends!

Is it

not, it follows

from Rabbi’s words that

Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with him,

maintaining that even when one sanctifies an item upon which the soul depends, the entire animal is not sacred?!

And this is a refutation of all of them,

a difficulty against all the amoraim: Rav Hisda, Rava, and Rav Sheshet!

And we answer:

“Rabbi Yosei’s words appear correct to Rabbi Yehuda,”

meaning that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with Rabbi Yosei—

concerning something upon which the animal’s life depends, for

even Rabbi Yehuda disagreed with him only concerning something upon which the animal’s life does not depend; but concerning something upon which the animal’s life does depend—

he agrees with him.

This is in accordance with the statements of Rav Hisda, Rava, and Rav Sheshet.

concerning something upon which the soul depends, since

it is true that

Rabbi Yehuda too disagreed with him only concerning something upon which the soul does not depend, but concerning something upon which the soul depends—

No,

that is not how Rabbi’s words are to be understood! Rabbi is not deciding between the opinions. Rather, a portion is missing, and this is what it teaches , and these are Rabbi’s words in the latter clause: “The words of Rabbi Yosei appear to be correct to Rabbi Yehuda,” meaning that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with Rabbi Yosei— with regard to an item upon which the soul depends, for indeed Rabbi Yehuda disagreed with him only with regard to an item upon which the soul does not depend; but with regard to an item upon which the soul depends, he agrees with him.

This is in accordance with the words of Rav Hisda, Rava, and Rav Sheshet.

Rava raises a question whether Rabbi Yosei likewise stated the law of the spreading of sanctity with regard to a bird . This is what Rashi wrote. Apparently, from his words it follows that he did not raise this question with regard to Rabbi Yehuda, although it would be possible to raise the question of what the law would be if one sanctified a limb upon which the soul depends in a bird. See Rashash, Kodshei David, and Hidushei HaGri z, which explain why Rashi was compelled to maintain this. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the law that sanctity spreads when one sanctifies a limb upon which the soul depends is based on pure logical reasoning, and this reasoning applies to a bird just as it does to an animal. By contrast, Rabbi Yosei derives all the laws of the spreading of sanctity from the scriptural exposition, and it is possible to raise the question because the verse mentions “an animal.” See Penei Yehoshua (Kiddushin there) and Avnei Miluim (section 31, subsection 18). See also Kehillot Yaakov (section 5). However, Kesef Mishne and Birkat HaZevaḥ already noted that Rambam disagrees, and explains Rava’s question as applying even according to Rabbi Yehuda. This is the wording of Rambam [Hilkhot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, chapter 15, halakha 2]: One who says, “The wing of this bird is an ola,” or “The leg of this bird is an ola”—it shall be sold to those obligated to bring olot, and its proceeds are non-sacred, except for the value of that limb. One who says, “The heart or head of this animal is an ola,” since it is an item upon which the soul depends, the entire animal is an ola. If one sanctifies one limb of a bird, it is uncertain whether the sanctity spread throughout the entire bird or did not spread. Thus, Rambam rules in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, and since the Gemara did not resolve Rava’s question, it left the matter uncertain. Kesef Mishne explains Rambam’s position regarding a bird as referring specifically to the sanctification of a limb upon which the soul depends. However, Lehem Mishne and Hok Natan and Sefat Emet noted that this is not implied by Rambam, and the unqualified wording implies that it applies even to other limbs. They explain that Rambam maintains that the Torah excluded the entire animal specifically in the case of an animal, with the phrase “of it, and not all of it”; but in the case of a bird [according to the possibility that “animal” is not specifically meant], the Torah did not exclude it. Therefore, the sanctity spreads throughout the entire bird, and in the case of a bird there is no distinction between a limb upon which the soul depends and other limbs. The entire question is whether the bird was excluded along with the animal or not. See the commentators on Rambam there and in Hilkhot Arakhin (chapter 8, halakha 15), and see Hok Natan. Rava raised a question: What is the law with regard to a bird?

And we conclude:

Do we say that

the Merciful One said “an animal,”

in that same verse from which Rabbi Yosei derives that the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal, the word “animal” is stated,

and this is not an animal,

so one can say that the verse came to exclude a bird?

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that since

the Merciful One also said “sacrifice,”

the word “sacrifice” is also stated there [“And if it is an animal from which they offer a sacrifice to the Lord—anything that one gives of it to the Lord shall be sacred”],

and this,

this bird,

is also a sacrifice,

and the Torah did not exclude it?

And we conclude:

Teyku! Rava raises another question. This question, too, is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei who maintains the law of the spreading of sanctity.

Rava raises another question. This question too is according to Rabbi Yosei , who holds the law of the spreading of sanctity.

Rava raised a dilemma: If one consecrated a limb for its value,

so that he would sell it and bring an olah with its proceeds,

what is the law,

what is the ruling,

that the sanctity of the body should descend

[that it should descend]

upon it,

upon the entire animal, and it should be offered as an olah?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Who said,

is it possible to say:

Since the sanctity of monetary value descended upon it—

the sanctity of the body also descended upon it. And since he consecrated one limb—

he consecrated the entire animal.

That is, does Rabbi Yosei hold that the principle of the extension of sanctity applies even to sanctity for monetary value, and once he consecrated one limb, the sanctity for monetary value extended to the entire animal?

And through the migo that the sanctity for monetary value descended upon the entire animal, the sanctity of the body also descended upon it. The reason for saying this is that since the animal itself is fit to be offered as an olah, why should he sell it and bring an olah with its proceeds? Therefore, it automatically acquires the sanctity of the body—

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say:

Rabbi Yosei stated one migo

but

he did not state two migo arguments,

the two migo arguments being: the first, that since sanctity takes effect upon the limb, it takes effect upon the entire body; and the second, that since the sanctity for monetary value descended upon the entire animal, the sanctity of the body also descended upon the entire animal.

Rabbi Yosei did not state

this. And what is the halakha?

And we raised an objection: What is Rava’s dilemma?

Resolve it from his own statement:

Could he not resolve the dilemma from his own words?!

For Rava said: If one consecrated

a male ram,

a male

fit to be offered as an olah, and consecrated it

for its value—

it is sacred with the sanctity of the body,

and he cannot sell it. The reason is the one stated above: Since it itself is fit to be an olah, it should itself be offered as an olah. What, then, is Rava’s dilemma? Is it not certain that the sanctity of the body descended upon it ?

And we answer:

There, he consecrated the entire animal

for monetary sanctity, and only one migo is needed. Therefore, Rava said that it is sacred with the sanctity of the body. But

here, he consecrated

one limb,

and we require two migo arguments for the sanctity of the body to take effect upon the entire animal—

And concerning this Rava raises his dilemma:

What is the law,

does Rabbi Yosei say that the entire animal is sacred even when there are two migo arguments?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

The Gemara presents another dilemma according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that only the limb became sacred.

Abaye asked Rabba

about the following: If one consecrated one limb

with the sanctity of the body for the altar—

what is the law with regard to shearing,

is that limb forbidden to be shorn, like consecrated animals that are forbidden to be shorn, or is it permitted to shear it?

Now, according to Rabbi Yosei, there is certainly no dilemma, since according to him the sanctity extends throughout the entire animal, and it is clear that it is forbidden to be shorn like fully consecrated animals.

Likewise, he did not raise a dilemma concerning the prohibition against performing labor with consecrated animals, since that limb is sacred, and if one works with the animal, that limb will be weakened. The dilemma concerns only shearing, according to Rabbi Yehuda .

And we resolve it:

Resolve it for yourself from this,

it may be resolved from this beraita:

As it was taught:

The Torah states [Deuteronomy 15],

“You shall not shear the firstborn of your flock,”

and we expound: “of your flock”—that which is entirely yours—you may not shear.

But you may shear that which is jointly yours and belongs to others,

a firstborn jointly owned by a Jew and a gentile. If one owns a firstborn in partnership with a gentile, he may shear it.

We can learn from this that the same applies to this animal, part of which was consecrated and part of which remained non-sacred, with the consecrated property and the non-sacred property jointly owning it: it is permitted to be shorn.

And we reject this: It cannot be resolved from there, because

there, no sanctity descends upon it at all,

and it is not sacred with any sanctity—not even the Israelite’s share—since “a gentile’s partnership exempts from the firstborn obligation.” Therefore, it is permitted to be shorn. This is not so

here, where sanctity descends upon it,

upon that limb, and the dilemma is whether it is forbidden to be shorn.

Alternatively,

we reject this: It cannot be resolved from there, because

there, he has no power to consecrate it,

his share in the partnership—even if he wishes to do so—since a gentile has a partnership in it. But

here, he has the power to consecrate it,

that limb, and he consecrated it; the dilemma is whether it is forbidden to be shorn.

The dilemma was not resolved! The Gemara presents another dilemma. Abaye raised another dilemma.

Abaye asked Rabba:

If one consecrated

its hide,

the hide alone,

what is the law concerning labor?

Is it permitted to perform labor with that animal?

You need not raise the dilemma concerning shearing, because shearing does not weaken the hide; but labor weakens the hide, and therefore he raised the dilemma. The sides of the doubt will be explained in the Gemara.

And Rabba resolved it for him:

Ta shma,

from what we learned in a beraita [and which was cited above, 10b]:

“If one says, ‘Whatever is in the womb of this animal shall be an olah,’ it is permitted to be shorn but forbidden for labor, because of the fetus being weakened.”

We can learn from this that just as labor weakens the fetus, so too does it weaken the hide.

He said to him,

Abaye said to Rabba: You cannot resolve it from that beraita,

because when it teaches

what the beraita taught,

“it is forbidden for labor,”

it means rabbinically,

whereas my dilemma is whether it is forbidden for labor by Torah law, and whether one who works with it is flogged for violating the prohibition “You shall not work with the firstborn of your ox,” which includes all consecrated animals.

And Rabba challenges him:

If so,

if the beraita forbids labor only rabbinically,

it should also be forbidden for shearing!

He said to him,

Abaye said to him: The beraita indeed prohibited it rabbinically, but there is a difference between shearing and labor.

With regard to labor, which weakens the fetus, the Sages decreed.

But

with regard to shearing, which does not weaken the fetus,

the Sages did not decree a prohibition.

All this was stated concerning one who consecrated the fetus, while the animal itself is not sacred at all. His dilemma concerns whether there is a Torah prohibition against shearing when one consecrated the hide.

The dilemma was not resolved!

The Gemara presents another dilemma concerning “non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard” .

Abaye asked Rav Yosef: If this animal is a shelamim and its offspring is non-sacred,

for example, one consecrated a pregnant animal but excluded its fetus, and according to everyone the fetus is not sacred,

and he slaughtered it inside, what is the law?

Is it forbidden as non-sacred meat in the Temple courtyard, since the fetus is non-sacred, or not?

Likewise, if one consecrated an empty animal and it subsequently became pregnant. The dilemma is according to

the one who says [above, on the preceding page]:

[above, the preceding page]:

the offspring of consecrated animals become sacred at the time of their emergence,

and as long as the fetus is in its mother’s womb, it does not become sacred through the “power” of the mother’s sanctity, and it is non-sacred. Now, if he slaughtered the mother in the Temple courtyard,

is this considered non-sacred meat in the Temple courtyard, or not?