Temurah 11b — the Talmud in English

The Gemara brings a beraita, in which a dispute between tannaim is explained concerning one who says, “The leg of this one is an offering”—whether the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal.

The Sages taught: Could it be that one who says, “The leg of this one is an offering,” means that all of it shall be an offering?

The Sages taught: Could it be that one who says, “The leg of this animal is an ola,” causes the entire animal to be an ola?

The verse says

[Leviticus 27] “And if it is an animal from which they bring an offering to the Lord

—everything that he gives from it to the Lord shall be sacred.”

And we expound: if he consecrates a limb of an animal, it shall be

“from it to the Lord,”

meaning that only that limb which was consecrated shall be sacred to the Lord,

and not

shall

all of it

be sacred

to the Lord.

Could it be

that the animal from which a limb was consecrated can be redeemed through the redemption of the sanctity of the limb, and

become unconsecrated? The verse says, “shall be sacred,”

that limb shall be sacred, without the possibility of redemption!

How so?

What shall be done with that animal? For if he slaughters it in the Temple courtyard, there is unconsecrated meat in the Temple courtyard; and if he slaughters it outside, there are sacred offerings here.

It shall be sold

in its entirety

for the needs of offerings,

that is, to one who vowed an offering [as will be explained below],

and its money is unconsecrated—

“of it to the Lord,”

except the value of that

and not

limb in it,

whose value he may not take, since it has already been consecrated and is not his, and he is not permitted to sell it. But he is permitted to sell the rest of the body of the animal, since it was not consecrated.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi

the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: From where

do we learn

that one who says, “The leg of this one is an offering,” means that all of it is an offering? As it is stated, “Everything that he gives from it to the Lord,”

even if he consecrates “from it,” that is, a part of it. And the Torah should have written, “Everything that he gives from it to the Lord shall be sacred.” But

when it says, “shall be sacred,”

it teaches us

to include all of it,

so that the entire animal shall be sacred.

The Master said,

we learned in the beraita in the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda:

“It shall be sold for the needs of offerings.”

And we raise an objection [according to the first version, which is the wording of the Babylonian Talmud]: How will the purchaser bring it for his obligation?

But he brings

for he brings

an animal lacking a limb,

since that limb is not his, but it is sacrificed toward the seller’s obligation. It follows that this purchaser has not sacrificed a complete offering; and how has he fulfilled his obligation with this offering, since he vowed to sacrifice a complete animal?

And we answer:

Rava said:

He should not sell it to one who vowed plainly, “An offering is incumbent upon me,” whose intention is a complete animal. Rather,

when he says,

that is, he should sell it to one who said

“A living offering is incumbent upon me,”

that is, to sacrifice all the limbs upon which the animal’s life depends [a limb upon which the soul depends]. And indeed, when he sacrifices this animal, he sacrifices all the limbs upon which the animal’s life depends, since the seller consecrated only the leg from the joint and below, which is a place such that if the leg is severed there, the animal does not become tereifa.

Certainly, this refers to one who consecrates a limb upon which the soul does not depend, since when one consecrates a limb upon which the soul depends, Rabbi Yehuda [and Rabbi Meir] agree that the sanctity spreads throughout all of it, and all of it is sacred, and he cannot sell it.

Another version

[and this is the wording of the Jerusalem Talmud]:

But he brings,

for this purchaser brings

an animal whose body is consecrated, when all of it is not his,

since the entire body is not his? As explained.

And we answer:

Rava said:

It refers to

a case where he said,

the seller,

“For one zuz

worth one zuz

of this animal

from this animal —

for an offering.”

And he did not vow more than one zuz, and in the end he acquired more than one zuz. Therefore, he fulfilled his obligation, since he did not vow a complete offering. We learned above that Rabbi Yehuda agrees when one consecrates “a limb upon which the soul depends,” that all of it is sacred and the sanctity spreads over all of it. The Gemara discusses the definition of “a limb upon which the soul depends.”

Rav Hisda said: Rabbi Yehuda agrees

Rava said:

when

one consecrates

something that makes it tereifa,

for if that limb is removed, the animal is forbidden to eat because of the prohibition of tereifa. And in this Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the sanctity spreads over all of it.

Rava said:

Concerning something that makes it tereifa, Rabbi Yehuda does not agree. Rather,

concerning something

that if it is removed from it

makes it a carcass,

and the animal is forbidden to eat because of the prohibition of a carcass and imparts the ritual impurity of carcasses—for example, when the thigh and its cavity are removed. The reason for their dispute will be explained below.

And Rav Sheshet said:

Rabbi Yehuda agrees

when

he consecrates

something that,

if it is removed from it,

it dies

immediately, for example, the heart or the esophagus.

And the Gemara asks:

What difference is there between Rav Hisda

who says: something that makes it tereifa,

and

between

Rava

who says: something that makes it a carcass? That is, in what do they disagree?

There is a difference between them:

They disagree concerning the dispute in which the Sages disagreed [Chullin 42a], whether

“a tereifa lives.”

That is, concerning all those tereifot that were taught there: when the animal is afflicted by one of them, will it ultimately die from this tereifa?

Rav Hisda agrees with

the view of

the one who says, “A tereifa does not live,”

therefore, when he consecrates something that makes it tereifa, he has consecrated “a limb upon which the soul depends,” and Rabbi Yehuda agrees.

But

if

Rava agrees with the one who says, “A tereifa lives,”

then it is not something upon which the soul depends. Rather, it is when he consecrates something that makes it a carcass.

And what difference is there between Rava and Rav Sheshet,

in what do they disagree?

There is a difference between them:

They disagree concerning the

w

ords of

Rabbi Elazar. For Rabbi Elazar said: When the thigh is removed

for example, when the seller said

and its cavity,

until the animal appears deficient when it crouches ,

it is a carcass,

even though it is still alive—it is like a dead creature and imparts the ritual impurity of carcasses.

Rava agrees with

the view of

Rabbi Elazar ;

therefore, if he consecrated the thigh and its cavity, it is something upon which the soul depends, and Rabbi Yehuda agrees concerning it.

And Rav Sheshet does not agree with Rabbi Elazar,

and he holds that it can live, and this is not something upon which the soul depends. Therefore, he defined it and said, “something by which it dies,” such as the heart or the esophagus.

The objection is raised,

the Gemara brings a beraita to prove that Rabbi Yehuda did not agree concerning “something upon which the soul depends.”

For it was taught:

Rabbi said: The words of Rabbi Yehuda appear

who holds that only the limb is sacred and the sanctity did not spread,

when

he consecrated

something upon which the soul does not depend.

Rabbi said: The words of Rabbi Yehuda appear

And

the words of

Rabbi Yosei appear

who says that the entire animal is sacred,

when

he consecrated

something upon which the soul depends.

The objector understood Rabbi’s words, “the words of Rabbi Yehuda appear” and “the words of Rabbi Yosei appear,” as meaning that Rabbi adopted an intermediate position, deciding from his own reasoning like Rabbi Yehuda concerning something upon which the soul does not depend, and like Rabbi Yosei concerning something upon which the soul depends. Therefore, he infers from the end of Rabbi’s words:

is it not

the meaning of his words:

does it not follow that

the words of Rabbi Yosei

disagree with Rabbi Yehuda

even concerning something upon which the soul does not depend, and that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Yosei even concerning something upon which the soul depends?

And now,

granted,

the decision of Rabbi in saying

“the words of Rabbi Yehuda appear concerning something upon which the soul does not depend,” for

However, Rabbi’s decision when he says

Rabbi Yosei disagrees with him,

and holds that all of it is sacred, while Rabbi decides like Rabbi Yehuda.

But,

the decision of Rabbi in saying

“the words of Rabbi Yosei appear concerning something upon which the soul depends”

is difficult: what decision is this? Did Rabbi Yehuda ever disagree concerning something upon which the soul depends [according to Rav Hisda, Rava, and Rav Sheshet]?

Is it

not, it follows

from Rabbi’s words, that

Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with him,

and holds that even when one consecrates something upon which the soul depends, all of it is not sacred?!

And this is a refutation of them all,

and a difficulty against all the amoraim: Rav Hisda, Rava, and Rav Sheshet!

And we answer:

No,

Rabbi’s words are not understood in this way! And it is not Rabbi’s decision, but rather

the text is incomplete, and this is what it teaches ,

and so are Rabbi’s words in the final clause:

“The words of Rabbi Yosei appear to Rabbi Yehuda,”

Rabbi Yehuda agrees with Rabbi Yosei—

concerning something upon which the soul depends, since

it is true that

Rabbi Yehuda too disagreed with him only concerning something upon which the soul does not depend, but concerning something upon which the soul depends—

No,

he agrees with him.

As stated by Rav Hisda, Rava, and Rav Sheshet.

Rava raises the question whether Rabbi Yosei also said the law of the spreading of sanctity in the case of a bird . For example: if he consecrated the leg of a turtledove or a young pigeon, does the sanctity spread over the entire bird? The sides of the question, and the reason for distinguishing between a bird and an animal, will be explained below.

Rava raised a question: In the case of a bird, what is the law?

Do we say that

“animal,” the Merciful One said,

in that very verse from which Rabbi Yosei expounded that the sanctity spreads over all of it, “animal” is stated,

and this is not an animal,

so one may say that it came to exclude a bird?

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say that since also

“offering,” the Merciful One said,

the word “offering” is also stated there [“And if it is an animal from which they bring an offering to the Lord—from everything that he gives from it to the Lord it shall be sacred”],

and this,

this bird,

is also an offering,

and the Torah did not exclude it?

And we conclude:

It remains unresolved!

Rava raises another question. This question too is according to Rabbi Yosei , who holds the law of the spreading of sanctity.

Rava raised a question: If one consecrated a limb for its value,

so that he would sell it and bring an olah with its value,

what is the law,

what is the ruling,

that it should descend

that it should descend

upon it the sanctity of the offering,

for the entire animal, and it should be brought as an olah?

And the sides of the question are:

perhaps he said,

is it possible to say:

since the sanctity of value descended upon it—

the sanctity of the offering also descended upon it. And since he consecrated one limb—

he consecrated the whole of it.

That is, does Rabbi Yosei maintain the principle of extension even with the sanctity of value, and since he consecrated one limb, the sanctity of value extended over the entire animal?

And through the migo that the sanctity of value descended upon the entire animal, the sanctity of the offering also descended upon it. And the reason for saying this is: Since it itself is fit to be brought as an olah, why should he sell it and bring an olah with its value? Therefore, by itself it becomes holy with the sanctity of the offering—

or perhaps,

or it is possible to say:

he said one migo,

Rabbi Yosei, whereas

two migos,

two “migos”—the first, the migo that when sanctity takes effect upon the limb it takes effect upon the entire body; and the second, the migo that when the sanctity of value descended upon the whole, the sanctity of the offering also descended upon the whole—

he did not say

Rabbi Yosei. And what is the halakha?

And we raise an objection: What is the reason for his question?—

Let him resolve it from his own statement;

can he not resolve the question from his words?!

For Rava said: If one consecrated

a ram,

a male

fit for an olah offering, and consecrated it

for its value—

it is holy with the sanctity of the offering,

and he cannot sell it. For the aforementioned reason: Since it itself is fit for an olah, it itself shall be brought as an olah. Why, then, is he asking? Is it not certain that the sanctity of the offering descended upon it

? And we answer:

There, he consecrated all of it

for the sanctity of value, and only one “migo” is needed. Therefore, Rava said that it is holy with the sanctity of the offering. But

here, he consecrated

one limb,

and we require two “migos” for the sanctity of the offering to take effect upon all of it—

And concerning this Rava asks:

What,

what is the halakha? Did Rabbi Yosei say that all of it is holy even with two “migos”?

And we conclude:

Teiku!

The Gemara brings another question according to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that only the limb became consecrated.

Abaye asked Rabba

about: If one consecrated one limb

with the sanctity of the offering for the altar—

what is its law regarding shearing,

is that limb forbidden to be shorn, as is the law with offerings forbidden to be shorn, or is it permitted to shear it?

Now, according to Rabbi Yosei, he certainly did not ask this question, since according to his words the sanctity extended throughout the entire animal; it is clear that it is forbidden to shear it like complete offerings.

Likewise, he did not ask concerning the prohibition against work with offerings, since that limb is holy, and if he works with the animal, that limb will become weakened. The question is only concerning shearing, according to Rabbi Yehuda

. And we resolve it:

Resolve it for yourself from this,

it is possible to resolve it from this beraita:

For it was taught:

The Torah said [Deuteronomy 15]:

“You shall not shear the firstborn of your flock,”

and we expound: “of your flock”—that which is yours, you may not shear.

But you may shear that which is yours and another’s,

a firstborn belonging to you and a gentile. For if you have a firstborn in partnership with a gentile, it is permitted to shear it.

And one may learn from this that the same law applies to this animal, part of which was consecrated and part of which remained unconsecrated, with consecrated property and unconsecrated property being partners in it: it is permitted to shear it.

And we reject this: It cannot be resolved from there, because

there, no sanctity descended upon it at all,

and it is not holy with any sanctity—not even the Israelite’s share—since “a gentile’s partnership exempts from the firstborn obligation.” Therefore, it is permitted to shear it. This is unlike

here, where sanctity descended upon it

that limb, and the question is whether it is forbidden to shear it.

Another version:

We reject this: It cannot be resolved from there, because

there, it is not in his power to consecrate it,

his share in the partnership—even if he wishes to, since a gentile has a partnership in it. But

here, it is in his power to consecrate it,

that limb, and he consecrated it; and the question is whether it is forbidden to shear it.

And the question was not resolved! The Gemara brings another question.

Abaye asked Rabba:

If he consecrated

its hide,

the hide alone,

what is its law regarding work?

Is it permitted to work with that animal?

Concerning shearing, do not ask, because shearing does not weaken the hide; but work weakens the hide. Therefore he asks about it. And the sides of the uncertainty will be explained in the Gemara.

And Rabba resolved it for him:

Ta shma

from what we learned in a beraita [and it was brought above, 10b]:

One who says, “Whatever is in the womb of this one is an olah,” it is permitted to shear it and forbidden to work with it, because of the fetus within it becoming weakened.

And one may learn from this: Just as the fetus becomes weakened through work, so too the hide.

He said to him,

Abaye said to Rabba: The matter cannot be resolved from that beraita,

for it teaches

when the beraita taught

“forbidden to work with it,”

by rabbinic ordinance.

But my question is whether it is forbidden to work with it by Torah law, and whether, if he works with it, he receives lashes for the prohibition of “You shall not work with the firstborn of your ox,” which includes all offerings.

And Rabba raises a difficulty against him:

If so,

if the beraita forbids work only by rabbinic ordinance,

then even shearing should also be forbidden!

He said to him,

Abaye said to him: The beraita indeed prohibited it by rabbinic ordinance, but there is a distinction between shearing and work. For

with regard to work, which weakens the fetus, the Sages issued a decree.

But

with regard to shearing, which does not weaken the fetus,

the Sages did not issue a decree concerning it.

All this was said concerning one who consecrated the fetus, while the animal is not holy at all. My question is whether there is a Torah prohibition of shearing when one consecrated the hide.

And the question was not resolved!

The Gemara brings another question, concerning “unconsecrated animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard” .

Abaye asked Rav Yosef: This one is a shelamim, and its offspring is unconsecrated,

for example, he consecrated a pregnant animal except for its fetus, and according to everyone the fetus is not consecrated,

and he slaughtered it inside—what is the law?

Is it forbidden because of “unconsecrated animals in the courtyard,” since the fetus is unconsecrated, or not?

And likewise, if he consecrated an empty animal and afterward it became pregnant. The question is

for the one who says

[above, the preceding page]:

“The offspring of offerings become consecrated at the time of their emergence,”

and so long as it is in its mother’s womb it was not consecrated through the “power” of the mother’s sanctity, and it is unconsecrated. Now, if he slaughtered the mother in the courtyard,

is it unconsecrated meat in the courtyard, or not?