Temurah 10a (י.) — the Talmud in English

Or perhaps

it may be possible to say:

everything

that is

of the same sanctity,

and is subordinate to the first,

does not add a fifth.

And this question concerns “two bodies and one sanctity.”

His second question concerns “two sanctities and one body”:

And if you would say

that, if we resolve the previous question and say:

the law is different with regard to another body,

this other body,

since it remains within the same sanctity,

does not add a fifth.

There is still another question to ask: One designated a guilt-offering to achieve atonement through it, it was lost, and he

achieved atonement through another guilt-offering,

and then the first was found,

and this first one was transferred to become an burnt-offering—what is the law?

The sides of the uncertainty are as follows:

For there is reason to say

that when we say that one does not add a fifth, this applies

only to

the same body

with the same sanctity;

since it retains the same sanctity and is subordinate to what preceded it, it does not add a fifth.

But where it is the same body with a different sanctity,

and it was transferred from a guilt-offering to a burnt-offering, there is reason to say that with regard to this burnt-offering

we do not

say that it does not add a fifth; rather, it does add a fifth.

Or perhaps,

it may be possible to say that,

since it is the same body,

and is subordinate to the first,

it does not add a fifth.

And Rabbi Avin presented these two questions in the form of “if you would say,” but he did not ask at all about “two bodies and two sanctities.”

And we conclude:

Teiku,

the questions remain unresolved!

The Gemara now turns from one matter to another and introduces a further discussion concerning the fifth.

The Torah states [there], with regard to one who consecrates an impure animal for the repair of the Temple: “And if any impure animal, of which they may not bring an offering to the Lord, shall be brought, then he shall place the animal before the priest. And the priest shall value it, whether it is good or bad; according to the valuation of the priest, so shall it be. And if he shall redeem it, then he shall add its fifth to your valuation.”

Apparently, the verses contradict one another. For at the beginning it says, “According to the valuation of the priest, so shall it be,” whereas at the end it says, “And he shall add its fifth to your valuation”?

The Sages expounded [the Torat Kohanim] that the statement, “According to the valuation of the priest, so shall it be,” refers to anyone else who comes to purchase it from the Temple treasury. But the statement, “And if he shall redeem it,” teaches that with regard to the owner, the verse was stringent, requiring him to add a fifth.

The Gemara discusses the case of one who designated an offering so that another person could achieve atonement through it , and the animal developed a permanent blemish and came to redeem it—who is considered the owner with regard to adding a fifth: the one who consecrated it or the one who achieves atonement through it?

Rami bar Ḥama asked:

Does the

consecrator add a fifth, or does the one achieving atonement

add a fifth?

And we conclude:

Rava said: The verse states

[there],

“And if the consecrator redeems his house

and he shall add a fifth of the money of your valuation to it.” And we infer:

The “consecrator”

adds a fifth,

but not the one achieving atonement.

The Gemara discusses a similar question concerning temura. It was already explained above [7b, 9a] that a person cannot designate as temura something that does not belong to him, and that only the owner can effect temura. The Gemara discusses one who designated an offering so that another person could achieve atonement through it: Who is the “owner” who can effect temura, the consecrator or the one achieving atonement?

Rami bar Ḥama asked:

Does the

consecrator effect temura, or does the one achieving atonement effect temura?

The Gemara discusses this:

Rava said: It is obvious ,

it is self-evident

that the one achieving atonement effects temura.

There are two reasons for this.

a.

For if the consecrator effects temura, then we find

that

the public and partners

can effect temura.

That is, temura with regard to an offering of the public or of partners—

and what would the case be,

how could such a case arise?

For example, when they appoint

the public or the partners appoint an individual

as an agent to consecrate

an offering on their behalf , and they will achieve atonement through it.

That is, the public and partners cannot effect temura. The reason is that temura is derived [below, 13a] from the tithe of cattle: Just as the tithe of cattle applies only to an individual, so too temura applies only to an individual.

Now, granted, if we say that the one achieving atonement is the owner, it is understandable why, when an individual consecrates an offering for the public, this offering cannot undergo temura: Since the public cannot designate something as temura for it, it follows logically that “we do not find temura with regard to an offering of the public or of partners.” —

But if we say that the consecrator is the owner, then when an individual consecrates an offering as an agent of the public, he can effect temura for the offering he consecrated. If so, we do find “temura with regard to an offering of the public.” Why, then, is it stated below as obvious that “an offering of the public” cannot undergo temura?

b.

Furthermore, for Rav Naḥman said: Huna told me

his colleague Rav Huna:

A tanna

taught in a beraita: The Torah states at the end of the passage concerning the nazirite [Numbers 6]: “This is the law of the nazirite who shall offer

his offering to the Lord for his naziriteship, apart from what he can afford.”

The beraita asks:

Does a nazirite come under the law of affordability?! [“Affordability” refers to any person obligated to bring an offering concerning whom the Torah states, “And if he cannot afford” to bring an animal offering, he brings two birds or a meal-offering instead. This is called an “ascending and descending offering,” meaning an offering that varies according to whether the person is wealthy or poor.] But the offering of a nazirite is fixed for both poor and wealthy, and nowhere in the passage concerning a nazirite is another law stated for a poor person who cannot afford it?

The beraita answers:

The beraita answers:

How is this understood?

How is the verse to be interpreted? The statement

“his offering to the Lord for his naziriteship”

refers to a case in which he

designated

an offering

from his own property;

he shall bring that offering for his naziriteship. And the statement

“apart from what he can afford”

teaches about a nazirite who currently cannot afford an offering, and whose offering is

one that others designated for him,

but who will be able to afford one in the future; when he brings an offering that others designated for him, he fulfills his obligation. This will be explained below.

Rava explains the beraita:

For what halakhic purpose

did the Torah state that he may bring an offering that others designated for his needs?

If you say

that it is

with regard to atonement,

that he achieves atonement through the offering—

it is obvious that it atones for him,

after all,

it is a gift that they give him,

the offering now belongs to him, since he received it as a gift; what novelty is there in this?

Rather,

is it not

with regard to temura, and this is what it means:

This is likewise the beraita’s exposition: The statement “his offering to the Lord for his naziriteship” refers to one who designated an offering from his own property, while the Torah concludes, “apart from what he can afford,” referring to one whose offering others designated for him, and teaches that if

others designated it for him,

then he is

as one who designated it from his own property.

This teaches:

Just as when he designated it from his own property,

he

effects temura

and no one else, so too

when others designated it for him,

the one achieving atonement

effects temura

and no one else.

Conclude from this

from these two proofs:

we follow the one achieving atonement,

we follow the person achieving atonement. That is, he effects temura, and not the consecrator.

The Gemara rejects this latter proof:

No!

There is no proof from here, because

in fact

the beraita

is speaking with regard to atonement,

not with regard to temura.

And as for what is difficult for you,

concerning your objection that with regard to atonement there is no novelty here, because

it is a gift that they give him,

and it now belongs to him—

We can answer: Since

were it not that the Merciful One amplified the law,

if the Torah had not explicitly extended the law through the words

“apart from what he can afford,”

we might have said

the following:

It is a scriptural decree: “his offering”—

he achieves atonement only through what is his ,

through an offering purchased with his money; only through his own offering does he achieve atonement. But

from

what

others

gave him—

others—

no,

that is the scriptural decree!

The verse teaches us,

the Torah teaches us that this is not so, and that he can achieve atonement through an offering that others designated for him.

After Rava’s proof has been rejected, the Gemara clarifies The

Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached,

and how can we resolve Rami bar Ḥama’s question: Who effects temura—the consecrator or the one achieving atonement?

And we conclude:

Come and hear

from this,

as Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan,

three laws concerning one who provides from his own property what his fellow is obligated to bring.

a.

The consecrator gives the fifth,

not the one achieving atonement.

b.

The one achieving atonement effects temura,

not the consecrator.

c.

One who separates

teruma

from his own

produce

on behalf of others—

the benefit of discretion belongs to him,

the benefit he can derive from it, such as choosing the priest to whom he will give it, and not to the others on whose behalf it was separated.

The Gemara explains the last law:

What is the reason

that the benefit of discretion belongs to the one who separates it?

The verse states

[Deuteronomy 26]: “When you have finished tithing

all the tithe of your produce, and you have given it to the stranger, the orphan, and the widow.”

And we expound: The one who took the tithe from his produce is the one who gives it, and he may give it to anyone he wishes; it is not in the hands of those on whose behalf it was separated.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues with the laws of temura. It has already been explained that wherever the Mishna says “they effect temura” or “they do not effect temura,” this means that after the fact, if temura was effected. Initially, it is certainly prohibited to effect temura, and one who does so receives forty lashes.

One may not effect temura with limbs

parts of unconsecrated animals,

for fetuses

of consecrated animals. If one said, “Let the leg of this animal be temura for the consecrated fetus in the womb of this animal,” sanctity does not take effect upon the leg.

Nor with fetuses for limbs:

If one said, “Let the fetus in the womb of this unconsecrated animal be temura for the leg” of this consecrated animal, the fetus does not become consecrated [the Gemara will explain how the limbs become consecrated].

Nor with fetuses and limbs

of unconsecrated animals,

for whole animals

of consecrated animals.

Nor whole animals

of unconsecrated animals

for them,

for limbs and fetuses of consecrated animals. These are the words of the first tanna.

Rabbi Yosei says: One may effect temura with limbs for whole animals. If one said, “Let the leg of this unconsecrated animal be temura for this consecrated animal,” the sanctity of temura takes effect upon the leg, and the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal; the entire animal is temura, and it is fit to be offered.

as in the case where one says, “Let the leg of this non-sacred animal be in place of this consecrated animal.” The sanctity of substitution takes effect on the leg, and the sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal; the whole animal is subject to substitution and may be offered.

But not whole animals for them.

A single limb of a consecrated animal does not have the power to effect temura.

Rabbi Yosei said:

But with regard to consecrated animals,

when

one initiates sanctity by saying, “The leg of this animal is a burnt-offering,”

the entire animal becomes a burnt-offering,

because the sanctity spreads throughout it. If so, we should derive from this with regard to temura that

even when he says, “The leg of this animal

shall be

in place of

this animal,”

the entire animal shall be temura in its place.

For just as at the initial stage of sanctity the sanctity of the limb spreads throughout the entire animal, so too with temura, the sanctity of temura that took effect upon the limb spreads throughout the entire animal.

Gemara:

Introduction

The Gemara cites the dispute between Bar Padda and Rabbi Yoḥanan as to whether “sanctity takes effect upon fetuses” or not. This dispute is cited here because later the Gemara will raise an objection to Bar Padda from our Mishna.

To clarify the matter, one must distinguish between the offspring of consecrated animals and a fetus that itself is consecrated. “

Offspring of consecrated animals,” meaning that one consecrated an unpregnant animal, and after its consecration it became pregnant and gave birth—the dispute between Bar Padda and Rabbi Yoḥanan does not apply to this case, because such offspring is consecrated with the sanctity of its mother, by virtue of the “force” of the mother’s sanctity, and this law is a גזירת הכתוב, a decree of the Torah. It is not consecrated by virtue of the verbal sanctity expressed by the person performing the consecration, since when he consecrated the mother, the offspring had not yet been formed in its mother’s womb.

Therefore, if it is the offspring of a sin-offering, it is put to death, in accordance with the law of the offspring of a sin-offering, which was transmitted as a halakha given to Moses from Sinai.

According to Rabbi Yehuda, the offspring can effect temura after it is born, while according to the Sages, it cannot effect temura at all, even after it is born.

They disagree as to when sanctity takes effect upon it. Some say: at the time of its coming into being, when it is born. And some say that it takes effect even while it is in its mother’s womb.

Bar Padda and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree with regard to a fetus, and their dispute concerns two cases:

a. One consecrated only the fetus while it was in its mother’s womb, and did not consecrate the mother.

b. One set aside a pregnant sin-offering; that is, one consecrated a pregnant animal as a sin-offering.

In the case where one consecrated only the fetus, Bar Padda maintains that the sanctity does not take effect at all. If one were to offer it as a sacrifice without consecrating it after its birth, once the time arrived when it could be consecrated, he would be bringing an unconsecrated animal into the Temple courtyard.

Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the sanctity takes effect immediately, while it is still in its mother’s womb.

In the case where one set aside a pregnant sin-offering, Bar Padda maintains that the consecration takes effect not upon the fetus but upon the mother. The fetus is consecrated only by virtue of the mother, like other offspring of consecrated animals, as explained. And since it is the offspring of a sin-offering, it is put to death, in accordance with the law of the offspring of a sin-offering that is put to death.

Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that an independent sanctity takes effect upon the fetus, since it is considered to be another animal. This is because the fetus and the mother are two animals, and “a fetus is not the thigh of its mother,” and “if one leaves it aside, it remains set aside,” as will be explained below.

According to him, if the fetus was consecrated as a substitute for the mother, so that if it happened that the mother was not offered, for whatever reason, the offspring would be offered in its place, an independent sanctity takes effect upon the fetus by virtue of the consecration expressed by the person performing the consecration, and not by virtue of the mother. Therefore, its law is not that of the offspring of a sin-offering, and it is not put to death, since it itself is a sin-offering and is not the “offspring of a sin-offering” [according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the “offspring of a sin-offering” refers only to a case where one consecrated an animal as a sin-offering, and afterward it became pregnant and gave birth].

It was stated:

One who consecrates a fetus as an offering:

Bar Padda said: Sanctity does not take effect upon fetuses. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Sanctity takes effect upon fetuses.

The Gemara explains:

And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his own line of reasoning,

what Rabbi Yoḥanan said, that sanctity takes effect upon fetuses, is consistent with his own view.

As Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who consecrated

[another version:

set aside]

a pregnant sin-offering,

that is, one consecrated a pregnant animal as a sin-offering,

and it gave birth,

if

he wishes—he is

atoned through it

itself;

and if

he

wishes—

he is atoned through its offspring,

since both were consecrated as substitutes for one another, and through one of them he achieves atonement, while the other grazes.

Thus, Rabbi Yoḥanan, in accordance with his own view, maintains that sanctity takes effect upon fetuses.

The Gemara explains:

And it was necessary,

Rabbi Yoḥanan had to teach us that sanctity takes effect upon fetuses in both cases: both when one consecrated only the fetus and when one consecrated the fetus together with its mother. One ruling cannot be derived from the other.