Sukkah 33a — the Talmud in English

The Gemara explains:

Abaye said: You find it ![](pamud.bmp "

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with an Egyptian myrtle,

with a myrtle that grows on the borders of the field, which, since it has a great deal of free space, becomes more improved,

so that there stand

in it

seven, seven

leaves

on a single branch,

and not only three;

for when four fall

of them, which are the majority of its leaves, there still

remain three,

and its braided appearance remains.

Abaye said: Infer from this

from this explanation, that

this Egyptian myrtle is

fit for the hosha'na.

And the Gemara is astonished:

It is obvious!

Why should it not be fit? What deficiency is there in the fact that many leaves grow upon it?!

The Gemara explains:

You might say: Since it has

to this myrtle

an accompanying name,

for it is not called simply “myrtle,” but rather “Egyptian myrtle,”

it is not rendered fit,

for this is not the myrtle mentioned in the Torah;

it teaches us

that nevertheless it is fit.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But perhaps that is indeed so,

perhaps in truth this myrtle will not be fit for this reason?!

The Gemara answers:

“A braided tree,” the Merciful One said,

and it indicates

in any event,

that is, all myrtles are fit for the mitzva [provided that their braidedness remains].

The Sages taught:

If

the majority of its leaves dried

of the myrtle,

and there remained in it three stalks of

leaves—that is, three stems, in each one of which there were three

moist leaves

for if there are fewer than this, it is not braided] —

it is fit.

And Rav Hisda said: And

that is specifically when those three moist leaves remained

at the top of each and every one

of the stems. But if they remained in the middle of the stems, this is not beauty.

We learned in the Mishna:

If its top was cut off

of the myrtle—it is disqualified:

Ulla bar Ḥinnana taught: If its top was cut off and there grew upon it

something like a

date,

which is like a green fruit attached to the top of the spine [this is especially common on willow leaves, and in ancient times it was used for dyeing garments]—

it is fit.

Rabbi Jeremiah raised a question: If its top was cut off on the eve of the Festival,

and a date grew upon it on the Festival,

after it had been bound together with the other species,

what is the law?

A date can grow upon it even after it has been detached.] And this was his uncertainty: We have an established principle concerning offerings that if the animal was fit to be offered, and after it was slaughtered it was rejected from being fit for an offering, it can no longer become fit for an offering, even if the cause of the rejection was removed. [For example, the offering was slaughtered, and before it was burned upon the altar, the altar became defective; for we say in tractate Zevahim 59a: Since it was rejected for one moment, it is rejected forever].

And therefore he was uncertain: Is there

a

law of

rejection

also

with regard to mitzvot,

to say that since the myrtle was rejected from its fitness when its top was cut off, it is no longer fit forever, and therefore, since its top was cut off, it will not be fit even if a date grew upon it,

or

perhaps

not

was this law stated with regard to mitzvot?

And we raised the matter:

Let him resolve it

this uncertainty

from that which we learned

with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood:

If a person covered

the blood of a wild animal or bird,

and

afterward

the blood became exposed,

the blood—

he is exempt from

covering it

again,

for he has already fulfilled his mitzva. But if

the wind covered it

initially, before he had managed to fulfill the mitzva—

he is obligated to cover it.

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They taught

not

that if the wind covered it, he must return and cover it,

but

where

the blood returned

and

became exposed

afterward. But if

it did not return and become exposed, he is exempt from covering it.

And we raised the matter: When it returned and became exposed

also,

why is he obligated to cover it

and why do we not say that

since it was rejected

from its mitzva by the wind’s covering—for as long as it was covered, he was exempt from covering it—

it was rejected

from its mitzva entirely even after it became exposed?

And Rav Pappa said: This indicates

it is proven from here that

there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot.

The Gemara rejects this: Indeed, Rabbi Jeremiah was not uncertain whether the law of mitzvot is the same in this matter as the law of offerings; rather, this is precisely what

that

utochnil

Rav Pappa

deduced from the beraita

itself—

he has a question:

Did

the tanna find it entirely clear

to the

tanna that there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot, whether

it is

to leniency,

as here, where if there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot, the myrtle is fit when a date grew upon it,

and whether

it is

to stringency,

as there, with regard to covering the blood, where since there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot, if it returned and became exposed, he must cover it again?

Or perhaps: He was uncertain

whether the tanna was uncertain whether there is rejection with regard to mitzvot or not, and therefore, because of the uncertainty,

to stringency—

we say

that there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot, and when the wind covered it and it subsequently became exposed, he must cover it again. But

to leniency, we do not say

that there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot; therefore, this myrtle upon which a date grew should not be deemed fit, because perhaps there is rejection with regard to mitzvot.

And we conclude:

teyku.

And the Gemara discusses:

Let us say

that we should say that this uncertainty—whether there is rejection with regard to mitzvot or not—is

dependent upon the tannaim,

who disagreed concerning this matter:

For we learned: A myrtle whose berries were [those small fruits that emerge from the myrtle] more numerous than its leaves—it is disqualified; and if one reduced them, it is fit; but one may not reduce them on the Festival [because of the prohibition of “making an implement”].

If he transgressed and picked them

on the Festival—

it is disqualified, the words of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok, but the Sages deem it fit.

They assumed

that the Sages, the members of the academy, meant that this was the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and the Sages:

Everyone

holds

that a lulav does not require binding.

That is, according to the fundamental law it need not be bound with the other species, but only as an enhancement of the mitzva, for the beauty of the mitzva. Therefore, although at the time that the myrtle was bound with the other species it was disqualified, this does not entail the deficiency of “you shall make it, and not one made through disqualification,” since there is no law of “making” with regard to their binding.

And

even

if you should say

that the lulav

requires binding

and its binding is considered part of the making of the mitzva, it should still not be disqualified because of “you shall make it, and not one made through disqualification,” for “you shall make” was not written with regard to the lulav. Therefore they held:

We do not derive the lulav from the sukka, in which “you shall make” is written

[“For seven days you shall make for yourself the Festival of Sukkot”], and we expound: “You shall make”

and not one made through disqualification,

so that also with regard to the lulav the making must be performed in fitness.

Is it not that they disagree about this: The one who disqualifies

this myrtle

holds that we say there is rejection with regard to mitzvot,

and therefore, since it was bound in disqualification, and the status of “a lulav of the mitzva” had already taken effect upon it at the time of the rejection, it is rejected forever and is not fit even if one reduces its berries.

And the one who deems it fit

this myrtle

holds that we do not say there is rejection with regard to mitzvot,

but only with regard to offerings; therefore, although the myrtle was bound in disqualification, it was not rejected forever.

And that the tanna stated their disagreement when one reduced them on the Festival is not specifically so, but because ordinarily one certainly already bound his lulav before the Festival began, and since he reduced them on the Festival after its binding, the law of rejection with regard to mitzvot applies here. In any event, it is explained that the entire law of rejection with regard to mitzvot applies only to something that is already considered a “substance of a mitzva,” such as a bound lulav. But if it was rejected before it was a “lulav of the mitzva,” there is no deficiency in this.

The Gemara rejects:

No.

One may indeed say that

everyone

holds that

we do not say that there is rejection with regard to mitzvot. And here, they disagree concerning deriving the lulav from the sukka:

One master

[Rabbi Elazar]

holds that we derive the lulav from the sukka

by a binyan av—that is, just as there is a law of “making” with regard to the sukka, so there is a law of “making” with regard to the lulav. Therefore, just as concerning the sukka its making must be performed in fitness, so too, if the lulav was bound in disqualification, it is not fit for the mitzva, because of “you shall make it, and not one made through disqualification.”

And the other master holds that we do not derive the lulav from the sukka.

And if you wish, say: If

it is

our view that

the

lulav requires binding—

everyone

would hold that we

derive the lulav from the sukka,

to disqualify it when it was made in disqualification.

And here, they disagree concerning whether the lulav requires binding, and in accordance with the disagreement of these tannaim:

As it was taught in a beraita: A lulav, whether bound or not bound—

is fit.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Bound, it is fit. But one that is not bound—

is disqualified.

What is Rabbi Yehuda’s reason?

He derives

by a gzera shava of

“taking” “taking” from the bundle of hyssop.

It is written here

[Leviticus 23:40]:

“And you shall take for yourselves on the first day,” and it is written there

[Exodus 12:22]:

“And you shall take a bundle of hyssop.” Just as there

with regard to the mitzva of taking hyssop for the Passover in Egypt, it specifically required

a bundle, so here also

with regard to the lulav, the mitzva of taking it is specifically with

a bundle.

And the Sages,

who said that a lulav does not require binding,

do not have

this gzera shava of

“taking, taking.”

Which tanna holds this, as the Sages taught: It is a mitzva to bind the lulav, but if he did not bind it—

it is fit?

Who is it

[which tanna holds this]?

If it is Rabbi Yehuda, when he did not bind it, why is it fit?

For Rabbi Yehuda holds that a lulav requires binding, and it indicates that the matter prevents fulfillment of the mitzva.

And if it is the Sages, what “mitzva” does he perform

by binding it, since according to their view there is no need to bind the lulav?

The Gemara explains:

It is indeed the Sages

it is,

and

although according to the fundamental mitzva of taking the lulav it is not necessary to bind it, nevertheless

it is a mitzva

—

because of

[Exodus 15:2]:

“This is my God and I shall glorify Him,”

for we expound: Beautify yourself before Him through mitzvot—to take a beautiful lulav, beautiful tzitzit, a beautiful shofar, and the like.

We learned in the Mishna:

Or if its berries were more numerous

than its leaves—it is disqualified:

Rav Hisda said: This matter our great master

[his intention was to refer to Rav, who was among the earliest amoraim]

said, and may the Omnipresent assist him: They taught

that this myrtle is disqualified

only

when its fruits were

in one place

[provided that they were more numerous than its leaves]. But if they were scattered

in two or three places—

it is fit.

Rava said to him: