Sukkah 11b — the Talmud in English

We require one corner, not two, even

at the time of making the fringe,

at the time of the thread,

that is, even when placing the fringes into the garment, they must hang from a single corner. One thread may not lie over two corners. This rule was not stated only with regard to the time of tying them,

and

therefore

there is nothing [that is, since he did not do so].

for he did not do so].

For this reason

Samuel teaches us

that this rule was stated only with regard to the time of tying them; but when placing them in the garment, it is permitted to place them over two corners at once.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s view:

They raise an objection from a source

that we learned in a beraita—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna:

If one suspended

the fringes from the corner of the garment while they were still a single thread folded into four strands, and tied them,

but did not cut the ends of their threads

before tying them, they are

invalid.

The Gemara analyzes this statement:

What, is it not saying that they are invalid forever,

and that cutting them after the tying does not help?

This is an objection to Rav,

who declares them valid when they are cut after they were tied, because “their cutting is their making,” as though they had now been made in complete accordance with the requirements? The Gemara answers:

Rav could say to you: What does “invalid” mean

as stated in the beraita?

They are invalid until they are cut.

But once they have been cut, they are valid, even if he cut them after tying them, since their cutting is their making.

And Samuel said:

If he did not cut them before tying them,

they are invalid forever,

and cutting them afterward does not help.

And Levi likewise said: They are invalid forever.

And Rav Mattana likewise said in the name of Samuel: They are invalid forever.

Some say:

Rav Mattana did not state this teaching in Samuel’s name. Rather, he

said: I personally had an incident

in which I suspended and tied the threads of the fringes before cutting them, while they were still one thread folded into four parts,

and I came before Master Samuel

to ask him whether they were valid,

and he said to me: They are invalid forever,

and cutting them afterward does not help.

They raise an objection

to Rav, who holds that cutting them after tying them is effective, because their cutting is their making, from the beraita that we learned:

If one suspended

the threads of the fringes and tied them,

and afterward cut the ends of their threads,

they are

invalid.

This proves that cutting them after tying them is ineffective and that they remain invalid forever, in accordance with Samuel’s view.

And further,

there is another difficulty for Rav, for

it was taught with regard to a sukka:

The Torah says, “You shall make the Festival of Sukkot for yourself.”

The Sages expounded:

“You shall make”

means that this sukka must be made in accordance with the requirements,

and not from something already made

in an invalid manner.

From here they said: If one spread over it

over the roof of the sukka

a grapevine, a gourd, or ivy,

which are invalid for roofing because they remain attached to the ground,

and

afterward

roofed over them

with valid roofing, the sukka is

invalid,

because it was initially made in an invalid manner.

Now,

what are the circumstances?

In what case does the beraita disqualify it only because of “You shall make, and not from something already made”?

If we say that he did not cut them,

and they are still attached, then

why particularly

did the beraita say that they are invalid only

because of “You shall make, and not from something already made,”

which implies that they are valid now and were invalid only at the time of their making?

Let it derive that

now they

are attached,

and are therefore invalid for roofing because they are attached to the ground?!

Rather,

you must say that the beraita is speaking

when

they had already been

cut

after he spread them over the sukka. Nevertheless, they were disqualified because of “You shall make, and not from something already made,” since they were invalid at the time they were made, and when he later made them valid, the sukka was found to have been made by itself.

And

therefore

it teaches: The sukka is invalid.

And learn from this that we do not say: Their cutting is their making.

For if their cutting were considered the making of the roofing, we would not regard the sukka as though it had been made by itself.

Is this a conclusive refutation of Rav?!

Rav could say to you

in answer to the second difficulty: Indeed, if he had cut them off from the ground completely, they would be valid, because their cutting is their making.

Rather,

here,

in the beraita that disqualifies this sukka because of “You shall make, and not from something already made,” and not because the material is attached,

what are the circumstances? He tore them away.

He pulled the branches from the tree, but they still stood near the place where they had been attached to the tree,

so their “making” is not recognizable,

since their making is not apparent, as they are near their former point of attachment and appear to remain attached to the ground. Therefore, this cutting is not considered the initial making of the roofing. Rather, the sukka is still considered to have been made in an invalid manner and is invalid because of “You shall make, and not from something already made.”

The Gemara raises another difficulty:

In any event,

the first difficulty, from the beraita that states,

“He suspended them and afterward cut

their ends, and they are invalid,” is

still a difficulty for Rav?!

The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this difficulty

is a difficulty

for Rav.

The Gemara considers the matter:

Shall we say

that the dispute between Rav and Samuel concerning cutting—whether it is considered making—is

like the

dispute between

tannaim:

We learned in the Mishna below, on page 32b: If the berries of a myrtle branch outnumber its leaves, it is invalid. But if one reduced the number of berries so that they no longer outnumber its leaves, it is valid. One may not reduce the berries of a myrtle branch on a Festival, since by doing so he is considered to have repaired an object by making the previously invalid myrtle fit for use.

The beraita adds: If one

transgressed

the words of the Sages, who said that one may not reduce them on a Festival,

and picked

the berries from the myrtle on the Festival after he had bound it with the lulav [for certainly he did not bind it on the Festival, since tying is a prohibited labor], it is

invalid; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak.

But the Sages deem it valid.

They assumed

that the students in the study hall understood the dispute between Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak and the Sages as follows:

Everyone

agrees that

the lulav requires binding,

meaning that the three species must be bound together.

And

everyone agrees that

we derive

by the method of “what do we find elsewhere,”

the law of the lulav from the sukka, for it is written concerning a sukka, “You shall make,” and not from something already made.

Thus, the same disqualification of “You shall make, and not from something already made” applies to a lulav that was bound in an invalid manner. Since the lulav was bound on the eve of the Festival with an invalid myrtle branch, it should be disqualified because of “You shall make, and not from something already made.”

If so,

is it not in this that they disagree: The one who deems it valid

[the Sages]

holds that with regard to a sukka we say: Their cutting is their making. And

therefore

with regard to a lulav as well we say: Its picking

of the myrtle berries

is its making.

It is as though it had now been bound in a valid manner.

And the one who deems it invalid

[Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak]

holds that with regard to a sukka we do not say: Their cutting is their making,

in accordance with Samuel’s opinion. Even after the cutting, the sukka remains invalid because of “You shall make, and not from something already made.”

And

consequently,

with regard to a lulav as well we do not say: Its picking is its making.

The Gemara rejects this:

No. Everyone

holds like Samuel, that

with regard to a sukka we do not say: Their cutting is their making. But here,

where they disagree about whether binding the lulav is valid after picking the myrtle berries,

they disagree about deriving the lulav’s law from the sukka

with regard to “You shall make, and not from something already made”;

that is what they disagree about.

The one who deems it valid holds: We do not derive the lulav’s law from the sukka.

Although the lulav requires binding, there is no deficiency in the fact that it was bound in an invalid manner.

And the one who deems it invalid holds: We derive the lulav’s law from the sukka.

And if you wish, say instead:

Indeed,

if we hold that the lulav requires binding, everyone agrees that we derive the lulav’s law from the sukka,

and it remains invalid even after the berries are picked, because it was made invalidly and is subject to “You shall make, and not from something already made.”

And here, they disagree about this:

One master holds:

The lulav

requires binding, while the other master holds:

The lulav

does not require binding.

Since binding is not required, even if he bound it on the Festival, it does not matter that it was bound in an invalid manner.

And

they disagree in

the dispute between these tannaim, as it was taught: A lulav is valid whether bound or unbound.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

A lulav that is

bound

is

valid,

but a lulav that is

unbound

is

invalid.

Thus, they disagree about whether the lulav must be bound together with the myrtle and willow branches.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda,

who requires that they be bound together?

He derives “taking” from “taking,” from the bundle of hyssop

that our ancestors took in Egypt and with which they placed the blood of the Paschal offering on the lintel and the two doorposts.

And this is how he expounded it:

It is written there

concerning the Passover in Egypt,

“And you shall take”—a bundle of hyssop; and it is written here

with regard to the lulav,

“And you shall take for yourselves on the first day

the fruit of a beautiful tree.”

Just as there,

in the Passover in Egypt, they took the hyssop

as a bundle,

namely, three hyssop stalks bound together, as it says “a bundle of hyssop,”

so too here,

the taking of the lulav is

as a bundle.

And the Rabbis,

who do not require that the three species be bound, explain their reasoning as follows:

We do not derive one taking from another taking.

That is, they did not receive this derivation by the method of identical expressions from their teachers. A person may not derive such a method on his own; he may do so only if he received it from his teachers, through an unbroken chain reaching back to Moses our teacher.

The Gemara considers the matter:

According to whom does

the following teaching conform, according to which of the tannaim cited above:

“A lulav: It is a mitzva to bind it, but if he did not bind it,

it is

valid”?

If

this beraita is the statement of

Rabbi Yehuda,

there is a difficulty:

Why is it valid if he did not bind it?

After all, the lulav requires binding.

And if

this beraita is the statement of

the Rabbis,

there is a difficulty:

Why is it a mitzva

to bind it, when they hold that the lulav does not require binding?! Nor can one say that according to the Rabbis it is initially a mitzva to bind it, because where do we find, with regard to Torah mitzvot, that the Torah says that one should perform them merely as a mitzva, while the requirement does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva?!

And one cannot say that according to the Sages as well, it is initially a mitzva to bind it, for where do we find, with regard to Torah mitzvot, that the Torah says to perform them merely as a mitzva, while failure to do so does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva?!

The Gemara answers:

Actually, it is the Rabbis.

The fundamental law of the lulav does not require that it be taken specifically as a bundle.

And

the reason that it is initially a mitzva to bind it is

because it is stated: “This is my God and I will glorify Him.”

The Sages expounded:

Glorify Him through mitzvot.

Binding the species together is an enhancement of the mitzva.

We learned in the Mishna:

This is the general rule: Anything that can contract ritual impurity,

and anything that does not grow from the ground, may not be used for roofing.

The Gemara explains:

From where are these matters derived?

Reish Lakish said:

We were commanded to dwell in a sukka as a remembrance of the Clouds of Glory that were in the wilderness, as it is stated: “For I caused the Children of Israel to dwell in sukkot,” and Onkelos translated it: “For I caused them to dwell under the shelter of clouds”—that is, under the protection of the Clouds of Glory.

And

the verse says, “And a mist

a cloud

will rise from the earth,”

from which we learn that the cloud grows from the earth.

And we derive as follows:

Just as a mist

is

something that cannot contract ritual impurity,

since impurity was stated only with regard to foods, liquids, vessels, and people,

and

so too

its growth

is

from the earth, so too a sukka,

which commemorates the Clouds of Glory, must be made from

something that cannot contract ritual impurity and that grows from the earth.

The Gemara rejects this:

This works according to the one who says

that the sukkot in which the Holy One, blessed be He, settled Israel when they left Egypt

were the Clouds of Glory.

But according to the one who says that they made actual sukkot for themselves

to protect themselves from the sun when they camped in the wilderness, and that it was in their memory that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them to make a sukka,

what can be said?

As it was taught:

The Torah says [Leviticus 23]: “Every native Israelite shall dwell in sukkot, so that your generations will know

that I caused the Children of Israel to dwell in sukkot.”

Those sukkot

were the Clouds of Glory; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Akiva says: They made actual sukkot for themselves.

And since this is so,

this works according to Rabbi Eliezer,

who says that they were the Clouds of Glory, since it is clear from where we learn that the sukka must be made from something that cannot contract ritual impurity and that grows from the earth.

But according to Rabbi Akiva,

who says that they made actual sukkot for themselves,

what can be said?

When

другое объяснение этих законов:

Rav Dimi

came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan

another source for these laws:

The verse says, “You shall make the Festival of Sukkot for yourself,”

and the word “Festival” is understood as referring to the Festival offering.

The verse compares

the

sukka to the

offering of the

Festival.

Just as

the offering of the

Festival

is

something that cannot contract ritual impurity and that grows from the earth

[according to Rabbi Yohanan, an animal is considered something that grows from the earth because it is nourished by the earth and grows from it],

so too a sukka must be made from something that cannot contract ritual impurity and that grows from the earth.