Sukkah 11b (יא:) — the Talmud in English

We require a corner

one and not two, even

at the time of the thread,

that is, even when inserting them into the garment, the tzitzit must be hanging from a single corner, and one thread may not lie over two corners; this halakha was not stated only with regard to the time of tying them,

and

behold,

there is none

for he did not do so].

Therefore

he teaches us

that Shmuel means that this halakha was stated only with regard to the time of tying them, but with regard to hanging them, it is permitted to hang them on two corners at once.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s opinion:

It was objected

from what we learned in a beraita:

If one hung

the tzitzit on the corner of the garment while they were still a single thread folded into four, and tied them,

but did not cut the ends of their threads

before tying them, they are

invalid.

The Gemara infers:

What, is it not that they are invalid forever,

and cutting them after the tying does not help?

This is a refutation of Rav,

who deems them fit when he cuts them after tying them, because “their cutting is their making,” as though they had now been made in complete fitness? The Gemara answers:

Rav could say to you: What is the meaning of “invalid”

as stated in the beraita?

Invalid until they are cut.

But once they have been cut, even if he cut them after tying them, they are fit, since their cutting is their making.

And Shmuel said:

If he did not cut them before tying them, they are

invalid forever,

and cutting them afterward does not help.

And Levi likewise said: They are invalid forever.

And Rav Mattana likewise said in the name of Shmuel: They are invalid forever.

Some say:

Rav Mattana did not state this teaching in Shmuel’s name. Rather, he

said: It happened to me personally,

that I hung and tied the tzitzit threads before cutting them, while they were still a single thread folded into four parts,

and I came before Mar Shmuel,

to ask him whether they were fit,

and he said to me: They are invalid forever,

and cutting them afterward does not help.

An objection was raised

against Rav, who maintains that cutting them after tying them is effective, because their cutting is their making, from the beraita in which we learned:

If one hung

the tzitzit threads and tied them,

and afterward cut the ends of their threads,

they are

invalid.

This proves that cutting them after tying them is ineffective, and that they are invalid forever, in accordance with Shmuel’s opinion.

And further,

there is another difficulty for Rav, for

it was taught with regard to a sukka:

The Torah states: “You shall make the Festival of Sukkot for yourself.”

And the Sages expounded:

“You shall make” [a sukka must be made in a fit manner],

means that this sukka must be made in accordance with the requirements,

and not from something already made

in an invalid manner.

From here they said: If one spread over it

over the roof of the sukka

a grapevine, a gourd, or ivy,

which are invalid for roofing since they remain attached to the ground,

and

afterward

roofed over them

with valid roofing, the sukka is

invalid,

because it was made in an invalid manner.

But

what are the circumstances?

In what manner does the beraita speak when it invalidates the sukka only because of “You shall make, and not from something already made”?

If you say that it is a case where he did not cut them,

and they are still attached, then

why specifically,

why did the beraita say that they are invalid only

because of “You shall make, and not from something already made,”

implying that they are now fit and were invalid only at the time of their making?

Let it also emerge that

now

they are attached,

and are invalid for roofing because they are attached to the ground?!

Rather,

you are compelled to say that the beraita speaks

of a case where

they had already

been cut

after he spread them over the sukka. Nevertheless, they became invalid because of “You shall make, and not from something already made,” since they were invalid at the time of their making, and when he rendered them fit afterward, the sukka was found to have been made automatically.

And

therefore

it teaches: The sukka is invalid.

And learn from here that we do not say that their cutting is their making.

For had their cutting been considered the making of the roofing, we would not regard the sukka as though it had been made automatically.

Is this a refutation of Rav?!

Rav could say to you in answer to the second difficulty: Indeed, if he had cut them off from the ground completely, they would be fit, since their cutting is their making.

in answer to the second difficulty: Indeed, if he had cut them off from the ground completely, they would be valid, because their cutting is their making.

Rather,

here,

in the beraita that invalidates this sukka because of “You shall make, and not from something already made,” and not because they are attached,

what are the circumstances? It is a case where he merely pulled them out.

He tore the branches from the tree, but they still stood near the place where they had been attached to the tree,

because their “making” is not apparent,

as their making is not discernible, since they are near their former place of attachment and appear to be attached to the ground. Therefore, this cutting is not considered the initial making of the roofing. Rather, the sukka is still considered to have been made invalidly, and is invalid because of “You shall make, and not from something already made.”

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

Nevertheless,

the first difficulty, from the beraita in which we learned:

If one hung them and afterward cut

their ends, they are invalid—is it

still a difficulty for Rav?!

The Gemara’s conclusion is: Indeed, this difficulty

is a difficulty

for Rav.

The Gemara discusses:

Let us say

that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel concerning cutting—whether it is considered making—is

like the

dispute between

tannaim:

We learned in a Mishna below (32b): If the berries of a myrtle branch are more numerous than its leaves, it is invalid. But if one reduced the number of berries so that they were no longer more numerous than its leaves, it is fit. One may not reduce the berries of a myrtle branch on a Festival, since by doing so he is like one who repairs a utensil, rendering the invalid myrtle branch fit.

The beraita adds: And if he

transgressed

the words of the Sages, who said that one may not reduce them on a Festival,

and plucked them

on the Festival after he had bound the myrtle together with the lulav [for on the Festival he certainly did not bind them, since tying is a prohibited labor], it is

invalid; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon bar Yehotzadak.

And the Sages deem it fit.

They assumed,

the members of the study hall assumed that the dispute between Rabbi Shimon bar Yehotzadak and the Sages could be explained as follows:

Everyone

holds that

a lulav requires binding,

that the three species must be bound together.

And

everyone holds that

we derive

by means of the principle “what do we find”

the lulav from the sukka, as it is written concerning the sukka: “You shall make,” and not from something already made.

The same law applies to a lulav that was bound invalidly: it is subject to the disqualification of “You shall make, and not from something already made.” Since the lulav was bound on the eve of the Festival together with an invalid myrtle branch, it should be invalidated because of “You shall make, and not from something already made.”

And if so,

is it not with regard to this that they disagree: The one who deems it fit [the

Sages]

holds: We say concerning a sukka that their cutting is their making. And

therefore

concerning a lulav as well we say that their plucking

of the myrtle berries

is their making.

It is as though it had now been bound in a fit manner.

And the one who deems it invalid [

Rabbi Shimon bar Yehotzadak]

holds: We do not say concerning a sukka that their cutting is their making,

in accordance with Shmuel’s opinion. Even after the cutting, the sukka remains invalid because of “You shall make, and not from something already made.”

And

consequently,

concerning a lulav as well we do not say that their plucking is their making.

The Gemara rejects this:

No. Everyone

holds like Shmuel, who

does not say concerning a sukka that their cutting is their making. And here,

where they disagree over whether the binding of the lulav is fit after he plucked the myrtle berries,

they disagree over deriving the lulav from the sukka

with regard to the law of “You shall make, and not from something already made”;

that is what they disagree about.

The one who deems it fit holds: We do not derive the lulav from the sukka.

Although the lulav requires binding, there is no deficiency in the fact that the binding was made invalidly.

And the one who deems it invalid holds: We derive the lulav from the sukka.

Alternatively, if you wish,

indeed,

if we hold that a lulav requires binding, everyone agrees that we derive the lulav from the sukka,

and it is invalid even after the berries have been plucked, because it was made invalidly in violation of “You shall make, and not from something already made.”

And here, this is what they disagree about:

One master holds:

A lulav

requires binding, and the other master holds:

A lulav

does not require binding.

Since it does not require binding, even if he bound it on the Festival, it does not matter that it was bound invalidly.

And

they disagree

in the dispute between these tannaim, as it was taught: A lulav, whether bound or unbound, is fit.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

A lulav that is

bound is

is

fit,

but a lulav that is

unbound is

is

invalid.

Thus, they disagree over whether the lulav must be bound together with the myrtle and willow, or not.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda

who requires binding them together?

He derives “taking” from “taking,” from the bundle of hyssop

that our ancestors took in Egypt and with which they placed the blood of the Paschal offering on the lintel and the two doorposts.

And this is how he expounded:

It is written there

concerning the Paschal offering in Egypt,

“And you shall take”—a bundle of hyssop; and it is written here

concerning the lulav,

“And you shall take for yourselves on the first day

the fruit of a majestic tree.”

Just as there,

in Egypt, they took the hyssop

as a bundle,

namely, three stalks of hyssop bound together, as it is stated, “a bundle of hyssop,”

so too here,

the taking of the lulav is

as a bundle.

And the Sages,

who do not require the three species to be bound, explain their reasoning as follows:

We do not derive taking from taking.

That is, they did not receive this gezeira shava from their teachers, and a person may not formulate a gezeira shava on his own unless he received it from his teachers, from one teacher to another, back to Moses our teacher.

The Gemara discusses:

In accordance with whom does

the following statement conform, according to which of the tannaim cited above:

“A lulav is a mitzva to bind it, but if he did not bind it,

it is

it is fit”?

If

it is

Rabbi Yehuda’s

statement, the beraita is difficult:

Why is it fit if he did not bind it?

A lulav requires binding.

And if

it is

the Sages’

statement,

why is it a mitzva

to bind it, when they maintain that a lulav does not require binding?!

And one cannot say that according to the Sages as well, it is initially a mitzva to bind it, for where do we find, with regard to Torah mitzvot, that the Torah says to perform them merely as a mitzva, while failure to do so does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva?!

The Gemara answers:

Actually, it is the Sages.

The fundamental law of the lulav does not require taking it specifically as a bundle.

And

the reason that it is initially a mitzva to bind it is

because it is stated: “This is my God, and I will glorify Him.”

The Sages expounded:

Beautify yourself before Him through mitzvot.

It is a beautification of the mitzva to bind them together.

We learned in the Mishna:

This is the general principle: Anything susceptible to tumah,

and whose growth is not from the ground, may not be used for roofing.

The Gemara explains:

From where are these matters derived?

Reish Lakish said:

We were commanded to dwell in a sukka as a remembrance of the Clouds of Glory that were in the wilderness, as it is stated: “For I caused the Children of Israel to dwell in sukkot,” and Onkelos translated it: “For I caused them to dwell in the shelter of clouds,” that is, in the shade of the Clouds of Glory.

And

the verse states: “And a mist

[a cloud]

will ascend from the earth,”

from here we learn that a cloud’s growth is from the ground.

And we derive:

Just as a mist

is

something that is not susceptible to tumah,

since tumah was stated only with regard to food, liquids, utensils, and a person,

and

likewise

its growth

is

from the ground, so too a sukka,

which commemorates the Clouds of Glory, must be made from

something that is not susceptible to tumah and whose growth is from the ground.

The Gemara rejects this:

That works for the one who says

that the sukkot in which the Holy One, blessed be He, settled Israel when they left Egypt

were the Clouds of Glory.

But according to the one who says that they made actual sukkot for them

because of the sun when they camped in the wilderness, and it was in their memory that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded the making of a sukka,

what can be said?

As it was taught:

The Torah states [Leviticus 23]: “Every citizen in Israel shall dwell in sukkot, so that your generations will know

that I caused the Children of Israel to dwell in sukkot.”

Those sukkot

were the Clouds of Glory; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Akiva says: They made actual sukkot for them.

And since this is so,

that works for Rabbi Eliezer,

who says that they were the Clouds of Glory; it is understandable from where we learn that the sukka must be made from something that is not susceptible to tumah and whose growth is from the ground.

But according to Rabbi Akiva,

who says that they made actual sukkot for them,

what can be said?

When

as came

Rav Dimi

came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan

a different source for these laws:

The verse states: “The Festival of Sukkot you shall make for yourself,”

and the word “Festival” is expounded with regard to the Festival offering.

The verse compares

the

sukka to the

Festival

offering.

Just as

the

Festival offering

is

something that is not susceptible to tumah and whose growth is from the ground [

an animal is considered by Rabbi Yoḥanan to be something whose growth is from the ground, since it is nourished from the ground and grows from it],

so too a sukka is something that is not susceptible to tumah and whose growth is from the ground.