Sotah 6b — the Talmud in English

The woman who says, “I am impure,”

“I committed adultery,” and acknowledges this after they had already consecrated it and brought the meal-offering.

And when witnesses came to her that she was impure,

her meal-offering too is burned.

And Rav proves:

When did witnesses come?

When did those witnesses come as a result of whose testimony the meal-offering is burned?

If we say before it was consecrated,

if this was still before they placed the meal-offering in a service vessel, then in such a case it certainly would not be said that her meal-offering is burned, but rather

it goes out to ordinary status—

it goes out to become ordinary property, since it had not yet been consecrated.

Rather,

certainly, the witnesses came

after it was consecrated,

after the meal-offering had already been consecrated in a service vessel.

Granted, if you say that the water examines her,

if we say that the water examines even a woman concerning whom there are witnesses that she committed adultery, except that they have not yet testified,

apparently she is fit for consecration and offering,

for when they placed the meal-offering in the service vessel, the meal-offering was fit to be offered and was consecrated,

and when it was consecrated initially, it was properly consecrated.

And its sanctity is complete sanctity,

and for this reason her meal-offering is burned,

since it is impossible to offer it, and it is also impossible to take it out to ordinary status, since its sanctity is complete sanctity.

But if you say that the water does not examine her,

then

the matter will be revealed,

the matter will become known

retroactively: for when it was consecrated initially, it was consecrated in error!

For the sanctity of the meal-offering was erroneous from the outset, since it is now clarified that the meal-offering was not fit at all for the examination, since there are witnesses that she became impure. And according to what Rav Sheshet said, that in this case the water does not examine her, there is no need to burn the meal-offering, but

it goes out to ordinary status,

and it goes out of its sanctity to become ordinary property, according to the law of an offering consecrated in error. And why did the Mishna say that her meal-offering is burned?

And the Gemara answers Rav’s difficulty:

Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said:

For example, she committed adultery

the woman

in the Courtyard,

after they had already brought her meal-offering and consecrated it in a service vessel; and concerning this adultery the witnesses came.

And therefore her meal-offering is burned, since when they consecrated the meal-offering, its sanctity was complete sanctity, for the water was fit to examine her, since at that time there were no witnesses concerning her adultery. It is only that now there is no longer a need to examine her, since we already know through the witnesses that she is forbidden to her husband, because she committed adultery in the Courtyard.

Rav Mesharsheya objected to him:

How can one rely on this interpretation of the Mishna? Is it not impossible that she committed adultery after she had already reached the Courtyard, since

the young koanim accompany her

when they bring her to the Courtyard? And when could she have committed adultery?

And we answer:

There are two possibilities for her to commit adultery in the Courtyard:

A.

That she committed adultery with the young koanim

themselves—that she committed adultery with those young koanim who accompanied her to guard her.

B.

Rav Ashi said: For example, she needed to relieve herself,

and then the young koanim left her, and there she committed adultery, since at those moments they leave her alone.

Do the young koanim hang her by the headdress?

Do they hold the headdress on her head so that she cannot move for a moment? Surely, if she needs to relieve herself, they leave her; therefore, it is possible that at those moments she commits adultery.

Rav Pappa said:

There is no need to establish the beraita as referring to a case in which she committed adultery in the Courtyard. Rather,

always, as we said initially,

as we initially understood it: that the witnesses testify that she committed adultery during that seclusion as a result of which they brought the meal-offering.

And what you said,

and what we objected to this—that according to Rav Sheshet the water does not examine a woman concerning whom there are witnesses, and if so, all the consecration was in error, and

it goes out to ordinary status,

and the meal-offering goes out to ordinary status, so why is it burned?

Your answer is—

by rabbinic decree.

Indeed, by Torah law it need not be burned; rather, the Sages instituted that it be burned.

And the reason is:

a decree, lest they say

those who see how they take a meal-offering that had already been in a service vessel and remove it to ordinary status

that they remove [an offering] from a service vessel to ordinary status.

And they will come to err, thinking that it is possible to redeem something that had already been consecrated in a service vessel, since they do not know that here the sanctity was in error. Therefore, the Sages decreed that the meal-offering be burned, so that the error would be prevented.

Rav Mari raised an objection

to the foundation of Rav Pappa, who innovated that even when the meal-offering is clarified to be ordinary property, nevertheless the Sages decreed that it be burned. For we learned in a beraita the laws of the meal-offering when it became impure, or when the husband and the woman died, and the like.

And the beraita says:

If her meal-offering became impure

of the sotah

before it was consecrated in the vessel

of service,

it is like all meal-offerings

that became impure before they were placed in a service vessel, which can be redeemed,

and it shall be redeemed,

and with the redemption money they bring a new meal-offering.

But if the meal-offering became impure

after it was consecrated in the vessel

of service,

it is like all meal-offerings

that became impure after they were consecrated in a service vessel, and it is impossible to take it out to ordinary status,

and it shall be burned.

And the beraita adds:

If the handful was consecrated,

even if they had already taken the handful from the meal-offering and placed the handful in a service vessel in preparation for offering it on the altar,

and he did not have time

the koen

to offer it until he died,

the husband,

or she died,

the woman—and there is again no need for the meal-offering, since the woman will no longer drink from the water—

it is like all meal-offerings

that became disqualified after the handful was taken, which are not offered upon the altar,

and it shall be burned.

But if already

the handful was offered

upon the altar, and only the remainder remained to be eaten by the koanim,

and he did not have time

the koen

to eat its remainder until he died

the husband,

or until she died

the woman,

it is like all meal-offerings

that are eaten after the handful is offered,

and it shall be eaten

even though they will not give the woman to drink, since one of the couple died.

And the reason is:

For concerning uncertainty you came initially,

perhaps she committed adultery;

its uncertainty was atoned for, and it went away.

That is, the meal-offering was offered according to law, since at the time of its offering there was still a possibility of drinking the water, and it is a meal-offering like all meal-offerings, and its remainder is eaten even though now there is no further need for it.

And the beraita adds: if

witnesses came to her

before the offering of the handful,

that she is impure, her meal-offering is burned,

even after the handful had been taken from it.

But if

her witnesses were found

who testified that she had secluded herself

to be plotting witnesses,

even after the handful had already been taken from it,

her meal-offering is ordinary property

and it does not require redemption at all, and certainly it is not burned, for it has become clear that the sanctity of the meal-offering was in error.

From here the Gemara asks concerning Rav Pappa’s words: he said that even when the meal-offering is clarified to be ordinary property, it is burned by rabbinic decree. Why, then, concerning a meal-offering whose witnesses were found to be plotting, is it not said that it is burned by rabbinic decree, on account of the decree that Rav Pappa mentioned?

And we answer:

Are you saying plotting witnesses!

Your proof, which you brought from the case of plotting witnesses, is not a proof for other cases, for even if the Sages decreed that the meal-offering be burned, nevertheless

plotting witnesses have publicity,

the matter becomes public, and everyone hears about it and understands that there was sanctity in error here; they will not come to err and say that it is possible to redeem to ordinary status a meal-offering that had already been consecrated in a service vessel.

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with Rav Sheshet.

We learned a beraita that states Rav Sheshet’s ruling explicitly,

but not for his reason.

However, not from the same source upon which Rav Sheshet based himself: for Rav Sheshet learned this from the written words “and there is no witness against her,” and Rav Sheshet understood from this that wherever there are witnesses, the examination by the water is ineffective. But the beraita learned this from the verse in a different manner.

And the beraita says as follows: It is written, “And if the woman was not defiled and she is pure, then she shall be cleared, and she shall conceive seed.”

Now the words “and she is pure” appear to be superfluous, since it was already stated, “and if she was not defiled”; and since she was not defiled, she is certainly pure. Rather, these words were stated to teach:

“Pure”—and not one concerning whom there are witnesses in a distant country.

That is, the Torah’s promise that the woman will give birth applies only when she is pure, and not in a case where she is impure and there are witnesses concerning this, except that they have not yet come to testify. In that case, the water does not examine her. And from the superfluous letter vav in the word “and she is pure,” another law is learned:

“And she is pure”—and not one for whom merit has suspended judgment.

For if merit suspended judgment for her and therefore she did not die, the Torah’s promise “and she shall conceive seed” does not apply to her.

And from the word “she” in the words “and she is pure”—for this word too is superfluous—it is learned:

“She”—and not one about whom the women who spin by moonlight conduct discussion.

That is, a woman about whom the women who spin by moonlight are already speaking, saying that she committed adultery, and the matter is already publicized: such a woman is not examined by the water, and concerning her as well there is no promise that “she shall conceive seed.”

And since the Gemara mentioned the opinion of Rabbi Shimon brought in the Mishna below, who disagrees with the law that merit suspends judgment, on the grounds that through this a situation is created in which a bad reputation is spread concerning the women who drank and were examined, it discusses:

And Rabbi Shimon—even though he does not expound the vav.

Even if he disagrees and holds that nothing is to be learned from the superfluity of the letter vav, and therefore the exposition “and she is pure”—and not one for whom merit suspends judgment—does not contradict his words, since he can disagree with it. Nevertheless, concerning the exposition from the word “pure,” he certainly does not disagree.