Sotah 47b — the Talmud in English

Until the days

of Yohanan the High Priest,

the hammer was striking in Jerusalem

On the intermediate days of the festival, the smiths would engage in their work for the sake of a matter involving loss, and he abolished it, because its sound was heard from afar, and not everyone knew that their work was only for the sake of a matter involving loss, and they would come to stumble. And also because the sound publicized their work, and this was a degradation of the festival.

And in his days there was no

person

who needed to ask

his fellow

about

demai,

whether it had been tithed or not, because he instituted that everyone who purchased from an am ha-aretz would tithe only terumat maaser and maaser sheni. Until his days, they would ascertain whether the seller was trustworthy to tithe, and if he was not trustworthy, they would not purchase from him, since they had needed to tithe all the tithes because of the doubt. And he instituted that they should remove only those separations whose [omission] involves the sin of death, but should not remove maaser rishon and maaser ani, since they could say to the Levite and to the poor person: “Bring proof that it is tevel, and receive your tithes.” And from his time they began to purchase even from ammei ha-aretz, and again they tithed only terumat maaser and maaser sheni.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: From where [do we know] that if the heifer was decapitated and afterward

the killer was found, there is no

decapitation of the heifer

that exempts him

from execution by the court?

The verse states: “And the land shall not be atoned for blood that was shed in it, except by the blood of the one who shed it.”

We learned in the Mishna:

One witness says: “I saw the killer,”

and another witness says: “You did not see,” they would not decapitate [the heifer].

And we infer:

The reason is that his counterpart witness contradicts him;

therefore, the first witness is not trustworthy, and they decapitate [the heifer]. And it implies:

But

if

not

was he

contradicted by one witness,

the first witness would be

trustworthy

that he saw the killer, and on the basis of his testimony they would not decapitate [the heifer].

And we raise a difficulty:

From where are these matters

that one witness is trustworthy in his testimony to exempt [the community] from the obligation of the decapitated heifer?

For the Sages taught:

The Sages,

it is written:

“It was not known who struck him,”

and we infer:

But if it was known who struck him, even

if the killer is known only to one person

at the end of the world, they would not decapitate [the heifer].

Rabbi Akiva says: From where [do we know] that if the Sanhedrin saw one who killed a person, and the judges do not

know

him,

the killer, nevertheless the law is

that they would not decapitate [the heifer]? The verse states

that the elders say:

“And our eyes did not see, and

in this manner

did not

the court

see,”

but although they do not know who he is, they are not obligated to bring the decapitated heifer.

And we object:

Now that you say that one witness is trustworthy

to say, “I saw the killer,” and thereby to exempt [the community] from the obligation of the decapitated heifer, if so,

the other one witness,

the witness opposite him,

how can he contradict him? For Ulla said: Wherever the Torah made one witness trustworthy, here he is as two.

His testimony is considered like the testimony of two witnesses in other testimonies.

And the statement of one

who comes against him is not accepted

in place

of one who comes against the testimony of a witness who is considered as

two.

And why, then, did we learn in our Mishna that if one testified that he saw the killer, and another came and contradicted him, the first testimony was contradicted, and they decapitate the heifer?

And we answer:

Ulla can say to you: Teach

in our Mishna:

“They would not decapitate [the heifer],”

and in truth the first witness is trusted like two, and the witness opposite him has no power to contradict him.

And Rabbi Yitzhak likewise said: Teach, “They would not decapitate [the heifer].” And

if

Rabbi Hiyya said: Teach, “They would decapitate [the heifer],”

and this is as we learned in our Mishna.

And we object:

But according to Rabbi Hiyya, there is a difficulty

with the earlier question

of Ulla,

who said that wherever the Torah made one witness trustworthy, he is like two: Can one witness contradict him?

And we answer:

It is not difficult. Here

in our Mishna, where we learned that the witness who says “You did not see” can contradict the one who says “I saw,” it is speaking of a case in which the two came and testified

simultaneously.

That is, the contradicting witness came within the time required for speech of the trustworthy witness, and his testimony had not yet been established in court, and they had not yet trusted him like two.

But

here,

the rule stated by Ulla, that the statement of one does not stand in the place of two, is speaking of a case in which the trustworthy witness and the one who contradicts him came

one after the other,

for once the first witness testified and was trusted like two, one witness has no power to contradict him.

We learned

in our Mishna:

One witness says: “I saw the killer,” and two say: “You did not see”; they would decapitate [the heifer].

And we infer:

But one

says, “I saw,”

and one

contradicts him and says, “You did not see,”

they would not decapitate [the heifer]—a refutation of Rabbi Hiyya,

who established our Mishna as referring to when they came simultaneously, and likewise read in the first clause that one witness contradicts him and they decapitate [the heifer]. According to his words, it is difficult why we learned that two can contradict him, since we already learned that even one can contradict him; it is obvious that two will contradict him. Necessarily, the Mishna comes to teach us in accordance with Rabbi Yitzhak, that in the first clause they would not decapitate [the heifer], because one witness is not trusted in place of two, and only when two testified against him and contradicted him would they decapitate [the heifer]. And it is not in accordance with Rabbi Hiyya.

And we answer:

And according to your reasoning,

that the Mishna comes to teach us in accordance with Rabbi Yitzhak, that one witness is not trusted to contradict him, and therefore the latter clause was stated, that two are trusted to contradict one, even though this is obvious, and it comes only to allow an inference and prove something about the first clause, if so,

say the latter clause: “Two say: ‘We saw’

the killer,

and one witness says: ‘You did not see’; they would not decapitate [the heifer],”

for here too one can infer that specifically when two said that they saw, one witness cannot contradict them;

but

if only one

witness

says, “I saw,”

and one

contradicts him, the contradicting witness is trusted and

they would decapitate [the heifer]. Since one can infer this and one can infer the opposite, necessarily the Mishna did not come to teach these inferences.

Rather, the entire Mishna

Rather, the entire Mishna

both in the case where one saw and two contradicted him, and in the case where two saw and one contradicted them, is speaking

of disqualified witnesses,

such as women and slaves, who are disqualified for other testimonies but are trusted for the testimony of the decapitated heifer.

And

the Mishna comes to teach us in these cases that the halakha is

in accordance with Rabbi Nehemiah, who says: “Wherever the Torah made one witness trustworthy, follow the majority of opinions,”

and there is no difference between a qualified and a disqualified witness.

And

therefore they

made

the law of

two women

who contradicted

one man

who testified that he saw

like

the law of

two men

who came to contradict

one man,

for the two nullify the statement of the one. The laws of testimony do not apply in the case of the heifer, and therefore we follow the majority of opinions of those testifying, since all the testimonies are equal in their trustworthiness, and even one witness or a disqualified witness is trusted in it like two.

And some say: Wherever one qualified witness came initially

and testified that he saw and was trustworthy,

even one hundred women

come to contradict him,

because

a witness

is considered like two,

and they are not trusted to contradict him, because he is trusted like two, while they are like one witness, who is not trusted to contradict him.

And here,

where we learned that one witness says, “I saw,” and two say, “You did not see,” they would decapitate [the heifer], implying that they trust the contradictors, even though according to Rabbi Nehemiah it is speaking of disqualified witnesses,

with what are we dealing? For example, a woman came initially,

and since the first witness too was disqualified, two disqualified witnesses are trusted to disqualify her.

And it is speaking of their having come one after the other, for if they came simultaneously, there would be no need for the reason that we follow the majority of opinions, since one witness is trusted to contradict one witness who came together with him. And the Mishna teaches us that even though they came after he testified and was trusted, since the witness was disqualified, we follow the majority of opinions, and two contradict him.

And if you wish, explain [the teaching] of Rabbi Nehemiah in this manner:

He did not state his principle to equate qualified and disqualified witnesses in the testimony of the decapitated heifer, and he does not hold that we follow the majority of opinions even when disqualified witnesses contradicted a qualified witness. Rather, this is what his intention must be explained to be:

Rabbi Nehemiah says: “Wherever the Torah made one witness trustworthy, follow the majority of opinions,”

and the continuation of the principle stated above, that “they made two women [equivalent] to one man,” and so on, was not stated by Rabbi Nehemiah; rather, this is how they explained it. In truth, it should not be explained in this manner, but rather as follows:

And they made two women

specifically when they contradict

one woman,

whom they trust, and whose law is

like two men

who contradicted

one man. But two women against one man

are not trusted to contradict him, for

it is like half and half,

since he is one qualified witness, and the two women too are considered only like one witness.

Therefore, if they came simultaneously, it is like one witness against one witness. The matter remains in doubt, and they decapitate [the heifer]. But if the two women came after one qualified witness testified and the Torah trusted him like two, they are not trusted to contradict him, since they are like one witness against two.

And likewise in the second case: If two women testified that they saw the killer, and one qualified witness came and contradicted them, he is trusted to contradict them as one witness against one witness, and the matter remains in doubt, and they decapitate [the heifer].

But in our Mishna we learned that they would not decapitate [the heifer], and this is speaking of a case in which the one witness who came against the two women was also a disqualified witness. Therefore, we follow the majority of opinions, and the first women remain trusted in their testimony, and the killer became known through them, and they do not decapitate [the heifer].

And we object: If so, that all the cases in the Mishna involve disqualified witnesses, the difficulty is:

And two

cases

involving disqualified witnesses—for what do I need them?

And we answer:

It might have entered your mind that when we follow the majority of opinions,

it is only

for stringency,

to trust the contradictors so that the law of the decapitated heifer will be fulfilled,

but for leniency,

in a case where two testify that they saw, it might have entered your mind

not

to follow the majority of opinions, since on the basis of their testimony we do not bring a decapitated heifer.

It teaches us

that in every testimony of disqualified witnesses concerning the decapitated heifer, we follow the majority of opinions.

We learned in the Mishna:

When the murderers became numerous, and so on.

The Sages taught: When the murderers became numerous, the decapitated heifer was abolished, because it comes only for uncertainty;

and therefore

when the murderers became openly numerous, the decapitated heifer was abolished ,

for they would see who the killer was, and in most cases there was someone at the end of the world who knew who had struck him; and even though they did not testify, they would not decapitate [the heifer].

We learned in the Mishna:

When the adulterers became numerous, and so on.

The Sages taught: “Then the man shall be clear of iniquity,”

and we expound: From what iniquity is the man cleared? After all, we are dealing with the iniquity of the woman who is a sota. Rather,

when the man is clear of iniquity

of adultery, whether with another woman or with his wife who is a sota and forbidden to him, then

the

bitter

waters test his wife,

and if she is a sota, they kill her, as stated in the section of the sota.

But if

the man is not clear of iniquity,

but he too sinned with the iniquity of adultery, then

the waters do not test his wife,

and there is no proof from the fact that she did not die upon drinking the waters that she is innocent of iniquity and is not a sota.

And

likewise we find that Scripture

says: “I will not punish your daughters when they commit adultery, and so on.”

And we raise a difficulty:

What

did the tan nay come to add when he also brought proof from

“and it says,”

and we explain that the tan nay’s intention was to say:

And if you would say: His iniquity—yes,

only the husband’s iniquity prevents the testing of his wife with the bitter waters, whereas the iniquity

of his sons and of his daughters,

the husband’s children,

does not

prevent the testing of his wife; for this reason the tan nay brought:

Come and hear: “I will not punish”

the iniquity of your wives—and why? As a punishment for the husband—the father—

“for your daughters commit adultery and your daughters-in-law commit adultery.”

And from the continuation of the verse the tanna brought it to say,

And should you say

that only when the husband has

the sin of a married woman, yes,

the waters do not test, whereas if he has in his possession only

the sin of an unmarried woman, no,

his sin does not prevent the testing of his wife,

come and hear, for they

the husbands

with the prostitutes they separate, and with the consecrated women they sacrifice, and so forth,

and it implies both with a married woman and with an unmarried woman.

And we explain the continuation of the verse:

What is, “and a people that does not understand shall stumble”? [

“shall stumble,” its meaning is: he shall fail through his foolishness — Ramban on the Torah, in the section of the sota]

Rabbi Elazar said: The prophet said to Israel, “If you are strict with yourselves

not to stumble through the sin of adultery,

the waters test your wives; but if not, the waters do not test your wives.”

When those who pursue pleasure increased,

and they do not trouble themselves to examine the law, as a result

the judgments became distorted,

and since they did not trouble themselves to examine the laws of prohibition and permission and to instruct the public in the law according to its truth,

the deeds became corrupted, and

since this was so,

there is no

satisfaction before the Holy One, blessed is He, in His world,

and it is not pleasant

to the Holy One, blessed is He,

in the world

that He created.

When those who show partiality in judgment increased,

who incline the judgment in favor of the rich,

the prohibition was nullified,

they ceased to fulfill the prohibition

“You shall not fear”

before any man,

and the fulfillment of the prohibition

ceased

“You shall not recognize

a face in judgment,”

and they cast off the yoke of Heaven from upon themselves and placed upon themselves the yoke of flesh and blood.

For they enslaved themselves to the rich and did everything according to their will, because they showed them partiality .

When those who whisper whispers in judgment increased,

these are the attorneys who whisper to the judges how to acquit or to convict the one being judged,

the wrath increased in Israel

for concerning the distortion of judgment it is said, “If you surely afflict,” “and My anger shall burn,” and so forth,

and the Divine Presence withdrew,

for it rests in the court, as it is stated, “God stands in the divine assembly,” but only when they judge according to the law of Torah, as is stated at the end of the verse:

“In the midst of the gods He judges”;

and therefore, when those who whisper whispers to distort the judgment increased, the Divine Presence withdrew from the court.

When there increased

people about whom it is said,

“After their gain their heart goes,”

as a result

those saying of evil that it is good and of good that it is evil increased,

for they praise the wicked and condemn the righteous.

When those saying of evil that it is good and of good that it is evil increased,

as a result

the “woe, woe” in the world increased,

for the rest of the verses after the verse about those who say of good that it is evil begin with “woe,” and several deficiencies are enumerated in them.

When those who draw out spittle increased,

they prolong their spittle, and they do so because of the trait of arrogance within them, and as a result

the arrogant increased,

those possessing much arrogance,

and the students diminished,

for haughtiness of spirit causes poverty in Torah,

and the Torah returns upon those who study it,

that is, it searches, perhaps it will find those worthy to be its students.

When the arrogant increased

and, out of their arrogance, presented themselves as sages,

the daughters of Israel began to marry the arrogant,

and they erred concerning them and considered them sages, as they presented themselves, because

our generation sees only the exterior,

what appears outwardly.

And we raise an objection:

Is that so?

How did they desire to marry them?

But the Master said: Whoever becomes haughty

a person who acts arrogantly,

is not accepted even by the people of his household,

even his wife disparages him.

As it is stated: “A haughty man, and he shall not be settled,”

and we explain:

“He shall not be settled”

that he shall be disgraced

even in his own settlement,

and if so, how did they find favor in the eyes of the daughters of Israel, who wanted to marry them?

And we answer:

At first,

when they saw their wisdom, as they pretended outwardly,

every

daughter of Israel hastened to marry him, but Scripture reveals that

in the end,

when she discovered his arrogance in her home,

he became despised to them

and was loathsome to his wife.

When those who impose merchandise upon householders increased,

for the judges compel householders who understand commerce to engage in their merchandise for the benefit of the judges, and in return for their engaging in their merchandise, when the householders come to judgment, the judges incline the judgment in their favor, and as a result,

the bribery and the distortion of judgment increased, and goodness ceased. When there increased

those saying to one another,

“Accept my benefit, and

in return for it

strengthen my benefits,”

I shall show you gratitude, as a result

“there increased: ‘Each man shall do what is right in his eyes,’

for they did not fear lest they be summoned to judgment, since they had done favors for the judges, and the judges had shown them gratitude and issued judgment in their favor; and from then

the lowly were raised and the high were brought low,

and the classes were not discerned, since the judgment was determined according to each one’s showing gratitude to the other,

and

as a result

the kingdom,

the kingdom of Israel,

goes and becomes ugly

it goes and deteriorates.

When the narrow-eyed increased

who do not want others to benefit from their property,

and the predators,

robbers,

the hardeners of the heart increased,

people who did not attend to the cry of the poor and did not have mercy on them,

and those who close their hands from lending

who did not agree to lend to their fellows.

And they transgressed what is written in the Torah: “Beware lest

there be a base thing in your heart, saying, ‘The seventh year, the year of remission, is approaching,’ and your eye be evil toward your poor brother, and you do not give him.”

When there increased

women who walked

with outstretched necks and deceptive eyes,

painting their eyes so that people would look at them,

there increased

the women whose husbands gave them to drink

the bitter waters, but they ceased

to give them to drink, since the waters did not test, as above.

When those who accept gifts increased, the days diminished and the years were shortened

of a person’s life,

as it is written: “And one who hates gifts shall live.”

When the presumptuous of heart increased

who did not incline their ear to hear the words of their teacher because of the haughtiness of their heart, but relied upon their own understanding to scrutinize what they had heard, as a result

disputes in Israel increased

for each one understood what he had heard according to his own way.

When the students of Shammai and Hillel who had not served sufficiently increased, dispute in Israel increased, and the Torah became like two Torahs,

for in their period the decrees and the yoke of the kingdom grew stronger, and they could not set their hearts to clarify the words of the disputants and with whom the truth lay.

When those accepting charity from the idolaters increased, Israel were above and they

the gentiles

below, Israel

in front and they behind,

and everything is in reversed language for the good; and the intention is that the gentiles were above and in front.

We learned in the Mishna:

“When Yose ben Yoezer died,

the clusters ceased.”

And we explain:

What are “clusters”? Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: It is an acronym for

“a man in whom everything is found,”

a man in whom everything is found,

who knows the Torah according to its truth, without blemish of forgetfulness or dispute. [And in Temura 15b Rashi explained: Torah, fear of sin, and acts of kindness].

We learned in the Mishna:

“Yohanan the High Priest abolished the declaration of the tithe, and so forth.”

And we inquire concerning it:

What is the reason

that he abolished in his period the recitation of the confession at the removal of the tithes?

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: Because they do not give it as prescribed, for

behold,

the Merciful One said that they give

the first tithe

to the Levites,