Sotah 3a — the Talmud in English

It is evident,

it is proven from the fact that all agree that kinui is an expression of jealousy,

they hold that it is forbidden to be jealous.

For jealousy is a disgraceful matter.

And the Gemara asks:

but the one who says that it is permitted to be jealous,

he cannot hold that it is an expression of jealousy, and if so,

what is the meaning of kinui?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said—

there is no

expression of

kinui except

from

an expression of warning,

whereby he warns her not to seclude herself with so-and-so.

And so it says,

a proof from the verse that kinui is an expression of warning.

As it is written in the prophecy of Joel: "

And the Lord warned concerning His land,

for He warned the locust that it should not destroy His land."

It was taught in a beraita,

we learned in a beraita,

Rabbi Meir would say—

A person commits a transgression in secret,

such as a promiscuous woman who committed adultery with her husband unaware, in secret,

and the Holy One, blessed be He, announces it concerning him publicly,

He places it in her husband's heart to be jealous concerning her, and through her husband being jealous concerning her, the matter becomes public that she is suspected of illicit relations.

As it is stated—

“And a spirit passed over him,”

referring to the husband who is jealous concerning his wife,

“a spirit of jealousy.”

And “passing over” is only an expression of announcement,

the word “passed over” is an expression of announcement, for the Holy One, blessed be He, so to speak intends to cause a report to pass, so that everyone will know the deeds of this promiscuous woman.

And the proof that “passed over” is an expression of announcement is

that

indeed

it is stated: “And Moses commanded, and they caused a proclamation to pass through the camp.”

And causing a proclamation to pass through the camp means that they announced a proclamation in the camp:

Reish Lakish said: A person does not commit a transgression unless a spirit of folly enters him.

As it is stated—

“When any man's wife goes astray.” It is written tishteh [with the connotation of folly].

And if the intention were according to its simple meaning, that she deviated from the path, the Torah should have written in the verse ki titteh, whose meaning is that she deviated from the straight path; and since it is written “ki tishteh,” necessarily the Torah's intention is an expression of folly

A tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael said—

Why did the Torah believe one witness concerning a sota,

to say that she became impure during that seclusion which followed the kinui?

For there are grounds for the matter

that she became impure.

For he warned her

not to seclude herself,

and

nevertheless

she secluded herself. And

therefore, if

one witness testifies that she is impure,

he is believed, because we have evidence from the fact that she secluded herself that he is speaking the truth.

The Gemara asks:

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: But when kinui is written, it is written after seclusion and impurity!

The very verse from which we learn that one witness is believed concerning a woman who became impure after the seclusion was stated before kinui was stated in the Torah, for this is the order of the verses: “And she was secluded, and she became impure, and there is no witness concerning her,” and only afterward it is written, “And a spirit of jealousy passed over him.” Thus it implies that even without kinui he is believed to say that she became impure. And if so, it is impossible to say that the reason is because there are grounds that she committed adultery.

And the Gemara answers:

He said to him,

Abaye to Rav Pappa: Regarding what is written in the verse,

“and he passed over,”

the intention is not that now he is jealous concerning her, but rather

“and he had already passed over,”

meaning that he warned her before she secluded herself. And since after the kinui she secluded herself, one witness is believed to say that she became impure, since we have grounds that she became impure.

And the Gemara asks:

But from now,

since we interpret “passed over” to mean that it had already passed over,

if so, when it is written in the portion of the descendants of Gad and Reuben, that Moses our teacher commanded them to cross the Jordan with Joshua, as it is stated,

“And every armed man shall cross over for you”—

here too,

should we likewise interpret that the intention is that they had already crossed? But Moses our teacher commanded them, before they crossed, that they should cross as vanguard in the camp.

And the Gemara answers:

There,

we can interpret “and shall cross” as referring to the future,

since it is written

for it is written

“And the land shall be conquered before the Lord, and afterward you shall return,”

and the expression “you shall return”

clearly refers to the future,

and therefore “and every armed man shall cross over for you” is also interpreted as referring to the future.

But here,

however here,

if it enters your mind

if you wish to interpret

as it is written, “and he passed over,”

that what he warned her concerning was

after impurity and seclusion,

after the seclusion and the impurity—

why do I need kinui!?

Why do we need him to be jealous concerning her?

Rather, necessarily, the intention of the verse is to say that he warned her before she secluded herself and became impure:

A tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael said—

A man is not jealous concerning his wife unless a spirit enters him

from on high.

As it is stated: “And a spirit of jealousy passed over him, and he was jealous concerning his wife,”

for it is through the spirit that he is jealous concerning her.

What is the meaning of “spirit”?

The Sages

of the school of Rav Ashi

say: A spirit of impurity,

for the Satan causes him to sin by quarrelling with his wife.

Rav Ashi said: A spirit of purity,

because he hates promiscuity; therefore he is jealous concerning his wife.

And it is reasonable according to the one who says that it is a spirit of purity—

for it was taught in a beraita,

we learned in a beraita—

“And he was jealous concerning his wife”—

permission, the words of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: An obligation!

If you say that it is a spirit of purity, it is well,

it is possible to understand the dispute whether it is permission or an obligation.

But if you say

that there entered into him

a spirit of impurity—

permission and obligation—

is there permission or obligation for a person to bring a spirit of impurity into himself!?

For the concept of an obligation, or even of permission, does not apply with regard to bringing a spirit of impurity into oneself.

The body of the matter,

now let us return to explain the body of the words of the beraita brought above—

“And he was jealous concerning his wife,” permission, the words of Rabbi Yishmael. And Rabbi Akiva says, an obligation.

And we find two additional places in which Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disputed in this manner.

A. It is written in the Torah, in the portion of Emor, that it is forbidden for a kohen to become impure through corpse impurity, except for seven close relatives, to whom he is permitted to become impure; and concerning this they disputed—

“To her he shall become impure”—

permission

to become impure, and not an obligation,

the words of Rabbi Yishmael—

And Rabbi Akiva says: An obligation!

It is a mitzva for the kohen to become impure for the seven close relatives.

B. Similarly, we find that they disputed concerning what the Torah said about a person who has a Canaanite slave, “You shall work them forever”: whether the Torah's intention is

“You shall work them forever,”

that this is only

permission

to subject them to labor forever, and not an obligation,

the words of Rabbi Yishmael—

And Rabbi Akiva says: An obligation!

It is a mitzva for the master to subject him to labor, and it is forbidden for the master to emancipate his slave.

The Gemara asks:

Rav Pappa said to Abaye—and some say

and some say that

Rav Mesharsheya

asked

Rava—

Shall we say that Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva—

dispute in this manner throughout the entire Torah!

Are we to say that Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disputed concerning everything that the Torah says to do,

for one master says

that according to Rabbi Yishmael it is

permission, while the other master says,

and according to Rabbi Akiva it is

an obligation!?

If so, according to Rabbi Yishmael, we have no positive mitzva in the Torah that is obligatory.

And the Gemara answers:

He said to him: Here, they dispute concerning the verses.

Certainly, even according to Rabbi Yishmael, wherever there is a command in the Torah to do something, it is an obligation; rather, here there is a dispute regarding how to expound the verses, [and the Gemara explains below what they dispute about], and this is how they disputed:

“And he was jealous concerning his wife,” permission, the words of Rabbi Yishmael—

Rabbi Akiva says: An obligation.

What is the reason of Rabbi Yishmael

that it is permission?—

He holds in accordance with this tanna,

for he holds like the tanna of the beraita—

as it was taught

in a beraita—

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: In view of

according to

the Torah's saying, “You shall not hate your brother in your heart,”

and since the Torah said that it is forbidden for a person to bring himself to hatred and dispute,

could it be in a case such as this,

should we say that even a man who sees his wife violating Jewish practice and behaving promiscuously

should not be jealous concerning her, since through this he causes hatred .

The verse says—

“And a spirit of jealousy passed over him, and he was jealous concerning his wife,”

meaning that if he wishes to be jealous, permission is in his hands.

It follows that we have no proof from the verse that there is an obligation to be jealous concerning one's wife, for the verse is needed for the fundamental law that there is permission to be jealous and that there is no prohibition of “You shall not hate” in this.

But with regard to all the mitzvot in the Torah, certainly they are obligations to fulfill.

The Gemara asks:

And Rabbi Akiva,

who holds that kinui is an obligation—this is difficult for him: the verse is needed to teach us that there is no prohibition of “You shall not hate” in this; how does he learn that it is an obligation?

And the Gemara answers:

Another kinui is written.

For the matter of kinui is written twice in the Torah: at first the Torah wrote, “And a spirit of jealousy passed over him, and he was jealous concerning his wife, and she became impure,” and afterward the Torah wrote, “Or a spirit of jealousy passed over him, and he was jealous concerning his wife, and she did not become impure.” One verse comes to teach us that there is no prohibition of “You shall not hate” in this and that it is permitted to be jealous, while the other comes to teach us that it is an obligation.

The Gemara asks:

And Rabbi Yishmael,

how does he expound the repetition of the matter of kinui in the Torah?

The Gemara answers:

Since it was necessary to write,

since the Torah wishes to introduce the law of

“and she became impure,” “and she did not become impure,”

that although we are uncertain whether she became impure or did not become impure, nevertheless she is forbidden because of the doubt,

it also wrote, “and he was jealous concerning his wife,”

the Torah wrote the matter of kinui again.

And although for this law alone the Torah could have written, “And a spirit of jealousy passed over him, and he was jealous concerning his wife, and she became impure or did not become impure,” nevertheless the Torah wrote the matter of kinui again, for this is the way of the Torah, as we learned in a beraita—

In accordance with what a tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught—

For a tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Every passage that was stated and repeated—

was repeated only because of a matter that was renewed in it.

For when the Torah repeats the entire passage once again, sometimes the verse comes only to introduce one matter that was renewed in it, and nevertheless the Torah writes the entire passage a second time. Here too, the entire repetition serves only to introduce that she is forbidden because of the doubt, and incidentally the Torah also repeated the matter of kinui:

And now the Gemara comes to discuss the matter that we learned concerning the impurity of a kohen for the seven close relatives—

“To her he shall become impure,” permission, the words of Rabbi Yishmael—

Rabbi Akiva says: An obligation.

What is the reason of Rabbi Yishmael?

How does he learn from the verse that it is only permission?—

Since,

since

it is written, “Say to the priests, the sons of Aaron, and say to them: He shall not become impure for a person among his people,”

there is a prohibition upon the kohen against becoming impure for the dead, and therefore

it was necessary to write,

the Torah needed to say

“To her he shall become impure,”

that nevertheless it is permitted for him to become impure for the seven close relatives; and if so, it is possible to learn only that this is permission.

The Gemara asks:

And Rabbi Akiva,

what compels him to say that this is an obligation?

And the Gemara answers: To teach that he has permission to become impure—

it follows from “except for his close relative”!

For it is explicitly stated in the Torah that he may become impure.

And if so,

“He shall become impure”—

why do I need it?

Why did the Torah repeat the permission to become impure for the seven close relatives at the end of the passage? Rather, necessarily, the verse comes to teach

an obligation,

that it is an obligation upon the kohen to become impure.

The Gemara asks:

And Rabbi Yishmael,

why does he not learn from the Torah's repetition that it is an obligation?

The Gemara answers:

“To her he shall become impure,” but he does not become impure for her limbs!

For in the verse “He shall not become impure,” the Torah teaches us that only if one of the relatives dies does he become impure for him. But if the relative were afflicted with boils and one of his limbs fell from him—and the law is that anyone who touches a limb from a living person becomes impure—then I might say that it is permitted for the kohen to become impure for the limb of the relative;

it teaches us that only if the relative dies does he become impure for him, but if he is alive, it is forbidden for him to become impure for the limb from the living person of the relative.