Sotah 31b (לא:) — the Talmud in English

And if

the latter testimony

of impurity,

which renders her forbidden

to her husband

with an eternal prohibition, is valid on the testimony of one witness,

the first testimony

of seclusion,

which does not render her forbidden

to her husband

with an eternal prohibition,

but only until she drinks,

is it not logical that it should be valid on the testimony of one witness?

The verse therefore states: “For he has found in her a matter of indecency”

(Deuteronomy 24:1).

And there it says: “A matter shall be established on the testimony of two witnesses”

(ibid. 19:15).

Just as there, on the testimony of two, so too here, on the testimony of two.

The Gemara will explain what the tanna derives from this gzera shava.

The continuation of the Mishna concerns conflicting testimonies regarding the woman’s impurity: when she drinks and when she does not drink.

One

witness

says

“I saw her become

impure,” and

another

says

“She secluded herself in my presence but

did not become impure

during that seclusion.”

And similarly,

one woman

alone

says

“I saw her become

impure, and another woman

says

“She secluded herself in my presence but

did

not become impure

during that seclusion.”

She would drink.

For although the first witness testifies to render her impure, the second contradicts that testimony. And although the second testifies to establish her purity, the first contradicts her. The woman therefore remains in doubt as to whether she became impure, and she drinks in order to clarify the doubt.

One

says

“I saw her become

impure,” and two

others contradict him and

say,

“When you testify that she became impure, we were with you, and in our presence she

did not become impure.”

She would drink.

For the words of the one witness have already been nullified by the two witnesses who testify that she did not become impure. Nevertheless, we must consider the possibility that the woman became impure during that seclusion before the witnesses arrived, and she drinks to clarify the doubt.

Two say

“We saw that she became

impure,” and one says that she did not become impure, she would not drink.

The one witness’s testimony has no force against that of the two, and her impurity has already been established through the testimony of the two.

Gemara:

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

This

statement that we learned in the Mishna:

“The verse therefore states: ‘For he has found in her a matter of indecency,’

from which we learned that two witnesses are required for seclusion—why was this gzera shava necessary?

The tanna could have said as follows:

The verse states: “Against her.”

“And there is no witness against her.”

“Against her.”

With regard to impurity, you say that one witness is sufficient,

but not with regard to the warning.

For two witnesses are required to testify concerning it.

“Against her.”

With regard to impurity, you say that one witness is sufficient,

but not with regard to seclusion.

For two witnesses are required to testify concerning it.

It should have been sufficient for him.

The tanna should have said this, and it would not have been necessary to learn that two witnesses are required for seclusion through the gzera shava of “matter” and “matter,” since in the very verse from which we learn that one witness is believed to testify that she became impure, the Torah wrote “against her,” teaching us that two witnesses are required for the warning and the seclusion.

And we answer:

This too is what he is saying.

The tanna indeed intended to say this, but our Mishna was taught in an abbreviated form.

The verse states: “Against her”—

“Against her,” but not with regard to the warning; “against her,” but not with regard to seclusion.

It follows that the first testimony, concerning the warning and seclusion, is not valid with fewer than two witnesses. The beraita now discusses:

But mere impurity,

testimony that a woman became impure,

without a warning and without seclusion,

without testimony of warning and seclusion having preceded it—

from where do we know that one witness is not believed?

What is the source for this? Perhaps when the Torah says that one witness is believed to testify that she became impure, this applies even without a warning.

Concerning this the tanna says:

“Here, the term ‘matter’ is stated.”

“When a man takes a woman and marries her, and it comes to pass that she does not find favor in his eyes because he has found in her a matter of indecency, and he writes her a bill of divorce…”

“And there, the term ‘matter’ is stated.”

“On the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses shall a matter be established.”

Just as there, with two witnesses, so here

with regard to a woman’s impurity,

with two witnesses.

But one witness is not believed to testify that a woman became impure unless there was a warning and seclusion beforehand, in which case there is circumstantial support that she became impure.

We learned in the Mishna:

“One witness says: ‘She became impure,’

and his fellow contradicts him; she would drink.”

And one may infer:

The reason is that he contradicts him.

The reason she drinks is that his fellow contradicts him.

Had he not contradicted him, one witness would be believed.

And she would not drink.

From where are these matters derived?

What is the source for this? Although the principal source was already explained in the Mishna, the Gemara cites a beraita that explains the matter more fully.

For the Sages taught: “And there is no witness against her”—the verse is speaking of two witnesses.

The word “witness” generally refers to the testimony of two witnesses, and the meaning of “and there is no witness against her” is that although there are not two witnesses against her, but only one, she is forbidden.

You say that

the verse is speaking of two witnesses;

or perhaps it refers only to one.

Perhaps “witness” means one witness, and the meaning of the Torah is that one witness against her is not believed.

The verse therefore states: “One witness shall not stand against a man.”

“For any iniquity or for any sin; on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15).

From the implication of the statement, “A witness shall not stand,”

rather than “witnesses”—is it not the case that

I know that it means one?

What, then, does it teach?

What does the superfluous word

“one”

come to teach?

This establishes a principle:

This is a source and a foundational rule, that

wherever “witness” is stated

without the word “one,”

it refers here to two witnesses.

That is, it refers to two witnesses.

Until the verse specifies

and explicitly states

for you

a

single witness.

Accordingly, when the Torah says, “And there is no witness against her,” it means, “There are no two witnesses against her.”

And the Merciful One said,

that

two

witnesses

are not against her, but only one.

Only one witness testifies that she became impure.

“And she was not seized,”

she was not raped but committed adultery willingly, according to the witness;

she is forbidden

to her husband forever.

And

this raises a difficulty concerning what we learned: If his fellow contradicts him, the woman drinks.

Since by Torah law one witness is believed, how

can the other contradict him?

How can his fellow contradict him?

But Ulla said: Wherever the Torah believed one witness,

such as in the testimony concerning a sota, where two witnesses should ordinarily be required, like all testimony concerning forbidden marital relations, and the Torah believed one witness as it would two—

he is here considered two.

That one witness has the status of two, since the Torah believed him as two.

And the words of the one

who contradicts him, whom the Torah did not believe as two, have no force

in the presence of

the first witness, who has the status of

two.

And we answer:

Rather, Ulla said:

Our Mishna must be emended, and

teach: “She would not drink.”

For one witness testifies that she became impure, and his fellow is not believed to contradict him.

And Rabbi Yitzḥak likewise said: “She would not drink.”

And Rabbi Ḥiyya said

that our Mishna should be maintained according to its wording as it stands:

“She would drink.”

And we challenge this:

But for Rabbi Ḥiyya there is a difficulty from Ulla.

The reasoning supports Ulla’s statement: Since the Torah believed him in a case where two witnesses are ordinarily required, it gave him the status of two, and the words of one witness have no force against two.

And we answer:

This is not difficult. Here,

our Mishna is speaking when both testified

at the same time.

They testified within the time during which speech is considered continuous, so that the second contradicted his fellow before his testimony had been accepted in court, and his testimony was contradicted from the outset.

Here,

Ulla’s statement was made when both testified

one after the other,

with the second testifying after the time during which the first’s speech is considered continuous, for once the first witness’s testimony was accepted, it was accepted as the testimony of two, and the other witness could no longer come and contradict him, since the words of one witness have no force against two.

We challenge Rabbi Ḥiyya from the continuation of our Mishna, where

we learned: “One witness says: ‘She became impure,’ and two say: ‘She did not become impure’; she would drink.”

This statement would seemingly be superfluous, since it is obvious that two witnesses contradict the words of one, even if they testified after his testimony had been accepted, for the words of one witness have no force against two. Necessarily, the Mishna did not come to teach the basic law stated in it, but rather the inference derived from it, in order to explain the preceding clause concerning one witness against one witness: in what circumstances does it apply?

The inference is as follows: It is specifically when two contradicted him that the first witness’s testimony was nullified and she drinks;

but when one and one,

that is, when only one witness contradicts him,

she would not drink.

The two witnesses contradicted the first after his testimony had been accepted, and we understand the first witness, who said that she became impure, to be speaking of such a case. Thus,

this is a refutation of Rabbi Ḥiyya.

His position is that the preceding clause, concerning one witness against one witness, refers to a case where both testified at the same time, for in that situation she would drink even when one witness testified against one witness. Necessarily, the Mishna must be emended in accordance with Ulla to read, “She would not drink,” and it refers to a case where his fellow contradicted him after his testimony had been accepted in court.

And he answers:

Rabbi Ḥiyya could say to you:

Rabbi Ḥiyya can answer you as follows.

And according to your reasoning.

According to your approach, in which you emend the text to read, “She would not drink,”

before challenging me from the inference of the first clause,

infer from the final clause.

Challenge yourself from the inference of the final clause.

For

we learned: “Two say: ‘She became impure,’ and one says: ‘She did not become impure’; she would not drink.”

Here too, the statement would seemingly be superfluous, since it is obvious that one cannot contradict the words of two, even if he testified within the time during which their speech is considered continuous. Necessarily, the Mishna did not come to teach the basic law stated in it, but rather the inference derived from it, in order to explain the preceding clause concerning one witness against one witness: in what circumstances does it apply?

The inference is as follows: It is specifically when one contradicted two that his words were nullified and she does not drink.

But when one and one,

if one witness contradicted one witness,

she would drink.

The two witnesses contradicted the first within the time during which the first’s speech is considered continuous, and his testimony was nullified before it was accepted in court.

It follows that, according to both my position and your position, the Mishna is difficult.

For the first clause implies that the case is one of testimony given one after the other, and the second witness does not contradict the first. The final clause implies that the case is one of testimony given at the same time, with the second witness contradicting the first.

There is no way to resolve this

except

by establishing

the entire Mishna as referring to witnesses disqualified from testimony.

The Mishna did not come at all to teach the inferences derived from it, but rather the basic law stated in it, as we shall explain.

And it is the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya,

the tanna who taught our Mishna; it is Rabbi Neḥemya.

For it was taught in a beraita that Rabbi Neḥemya says: Wherever the Torah believed one witness,

such as in testimony concerning a sota,

follow the majority of opinions.

Although with testimony of two valid witnesses the number of opinions has no significance, for two are considered like one hundred, with testimony of one witness, one follows the majority of opinions.

And

therefore

considered

in this testimony

two women

testifying

against one man

as opposed to the testimony of one man.

As two people against one person.

That is, like two people testifying against one, for the testimony of one witness does not stand against that of two witnesses.

Although two women do not have greater evidentiary force than one witness, in this testimony we follow the majority of opinions, and the majority are deemed credible against the minority. And although the women are disqualified witnesses while the one witness is qualified, once disqualified witnesses are deemed credible in this testimony, a qualified witness does not have greater status than a disqualified one. The same law applies to three women testifying against two women: the three are deemed credible.

And this is what we learned in the Mishna: One says, “She became impure,” and two say, “She did not become impure”; she would drink.

And this is its meaning: One qualified witness says, “She became impure,” and two women say, “She did not become impure.” Even though the two testified after the testimony of the qualified witness had been accepted in court, she would drink, because the two are deemed credible to contradict the statement of the one, even when they testify one after the other.

And this is what we learned in the Mishna: Two say, “She became impure,” and one says, “She did not become impure”; she would not drink.

And this is its meaning: Two women say, “She became impure,” and one qualified witness says, “She did not become impure.” Even though the qualified witness testified within the time of the women’s statement, she would not drink, because one witness cannot contradict the statement of two, even when he testifies simultaneously with them.

And some say,

and there are those who disagree and say:

Wherever one qualified witness came initially, even a hundred women are likewise considered equivalent to one witness.

Whenever a qualified man came to testify and testified that she had become impure, and his testimony was accepted in court, disqualified witnesses cannot contradict him, even if they outnumber him, because many disqualified witnesses are considered no more than one qualified witness. And just as one qualified witness cannot contradict the first witness after his testimony was accepted in court, so even a hundred women cannot contradict him.

Likewise, when many disqualified witnesses testified that she had become impure, and one qualified witness came and testified, within the time of their statement, that she had not become impure, their testimony is nullified, because one qualified witness is considered equivalent to many disqualified witnesses. And just as he contradicts the testimony of his fellow when testifying simultaneously with him, so he contradicts the testimony of the disqualified witnesses when testifying simultaneously with them.