Sotah 31b — the Talmud in English

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the latter testimony

of impurity,

which forbids her

to her husband

with an eternal prohibition, is established through one witness,

the first testimony

of seclusion,

which does not forbid her

to her husband

with an eternal prohibition,

but only until she drinks,

is it not surely established through one witness?

The verse therefore says: “For he has found in her a matter of nakedness” (Deuteronomy 24:1).

(Deuteronomy 24:1)

And there it says: “By the mouth of two witnesses shall a matter be established”

(there, 19:15).

Just as there, by the mouth of two, so here, by the mouth of two.

The Gemara will explain what the tannai learned from this gzera shava.

The continuation of the Mishna concerns a situation in which there are contradictory testimonies concerning the woman’s impurity: when she drinks and when she does not drink.

A witness

one

says

I saw her become

impure, and a witness

another

says

she secluded herself in my presence and

did not become impure

during that seclusion.

And likewise,

a woman

one

says

I saw her become

impure, and a woman

another

says

she secluded herself in my presence and

did not become impure

during that seclusion.

She would drink.

For although the first testifies to render her impure, the second contradicts him. And although the second testifies to declare her pure, the first contradicts him; and the woman remains in doubt as to whether she became impure, and she drinks in order to clarify the doubt.

A

witness says

I saw her become

impure, and two

others contradict him and

say

that when you testify that she became impure, we were with you and in our presence she

did not become impure.

She would drink.

For the words of the one have already been nullified by the two who testify that she did not become impure; nevertheless, we must remain uncertain whether the woman became impure during that seclusion before the witnesses arrived, and she drinks in order to clarify the doubt.

Two say

we saw her become

impure, and one says that she did not become impure—she would not drink.

For the words of one have no standing against the two, and her impurity has already been established through the testimony of the two.

Gemara:

The Gemara raises an objection:

This,

that which we learned in the Mishna,

“The verse therefore says: ‘For he has found in her a matter of nakedness,’”

and from this we learned that two witnesses are required that she secluded herself—why was this gzera shava necessary?

For the tannai could have said as follows:

The verse therefore says: “In her.”

“And there is no witness in her.”

“In her.”

Concerning impurity, you say that one witness is sufficient for her,

but not concerning the warning.

For two witnesses are required to testify concerning it.

“In her.”

Concerning impurity, you say that one witness is sufficient for her.

But not concerning seclusion.

For two witnesses are required to testify concerning it.

It was needed for him.

This is what the tannai should have said, and he would not have needed to learn that two witnesses are required concerning the seclusion through the gzera shava of “matter” and “matter”; for in the very same verse from which we come to learn that one witness is believed to testify that she became impure, the Torah wrote “in her,” to teach us that two are required concerning the warning and the seclusion.

And we answer:

This is also what he says.

The tannai also intended to say this, and our Mishna was taught with something omitted.

The verse therefore says: “In her”—

“In her,” but not concerning the warning; “in her,” but not concerning seclusion.

And from here it follows that the first testimony, concerning warning and seclusion, is not established with fewer than two witnesses. And now the beraita discusses:

And mere impurity,

testimony concerning a woman who became impure,

without warning and without seclusion.

Without testimony concerning warning and seclusion having preceded it.

That one witness is not believed, from where do we know it?

From where do we know this, and perhaps when the Torah said that one witness is believed to testify that she became impure, it is speaking even without warning?

Concerning this the tannai said:

“Here, ‘matter’ is stated.”

“When a man takes a woman and marries her, and it happens that she does not find favor in his eyes, because he has found in her a matter of nakedness, and he writes her a bill of severance, etc.”

“And there, ‘matter’ is stated.”

“By the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall a matter be established.”

Just as there, with two witnesses, so here

concerning a woman’s impurity,

with two witnesses.

But one witness is not believed to testify concerning a woman that she became impure except after warning and seclusion, when there are grounds for the matter that she became impure.

We learned in the Mishna:

A witness says: She became impure

and his fellow contradicts him; she would drink.

And it is precise:

The reason is that he contradicts him.

The reason that she drinks is that his fellow contradicts him.

But if he does not contradict him, one witness is believed.

And she does not drink.

From where are these matters?

From where did we learn this? And although the fundamental source for this was already explained in the Mishna, the Gemara brings a beraita that explains the matter more fully.

For the Sages taught: “And there is no witness against her”—the verse speaks of two.

“Witness” everywhere means testimony of two witnesses, and the intention of the verse “and there is no witness against her” is to say that although there are not two witnesses against her, but only one, she is forbidden.

You say that the verse speaks of two

witnesses,

or perhaps it is only of one.

Perhaps “witness” means one witness, and the intention of the Torah is: one witness is not believed concerning her.

The verse therefore says: “One witness shall not rise against a man.”

For every iniquity and every sin, “by the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15).

From the implication of what is said, “A witness shall not rise,”

and it did not say “witnesses,”

do I not know that it is one?

What does it come to teach?

What does the superfluous word

“one”

come to teach?

This establishes a principle

This is a source and principle, that

everywhere that “witness” is said

and “one” is not written,

here there are two.

The intention is two witnesses.

Until the verse specifies

and explains

for you, the verse

a

single witness.

From now on, when the Torah said “and there is no witness against her,” the intention is: “and there are no two witnesses against her.”

And the Merciful One said,

t

wo,

two witnesses

are not in her, but one.

Only one testifies that she became impure.

“And she was not seized,”

she was not raped, but committed adultery willingly, according to the witness;

she is forbidden

to her husband eternally.

And

from now there is a difficulty concerning what we learned: that if his fellow contradicts him, the woman drinks.

Since by Torah law one witness is believed, the other—

how can he contradict him?

How can his fellow contradict him?

But Ulla said: Everywhere that the Torah believed one witness,

such as in the testimony concerning a sota, where it would have been proper to require two, as in all testimony concerning a matter of forbidden sexual relations, the Torah believed one witness as two,

here there are two.

That one is considered as two, since the Torah believed him as two.

And the words of one

who contradicts him, whom the Torah did not believe as two, are nothing

in the place of

the first, who is considered as

two.

And we resolve:

Rather, Ulla said:

Our Mishna must be emended, and

teach: “She would not drink.”

For one witness testifies that she became impure, and his fellow is not believed to contradict him.

And Rabbi Yitzhak likewise said: “She would not drink.”

And Rabbi Hiyya said

that our Mishna should be upheld as it is written before us:

“She would drink.”

And we object:

But for Rabbi Hiyya there is the difficulty of Ulla.

The reasoning supports Ulla’s words: since the Torah believed him in a place where two are ordinarily required, it placed him in the position of two, and the words of one have no standing in the place of two.

And we answer:

It is not difficult. Here

our Mishna is speaking when the two testified

at one time.

Within the time of speech, so that his fellow contradicted him before his testimony had been accepted in the court, and his testimony is contradicted from the outset.

Here

Ulla’s words were said when the two testified

one after the other.

The second testified after the time of speech of the first , for once the first’s testimony was accepted, it is accepted as two, and the one can no longer come and contradict him, since the words of one have no standing in the place of two.

And we object to Rabbi Hiyya from the continuation of our Mishna, for

we learned: “Two say: She became impure, and one says: She did not become impure—she would not drink.”

And seemingly this Mishna is superfluous, for it is obvious that two contradict the words of one, even if they testified after his testimony had been accepted, since the words of one witness have no standing against two witnesses. Necessarily, our Mishna did not come to teach the substance of the law stated in it, but rather the precision derived from it, and to explain the preceding clause, concerning one against one, in what manner it speaks.

And thus it should be inferred: only when two contradicted him was the first testimony nullified and she drinks,

but one and one,

when only one contradicts him,

she would not drink.

For the two contradicted the first after his testimony had been accepted, and we are hearing concerning the first, who said that she became impure. And from here there is

a refutation of Rabbi Hiyya.

For he places the preceding clause, concerning one against one, in a case where both testified at one time; for in this manner, even one against one would result in her drinking. Necessarily, it must be emended, as Ulla said, to “she would not drink,” and it speaks of his fellow contradicting him after his testimony had been accepted in the court.

And he answers:

Rabbi Hiyya could say to you.

Rabbi Hiyya can say to you:

And according to your reasoning.

According to your approach, that you read “she would not drink.”

Before you object to me from the precision of the first clause,

consider the latter clause.

Challenge yourself from the precision of the latter clause.

For we learned:

“Two say: She became impure, and one says: She did not become impure—she would not drink.”

And here too, seemingly this Mishna is superfluous, for it is obvious that one cannot contradict the words of two, even if he testified within their time of speech; necessarily, our Mishna did not come to teach the substance of the law stated in it, but rather the precision derived from it, and to explain the preceding clause, concerning one against one, in what manner it speaks.

And thus it should be inferred: only when one contradicted two were his words nullified and she does not drink.

But one and one,

if one contradicted one,

she would drink.

For the two contradicted the first within the time of speech of the first, and his testimony was nullified before it was accepted in the court.

It follows that both according to my words and according to your words, the Mishna is difficult.

For in the first clause it is precisely indicated that the case is one after the other, and the second does not contradict the first. And in the latter clause it is precisely indicated that the case is at one time, and the second contradicts the first.

And there is no way to resolve it

except

by establishing

the whole of it with disqualified witnesses.

The Mishna did not come at all to teach the precision derived from it, but rather the substance of the law stated in it, as we shall explain.

And it is Rabbi Nehemiah’s [opinion],

the tannai who taught our Mishna is Rabbi Nehemiah.

For it was taught: Rabbi Nehemiah says: Everywhere that the Torah believed one witness,

such as in testimony concerning a sota,

follow the majority of opinions.

Although in testimony of two valid people the number of opinions has no significance, since two are considered like one hundred, in testimony of one witness, one follows the majority of opinions.

And

therefore

they treated

in this testimony

two women

testifying

against one man

against the testimony of one man.

Like two people against one person.

Like two people testifying against one, for the testimony of one witness has no standing in place of two witnesses.

Even though two women have no greater evidentiary force than the one man, in this testimony we follow the majority of opinions, and the majority are trusted against the minority. And even though the women are disqualified and the one man is fit, since disqualified persons are trusted in this testimony, the fit person is not preferable to the disqualified persons. And the same law applies to three women testifying against two women: the three are trusted.

And this is what we learned: one says, “She became defiled,” and two say, “She did not become defiled”—she would drink.

And its explanation is as follows: one fit man says, “She became defiled,” and two women say, “She did not become defiled”; even though the two testified after the testimony of the fit man had been accepted in the court, she would drink, because the two are trusted to contradict the words of the one, even one after the other.

And this is what we learned: two say, “She became defiled,” and one says, “She did not become defiled”—she would not drink.

And its explanation is as follows: two women say, “She became defiled,” and one fit man says, “She did not become defiled”; even though the fit man testified within the time of their utterance, she would not drink, because the one cannot contradict the words of the two, even simultaneously.

And some say,

and there are those who disagree and say:

Whenever one fit witness came first, even a hundred women are likewise considered like one witness.

Whenever a fit man came to testify and testified that she became defiled, and his testimony was accepted in the court, the disqualified persons cannot contradict him, even though they are more numerous than he, because many disqualified persons are considered only like one fit witness; and just as one fit person cannot contradict the first witness after his testimony was accepted in the court, so even a hundred women cannot contradict him.

And likewise, when many disqualified persons testified that she became defiled, and one fit witness came and testified within the time of their utterance that she did not become defiled, their testimony is nullified, for one fit person is considered like many disqualified persons; and just as he contradicts his fellow’s testimony simultaneously, so he also contradicts the testimony of the disqualified persons simultaneously.