Sotah 29a (כט.) — the Talmud in English

For

the sota who secluded herself

the verse treated her as

the

doubtful adulteress as an adulteress—she is forbidden to her husband as though she had certainly committed adultery; and once she has the status of an adulteress, she is automatically forbidden to a kohen, as it is written: “They shall not take a woman who is an adulteress”

?

If so,

there should likewise be no need for a verse concerning teruma

to prohibit her from eating teruma,

for the verse treated her doubtful status as an adulteress

and an adulteress is forbidden to eat teruma

? And we answer:

Rather, according to Rabbi Akiva, four verses are written.

There are two occurrences of “she has become impure,” and one occurrence of “and she has become impure” with an additional vav. Rabbi Akiva expounds the superfluous vav, making four verses in all.

One is for the husband, one for the paramour, one for priesthood, and one for teruma.

And Rabbi Ishmael

holds that

three verses

alone

are written,

as he does not expound the superfluous vav:

One is for the husband, one for the paramour, and one for teruma.

And

if the prohibition with regard to

priesthood can be derived by a kal va-homer

from teruma.

We inquire about this:

And Rabbi Ishmael, from where does he know that a verse is required for teruma?

What is the basis for his assumption that the third verse concerns teruma,

and

if

priesthood can be derived by a kal va-homer

so that they would all be included in the prohibition?

Perhaps, when the

verse is required, it is

for priesthood.

Since teruma is not explicitly mentioned in the verse, it is more reasonable that the third verse comes to teach the law of priesthood, which is more stringent than teruma,

and

if

teruma is permitted,

she is permitted to eat it?

And we answer:

Rabbi Ishmael can say:

“

It is reasonable

that the third verse is

analogous

to the other two verses, from which we learned a prohibition

of the husband and the paramour. Just as the husband and the paramour

are forbidden

during the husband’s lifetime

—the prohibition of the paramour can apply even during the husband’s lifetime, for example, after the husband divorces her—

so too

the prohibition of

teruma also

applies

during the husband’s lifetime

of the husband.

This excludes

the prohibition with regard to

priesthood, for

it applies only

after death.

During the husband’s lifetime there is no need to prohibit her to a kohen, since if her husband divorces her, she is automatically forbidden to a kohen on account of being a divorcee; the only need to prohibit her to a kohen is if she is widowed by her husband.”

And we raise an objection:

And Rabbi Akiva,

why does he need a fourth verse to include priesthood? It could be derived by a kal va-homer from teruma

? And we answer: “

Analogous to the husband and the paramour”

is not accepted by him.

For each verse is expounded independently and need not be analogous to the other verses. Had there been only three verses, he would have derived from the third the prohibition with regard to priesthood, which is more stringent; therefore, a fourth verse is needed for teruma.

Alternatively, he does accept

that Rabbi Akiva accepts the principle of “analogous to the husband and the paramour,” and the third verse is indeed expounded with regard to teruma. Nevertheless, the Torah wrote an extra vav for priesthood, even though it could be derived by a kal va-homer, because

when a matter can be derived by a kal va-homer, Scripture nevertheless takes the trouble to write a verse for it!

Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: With regard to an item that has awareness to inquire and an item that does not have awareness to inquire,

meaning, this principle that we state—that only an item that has awareness to inquire is rendered impure when its status is doubtful—is not derived from sota; rather, it

emerges from this verse:

As it is written:

“And the meat that touches anything impure shall not be eaten.”

And we may infer that only meat that is

certainly impure is not to be eaten; but

meat that is

doubtfully impure and doubtfully pure may be eaten.

Say the latter clause

of the verse:

“And the meat—every pure person may eat

meat.”

This implies that only one who is

certainly pure may eat meat .

But

a person who is

doubtfully impure and doubtfully pure may not eat!

Rather, is it not that one may infer from here: In this case,

where the doubt concerns a person

who has awareness to inquire

whether or not he became impure, the law is that his doubtful status is impure.

Here,

where the doubt concerns meat

that has no awareness to inquire,

the law is that its doubtful status is pure.

And both Rav Giddel’s statement in the name of Rav and the need to derive the parameters of doubtful cases of impurity from sota are necessary

to teach us the boundaries of doubtful cases with regard to impurity.

For if we had only Rav’s statement,

alone,

I would have said that whether in the private domain or in the public domain,

its doubtful status is impure. Therefore,

it is necessary to derive it from sota,

that only in the private domain is its doubtful status impure.

And if

we had learned only

from sota,

alone,

I would have said that the rule applies only when both the one who comes into contact with the impurity and the one who imparts it have awareness to inquire,

that only when both the source of impurity and the person who becomes impure have awareness to inquire is the doubtful status impure, as in the case of sota, where both she and the paramour who imparts the impurity have awareness to inquire.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to have Rav Giddel’s statement in the name of Rav teach us that it is sufficient for only the person who becomes impure to have awareness to inquire; there is no need for the source of impurity also to have awareness to inquire.

We learned in the Mishna:

On that very day Rabbi Akiva expounded:

“And every earthenware vessel,” “Who will uncover the dust from your eyes, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai? You used to say that a future generation would purify a third loaf, for which there is no verse in the Torah establishing that it is impure.”

We inquire about this:

And since it has no

verse establishing its impurity in the Torah,

why

is it

impure?

For the statement implies that the other generation would eventually declare it pure, whereas Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai himself held that the third degree is impure with regard to teruma.

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

Indeed,

by Torah law it has no

impurity, but

by means of a kal va-homer it does have

impurity.

And if a tevul yom,

a person or vessel that was impure, immersed, but for whom the sun has not yet set,

is permitted

with regard to non-sacred food,

as it does not render non-sacred food impure, and nevertheless

disqualifies

it

with regard to teruma

through touching it,

a second loaf, which is disqualified with regard to non-sacred food,

should it not follow that it renders

everything that touches it a

third degree

of impurity

with regard to teruma,

and disqualify it?

And we challenge this:

There is room to refute

the kal va-homer:

As for a tevul yom,

it is logical that he should disqualify teruma

because

when he was impure he was

a primary source of impurity,

for example, if he had been impure through contact with the dead, a zav, or a leper; whereas this is not so with regard to a second degree of impurity, which was never a primary source of impurity ?