Sotah 29a — the Talmud in English

for

the woman suspected by her husband of seclusion

the verse made her

the written text

a doubtful adulteress like an adulteress,

for she is forbidden to her husband as though she had certainly committed adultery, and since she has the status of an adulteress, she is automatically forbidden to a priest, as it is written: “They shall not take a woman who is an adulteress”?

If so,

teruma also should not require a verse

to forbid her from eating teruma,

for the verse made a doubtful adulteress like an adulteress,

and an adulteress is forbidden with teruma?

And we answer:

Rather, according to Rabbi Akiva, four verses are written.

There are two occurrences of “she became impure,” and one occurrence of “and she became impure” with a vav; and Rabbi Akiva expounds the extra vav, making four altogether.

One for the husband, one for the paramour, one for priesthood, and one for teruma.

и один — для запрета трумы.

And Rabbi Ishmael

held that

three verses

alone

are written,

for he does not expound an extra vav:

One for the husband, one for the paramour, and one for teruma.

And

if the prohibition with regard to

priesthood can be derived by a kal va-chomer

from teruma.

And we examine this:

And Rabbi Ishmael, from where do you know

that the verse was needed with regard to teruma

and

if

priesthood can be derived by a kal va-chomer

and all of them would thus be included in the prohibition?

Perhaps when

the verse was needed, it was

for priesthood.

For teruma is not explicitly written in the verse, and it is more reasonable that the third verse comes to expound priesthood, which is more stringent than teruma,

and

if

teruma is permitted,

it is permitted to be eaten?

And we answer:

He can say to you,

Rabbi Ishmael:

It is reasonable

that the third verse is

analogous

to the other two verses, from which we learned a prohibition

of the husband and the paramour; just as the husband and the paramour

are forbidden

during the lifetime

of the husband—for the prohibition of the paramour can also apply during the husband’s lifetime, such as after divorce—

so the prohibition of

teruma

also

applies

during the lifetime

of the husband.

To exclude

the prohibition with regard to

priesthood, which

exists only

after death.

For during the husband’s lifetime there is no need to forbid her to a priest, since if her husband divorces her, she is in any event forbidden to a priest because of the divorce; the entire need to forbid her to a priest is only if she is widowed by her husband.

And we ask:

And Rabbi Akiva,

why does he need a fourth verse to include priesthood? It could be learned by a kal va-chomer from teruma?

And we answer: “

Analogous to the husband and the paramour”

he does not have.

For each verse is expounded on its own, and it need not be analogous to the other verses. And if there were only three verses, he would expound from the third the prohibition with regard to priesthood, which is more stringent; therefore, a fourth verse is needed for teruma.

Alternatively, he does have

with regard to Rabbi Akiva “analogous to the husband and the paramour,” and the third verse is indeed expounded with regard to teruma. Nevertheless, the Torah wrote an extra vav for priesthood, even though it could be learned by a kal va-chomer, because

a matter that can be derived by a kal va-chomer, it nevertheless took trouble and wrote a verse for it!

Rav Giddel said that Rav said: A matter that has awareness to ask and a matter that does not have awareness to ask,

that is, this rule that we say—that only a matter that has awareness to ask has a doubtful status of impure—is not learned from the woman suspected by her husband of seclusion, but

it emerges from this verse:

For it is written: “

And the meat that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten.”

And we must infer that only meat that is

certainly impure shall not be eaten; but

meat that is

doubtfully impure and doubtfully pure shall be eaten.

Say the latter clause

of the verse: “

And every pure person may eat

meat.”

And it implies that only one who is

certainly pure may eat meat .

But

a person who is

doubtfully impure and doubtfully pure may not eat!

Rather, is it not so? Learn from it: Here,

where the doubt concerns a person

who has awareness to ask

whether he became impure or not, the law is that his doubtful status is impure.

Here,

where the doubt concerns meat

that does not have awareness to ask,

the law is that its doubtful status is pure.

And Rav Giddel’s statement in the name of Rav is necessary, and it is necessary to learn from the woman suspected by her husband of seclusion

the parameters of doubts concerning impurity.

For if it were only from Rav

alone,

I would have said: Whether in private domain or in public domain,

its doubtful status is impure; therefore,

it is necessary to learn from the woman suspected by her husband of seclusion

that only in a private domain is its doubtful status impure.

And if

we were to learn only

from the woman suspected by her husband of seclusion

alone,

I would have said: Until there is awareness both of the toucher and of the touched,

that only when both the one who causes the impurity and the one who becomes impure have awareness to ask is its doubtful status impure, as with the woman suspected by her husband of seclusion, for both she and the paramour who causes the impurity have awareness to ask.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to have Rav Giddel’s statement in the name of Rav to teach us that it is sufficient that only the one who becomes impure has awareness to ask; it is not necessary that the one who causes the impurity also have awareness to ask.

We learned in the Mishna:

On that day Rabbi Akiva expounded “

And every earthenware vessel”:

Who will uncover the dust from your eyes, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, for you would say: A future generation is destined to declare pure a third loaf, for which there is no verse in the Torah showing that it is impure.

And we examine this:

And since it has no

verse in the Torah

why

is it

impure?

For it implies that the other generation is destined to declare it pure, but Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai himself holds that the third loaf is impure with teruma.

And we answer:

Rav Judah said that Rav said:

Indeed,

by Torah law it has no

impurity, but

by the law of a kal va-chomer it has

impurity.

And if a person who immersed that day,

a person or impure vessels that immersed but for whom the sun has not yet set,

is permitted

with ordinary food,

for he does not render ordinary food impure, and nevertheless

disqualifies

it

with teruma

through touching it.

A second loaf, which is disqualified with ordinary food,

is it not the law that it should make

everyone who touches it

a third degree

of impurity

with teruma,

and disqualify it?

And we ask:

There is room to refute

the kal va-chomer:

What is true of one who immersed that day,

that it is logical that he should disqualify teruma,

since

when he was impure he was

a primary source of impurity,

such as if he had been impure through contact with the dead, or a man with a flux, or a leper; whereas this is not so with regard to a second degree of impurity, which was never a primary source of impurity?