Sotah 28a (כח.) — the Talmud in English

And if you would say

that he has a sin,

if he transgressed by having relations with his wife after she secluded herself following his warning, when she became forbidden to him,

the water examines him

and he too dies.

It cannot be said so, for

when he has a sin

of his own, does the water examine her, her?

Does the water not examine the wife at all when the husband has sinned, and consequently not examine him either?

But it was taught in a baraita: “

And the man shall be free of iniquity, but that woman shall bear her iniquity.”

We expound: only

when the man is free of iniquity

then

the water examines his wife.

But if

the man is not free of iniquity,

because he had relations with her after she secluded herself,

the water does not examine his wife!

Rather,

perhaps you will say that it refers

to the adulterer,

whom the water examines?

This too is difficult:

let the Mishna teach

explicitly: Just as the water examines her, so it examines the adulterer,

as it teaches in the latter clause: “

Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to the adulterer,”

rather than saying, “so she is forbidden to him.”

We answer:

Actually, “him” means

the adulterer,

the adulterer.

There is no difficulty from the latter clause, because

since the first clause taught “her,”

it also taught

“also”

“him.”

And

since the latter clause taught

“husband,”

it also taught

“also”

“adulterer.”

We learned in the Mishna:

As it is stated: “And they shall come, and they shall come.”

They raised a dilemma before them: When it says “

they came and they came,” is it

saying that we derive this from the extra letter vav in the word “and they shall come,”

the superfluous vav teaching that the water examines him?

Or when it says “

and they shall come, and they shall come,” is it

saying that we derive this from the actual repetition of the word “and they shall come” in the passage?

Come and hear

from what we learned in the Mishna:

Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to the adulterer.

As it is stated, “

She has become impure,”

“and she has become impure.”

It follows that Rabbi Akiva derives the law from the superfluous vav; therefore, the exposition of “they came and they came” should likewise be understood in this manner.

Nevertheless, concerning this very exposition of “she has become impure and she has become impure,”

the question should be raised:

the dilemma remains: Does it say “

she has become defiled, she has become defiled,”

she has become impure, she has become impure,”

saying that we derive it from the repetition of the word “she has become impure” in the passage,

or does it say “

or does it say “

she has become impure and she has become impure,”

saying that we derive it from the superfluous vav in the word “and she has become impure”?

Come and hear a proof: since the latter clause states

Come and hear: Since the latter clause teaches,

of the Mishna,

Rabbi says: The two occurrences stated in the passage “

she has become impure and she has become impure,”

one refers to the husband and one to the adulterer,

it follows that Rabbi derives it from the repetition of the words.

By inference,

you learn

that Rabbi Akiva,

who disagrees with Rabbi,

expounds the vav!

The Gemara explains the expositions of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi:

Therefore, according to Rabbi Akiva, six verses are written.

Three occurrences of “and they shall come” are written in the passage, and each contains a superfluous vav, making six altogether.

One is for her decree,

that the Holy One, blessed be He, decrees upon the woman that the bitter waters should enter her.

And one is for his decree,

the vav is expounded to teach that the same decree applies to the adulterer.

One is for her execution,

for the verse informs Israel and assures them that the water will examine sotot.

And one is for his execution,

for the adulterer too is assured that the water will examine him.

One is for her notification,

for the koen informs the woman that although the wording of the curse first says “your thigh shall fall” and afterward “your abdomen shall swell,” nevertheless she is afflicted in the order in which the water takes effect: first in her abdomen and afterward in her thigh.

All this is so that no disrepute should be cast upon the water, lest people say that the water did not act in the order of the curse and consequently did not cause the punishment.

And one is for his notification,

for the adulterer too will be afflicted first in his abdomen and afterward in his thigh.

And Rabbi

held that

only three verses

are

are written.

He does not expound the superfluous vav.

One is for the decree, one for the execution, and one for the notification.

All of them refer only to the woman.

We raise a difficulty:

And Rabbi—“

Just as the water examines her, so it examines him”—

from where does he derive it?

We answer:

He derives it from that which was taught: It is stated, “And these bitter waters shall enter your innards

to make your abdomen swell and your thigh fall,”

to cause the abdomen to swell and the thigh to fall,”

and we expound this as referring to

the abdomen and thigh of the adulterer.

You say that it refers to the abdomen and thigh of the adulterer.

Or perhaps it refers only to the abdomen and thigh of the woman who was violated?

When it says

below, “

Her abdomen shall swell and her thigh shall fall,”

the abdomen and thigh of the woman who was violated

already

have been stated.

And how do I understand “

to cause the abdomen to swell and the thigh to fall” —

to swell the belly and make the thigh fall”? —

the abdomen and thigh of the adulterer!

It follows that the water examines the adulterer as well.

We raise a difficulty:

But the other one,

Rabbi Akiva—why does he not derive from here that the water examines the adulterer? We answer:

That

verse, “to cause the abdomen to swell and the thigh to fall,” comes to teach

that the koen informs her,

the woman,

that the abdomen

will be afflicted

first, and afterward

afterward

the thigh,

despite the fact that the curse writes the reverse order, so that

no disrepute should be cast upon the bitter waters.

We raise a difficulty:

But the other one, Rabbi—this presents a difficulty for him, since the verse “to cause the abdomen to swell” is not superfluous.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi could say:

We answer: Rabbi could say:

If so,

if “to cause the abdomen to swell” came only to teach about the koen’s notification,

the verse should have written “her abdomen and her thigh”; why “abdomen and thigh”?

Learn from this that it refers to the adulterer,

to teach that he too is examined by the water.

We challenge Rabbi:

But perhaps the entire verse comes for this purpose,

with the entire verse teaching only about the examination of the adulterer; from where do we learn that it also teaches about the koen’s notification?

We answer:

If so,

if it teaches only with regard to the adulterer,

the verse should have written “his abdomen and his thigh”; why “abdomen and thigh,”

which has an unspecified meaning, referring either to the adulterer or to the woman who was violated?

Learn from this that it teaches two things:

it also teaches about the koen’s notification.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehoshua said: This is how Zekharya

ben HaKatzav expounded.

The Sages taught: Three occurrences in the passage: “And it shall be,

if she has become impure”; “and he was jealous of his wife, and she

has become impure”; “when a woman goes astray under her husband and

has become impure.”

Why

are these three occurrences stated?

One refers to the husband, one to the adulterer, and one to teruma.

For even if she is the daughter of a koen and her husband is a koen, she is disqualified from eating teruma through the seclusion,

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Yishmael said:

Once we have learned that she is disqualified from teruma,

a kal va-chomer

teaches that she is disqualified from marrying a koen, and we do not need to bring a verse for this.

And if a divorcee,

a koen’s daughter who married an Israelite and was divorced, without having had children from him,

is permitted to teruma,

returning to her father’s home to eat teruma, and nevertheless

is forbidden to the priesthood,

to marry a koen,

this woman,

the sota who secluded herself,

who is forbidden to teruma—does it not follow that she is forbidden to the priesthood? [The Gemara will ask below: Rabbi Akiva did not speak at all about disqualification from the priesthood, so what did Rabbi Yishmael mean by telling him that no verse was needed for this?]

The baraita continues to explain the verses in the passage of the sota:

What does the verse state: “And a spirit of jealousy passed over him, and he was jealous of his wife,

And a spirit of jealousy passed over him, and he was jealous of his wife,

and she has become impure,” or “a spirit of jealousy passed over him, and he was jealous of his wife,

and she has not become impure”?

If

it is clear to her husband that she

has become impure, why does she drink?

And

if it is clear to him that she

it is clear to him that she

has not become impure, why does he give her to drink

the water?

The verse tells you that

with regard to

doubt, she is

she is

forbidden!

The meaning of the verse is: In the case of this woman, concerning whom he is uncertain whether she has become impure or not, he should give her to drink in order to clarify the doubt. If he does not give her to drink, she is forbidden to him as a matter of doubt.

From here you derive

kal va-chomer

for a sheretz:

when there is doubt whether it touched pure items, and doubt that it did not touch them, we must regard the pure items as impure on account of the doubt.

And if, in the case of a sotah, where an inadvertent act is not treated like a deliberate act, nor coercion like willingness,

for if she engaged in adultery inadvertently—for example, she thought that a certain man was her husband—or if she was raped, she is not forbidden to her husband, and nevertheless

the doubt was treated in her case like certainty.

In the case of a sheretz, where an inadvertent act is treated like a deliberate act, and coercion like willingness,

for even if pure items touched a sheretz inadvertently or under coercion, they become impure,

is it not logical that doubt should be treated

like certainty?