Shevuot 45b (מה:) — the Talmud in English

Thus, once again, the worker must take an oath in order to claim and collect his wages from the employer. The employer is not required to pay him in the presence of witnesses, nor is he required to pay him at the beginning of the day. And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

If so

the hired laborer should be trusted against the employer, since the employer is preoccupied with his workers and does not remember whether he paid him, and for that reason the laborer collects from him by oath,

even

if

the employer fixed

his wage at a sum specified in advance. The employer claims that he fixed a certain sum with him, whereas the laborer claims that he fixed a higher sum with him—

also,

the laborer should likewise be trusted against him. But it is evident from the beraita that this is not so.

Rather, it was taught: A craftsman says

to the employer:

You fixed two

as my wage.

And the other,

the employer,

says: I fixed only one for you—

the burden of proof rests upon the claimant!

The craftsman who comes to collect his wage from the employer must bring testimony from witnesses who will testify that the employer fixed his wage as he claims.

But this is difficult: Why should we not believe the laborer on the basis of an oath?

The Gemara answers:

As for the fixing of the wage, he certainly remembers it [

how much the fixed wage was, the employer certainly remembers]. Therefore, the Sages did not institute that the laborer should take an oath and collect.

However, the following difficulty still remains:

If so, even

if

the time for payment has passed [for a day laborer may collect throughout the following night, and a night laborer may collect throughout the following day], and the employer still has not paid him,

[for a day laborer may collect his wage throughout the following night, and a night laborer may collect his wage throughout the following day], and the employer still has not paid him,

also

we should believe the laborer against the employer, and he should collect by oath.

But it is evident from the beraita that this is not so.

Rather, it was taught: The time for payment has passed

and

he did not give him

the employer his wage;

he,

the laborer,

does not take an oath and collect,

but must bring proof that the employer still has not paid him.

This is puzzling: Why is he not trusted on the basis of an oath against the employer?

The answer is: If the laborer comes to claim from the employer after the time when he was obligated to pay his wage has passed, we say:

There is a presumption that an employer does not transgress the prohibition of

not

letting the wage remain overnight.

But

did you not say that

the employer is preoccupied with his workers,

and he assumes that he has already paid, and does not know at all that he is transgressing the prohibition of letting the wage remain overnight?

The answer is:

That applies

when he does not remember whether or not he paid him,

before the time of his payment obligation arrives,

before the time when he is obligated to pay.

But

when the time of his payment obligation arrives,

when the time for payment passes,

he focuses his attention on it and remembers.

He directs his attention to the matter and remembers.

But there is a difficulty:

And is a laborer

suspected of

transgressing

the prohibition of

“You shall not rob” and demanding his wage twice? Just as we do not suspect the employer of transgressing the prohibition of letting the wage remain overnight, so too we should not suspect the laborer of transgressing the prohibition of robbery. The answer is:

and demanding his wage twice? Just as we do not suspect the employer of violating the prohibition against delaying a laborer's wage, so too we should not suspect the laborer of violating the prohibition against stealing. The answer is:

Regarding the employer, there are two presumptions.

There are two presumptions establishing that he will not transgress but will pay:

One, that an employer does not transgress the prohibition of letting the wage remain overnight,

and one, that a laborer does not leave his wage outstanding,

but claims it immediately.

And once the time has passed, presumably the laborer has already received his wage and did not leave it with the employer during this period.

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: They taught

this law—that the laborer takes an oath and collects his wage—

only when he hired him

the employer

in the presence

of

witnesses.

But if he hired him without witnesses, since he can say to him, “I never hired you,”

and if he were to say this, the laborer would certainly have no opening to make a claim against him,

he can say to him—

“I hired you, and I gave you your wage!”

He is trusted on the basis of this migo and is exempt even without taking an oath.

Rabbi Yitzḥak said to

Rav Naḥman:

Well said [

your words are correct].

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said

the same as you!

The Gemara analyzes this: From the fact that Rabbi Yitzḥak mentioned only Rabbi Yoḥanan and did not mention that Reish Lakish [who was seated alongside him] also joined him and agreed with him,

by inference,

it may be said and demonstrated

that Reish Lakish disagreed with him.

For Rabbi Yitzḥak participated in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s lecture together with Reish Lakish, as stated, and would have known whether Reish Lakish disagreed with Rabbi Yoḥanan or not.

The Gemara rejects this: There is no proof of this. A.

1.

Some say:

The reason he did not mention Reish Lakish’s statement is that

Reish Lakish was delaying him

Reish Lakish.

And he remained silent before him

until Rabbi Yoḥanan finished all his words, and only then would he respond and disagree with him.

In the meantime, Rabbi Yitzḥak left the beit-midrash and did not hear Reish Lakish’s opinion. It is possible that after Rabbi Yoḥanan finished his words, Reish Lakish agreed with him. B.

2.

And some say: Reish Lakish was drinking!

Reish Lakish was drinking water at the time Rabbi Yoḥanan stated this law,

and he remained silent.

Because he was in the middle of drinking, Rabbi Yitzḥak could therefore not bring proof from his silence.

It was also stated

in accordance with the words of Rav Naḥman in the name of Shmuel:

Rav Menashya bar Zevid said in the name of Rav: They taught

that the laborer takes his wage by oath

, only when he hired him in the presence of witnesses.

But if he hired him without witnesses, since he can say to him, “I never hired you,” he can say to him, “I hired you”—

“and I gave you your wage!”

Rami bar Ḥama said: How excellent

correct and praiseworthy

is this teaching,

that the laborer collects by oath only when the employer hired him in the presence of witnesses. But when the employer has a migo, he does not collect by oath; rather, the employer is exempt even without an oath.

Rava said to him: What is the excellence of this teaching?

But

if so, there is a difficulty from

the oath of bailees

the oath concerning bailees that the Merciful One obligated,

for example, when the bailee says that the deposit was lost or stolen and is obligated to take an oath. The difficulty is:

How can this be found?

How can this oath apply? For

since he can

say to him,

the bailee to the depositor,

“Nothing of the sort ever happened,”

he can say to him

that the vessels he deposited with him

were forcibly destroyed,

and thereby be exempt from the oath, for the same reason as the migo mentioned here, through which the employer is exempt when he hires the laborer without witnesses?! Rami bar Ḥama replied to him: The Torah oath of bailees can apply where

he deposited it with him,

the employer having given the deposit to the bailee

in the presence of witnesses.

In that case, he does not have the migo, since he cannot say, “Nothing of the sort ever happened,” as the witnesses testify that he deposited it with him.

Rava said to him: He still has the migo, since

because he can say to him, “I returned it to you,”

[for the witnesses testify only that he deposited it, but they do not know whether or not he returned the deposit to him], and therefore

he can say to him, “It was forcibly destroyed”?

Rami bar Ḥama replied to him: The case is

where he deposited it with him by means of a document.

He entrusted the deposit to him and wrote a document concerning this deposit.

In that case, the bailee cannot claim, “I returned it to you.” For if he had returned it, the bailee should have demanded from him the document that he had written at the time of the deposit. Since the document is in the depositor’s possession and not in the bailee’s, it is evident that he has not yet returned the deposit.

The Gemara infers from the words of both of them:

By inference, both,

Rava and Rami bar Ḥama,

hold that

a person who

one who deposits an item with another in the presence of witnesses—

need not have it returned to him in the presence of witnesses.

The proof is as follows: When Rava argued to Rami bar Ḥama that the bailee could claim “I returned it to you” by virtue of a migo from “It was forcibly destroyed,” Rami bar Ḥama did not answer him that it must be returned in the presence of witnesses. Rather, he answered him that the deposit had been made by means of a document. This proves that it is indeed unnecessary to return it in the presence of witnesses.

But when one deposits an item with another, and the bailee signs with him

a document

concerning the deposit,

he must return it to him in the presence of witnesses,

or the bailee must demand the document from the depositor. If he has no witnesses or does not possess the document, he is liable!

The proof is from Rami bar Ḥama’s answer, “Where he deposited it by means of a document.” Consequently, if he does not possess the document, he takes an oath but has no migo, since he should have demanded the document when he returned the deposit or established the return through witnesses, and Rava accepted this answer.

Rami bar Hama raised it against

the words of Rav Sheshet:

“And David placed these matters upon his heart.”

He took these matters to heart, to know whether their words were indeed correct: that one who hires his fellow without witnesses is trusted by virtue of a migo that “it never happened.”

Rav Sheshet encountered Rabbah bar Shmuel. He said to him: Has master taught anything

concerning the laws stated with regard to a hired worker?

He said to him: Yes!

And this:

We learned: A hired worker

who demands his wages

at their time,

within the time for collection,

takes an oath and collects

his wages from the employer.

And the Gemara asks:

How

does this law operate, that he takes an oath and collects? [That is, what is the hired worker’s claim, and what is the employer’s claim]

When he said to him

the hired worker to the employer:

“You hired me, but you did not give me my wages,” and the other

the employer

says: “I hired you and gave you your wages.”

Then the law is that the worker takes an oath that he did not receive his wages, and collects.

But

if

he said to him

the hired worker: An amount of

“Two did you fix”

you set and agreed for me as my wages.

And the other,

the employer,

says: “I fixed for you only one.”

The law is that

the one who extracts from his fellow

that is, the worker who wishes to take from the employer—

the burden of proof is upon him!

And the Gemara infers:

Is it not from the seifa

of this Mishna, which discusses the case in which he demands from him an agreement of two, while he admits to him an agreement of one—that he collects only

with proof,

it follows that

the reisha

in which they dispute whether the employer paid the hired worker’s wages at all or not, he takes an oath and collects even

without proof.

And it is proven from here, not in accordance with Rav and Shmuel, who say that the law of our Mishna—that he takes an oath and collects—applies only when he hired him in the presence of witnesses, which constitute proof. But without witnesses, the employer is trusted by virtue of a migo.

And from the words of the Mishna it is implied that the worker does not require any proof—apart from the oath that he takes.