Shevuot 14b — the Talmud in English

The

inner loaf is eaten and

whereas the

outer loaf is burned,

and it will be explained in the Gemara which one is the inner one and which one is the outer one, and there the reason for burning the outer one will also be explained.

And anyone for whom all these were not performed

is not sanctified with the sanctity of the Temple courtyard, and

one who enters there is not liable for it

because of entering the Temple.

One who comes into the Temple courtyard while impure, when one of all the aforementioned unawarenesses was hidden from him, is liable, even if he left immediately —

but if

he became impure in the Temple courtyard

itself, and knew that he had become impure,

and

again

impurity was hidden from him, and

but

he remembered

he

the Temple;

or

the Temple was hidden from him, and

but

he remembered

he

the impurity;

or

both this and that were hidden from him,

for all these unawarenesses are unawarenesses for which one who enters the Temple while impure is liable —

and

he did not leave the Temple immediately when he became impure there, but

bowed down

during the unawareness,

or remained

in the Temple during the unawareness

for the amount of time required for bowing —

Or

even if he turned to leave immediately when he became impure, but he could have left the Temple by the shortest route, and he did not do so, but

he took the

route

that was longer —

he

is liable.

But if, when he became impure, he immediately left

by the

route

that was shorter,

he

is exempt.

In tractate Horayot we learned: A great court that issued a ruling mistakenly, and the public acted according to their ruling, is obligated to bring a “bull for the hidden matter” for their mistaken ruling; and it was explained there that they are liable only if they issued a ruling concerning a matter for which one who sins deliberately is liable to karet, and one who sins unwittingly is liable to bring a sin offering; but if they issued a ruling concerning a matter for which an unwitting transgression entails an ascending-and-descending offering, they are not liable. Therefore we learned in the Mishna there [8b]: “

No liability — a court that issued a ruling mistakenly — for a positive commandment or a negative commandment concerning the Temple.” That is, if they ruled mistakenly to permit an impure person in the Temple, in a manner in which he violates a positive commandment [“They shall send out from the camp every leper and everyone with a discharge”], or in a manner in which he enters the Temple and violates a negative commandment [“He shall not come into the Temple,” “and they shall not defile their camps”], in both this case and that case they are not liable. The reason is that their offering is an ascending-and-descending one. “But

they are liable for a positive commandment and a negative commandment concerning a menstruant,” for her offering is a fixed sin offering; and the explanation of that Mishna is clarified by our Mishna.

This —

remaining in the Temple for one who became impure inside the Temple courtyard —

is the positive commandment concerning the Temple,

about which we learned in tractate Horayot: “

for which there is no liability

for the court

for it,”

that is, if the court ruled that one who became impure in the Temple need not leave immediately by the shortest route, and they acted according to their ruling, they are not liable to bring an offering.

And what is the positive commandment concerning a menstruant

about which we learned in tractate Horayot, “

that

the court

is liable for it”?

He was intimate with a pure woman, and she said to him “

I have become impure,”

and he withdrew immediately,

before the organ came to rest, he

is liable

to karet when deliberate and to a fixed sin offering when unwitting,

because his withdrawal [

his separation ]

is as pleasurable to him as his entering.

Here the Mishna returns to the law of entering the Temple, and brings the words of the tannaim who disputed the statement explained in the first part of our Mishna, that he is liable to bring an ascending-and-descending offering even for unawareness of sacrificial food or unawareness of the Temple.

Rabbi Eliezer

disputes what the first tanna made liable to bring an ascending-and-descending offering even when the sacrificial food or the Temple was hidden from him, and

says:

Since the Torah said: “Or concerning the carcass of

the

creeping creature

impure,

and it was hidden from him,”

we have learned:

for unawareness of the creeping creature

he

is liable

to bring an ascending-and-descending offering,

but he is not liable

to bring an ascending-and-descending offering

for unawareness of the Temple.

Rabbi Akiva

also holds like Rabbi Eliezer, and

says:

Since the Torah said: “

and it was hidden from him, and he is impure,”

we have learned:

for unawareness of impurity he is liable, but he is not liable for unawareness of the Temple

alone.

Rabbi Ishmael

disputed both of them and

says:

Since the Torah said: “

and it was hidden and it was hidden”

twice,

we have learned

to make one liable for unawareness of impurity,

and also

for unawareness of the Temple.

Gemara:

Said

Tamha

Rav Pappa to Abaye concerning the wording of our Mishna, which counted with regard to knowledge of impurity only two that are four:

Since our Mishna does not refer to the number of acts of forgetting, but to the number of instances of knowledge, as in the wording of the Mishna, “knowledge of impurity,” and since one is liable only for an act of forgetting that had knowledge at the outset and knowledge at the end, therefore, this is difficult:

Is it so that

only

two that are four

instances of knowledge are there!? But

there are two that are six!? “

Two,”

the knowledge of impurity itself—

whether he ate sacred food in his impurity or entered the Temple in his impurity—

at the outset and at the end.

There are thus two explicit in the Torah. For the forgetting of the impurity is explicit in the Torah, and we do not refer to the forgetting itself, but to the instances of knowledge that preceded and followed the transgression; it follows that you have to count two instances of knowledge explicit in the Torah.

And there are two more that are not explicit in the Torah:

knowledge of sacred food—

at the outset and at the end—

for the forgetting of the sacred food [without the forgetting of the impurity] is not explicit in the Torah, and when we refer to the instances of knowledge that preceded and followed it, there are two additional ones that are not explicit in the Torah.

And there are two more that are not explicit in the Torah:

knowledge of the Temple—

at the outset and at the end—

for the forgetting of the Temple is not explicit in the Torah, and when we refer to the instances of knowledge, there are two additional ones for us that are not explicit in the Torah—

Thus, what the Mishna taught as “two that are four” has to be counted as “two that are six”!?

Abaye was astonished at the wording of Rav Pappa’s question:

And

after all,

according to your reasoning

[according to your method], that you refer both to the instances of knowledge at the outset and to those at the end, the number does not come to “two that are six,” but rather

there are eight!

That is, “four that are eight”!

For there is the impurity of sacred food and the impurity of the Temple—

at the outset and at the end!?

That is: Why do you count the forgetting of the impurity as only two, on account of the earlier and later knowledge? There are, after all, two explicit instances of the forgetting of impurity in the Torah, one when he ate sacred food in his impurity and the second when he entered the Temple in his impurity. According to the way you count the instances of knowledge, these two are four, and there are in addition four instances of knowledge not explicit in the Torah, as explained; you have “four that are eight”!?

And we explain:

That is not difficult,

because

the category of impurity—

whether he ate sacred food through it or entered the Temple through it—

is one.

If so, the forgetting of the impurity is counted only as two instances of knowledge, one at the outset and one at the end; but—

In any event,

it is difficult: there are, after all,

six!

As explained, there are!?

Rav Pappa said

himself, to resolve his difficulty:

There are indeed eight.

That is, four instances of knowledge that are eight: two instances of knowledge for the forgetting of impurity and eating sacred food, two instances of knowledge for the forgetting of impurity and entering the Temple, two instances of knowledge for the forgetting of sacred food, and two instances of knowledge for the forgetting of the Temple. However, the Mishna does not count the two instances of knowledge in each act of forgetting, but rather:

The first four

instances of knowledge,

the earlier ones

[the four instances of knowledge preceding the forgetting],

which do not

bring him to

the obligation of an offering

[it is not these instances of knowledge that bring him to the obligation of an offering], for the preceding knowledge is not a cause of the offering,

the

tan[n]ay did not count.

And only

the four

instances of knowledge,

the later ones

[which follow the transgression],

which bring him to the obligation of an offering,

that is: as soon as these instances of knowledge became known to him, he becomes liable for an offering; only those did

the

tan[n]ay count. If so, we have only two that are four, corresponding to the number of acts of forgetting, for each act of forgetting has one instance of knowledge following it.

Some say:

Thus

Rav Pappa said

to resolve it, and in the reverse of the first wording:

There are indeed eight, and

nevertheless,

the four

instances of knowledge,

the earlier ones, which are not found throughout the entire Torah,

the four instances of knowledge preceding the transgression, which are a novelty in this offering, for they do not exist with regard to all other persons liable for offerings through an act of forgetting—because only with regard to impurity of the Temple and its sacred things did the Torah introduce that one is not liable for an act of forgetting from the outset, but only for an act of forgetting preceded by knowledge—it is only these four instances of knowledge that

the

tan[n]ay of our Mishna counted.

Whereas the four instances of knowledge

the later ones, which are found

also

throughout the entire Torah,

for all those liable for sin-offerings are liable only when the act of forgetting that they had at the time of the transgression became known to them, these

the

tan[n]ay did not count in the number of instances of knowledge.

Rav Pappa raised a question

concerning the law of knowledge at the outset:

One from whom

the laws of impurity were forgotten

at the time of his knowledge—that is, he knew that he had performed the act that rendered him impure, but did not know that this act rendered him impure, and when he ate the sacred food or entered the Temple, he forgot that act entirely—

what

is the law: Is he liable for an offering on account of this knowledge? And we object:

What are the circumstances!?

If we say that he did not know whether a creeping creature is impure or whether a frog is impure,

that is: He knew that he had touched a lizard or a newt, which resemble a frog, which is pure, but did not know that they have the law of a creeping creature; rather, he thought that their law was like that of a frog, which is not a creeping creature and does not render impure, and when he ate the sacred food or entered the Temple, he forgot entirely that he had touched them; and it is concerning this that we question whether this knowledge that he had when he touched the lizard is knowledge of impurity, even though he did not know that it was impure, or perhaps, since he did not know that it was impure, this is not knowledge at the outset for which he should be liable; this cannot be said, because:

Go and read it in the schoolhouse!

[The children of the schoolhouse read this.] That is: It is an explicit matter in the Torah who the impure creeping creatures are, and if so, this is like one who has knowledge at the outset, for he should have asked, since this matter is known to children.

And we explain:

It is always a case where he knew of the impurity of a creeping creature

that is: He knew that his touching was touching an impure creeping creature,

and

the question is in a case

where he touched an olive-bulk

of the creeping creature, which is the measure of a creeping creature sufficient to render impure,

and

he

did not know whether an olive-bulk renders impure or does not render impure,

that is: He thought that this small measure was insufficient to render impure; and it is concerning this that we question:

What

is the law: Should we consider him as one who knew at the outset that it was impure, and if he forgot the fact of his touching entirely, he is liable, or not?

The sides of the question are:

Shall we say:

Since he knew that a creeping creature renders impure in the world, it is knowledge,

even though he does not know that this one is impure—

Or perhaps: Since

the measure

of an olive-bulk

that he touched

he did not know whether it renders impure or does not render impure,

and he thought that it did not render impure, therefore

it is an act of forgetting,

that is: This is not knowledge at the outset for which he should be liable—

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a question,

Rabbi Yirmeya was uncertain concerning the law of knowledge at the outset required for the forgetting of the Temple:

A Babylonian who went up to the Land of Israel,

and knew that there was a Temple in Jerusalem,

but

nevertheless

the place

of the

Temple was forgotten from him, what is the law

that this knowledge should be considered knowledge at the outset, to make him liable if he entered the place of the Temple in impurity? The question will be explained in greater detail below.

And we object:

According to whom,

according to which of the tannaim was Rabbi Yirmeya uncertain!? After all:

If according to Rabbi Akiva,

who is the one

who requires

knowledge at the outset,

as explained above, 4a, and according to his method it is relevant to be uncertain what is considered knowledge at the outset,

he does not make one liable for the forgetting of the Temple,

as explained in our Mishna; and since one is not liable for the forgetting of the Temple, he does not need knowledge at the outset concerning the Temple, but only concerning the impurity!? And

if

the question is

according to Rabbi Yishmael, who makes one liable for the forgetting of the Temple,

as explained in our Mishna,

then

Rabbi Yishmael

does not require knowledge at the outset,

and it is not possible to be uncertain whether knowledge of this kind is considered knowledge at the outset—

If so, there is no place for this question, neither according to Rabbi Yishmael nor according to Rabbi Akiva!?

And above, 5a, we learned: From where [do we know] that one is liable only for that which had knowledge at the outset and knowledge at the end, with forgetting in between? Rabbi says: It says, “and it was hidden,” implying that he knew. “And he knew”—here are two instances of knowledge. If so, what does “and it was hidden and it was hidden” teach? To make one liable for the forgetting of impurity and for the forgetting of the Temple.

And there we objected to Rabbi, for it would seem that “and it was hidden” means that he knew, from several places where it cannot be explained so, and Abaye answered: Rabbi holds that “knowledge of the schoolmaster’s house is called knowledge.” That is, the knowledge that he learned in his schoolmaster’s house, that one who touches impurity is impure, and he knew—he felt when he touched, but did not pay attention to place it upon his heart that he had become impure—is called knowledge.

And we answer:

It is necessary,

that is, this question is only

according to Rabbi

above, 4a,

who requires knowledge at the outset and makes one liable

also

for the forgetting of the Temple—

And the Gemara adds to explain that this question applies only according to another view of Rabbi, and it also explains the sides of the question:

And

Rabbi also said above, 5a:

Knowledge of the schoolmaster’s house—

with regard to knowledge of impurity—

is called knowledge, and according to his method one must ask:

What is the law?

What?

The sides of the question are:

Since he knew that there is a Temple in the world, it is knowledge,

for this is like the knowledge of his schoolmaster’s house that one who touches impurity is impure—

Or perhaps: Since the place

of the Temple, where it is in Jerusalem,

he did not know,

if so,

it is an act of forgetting

and there is no knowledge at the outset here. And we conclude:

Teyku.

We learned in the Mishna:

Whether one who enters the Temple courtyard

or whether one who enters the addition to the Temple courtyard— for additions may be made to the city and to the courtyards only with a king, a prophet, the Urim and Tummim, and a Sanhedrin of seventy-one:

And we explain:

From where are these matters,

from where [do we know] that these are required in order to add to the courtyard?

Rav Shimi bar Chiya said:

Because

the verse says,

in the command concerning the establishment of the Tabernacle: “

According to all that I show you, the pattern of the Tabernacle and the pattern of all its vessels,