Shekalim 4a — the Talmud in English

Kalbon is a small and slight coin, which is added to the half-shekel in certain cases, which will be detailed below.

4.

And these are obligated in kalbon: Levites and Israelites, converts, and emancipated slaves.

But not kohanim or women

or slaves, or minors

until they are twenty years old.

Just as they are not seized as collateral, so they were not obligated to add the kalbon.

And likewise,

one who weighs through a kohen,

who gives the half-shekel on behalf of a kohen, or

through [

on behalf of]

the woman,

or

through a slave,

or

through a minor—

is exempt

from kalbon.

Since a kohen, woman, slave, and minor are exempt from kalbon, even when their contribution comes through a person who is obligated in kalbon, the one who weighs is exempt, since it was given on behalf of those who are exempt.

And now the Mishna explains the manner in which one must add a kalbon:

If he weighed

a person weighed one whole shekel

through himself

on his own behalf

and through

and on behalf of

his fellow.

For he weighed a half-shekel on his own behalf, and a half-shekel on behalf of his fellow—

he is obligated in one kalbon.

For each individual, when he brought the half-shekel, brought it with a “decision,” meaning that he added a slight addition to its weight, lest it be somewhat lacking.

And if two gave one whole shekel together, they added only one “decision” to it.

But if each had brought a half-shekel separately, they would have added two “decisions.”

Therefore, the Sages said that one who weighs one whole shekel on his own behalf and on behalf of his fellow must add a kalbon, a small coin, to his shekel, so that the consecrated property should not lose the second “decision” [Rashi, Menahot 108a].

And Rabbi Meir says:

He must add

two kalbonot.

For Rabbi Meir holds that even one who gives a half-shekel alone and adds a “decision” to it also gives a kalbon in addition to that.

And it is explained in the Gemara that Rabbi Meir holds that the addition of the kalbon is an essential legal requirement, from the Torah: Everyone who gives a half-shekel must also add a small coin to it, for the reason that will be explained.

5.

One who gives a sela [

which is two ordinary shekalim, or one complete sacred shekel] to the moneychanger of the consecrated property, for fulfilling the mitzva of the shekalim,

and takes

change from him,

one shekel

ordinary [

Although everywhere in the Talmud it is explained that there are two shekalim in a sela, this refers specifically to ordinary shekalim. But sacred shekalim were double. It follows that an ordinary sela and a sacred shekel are equal.

An ordinary shekel equals half of a sacred shekel.

And the tannai here stated an ordinary sela and an ordinary shekel. Therefore, when he gave an ordinary sela for the mitzva of the shekalim, he received an ordinary shekel as change, which is half a sacred shekel].

is obligated in two kalbonot.

And the Gemara explains what the reason is, and according to whose opinion it was taught.

6.

One who weighs through [

on behalf of]

the poor person,

who gives to the consecrated property on behalf of the poor person, and he is like one who gives a gift to the poor person,

and

the one who weighs

on behalf of his neighbor, and on behalf of his fellow townsman—

is exempt

from adding a kalbon, since he confers benefit upon the consecrated property by giving a gift on their behalf; they exempted him from kalbon.

But

if

he did not give on his behalf as a gift, but only

lent it to him,

who gave to the consecrated property on their behalf as a loan, on condition that they return it to him—

is obligated,

the lender, in kalbon, for it is like the poor person himself giving, who is obligated in kalbon.

7.

Brothers who are partners

in property that they received as an inheritance from their father—there are two possible forms of this partnership.

A. The brothers divided among themselves the property that they inherited, and afterward again became partners in that property.

B. They have not yet divided the inheritance among themselves, and their partnership derives from their being heirs of that property.

And there are differences in the laws between these two forms, as follows:

When they are obligated in kalbon,

if the partnership between the brothers was in the manner that they divided the inheritance and afterward became partners, their law is like that of ordinary partners.

And if the two brothers gave one shekel together from the jointly owned property, they are obligated to give one kalbon [one according to the first tannai, and according to Rabbi Meir two kalbonot].

And when the partnership is in this manner, they are

exempt from the tithe of animals.

For all the offspring born from the animals in which they are partners are exempt from separating from them one out of every ten animals for the sacrifice of the tithe of animals. This is the law of partners, who are exempt from the tithe of animals.

And when they are obligated in the tithe of animals,

when they have not yet divided among themselves the property that they inherited, for then they are obligated to tithe the offspring born to them in partnership, since this property is considered as though it were still in their father’s possession, and the brothers are not considered partners in it,

then they are

exempt from kalbon

if they gave one shekel together, and they are not obligated to add even one kalbon.

For since the property is considered as though it belonged to their father, it is as though the father gave the shekel on their behalf.

And a father who gives one whole shekel on behalf of his two sons is exempt from giving a kalbon [Rashi, Hullin 25b].

8.

And how much is a kalbon? A silver maah, the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: half a maah

of silver.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna:

Although they said

that women, slaves, and minors are not seized as collateral, nevertheless, if they weighed, they accept from them immediately.

And we infer: They accept only if they weighed on their own,

but to demand

from them that they give shekalim

they do not demand.

And this is difficult:

For

if

here,

in the previous Mishna,

you say: They demand!

For from the previous Mishna, which teaches, “They do not seize the minors as collateral,” we inferred above that they only do not seize them as collateral, but they do demand from them.

And

if

here,

in our Mishna,

you say

that even

they do not

demand

from the minors, and accept only if they weighed on their own?!

And we answer:

Here—

the earlier Mishna, which teaches that they demand from minors, is speaking

when he has brought two hairs,

and has reached the status of majority, but has not yet reached the age of twenty years. Therefore we say that they only do not seize him as collateral, but nevertheless demand that he give, by rabbinic ordinance.

And here,

in our Mishna, which teaches that they do not demand from him at all, is speaking

when he has not brought two hairs,

and he is truly a minor.

We learned in our Mishna:

The gentile and the Samaritan

who weighed—we do not accept from them.

Rabbi Ba said: It can be explained [

our Mishna can be interpreted]

according to the one who says, “The Samaritan

is like a gentile.”

For their conversion was not a true conversion. Therefore our Mishna teaches that we do not accept shekalim from them, nor obligatory sacrifices from them, as is the law of a gentile.

For they disagreed [

for tannaim disagreed] concerning the law of the Samaritans.

For we learned:

A Samaritan is like a gentile—

the words of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A Samaritan is like an Israelite in every respect.

For he holds that they are true converts.

And our Mishna is Rabbi’s. For according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that Samaritans are like Israelites, why do we not accept shekalim and sacrifices from them?

Rabbi Elazar said:

It is not necessary to establish our Mishna according to Rabbi; rather, our Mishna is properly Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s.

And

the Mishna

speaks only

of gentiles.

As for Samaritans—

not

do we say that we do not accept from them; rather, they are true converts, and we accept from them.

And it now follows that we do not read “Samaritans” at all in the Mishna, but “gentiles,” and Samaritans indeed have the law of Israelites, since they are true converts.

And we accept sacrifices from converts, for

it was taught so:

It is written: “When a person brings an offering from among you.” And we expound:

“A person”—

to include converts.

“From among you”—

to exclude apostates.

And we say:

The Mishna

our own Mishna

disagrees with Rabbi Elazar,

who explained that our Mishna deals only with gentiles and not with Samaritans.

For our Mishna teaches:

We do not accept from them the nests of men and women with flux, or the nest of a woman who has given birth.

And if our Mishna deals only with gentiles, the difficulty is:

Do gentiles have nests of men and women with flux!?

For impurity and purity do not apply to them at all, and there is no need to teach us that such nests are not accepted from them.

Rather, certainly the final clause of the Mishna deals with Samaritans, who observe impurity and purity and bring their nests to the Temple. And concerning them the Mishna teaches us that we do not accept from them, since they have returned to their former error.

Is it possible to say that

the first clause,

which says, “If they weighed, we do not accept,” deals only

with gentiles, and the final clause,

which says, “We do not accept from them the nests of men and women with flux,” deals

with Samaritans!?

And we answer: Indeed

that is so!

Indeed,

the first clause

speaks

of gentiles, and the final clause

speaks

of Samaritans.

Rabbi Yohanan said:

With regard to gentiles who voluntarily donated a freewill offering for the repair of the Temple:

At the beginning,

of the construction of the Temple—

we accept from them neither a specified object

and defined, which is visible in the construction,

nor an unspecified object,

even though it is not recognizable in the construction. For there is concern that they do not intend for the good, but their entire purpose is that reliance should also be placed upon them and that their advice should be heard in the construction, and thereby they will delay the construction of the Temple, as explained in the first chapter of Arakhin.

And at the end,

of the construction, after the Temple has already been built, when the donation comes only for strengthening and repairing the Temple, so that there is no longer concern about delaying the construction,

we accept from them an unspecified object,

which is not recognizable by itself,

but we do not accept from them a specified object,

for it is disgraceful that there should be a specified object of theirs in the Temple.

Moreover, if a specified object of theirs were in the Temple, they would boast about it. But with an unspecified object, which is not fixed in the construction, we accept from them, sell it, and use its proceeds.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Both at the beginning

of the construction of the Temple

and at the end

of the construction, after it was built,

we accept from them neither a specified object nor an unspecified object.

This is the meaning of what is written in the Book of Ezra [above]: “It is not for you and for us to build a House for our God.” And if they donated, the objects require concealment.

And we raise an objection:

A beraita disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan.

For it was taught:

We do not accept from them [

from the gentiles]

consecrated property or a freewill offering for the repair of the Temple.

And since the beraita did not distinguish between the beginning and the end, or between a specified and an unspecified object, it implies that we never accept from them.

And this is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan, who says that at the end we accept from them an unspecified object?

And we answer:

He explained it

Rabbi Yohanan explained this beraita: Indeed, there is no difference

between the beginning and the end, provided

that the subject is

a specified object.

And the beraita is speaking of this.

But with an unspecified object, there is a difference between the beginning and the end.

Essentially:

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Both at the beginning and at the end we accept from them neither a specified object nor an unspecified object.

And we raise an objection to Reish Lakish:

The Mishna

of the first chapter of tractate Arakhin

disagrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish.

For it was taught

there, after the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah as to whether there is the law of valuations concerning gentiles:

Everyone agrees [

both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah]

that they [

the gentiles]

vow,

that is, they say, “The value of so-and-so is upon me,”

and are vowed for,

that is, “My own value is upon me.”

Or others say concerning them, “The value of this gentile is upon me.”

And they assess the value of the gentile as a slave sold in the marketplace, and the money goes for the repair of the Temple.

And we learn from this that we accept from gentiles a freewill offering for the repair of the Temple. And this is difficult for Reish Lakish, who holds that we never accept from them a freewill offering for the repair of the Temple.

And we answer:

He explained it

Reish Lakish explained this Mishna, in which gentiles vow and are vowed for, not as one who says, “A valuation is upon me for the repair of the Temple,” but as one who vows

a burnt offering,

for gentiles vow burnt offerings as sacrifices, according to everyone.

And we raise an objection:

This is satisfactory

for the first clause, which says that they

vow,

for it speaks of their vowing a burnt offering.

But the final clause, which teaches that gentiles are “vowed for,” is difficult: Is it possible to say that gentiles are

“vowed for” a burnt offering?

And he answers: The final clause too deals with the consecration of a burnt offering.

For example,

a gentile said, “Behold, upon me is a burnt offering.”

And an Israelite heard

the gentile’s vow

and said,

the Israelite:

“That which this one said,

the gentile—I hereby accept

upon myself

to bring it as well!” And this is “being vowed for” concerning a gentile, for it is as though the gentile caused the Israelite to vow, since through the gentile’s vow he becomes obligated in a burnt-offering sacrifice. [According to the Gra].

And we refute Reish Lakish: Now that we have established the Mishna as referring to those who vow a burnt offering, is it satisfactory?

For a gentile who brings a burnt offering, if he

did not bring with it

a meal offering of

libations,

as with every freewill offering, which brings with it fine flour, oil, and wine for a “meal offering of libations,”

and afterward brought libations—

we accept them from him.

And

because

not for

the purchase of

sacred vessels,

they go—

they are “the surplus of libations”

that the gentile brought afterward.

And since this is so, how can a gentile donate a burnt offering? It emerges that he

brings an unspecified object,

for this surplus is sold, and sacred vessels are bought with the money.

But you said that we do not accept from gentiles a freewill offering for the repair of the Temple.

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Bun objected

in order to answer the difficulty from the Mishna against Reish Lakish:

But this difficulty is difficult even for Rabbi Yohanan, who established the Mishna in Arakhin, concerning those who vow and are vowed for, as referring to one who says, “A valuation is upon me,” and we accept it from him because it is an unspecified object. For how will he explain our Mishna, which says that gentiles bring burnt offerings and peace offerings?

And we learned

in the first clause of the Mishna in Arakhin that gentiles vow and are vowed for. For there is one who says that gentiles

are subject to valuations,

so that one who says, “The valuation of this gentile is upon me,” is obligated in the payment of valuations.

And

there is also one who says that gentiles

“make valuations,”

meaning that they can vow and say, “My valuation is upon me,” and become obligated in the payments of valuations fixed in the Torah.

And do the payments of valuations

not go for the repair of the Temple [

they] go,

and is it not a specified object,

for they build the Temple with them!?

And if so, this is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan: How do we accept from them payments of valuations?

Rather, necessarily,

just as you say there [

rather, there, in the first clause concerning valuations, what do you have to say? Since the gentile does not explicitly intend for the repair of the Temple, but

he intends for Heaven, and they come of themselves

and fall

for the repair of the Temple,

we accept it from him; and Rabbi Yohanan said that we do not accept from them only when he contributes directly and explicitly for the repair of the Temple.

So you should say here as well [

so you should say this here as well] concerning Reish Lakish, regarding one who donates a burnt offering, that the gentile

for Heaven [

for the Most High]

intends.