Shekalim 19b (יט:) — the Talmud in English

And during a pilgrimage festival, when there is much meat,

the meat is not cut into small pieces; rather, it is cooked limb by limb—

even

if one found pieces of meat cut

into limbs,

they are

permitted.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Money found on the Temple Mount is presumed to be non-sacred.

And we raise a difficulty:

Is it not necessary

that the tanna should have taught the opposite,

that

there should

be on the Temple Mount

only money that is

consecrated?!

For this money certainly fell from the collection of the chamber funds, since a person is not permitted to enter there with his money tied in his garment.

He said,

Rabbi Ba

said

Rabbi Hiyya in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

Even money that the kohen took from the chamber is not consecrated; it is non-sacred.

For there is a

presumption

that

the kohen,

the treasurer,

does not remove money from the chamber until he redeems it through an animal.

It follows that the money is non-sacred and not consecrated.

We learned in the Mishna:

Meat found in the Temple courtyard—

it must be left until its form changes, and then taken to the place of burning:

Sacred offerings from which one diverted his attention are disqualified.

There is one who says that this law is a “higher standard concerning sacred offerings,” and even if Elijah were to come and say that the sacred offerings did not become impure during all the time that one’s attention was diverted from them, we would not heed him and declare them fit.

According to that opinion, since it is disqualified, it should be burned immediately.

But there is one who says that it is disqualified only because of uncertainty, as perhaps it became impure.

According to him, it cannot be burned until its form has changed.

And this is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Hoshaya:

Rabbi Elazar said

in the name of Rabbi Hoshaya: Lack of awareness

concerning sacred offerings renders them disqualified, but

it requires the passing of its form,

so that it becomes disqualified after the time for eating it passes and it becomes notar; only afterward is it burned.

Rabbi Hoshaya said: The Mishna says so [

This law is proven from our Mishna].

For the Mishna states that those sacred offerings found in the Temple courtyard

must be left until their form changes and then taken to the place of burning.

These sacred offerings that were found had been lost, and attention had been diverted from them. If they are disqualified because of lack of awareness even when they certainly did not become impure, why was it necessary to wait for “the passing of their form”?

It follows that every sacred offering disqualified through lack of awareness is disqualified only because of uncertainty—perhaps it became impure—and therefore it is not burned until its form has changed.

Rabbi Yosei said: It is well,

the law that this meat found in the Temple courtyard should be burned is properly understood, even though the disqualification of meat from which one diverted his attention is due to the possibility that it became impure.

Although one might apparently raise the following difficulty: We learned in Tractate Pesachim that the Temple courtyard is considered equivalent to “public domain with regard to ritual impurity.”

And the law is that uncertain impurity, if it occurs in the public domain, is deemed pure.

If so, why is meat found in the Temple courtyard, when it is uncertain whether it became impure while attention was diverted from it, burned? After all, uncertain impurity in the public domain is deemed pure.

The reason is

that you cannot eat it,

because

perhaps

its

form has already deteriorated,

perhaps the time for eating it has passed and it is notar.

And you cannot burn it, because perhaps it has not yet become disqualified as notar.

Therefore, it must be said [

and for this reason it is necessary to say]:

Its form must be allowed to change,

so that it certainly becomes notar,

and

then it is taken

to the place of burning.

We learned in the Mishna:

If

pieces of meat are found

in the outlying areas

when they are cut into limbs, they are forbidden; if pieces are found, they are permitted:

He said

Rabbi Krispa in the name of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina:

what we said,

limbs

that are found are presumed to be

carcasses,

this is not a law based on uncertainty. Rather, they are certainly carcasses, and those who eat them

are flogged for eating a carcass. [

And if it were uncertain, it would be forbidden to eat them, but one would not be flogged on account of an uncertainty].

And we say:

The beraita says so.

It is evident from the Mishna that the limbs are forbidden as definite carcasses.

As the Mishna teaches:

“Limbs—

carcasses;

and pieces—

permitted.”

But

“pieces—

permitted”, it teaches;

and are they

not actually

permitted, and by definite law!? For if it were uncertain, they would be forbidden.

If so,

and similarly,

that which it teaches,

“limbs—

carcasses,”

is analogous to the case of the pieces, which is governed by definite law,

and one is flogged for eating them as carcasses.

Rabbi

Krispa in the name of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina: If they were

the meat limbs that were found

strung

on a string, they are

permitted,

because it is not customary to string carcasses.

If there were ten shops in the city:

nine shops

among them

sold carcass meat, and one

among them

sold slaughtered meat:

If they became confused for him,

that is, he took meat from one of them and now does not know from which one he took it, he

is concerned

and the meat is forbidden to eat.

But one is not flogged for eating the meat, even though most of the shops sell carcass meat, because in this case we do not follow the majority, since the uncertainty arose concerning the shop itself—the place from which he took the meat—which shop was it?

And since the shops are “fixed” in their places, any uncertainty that arises at the fixed location of the prohibition is not decided according to the majority in order to make him liable for lashes.

Rather, this is like half prohibition and half permission; and since it is an evenly balanced uncertainty, we say: in a case of uncertain prohibition, one rules stringently, but one is not flogged on account of an uncertainty.

And

a piece

found

in the city is decided

according to the majority.

For if the uncertainty did not arise at the shop, but rather concerning meat found in the city, and the uncertainty is from which shop it separated, we follow the majority.

Since the meat separated from the fixed location, it is not subject to the law of a “fixed” item; rather, we attribute it to the majority of shops that sell carcass meat, in accordance with the principle that anything separated is presumed to have separated from the majority. Therefore, the meat is forbidden as a matter of certainty, and one who eats it is flogged.

The same law applies in the reverse case: for example, if there were in the city

nine shops selling slaughtered meat, and one selling carcass meat, and they became confused for him,

so that he forgot from which shop he had taken it, he

is concerned

because the uncertainty arose at a fixed location, whose law is that it is like half and half, and the meat is not permitted to eat, despite the fact that most of the shops are kosher.

And

a piece of meat

found

in the marketplace, after it separated from the shop, its law is

that it is decided according to the majority,

and it is permitted.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Meat

found in the possession of a non-Jew

has the same law

as

if it were

found in the marketplace [in the market], and if the majority of those who slaughter meat in the city are Jews, we say that anything separated is presumed to have separated from the majority, and it is permitted to eat it.

[in the market]. If the majority of those who slaughter meat in the city are Israelites, we say that whatever separates, separates from the majority, and it is permitted to eat it.

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Ḥaggai was supporting Rabbi Mana

[he was leaning on Rabbi Mana as they walked].

He saw a certain non-Jew cutting meat from his horse and throwing it outside

[he saw a certain non-Jew cutting a piece of meat from the horse and throwing it outside].

He said to him,

Rabbi Mana said to Rabbi Elazar:

Is this

[is this an example]

of what Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Meat

found in the possession of a non-Jew—

like

meat

found in the marketplace?

And if the majority of those who slaughter are Jews, it is permitted to eat it?!

That is, why should we not be concerned that perhaps that non-Jew cut it from his own animal and threw it outside, as occurred in this incident?

He said to him,

Rabbi Elazar said to Rabbi Mana:

So Rabbi Yosei said:

Meat found in the possession of a non-Jew is permitted,

provided that

[he]

was seen

[the non-Jew]

emerging from the butchers’ market

of the Jews [from the Jewish butchers’ market].

For then that non-Jew certainly did not cut this piece of meat from his horse; rather, he purchased it in that market.

And it teaches us that we do not suspect that a Jew sold him meat from a tereifa animal.

A certain man in Tzippori went.

He wanted to buy meat from the butcher

[a certain man in Tzippori went and wanted to buy meat from the butcher],

but he did not give it to him,

because they hated one another and the butcher did not want to sell to him.

He said to him,

the purchaser said to one

Roman, “Go and bring it to me.”

The purchaser told a certain non-Jew to buy meat for him, and the non-Jew went and brought it to him.

He said to him,

the purchaser said to the seller:

“Did I not take it from you against your will?!”

[“Did I not take meat from you against your will?” He said this in order to provoke him.]

He said to him,

the seller said: “Did I not

give him carcass meat?”

The seller wanted to distress him, and said to him: “This meat that I gave to your non-Jewish agent, and that you ate, was carcass meat.”

Rabbi

Yirmeya in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina: The incident

itself

came before Rabbi, and he said:

Even if we believe him that he sold him carcass meat, nevertheless, the ruling remains that when one sees a non-Jew taking meat from the butchers’ market of Tzippori, it is kosher.

For it is not within his power to prohibit the butchers’ market of Tzippori.

That is, because of what happened once, that a single Jew sold carcass meat to a non-Jew, we do not prohibit the entire market.

Since we are dealing with the law of meat found in the possession of a non-Jew, the Gemara now discusses the law of meat that was known to have been kosher, then disappeared from view, and afterward was seen again. What is its law?

Rav went down there,

he went down to Babylonia.

He saw them being lenient,

and saw that the Babylonians were lenient concerning the law of meat that had disappeared from view,

and he was stringent with them,

and he imposed stringencies upon them in several incidents, as follows:

A certain man went [a certain man went].

[a certain man went].