Shabbat 80a — the Talmud in English

A tanna, a sage of the Mishnaic era, taught:

one who carries out ink, the amount that makes him liable is the amount used for writing

two letters

when he carries it out

as dry ink.

Or, the amount of

two letters—

as

ink in a pen.

Or, if he carries out enough ink suitable for writing

two letters, in an inkwell—

in the writer’s inkwell.

Rava raised a dilemma:

If one carries out ink in the amount of

one letter, as dry ink

and

one letter in a pen and one letter in an inkwell—

what is the law?

Do the three types of ink combine to reach the amount of two letters?

And we conclude:

The question remains without a resolution.

Rava said: If one carried out

ink in the amount of

two letters

into the public domain

and wrote them while walking,

even though, apparently, he did not perform the required placing in the public domain, since he himself did not stop—and there was no situation in which one could say that “the placing of his body is considered like the placing of the object”—nevertheless he is

liable

for carrying out, [in addition to liability for writing], because

the writing

of the letters in ink

is its placing.

That is the essential form of placing ink: placing it on paper in the form of writing.

And Rava said: If one carried out

ink in the amount of

one letter and wrote it, and then carried out again

ink in the amount of

one letter and wrote it—

he is exempt

from bringing a sin-offering for carrying, even if he performed the entire act during one period of unawareness.

What is the reason?

Because

when he carried out the latter one,

the ink of the second letter,

the measure of the first one was lacking.

The ink of the first letter had already dried, so at the completion of the carrying, when we seek to combine the two letters, there is not an amount sufficient for two letters.

And Rava said: If one carried out one-half of a dried fig

from the private domain

and placed it

in the public domain,

and then carried out another one-half of a dried fig and placed it

in the public domain, the first half

of the first dried fig

is treated as though a dog had caught it

in its mouth, so that the placing was not performed through his agency,

or

as though it

had burned

before the second half was placed, in which case the two halves are not fit to combine,

and he is exempt.

And we discuss this:

But why

is he exempt?

The first half is lying

at the time the second half is placed. The first half was not caught in a dog’s mouth and did not burn; rather, both halves are now lying together at the completion of the carrying, in the full measure of a dried fig. Why, then, should they not combine to reach the measure of a dried fig? And why do we say that the first half is “treated as though a dog had caught it or it had burned”? And we answer:

This is what

Rava

was saying:

And if he first lifted

the first one

from the place where he had placed it,

before placing

the

second one—

the

first

becomes like one that was caught

by a dog [before it was placed; he is exempt, as we learned below, on page 102a: one who throws an object and a dog catches it is exempt, since the placing was not performed through his agency and there is no placing. Rashi]

or burned, and he is exempt.

For here too, at the time the carrying is completed, the first placing has already been nullified.

And Rava said: If one carried out one-half of a dried fig and placed it, and then carried out another one-half of a dried fig and carried it over the first half,

above the first half,

he is liable.

And we discuss this:

But why

is he liable?

The

second half did not come to rest.

And we answer:

For example, he carried it—

the second half of the dried fig—

within three

handbreadths of the ground on which the first half of the dried fig was lying, and it is considered as though it had been placed, by the principle that objects within three handbreadths are regarded as joined.

And we challenge this:

But Rava said: If one throws an object from the private domain into the public domain, or throws it a distance of four cubits in the public domain, and the object does not come to rest in the public domain, he is exempt. Even if the object passed

within three

within three

handbreadths of the ground of the public domain, he is exempt

according to the Rabbis,

who hold that an object caught in the airspace of a domain is not considered to have come to rest. Rather,

it is necessary

that there be

a placing

of the object

on something.

We do not say that, when it is within three handbreadths, the Rabbis agree that the object is considered to have been placed on the ground; rather, it must actually come to rest! [Nevertheless, it need not be placed on a surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths, as is required for ordinary placing, since it is within three handbreadths of the ground.]

And we answer:

There is no difficulty.

Here,

where placing on something is required, it is

in the case of one who throws

the object and it does not come to rest in the public domain.

Here,

where carrying it within three handbreadths is sufficient to make him liable, even without placing it, it is

in the case of one who carries

the object in his hand. In that case, no separate placing is necessary, since the object is resting in his hand and his hand is close to the ground.

The fact that the object is resting in a hand is considered like its resting on any surface. Hazon Ish, section 62, subsection 23.

The Sages taught: If one carried out one-half of a dried fig, and then carried out another one-half of a dried fig during one period of unawareness,

meaning that he was unwitting from beginning to end and did not realize in the interim that he had sinned—

he is liable

for a sin-offering.

But if he carried them out

during two periods of unawareness,

meaning that he realized between the two halves that he had sinned, then forgot again and carried out the second half—

he is exempt.

Since the awareness in between separates the two acts, the two halves do not combine to reach the measure that makes one liable for a sin-offering.

Rabbi Yosei says: Even if he carried them out

during

one period of unawareness,

one, he is liable only if he carried out both halves

to two domains,

to one domain,

that is, to the same public domain—

he is liable.

But if he carried out both halves

to two domains

that are separate public domains, on opposite sides of a private domain, with each half carried into a different public domain—

he is exempt.

Rabba said: And this is so

on the condition

that

the separation between the two public domains is specifically by means of a private domain. In that case,

there is

a domain of

“liability for a sin-offering”

that separates

between them.

Only a private domain separating two public domains causes liability for a sin-offering [for if one carries from one of those public domains into the intervening domain, or from the intervening domain into one of them, he is liable for a sin-offering]. Only in that case are they considered two separate public domains that divide the acts of carrying into separate acts. Therefore, in order to make one liable for each act of carrying, each act must have the complete measure required for carrying.

But

if only a

karmelit, an area that has an intermediate status and is neither a public nor a private domain, separates

not

does it constitute a separation that divides the domains and makes the acts of carrying into them separate acts. Rather, they are considered one public domain. Therefore, even if he carried one half of a dried fig into this public domain and the second half into that public domain, he is liable.

Whereas

Abaye said: Even a karmelit

constitutes a separation.

But a plank,

a tree trunk lying across the entire width of the public domain,

does not

constitute a separation. If he carried one half of a dried fig to one side of the trunk and one half to the other side, he is liable.

And Rava said: Even a plank

constitutes a separation.

And Rava follows his own reasoning:

For Rava said: A Shabbat domain

is comparable to a domain with regard to bills of divorce.

With regard to bills of divorce, we find that a plank divides the domain and is considered a domain in its own right. The same applies with regard to Shabbat: it separates two public domains.

The case involving bills of divorce was as follows: A husband threw a bill of divorce to his wife in his courtyard, and the bill fell onto a plank. The ruling is that she is not divorced. Although the husband lent his courtyard to his wife for the purpose of acquiring the bill of divorce, he did not lend her the place occupied by the plank, since it is a separate domain. We say that a person lends only one place, not two.

We learned in the Mishna, the foundational compilation of the Oral Law: One who carries out

eye makeup—

the measure is enough to apply it to one eye.

And we discuss this: Why is one liable for carrying out eye makeup in an amount sufficient to apply it to one eye?

One eye—do people not apply it

to one eye alone, but to both eyes? Why, then, did the Sages establish the measure as enough for one eye? And we answer:

Rav Huna said: It is because

women

who observe modesty apply makeup to only one eye,

covering their faces and revealing only one eye in order to see, and applying makeup to that eye. Therefore, eye makeup sufficient for one eye is also considered a significant measure.

They raise an objection from a source

against Rav Huna: Is it not taught

that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Eye makeup, if

it is intended

for medicinal purposes,

its measure is

enough to apply

it to

one eye?

And

if

it is intended

for adornment,

its measure is enough to apply it

to both eyes.

This is difficult for Rav Huna, since according to his statement, even when it is intended for adornment, enough for one eye is sufficient.

And we answer:

He explained it,

he interpreted it,

Hillel, son of Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani: When that teaching was taught, it was

with regard to townspeople,

the women of the villages. They do not need to observe such a high degree of modesty, since there are not many people there, and frivolity and levity are also uncommon there. They apply makeup to both eyes, and therefore, with regard to them, this is the measure for Shabbat.

We learned in the Mishna:

Wax, the measure is enough to place it over the opening of a small hole.

A tanna taught: The measure is enough to place it over the opening of a small hole in

the stopper of a small flask of

wine,

and not of oil or honey, since wine flows through a smaller opening than the opening made for oil and honey.

We learned in the Mishna:

Glue, the measure is enough to place it on the top of a bird trap.

A tanna taught: The measure is enough to place it on the top of a bird trap,

a small board

at the top of a reed used by hunters,

where a large amount of glue must be placed so that the bird will stick when it lands there.

We learned in the Mishna:

Tar and sulfur, the measure is enough to make

a hole.

A tanna taught: The measure is enough to make a small hole

[see the Mishna].

We learned in the Mishna:

Pottery, the measure is enough to make the opening of a furnace

used by goldsmiths. Rabbi Yehuda says: The measure is enough to make a support.

And we discuss this:

Does this mean

that

Rabbi Yehuda’s measure is larger

than the measure of the Rabbis? The measure needed to make a support is greater than the measure needed to make the opening of a furnace.

But

we have established

with regard to the measure for carrying another substance

that the measure of the Rabbis is larger

than Rabbi Yehuda’s.

For

indeed,

we learned

in the Mishna concerning the measure of a strip of cloth:

Rabbi Yehuda says: The measure is enough to take from it the measure of a shoe for a child,

which is less than the measure stated by the Rabbis, enough to make a patch.

Thus, Rabbi Yehuda is more stringent than the Rabbis, so why here is he more lenient than they are?

And we answer:

Say

that Rabbi Yehuda’s statement means:

The measure is enough to plaster

the cracks of the

support

of the leg of

a small stove,

which is less than the amount needed to make the opening of a goldsmith’s furnace.

Bran, the measure is enough to place it over the opening of a goldsmith’s furnace.