Shabbat 80a (פ.) — the Talmud in English

A tanna taught:

one who carries out ink, its measure is the measure required for writing

two letters

when he carries it out

as dry ink.

Or, the measure is that required for writing

two letters—

with ink

in a quill.

Or, if he carries out ink fit for writing

two letters, in a kelmarin—

in the writer’s inkwell.

Rava raised a dilemma:

If one carried out ink in the measure of

one letter, as dry ink,

and

one letter in a quill and one letter in a kelmarin—

what is the halakha?

Do the three types of ink combine to constitute the measure of two letters?

And we conclude:

The dilemma remains unresolved.

Rava said: If one carried out

ink in the measure of

two letters

to the public domain,

and wrote them while walking,

then, although it would appear that he did not perform placement in the public domain, since he himself did not come to rest—and there was no situation in which one could say that “the placement of his body is equivalent to the placement of the object”—even so he is

liable

for carrying out [in addition to liability for writing], since

writing them

of the letters in ink—

that is their placement!

For this is the fundamental form of placement of ink: when it is placed on paper in the form of writing.

And Rava said: If one carried out

ink in the measure of

one letter and wrote it, and then carried out

ink in the measure of

one letter and wrote it—

he is exempt

from a sin-offering for carrying out, even if he did this in one lapse of awareness.

What is the reason?

Because

at the time he carries out the latter,

the ink of the second letter—

the measure of the first is lacking.

For the ink of the first letter has already dried, and it follows that at the completion of the carrying, when we come to combine the two letters, there is not here the measure of two letters.

And Rava said: If one carried out one half of a dried fig

from the private domain

and placed it

in the public domain,

and then carried out one half of a dried fig and placed it

in the public domain, the first half of the dried fig—

the first—

is treated as though a dog caught it

in its mouth, so that the placement was not effected by his agency,

or

as though it

had burned

before the placement of the second half of the dried fig, in which case the two halves of the dried figs are not fit to combine—

and he is exempt.

And we raised an objection concerning this:

But why

is he exempt?

Is he not placing

the first half of the dried fig when he places the second half? The first half was neither caught in a dog’s mouth nor burned; rather, both are now placed together at the completion of the carrying, in the full measure of a dried fig. Why, then, should they not combine to constitute the measure of a dried fig? And why do we say that the first half “is treated as though a dog caught it or it burned”? And we answer:

This is what

Rava

said: And if he lifted

the

first

from the place where he had placed it

before placing

the

second—

the

first is rendered as though it was caught

by a dog [before placement, in which case he is exempt, as we learned below, on 102a: One who throws an object and a dog catches it is exempt, since the placement was not effected by his agency and there is no placement. Rashi]

or burned, and he is exempt.

For here too, at the time of completion of the carrying, the first placement had already been nullified.

And Rava said: If one carried out half a dried fig and placed it, and then carried out half a dried fig and passed it over it,

he is liable,

above the first half.

And we raised an objection concerning this:

But why

is he

liable—

did it not come to rest,

the second half?

And we answer:

For example, he passed it

the second half of the dried fig

within three

handbreadths of the ground on which the first half of the dried fig was lying; therefore it is considered as though it had been placed, by virtue of the principle of lavud.

And we challenge this:

But Rava said: One who throws an object from the private domain into the public domain, or throws it a distance of four cubits in the public domain, and the object does not come to rest in the public domain, is exempt. Even if the object passed

within three

handbreadths of the ground of the public domain, he is exempt

according to the Rabbis,

who hold that an object caught in the air of a domain is not considered to have been placed. Rather,

it is necessary

that there be

placement

of the object

upon something

. We do not say that, within three handbreadths, the Rabbis agree that the object is considered to have been placed on the ground; rather, it must actually come to rest! [In any event, it is not necessary that it be placed upon a surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths, as with every placement, since it is within three handbreadths of the ground.]

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

Here, where placement upon something is required, it is

in the case of one who throws

the object and it does not come to rest in the public domain.

Here, where passing it within three handbreadths is sufficient to render him liable, even without placement, it is

in the case of one who carries

the object in his hand, for then placement is unnecessary, since the object is resting in his hand, and his hand is near the ground.

For the fact that the object is resting in his hand is considered as though it were resting upon any surface. Hazon Ish, section 62, subsection 23.

The Sages taught: If one carried out half a dried fig, and then carried out half a dried fig in one lapse of awareness, meaning that he was unwitting from beginning to end and did not become aware in the interim that he had sinned— he is liable

the object in his hand. In that case, no separate placing is necessary, since the object is resting in his hand and his hand is close to the ground.

The fact that the object is resting in a hand is considered like its resting on any surface. Hazon Ish, section 62, subsection 23.

for a sin-offering.

But if he carried them out

in two lapses of awareness,

meaning that he became aware between the two halves that he had sinned, then forgot again and carried out the second half—

he is exempt.

Since the intervening awareness divides the two acts, the two halves do not combine to constitute the measure that renders one liable for a sin-offering.

Rabbi Yosei says: Even if he carried them out

in one

lapse of awareness, he is liable specifically if he carried out both halves

to one domain,

that is, to the same public domain—

he is liable.

But if he carried out both halves

to two domains,

separate public domains, on the two sides of a private domain, with each half carried out to a different public domain—

he is exempt.

Rabba said: And this is so on the condition that the separation between the two public domains is specifically by means of a private domain, in which case there is a domain of “ liability for a sin-offering”

But if he carried out both halves

to two domains

that are separate public domains, on opposite sides of a private domain, with each half carried into a different public domain—

he is exempt.

Although we find with regard to writing, below, on page 104b, that if one wrote one letter on one sheet in Tiberias and another letter on another sheet in Sepphoris, he is liable, a distinction must be made between writing and carrying. With regard to writing, we say: “The fact that the sheets require bringing close to one another is not considered an act that is still lacking.” For the two sheets can be brought close and placed next to one another, and the two letters will then be read together. But with regard to carrying, the act is not complete until he carries both halves into the same public domain. Tosafot in their commentary, beginning with the words “during one period of unawareness.” Regarding cooking, if one roasts two separate halves of dried figs in two places [within one piece of meat], see Menahot 57a, where the Gemara presents two formulations: whether one is liable for cooking only when it is done in one place, or even when it is done in two or three places. Tosafot in Menahot 57a offer two explanations for the distinction between the first position in the Gemara, according to which one is liable for cooking only if he cooked in one place, and the combining of two halves of dried figs with regard to carrying. For these distinctions they use the Gemara’s definition below concerning the combining of two letters written in different places. [See Tosafot below, 104b.] One distinction is that, when carrying into one domain [as with writing in two places], we say that the items combine because “the fact that they require bringing close to one another is not considered an act that is still lacking.” But with regard to cooking, they do not combine, because “this is not the usual manner of cooking.” The second distinction is that, since he roasted the two halves of the dried fig in two places within one large piece of meat, they do not combine because “they also require cutting and bringing close.” It is possible that Tosafot’s two distinctions reflect two fundamental approaches to combining parts of the measure on Shabbat. According to the first distinction, the matter depends on each labor: whether, in that particular labor, the two halves can be regarded as the normal way of producing one complete measure of the labor. According to the second distinction, everything depends on whether it is practically possible to combine the two parts of the measure without requiring an additional action to combine them. See the work Musakh HaShabbat in Minhat Hinukh, which discusses the combining of measures at length, as well as the relationship between combining parts of a measure on Shabbat and combining parts of a measure in other areas of halakha.

separating

between them.

For only a private domain interposed between two public domains causes liability for a sin-offering [for if one carries out or brings in from one of these public domains to the domain interposed between them, he is liable for a sin-offering], and only then are they considered two separate public domains that divide the acts of carrying into separate acts. Therefore, to render one liable for each act of carrying, there must be a complete measure of carrying for each one individually.

But

if only a

karmelit

intervenes between them—

it does not

constitute an interruption dividing the domains and rendering the acts of carrying to them separate acts. Rather, they are considered one public domain, so that even if he carried one half of a dried fig to this public domain and a second half of a dried fig to that public domain, he is liable.

Whereas

Abaye said: Even a karmelit

constitutes an interruption.

But a pisla,

a tree trunk lying across the entire width of the public domain—

does not

constitute an interruption; and if he carried half a dried fig to one side of the trunk and half a dried fig to the other side, he is liable.

And Rava said: Even a pisla

constitutes an interruption.

And Rava follows his own reasoning:

For Rava said: The domain of Shabbat

is comparable to the domain with regard to bills of divorce.

With regard to bills of divorce, we find that a pisla divides and constitutes a domain in its own right. The same applies with regard to Shabbat: it separates between two public domains.

The incident concerning bills of divorce involved a husband who threw a bill of divorce to his wife in his courtyard, and the bill of divorce fell upon a pisla; the law is that she is not divorced. For although the husband lent his courtyard to his wife for the purpose of acquiring the bill of divorce, he did not lend her the place of the pisla, since it is a separate domain. And we say that a person does not lend only one place and two places.

We learned in the Mishna: One who carries out

eye makeup—

enough to apply it to one eye.

And we raised an objection concerning this: One who carries out eye makeup in a measure sufficient to apply it—why is he liable?

One eye—is that not insufficient for people to apply makeup?

People apply makeup to two eyes, not one; why, then, did the Sages establish the measure as one eye? And we answer:

Rav Huna said: For

women

who are modest apply makeup to one eye

alone. They cover their faces and reveal only one eye in order to see, and they apply makeup to that eye. Therefore, eye makeup sufficient to apply to one eye is also considered a measure.

A challenge was raised

against Rav Huna: Is it not taught in a

beraita:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Eye makeup, if

it is intended

for medicinal purposes,

its measure is

enough to apply

it to

one eye?

And if it is intended

for adornment,

its measure is enough to apply it

to both eyes.

This is difficult for Rav Huna, for according to his statement, even when it is for adornment one eye is sufficient.

And we answer:

Interpret it—

that is,

Hillel, son of Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani, interpreted it: When that

was taught, it was referring

to village women, the women of the villages, [see Masoret HaShas, which cites Rashi elsewhere as saying that the reference is to the women of a small town], who need not conduct themselves with such modesty, since there are not many people there, and frivolity and levity are also not common there. They apply makeup to both eyes, and therefore, with regard to them, this is the measure for purposes of Shabbat.

We learned in the Mishna:

Wax, enough to place over the opening of a small hole.

A tanna taught: Enough to place over the opening of a small hole in

the stopper of a small flask of

wine,

and not of oil or honey. Wine flows through a smaller opening than the opening made for dispensing oil and honey.

We learned in the Mishna:

Glue, enough to place at the top of a bird catcher.

A tanna taught: Enough to place at the top of a bird catcher,

a small board,

at the top of a reed used by hunters,

where a great deal of glue must be placed so that the bird will stick when it settles there.

We learned in the Mishna:

Tar and sulfur, enough to make

a hole.

A tanna taught: Enough to make a small hole [see the Mishna].

We learned in the Mishna:

Pottery, enough to make the opening of a furnace

of goldsmiths. Rabbi Yehuda says: Enough to make a tripod.

And we raised an objection concerning this:

Does this mean

that

Rabbi Yehuda’s measure is greater,

larger than the measure of the Rabbis? For the measure required to make a tripod is greater than that required to make the opening of a furnace.

And

we have established

with regard to the measure for carrying out another substance

that

the measure of the Rabbis is greater

than that of Rabbi Yehuda?

For

we learned

in the Mishna, with regard to the measure of a reed:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Enough to take from it the measure of a shoe for a small child,

which is less than the measure according to the Rabbis, who say that it must be enough to make a patch.

Thus, Rabbi Yehuda is more stringent than the Rabbis. Why, then, here is he more lenient than they are?

than Rabbi Yehuda’s.

For

And we answer:

Say concerning Rabbi Yehuda’s statement:

Enough to plaster

the cracks of the

tripod

of the

small stove, which is less than what is required to make the opening of a goldsmith’s furnace. Bran, enough to place over the opening of a goldsmith’s furnace.

Say

that Rabbi Yehuda’s statement means:

The measure is enough to plaster

the cracks of the

support

of the leg of

a small stove,

which is less than the amount needed to make the opening of a goldsmith’s furnace.

Bran, the measure is enough to place it over the opening of a goldsmith’s furnace.