Shabbat 70b (ע:) — the Talmud in English

But since it is written

“from one”

the verse comes to include that even if he wrote only part of the word he intended to write—for example, if he wrote

“shem” from

the word

“Shimon,” he is also liable, since “shem” is also a person's name.

But if he wrote “naft” from “Naftali,” he is not liable, because since he did not write anything meaningful, he did not perform a labor.

And now we expound the letter mem of “mah-neha”:

“neha”

means

primary categories.

Whereas the addition of the letter mem in

“maheneha”

comes to include

derivative categories.

And we return to explain the earlier statement:

“One that is ‘these’”—

intentional violation of Shabbat and unintentional violation of the labors,

in which case he is liable to bring many sin-offerings, one separate sin-offering for each labor.

“These that are ‘one’”—

unintentional violation of Shabbat and intentional violation of the labors,

in which case he is liable to bring only one sin-offering for each Shabbat, since the reason for all the labors is one unintentional act: his unintentional violation of Shabbat.

And one can challenge Shmuel: Why did he not derive the division of labors from here?

And we answer:

And Shmuel,

this exposition of

“one that is ‘these,’ and these that are ‘one’”—

does not

seem plausible to him,

because he expounds the entire verse as referring to one who writes “shem” from “Shimon,” and to derivative categories.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman:

What is the halakha concerning one who had

unawareness of both matters,

meaning that he both forgot that today was Shabbat and did not know that the thirty-nine labors were prohibited? That is, he was unintentional both with regard to unintentional violation of Shabbat and with regard to unintentional violation of the labors, and he performed many labors during one Shabbat—

what is the halakha?

Is he liable for each labor, as in a case of unintentional violation of the labors, or is he liable for only one, as in a case of unintentional violation of Shabbat?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

He had unawareness of Shabbat, and he is liable for only one.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary, he had unawareness of the labors

in his possession, and

he should be

liable for each and every one?!

Rather, Rav Ashi said: We examine the matter: If he desisted because of Shabbat,

that is, because they reminded him that today was Shabbat, he desisted from performing labors—

he had unawareness of Shabbat,

as it is evident that all his unintentional conduct was due to forgetting Shabbat,

and he is liable for only one.

And if he desisted because of the labor,

that is, they reminded him that these were prohibited labors, and he desisted as a result—

he had unawareness of the labors.

It is evident that his unintentional conduct resulted from forgetting the labors,

and he is liable for each and every one.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Did he in fact desist from

profaning

Shabbat

except because of the labors!

For the fact that he remembered that today was Shabbat would not by itself cause him to desist from the labors. Rather, from their telling him that today was Shabbat, he understood that they also intended to tell him that the labors were prohibited. For until then he had not known of their prohibition.

And

did he in fact desist from the labors

after he learned of their prohibition—

except because of Shabbat!

For from their reminding him that the labors were prohibited, he understood and remembered that today was Shabbat.

It follows that he always desists because he remembers both matters together.

Rather, it makes no difference!

In either case, he is liable for only one, in accordance with Rav Naḥman.

And we challenge this:

We learned

in our chapter:

The primary categories of labor are forty less one

in number.

And we considered it: Why do I need the number?

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

To teach you

that if he performed all of them during one period of unawareness, he is liable for each and every one.

But if he was unintentional with regard to all the labors because he thought that they were all permitted, then he does not know at all that it is Shabbat today. For what distinction is there for him between Shabbat and an ordinary day? If so, he had unawareness of both matters.

Granted, if you say that one who had unawareness of both matters

is liable for each and every one,

it works out well:

he is liable for each and every one, even when he was unintentional with regard to all of them.

Rather, if you say

that unawareness of both matters is equivalent to

unawareness of Shabbat

and

he is liable for only one,

then

how can you find

a case in which he is liable for each and every one?

It must be only

in a case of intentional violation of Shabbat and unintentional violation of the labors.

But here, in the Mishna, where he was unintentional with regard to all the labors, in what sense was he intentional with regard to Shabbat? If he considers all the labors permitted, Shabbat is not sanctified in his eyes more than any other day.

This works out well if he holds in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says: Since he was unintentional with regard to the

punishment of

karet,

that is, he does not know of the severity of desecrating Shabbat, whose punishment is karet, then

even though he intentionally violated a negative commandment,

that is, he knows that it is prohibited to perform a labor on Shabbat, nevertheless he is considered “unintentional” [because he does not know the severity of the punishment], and therefore he is liable to bring an offering for it—

you can find “intentional violation of Shabbat”

because

he knew Shabbat with regard to the negative commandment,

but did not know only of the punishment of karet, and therefore he is called unintentional.

But if he holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish,

who says:

A person is not considered unintentional with regard to liability for a sin-offering

until he is unintentional with regard to both the negative commandment and karet,

then this is difficult: Since he was unintentional with regard to all the labors, and thought that they involved neither a negative commandment nor karet—

in what sense did he know Shabbat?!

If so, he had unawareness of both matters, so why is he liable for each and every one?!

And we answer:

He knew

Shabbat

through the laws of teḥumim,

that there is a prohibition against going beyond the Shabbat limit,

and in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

who holds that the prohibition of teḥumim is from the Torah.

Rava said: He reaped and ground an olive-sized measure [“

An olive-sized measure” is the measure for which one is liable for all Shabbat labors performed with food]

in a case of unintentional violation of Shabbat and intentional violation of the labors,

for which he is liable to bring only one sin-offering for both.

And he learned that today was Shabbat. Afterwards, the prohibition of the labors was forgotten from him, and therefore:

He went back and reaped and ground an olive-sized measure, in a case of intentional violation of Shabbat and unintentional violation of the labors,

for although in the interim he had learned that today was Shabbat, he forgot that these labors were prohibited [and nevertheless all of it is considered one period of unawareness, since he did not have “awareness of sin” in the interim: immediately upon learning that today was Shabbat, he forgot the prohibition of the labors].

With regard to the second reaping and grinding, he would apparently be liable to bring two sin-offerings once he learned that he had sinned, since these were two unintentional acts involving two separate labors.

And he learned about the reaping and grinding

the first

that had involved unintentional violation of Shabbat and intentional violation of the labors,

and he set aside one sin-offering for both, since he is liable for only one sin-offering for unintentional violation of Shabbat. This offering is called a “sin-offering for unintentional violation of Shabbat.”

And

after he set aside the offering for unintentional violation of Shabbat,

he again learned about the reaping and grinding

the second

that had involved intentional violation of Shabbat and unintentional violation of the labors—

he does not need to bring an additional sin-offering for the second reaping and grinding.