Shabbat 46b (מו:) — the Talmud in English

But was it not taught:

the bracelets

[the armlets worn on the hands]

and the earrings and rings

which one may not go out wearing into the public domain, since they are not a manner of clothing,

are like all the utensils that may be moved in the courtyard.

And

concerning this

Ulla said: For what reason

are they moved, even though it is prohibited to wear them even in the courtyard [see Tosafot]—

since they have the status of utensils.

And if so,

here too

it should be permitted to move a naphtha lamp—

since it has the status of a utensil.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Blessed is the Merciful One that Rava did not embarrass

Rav Awwia,

Rav Awwia

having found an answer to him.

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba: It was taught: The oil remaining in a lamp and in a bowl—

is prohibited, but Rabbi Shimon permits it.

Apparently, Rabbi Shimon does not hold of muktzeh.

And we raise a contradiction: Rabbi Shimon says: Any

firstborn animal [which is a sacrifice and may be eaten only in the Temple after it has been sacrificed; but if a permanent blemish develops in it, it is eaten by its owner, a kohein, like an ordinary non-sacred animal]

whose

blemish was not apparent on the eve of the Festival—

it is prohibited to eat or move it, according to the law of muktzeh, because

it was not prepared.

Apparently, Rabbi Shimon does hold of muktzeh. If so, there is a contradiction between the two baraitot.

And we answer:

Can the cases really be compared!?

What similarity is there between the cases in the two baraitot!?

There,

in that case,

with regard to a naphtha lamp—

a person sits and waits for when his lamp will go out,

and does not remove it from his mind.

But

here,

with regard to a firstborn animal whose blemish did not become apparent before the Festival, does

a person sit and wait for when a blemish will develop in it?

For

he certainly says:

a.

Who can say that a blemish will develop in it?

b.

And even if you say that a blemish will develop in it—

who can say that a permanent blemish will develop in it,

which would permit it to be eaten?

c.

And even if you say that a permanent blemish will develop in it—

who can say that a Sage will attend to it

on the Festival in order to determine that it is a permanent blemish?

Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection:

Do we really say that a person removes an object from his mind because of “who can say”?

For we learned:

They annul

their wives’

vows on Shabbat, and

likewise

men may submit themselves

to the Sages

for

the nullification of

vows that are required for Shabbat.

For example, they vowed that they would not eat on Shabbat.

But why

is the woman permitted to eat after her husband has annulled her vow? As long as the food was prohibited to eat because of the vow, it was muktzeh, since she had removed it from her mind.

And since you said that there is muktzeh because of “who can say,” then here too

let us say: Who can say that the husband will attend to her

to annul her vow? And let it therefore be muktzeh on that account. How is this different from a firstborn animal, which is muktzeh even according to Rabbi Shimon because of “who can say,” according to your statement!?

And we answer:

There,

with regard to a vow, it is not muktzeh—

in accordance with the statement of Rav Pinḥas in the name of Rava.

For Rav Pinḥas said in the name of Rava: Every woman who vows

only

with the understanding

that

her husband

will consent to

her vow does she vow.

Therefore, she takes into account that her husband will annul it for her.

Come and hear: Men may submit themselves

to

the

Sages for the nullification of

vows required for Shabbat, on Shabbat.

But why

are these not muktzeh, like a firstborn animal?

Let us say: Who can say that a Sage will attend to him

to annul his vow? And we answer:

There,

with regard to vows,

if a Sage does not attend to him—

it is sufficient for him,

for it is sufficient to have the vow annulled when no Sage is found who can annul it

by three laymen,

and he can easily find them.

But

here,

with regard to a firstborn animal, which may be permitted only by an expert Sage—

who can say that a Sage will attend to him.

Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef:

But did

Rabbi Shimon say, “Once it has gone out

the lamp—

it is permitted to move it,”

which implies that

once it has gone out—

yes; if it has not gone out—

no.

And

what is the reason—

lest while he is holding it

and moving it,

it goes out.

And let this be difficult:

We have heard Rabbi Shimon say: An unintentional act is permitted.

Here too, he does not intend to extinguish it while moving it.

For it was taught: Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a chair, a bed, or a bench

even in a place where it is possible that dragging it will make a furrow in the ground,

provided that he does not intend to make a furrow!?

And we answer:

Whenever, if he intends it, there would be a Torah prohibition,

such as extinguishing a flame,

when he does not intend it, Rabbi Shimon issued a decree

that it is nevertheless prohibited

by rabbinic decree.

Therefore, Rabbi Shimon permitted moving the lamp only after it had gone out, and not while it was still burning.

But

whenever, if he intends it, there is

only

a rabbinic prohibition,

such as making a furrow by dragging a bench, since digging into the ground in this manner is only digging “in an unusual manner” [because proper digging is done only with a hoe], in such a case

when he does not intend it—

Rabbi Shimon permits it

even

from the outset.

Rava raised an objection: Clothing merchants may sell

mixed-species garments, and they wear them in order to display them, wearing them

in the usual manner, provided that they do not intend

to derive benefit from wearing the garment,

in the sun, because of the sun, and in the rain, because of the rain.

And the modest ones,

who are careful with their actions,

draw

the garment

behind them on a pole,

and do not wear it even without intending to derive benefit.

But here, when he intends it—

there is a Torah prohibition,

and nevertheless

when he does not intend it—

Rabbi Shimon permits it from the outset!?

Rather, Rava said:

Here, Rabbi Shimon did not prohibit moving the burning lamp because of extinguishing the flame, but on account of muktzeh.