Shabbat 46b — the Talmud in English

Did they not teach: ![](pamud.bmp "

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the bracelets [

bracelets worn on the hands]

and the earrings and rings

that one may not go out with them into the public domain, because they are not worn as clothing—

they are like all utensils that may be moved in a courtyard.

And

with regard to this

Ulla said: For what reason

may they be moved, even though it is prohibited to wear them even in a courtyard [see Tosafot]—

since they have the status of utensils.

And if so,

here too

it should be permitted to move an oil lamp—

since it has the status of a utensil.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Blessed is the Merciful One that Rava did not embarrass

for Rava did not succeed in embarrassing

Rav Avya;

rather, Rav Avya found an answer to him.

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba: It was taught in a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna: The remaining oil in a lamp and in a bowl—

is prohibited, but Rabbi Shimon permits it.

Apparently, Rabbi Shimon does not hold that there is a prohibition of muktzeh.

And they raise a contradiction: Rabbi Shimon says: Any

firstborn animal [which is an offering and may be eaten only in the Temple after it is sacrificed; but if it develops a blemish, it is eaten by its priest-owner like an ordinary animal]

whose

blemish was not discernible on the eve of a Festival—

it is prohibited to eat or move it, by the law of muktzeh, because

it is not prepared.

Apparently, Rabbi Shimon does hold that there is a prohibition of muktzeh. If so, there is a contradiction between the two beraitot.

And we reject this:

How can these cases be compared?!

What similarity is there between the cases in the two beraitot?!

After all,

there,

in the case of an oil lamp—

a person sits and anticipates when his lamp will go out,

and he does not set it aside in his mind.

But

here,

in the case of a firstborn animal whose blemish was not discovered before the Festival,

does a person sit and anticipate when a blemish will develop in it?

After all,

he certainly says:

a.

Who can say that a blemish will develop in it?

b.

And even if you should say that a blemish will develop in it—

who can say that a permanent blemish will develop in it,

which permits it to be eaten?

c.

And even if you should say that a permanent blemish will develop in it—

who can say that a Sage will attend to it

on the Festival in order to determine that it is a permanent blemish?

Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection:

Did we really say that a person sets an object aside because of a “who can say” uncertainty?

After all, we learned:

Husbands may annul

their wives’

vows on Shabbat, and

likewise,

men may present themselves

to Sages

for

the annulment of

vows that concern the needs of Shabbat.

For example, they vowed not to eat on Shabbat.

But why

is the woman permitted to eat after her husband has annulled her vow? As long as the food was prohibited to her because of the vow, it was muktzeh, since she had taken her mind off it.

And since you said that an object becomes muktzeh because of a “who can say” uncertainty, then here too

let us say: Who can say that her husband will attend to her

to annul her vow? It should therefore be muktzeh for this reason. And how is this different from a firstborn animal, which, according to your words, is muktzeh even according to Rabbi Shimon because of a “who can say” uncertainty?!

And we answer:

There,

in the case of a vow, it is not muktzeh—

in accordance with what Rav Pinḥas said in the name of Rava.

For Rav Pinḥas said in the name of Rava: Every woman who vows—

only

on the understanding

that her

husband

will agree

does she make her vow.

Therefore, she takes into account that her husband will annul it for her.

Come and hear a proof: Men may present themselves

to

Sages

for the annulment of

vows needed for Shabbat, on Shabbat.

But why

are they not muktzeh, just as the firstborn animal is?

Let us say: Who can say that a Sage will attend to him

to annul his vow? And we answer:

There,

in the case of vows,

if a Sage does not attend to him—

it is sufficient for him;

it is sufficient for the vow to be annulled when no Sage is found, as

three ordinary people

may annul his vow, and he can easily find them.

But

here,

in the case of a firstborn animal, which can be permitted only by an expert Sage—

who can say that a Sage will attend to it?

Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef:

Did

Rabbi Shimon really say, “Once it has gone out,

the lamp

may be moved,”

which implies:

once it has gone out—

yes; if it has not gone out—

no?

And

what is the reason?

Perhaps while he is holding it

and moving it,

it will go out.

And this is difficult:

We have heard Rabbi Shimon say: An unintentional act is permitted.

Here too, he does not intend to extinguish it while moving it.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a chair, a bed, or a bench

even in a place where dragging it might cause a furrow in the ground,

provided that he does not intend to make a furrow?!

And we answer:

Whenever, if he intends it, there is a prohibition by Torah law,

such as extinguishing a flame,

when he does not intend it, Rabbi Shimon issued a decree

that it is nevertheless prohibited

by rabbinic law.

Therefore, Rabbi Shimon permitted moving the lamp only after it went out, and not while it was still burning.

But

whenever, if he intends it, there is

only

a rabbinic prohibition,

such as making a furrow by dragging a bench, since digging in the ground in this manner is only digging in an unusual way [because proper digging is done only with a hoe], in such a case

when he does not intend it—

Rabbi Shimon permits it

even

initially.

Rava raised an objection: Garment merchants may sell

garments containing a mixture of wool and linen, and they wear them in order to display them, while wearing them

in the usual manner, provided that they do not intend

to derive benefit from wearing the garment,

in the sun because of the sun, or in the rain because of the rain.

And the scrupulous

who are careful in their actions

carry

the garment

on a pole behind them,

and do not wear it even without intending to derive benefit.

But here, when he intends it—

there is a Torah prohibition,

and nevertheless

when he does not intend it—

Rabbi Shimon permits it initially?!

Rather, Rava said:

Here, Rabbi Shimon prohibited moving the burning lamp not because of extinguishing it, but because of muktzeh.