Shabbat 45a (מה.) — the Talmud in English

This is also logical: Rav -

held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

As Rav said: One may place a lamp atop a palm tree on Shabbat,

because there is no concern that when the lamp goes out he will use the tree, which is attached to the ground. Since he set it aside during twilight, it is set aside for the entire day, and he will not come to take it and use the tree.

However,

one may not place a lamp atop a palm tree on a Festival.

On a Festival it is permitted to take the lamp, and he may come to use the tree, which is attached to the ground.

Granted, if you say that Rav held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda -

this is

understandable:

what he distinguished,

when Rav differentiated

between Shabbat,

on which the lamp is muktzeh,

and a Festival,

on which the lamp is not muktzeh.

But if you say that

Rav

held

in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon,

the difficulty is:

What difference is there to me between Shabbat and a Festival!?

In both cases, when the lamp goes out he can take it, and there is concern that he will then come to use the tree.

We raise an objection:

A

since

Rav

with regard to the law of muktzeh

held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

But they asked Rav: What is the ruling concerning moving a Hanukkah lamp

a Hanukkah lamp after it went out on Shabbat

from before the Persians,

who do not permit lighting it

on Shabbat?

And he said to them

Rav:

It is entirely permitted.

This proves that he held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who does not accept the law of muktzeh.

And we reject this:

A time of exigency is different.

For Rav Kahana and Rav Ashi said to Rav

[when he answered that it was permitted to move the lamp], rhetorically: Surely

that is not the halakha?

And

he said to them

Rav:

It is worthwhile

[it is appropriate]

to rely on Rabbi Shimon in a time of exigency!

This proves that when there is no exigency, Rav ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yohanan: Wheat that one planted in the ground, and eggs that one

placed

under a hen

so that she would warm them and chicks would emerge from them -

what is the ruling?

Are they muktzeh according to Rabbi Shimon?

Should we say:

When Rabbi Shimon does not accept the law of muktzeh -

that is where he did not actively set it aside.

But

where he actively set it aside -

he does accept the law of muktzeh.

Or perhaps -

is there no difference?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan:

There is no muktzeh according to Rabbi

Shimon [according to Rashi’s version, one should add: with regard to an item fit for use] -

except for the oil in a lamp

of Shabbat,

while it is burning.

Because at that time it has been set aside in two ways:

since it was set aside for its mitzva,

of lighting the Shabbat lamp, and

it was

set aside

then also

for its prohibition,

as it is forbidden to take oil from it while it is burning, because of the prohibition against extinguishing.

That is to say, it is only by virtue of this twofold setting aside—setting aside because of the prohibition against extinguishing and setting aside because of the lamp mitzva—that the status of muktzeh takes effect with regard to an item.

It should be noted here that although setting aside for a mitzva and setting aside for Shabbat are entirely different concepts, with different laws,

“Muktzeh for a mitzva” means that the item has been designated for its mitzva [and this is not mere designation in thought; it is specifically after a mitzva has been performed with it], and one may not undermine the item’s designation for a mitzva by using it for purposes unrelated to the mitzva or by deriving benefit from it in ways unrelated to the mitzva. Likewise, the item is not thereby forbidden to move.

By contrast, muktzeh on Shabbat concerns the prohibition against moving an item, not undermining the item’s designation; and it takes effect through thought alone, without any action being performed with the item to set it aside.

Nevertheless, the foundation of the law is the same in both matters: there is a concept whereby a person causes the status of muktzeh to take effect upon an item.

[Rashi wrote in tractate Sukkah 37b that setting aside for a mitzva is derived from the walls of a sukka, which are forbidden for benefit by Torah law even after the sukka has fallen, and even during Chol HaMoed, since they were set aside for the mitzva of sukka. Although muktzeh for a mitzva derived from the walls of a sukka is only a rabbinic prohibition.

Apparently, his intention is to derive the very concept of a person’s designation from the fact that the walls of a sukka become forbidden only because the person set them aside and caused designation for a mitzva to take effect upon them, and not because a mitzva exists in them. For if a person sits in a sukka intended merely for shade, but did not designate it for fulfilling the mitzva of sukka, he fulfills the mitzva of dwelling in a sukka, but the walls of the sukka do not become forbidden for benefit.

The Meiri likewise wrote at the beginning of tractate Beitza that there are nearly fifty types of muktzeh on Shabbat and Festivals, and the basis for deriving them is the designation of the sukka, which is forbidden by Torah law throughout all seven days of the Festival, even when it has fallen.

This proves that there is a concept of “designation,” whereby a person’s designation is perceived as applying to the item.]

Therefore, the Gemara now assumed that according to Rabbi Shimon, the status of muktzeh takes effect upon an item that a person set aside only where there is a twofold designation: through designation for a mitzva and through designation arising from a prohibition.

In that case, the designation has two expressions, in the two different contexts:

a. With regard to Shabbat, the item is forbidden to move.

b. With regard to other uses, it is forbidden for every use other than use for the mitzva.

We challenge this:

A

since

he does not accept

that Rabbi Shimon causes the status of “muktzeh” to take effect upon an item that was

set aside

by a person

for its mitzva alone, and that it should be forbidden to use it solely because it was designated for a mitzva?

But it was taught in a beraita

with regard to the law of muktzeh for the mitzva of sukka:

If one roofed it

the sukka

in accordance with its halakhic requirements, and decorated it

with sukka decorations,

with dyed cloths,

colored garments,

and with decorated sheets, and hung in it nuts, peaches, almonds, and pomegranates, and clusters

of grapes

and wreaths of grain stalks, wines, oils, and flour

[inside glass vessels]—they are set aside for their mitzva, and

it is forbidden to make use of them

even during Chol HaMoed,

until the conclusion of the final Festival day

of Simchat Torah.

The prohibition against making use of them on Shemini Atzeret and Simchat Torah is not because of designation for a mitzva, since the mitzva of sukka does not apply then. Rather, it is based on the principle that once an item was set aside during twilight at the beginning of the final Festival day [for if one wishes to eat during twilight, he must eat in the sukka, since perhaps this time is still the Festival of Sukkot], it is set aside for the entire day.

[See Tosafot, who wrote that this law applies only according to Rabbi Yehuda. Only the preceding law, concerning the designation of the sukka decorations during Chol HaMoed, follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.]

And if one stipulated concerning them

that he would use them during the Festival of Sukkot -

everything follows his stipulation.

The Gemara adds:

And from where

is it established that this beraita

is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon,

so that we can prove from it that Rabbi Shimon concedes that an item set aside solely for its mitzva is forbidden?

From this

which Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef taught before Rabbi Yohanan: One may not take wood from a sukka

that fell

on a Festival

of Passover or Shavuot. Since the wood was set aside from the eve of the Festival because of the prohibition against dismantling a shelter, once it was set aside during twilight, it was set aside for the entire day;

rather, one may take

wood

from that which is adjacent to it,

such as bundles of wood placed next to the sukka, which were not designated for the walls of the sukka.

And Rabbi Shimon permits

taking wood from a sukka that fell.

And they agree

the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon

with regard to a Festival sukka

that fell

during the Festival

of Sukkot

that it is forbidden.

And if one stipulated concerning it

that he could use the wood during the Festival -

everything follows his stipulation.

It is proven from the designation of the wood of a sukka that fell that it is forbidden to use it even during Chol HaMoed, and that Rabbi Shimon concedes that an item set aside solely for its mitzva is muktzeh.

And we answer: Indeed, Rabbi Shimon holds that there is muktzeh for a mitzva alone.

And this is what we are saying: Rabbi Shimon forbade only

“something akin to the oil in a lamp.”

Since it

was set aside

then

for its mitzva - it was

set aside

then

for the

duration of the

prohibition.

As long as it is forbidden to extinguish the lamp because it is burning, it is forbidden at that time to use the oil dripping from it, because at that time it is muktzeh for its mitzva.

Likewise, it is forbidden to move it at that time, since it is then unfit for use, as it is impossible to light it on Shabbat in order to fulfill the mitzva with it [and the prohibition against moving it is not because the person designated it not to be moved on Shabbat, for according to Rabbi Shimon there is no place for such designation. Rather, once designation for the mitzva has taken effect, it has no further use. It is therefore muktzeh by virtue of its intrinsic nature!]

But once the lamp goes out, it is no longer muktzeh, neither with regard to its mitzva nor with regard to moving it.

It was also stated: Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: There is no muktzeh according to Rabbi Shimon except for something akin to the oil in a lamp, while it is burning,

since

it was set aside

then

for its mitzva - it was

set aside for the

duration of the

prohibition.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: There is no muktzeh according to Rabbi Shimon except for dried figs

figs

and raisins

of grapes

alone.

They are placed on the roof to dry in the sun, and from the time they have lain briefly in the sun they are unfit for eating until they have dried completely. Since this is accompanied by the fact that he actively set them aside, they are muktzeh.

We raise a difficulty: Is it only dried figs and raisins, which spoil at the beginning of the drying process, that are muktzeh according to Rabbi Shimon,

a

since

nothing else

becomes muktzeh according to Rabbi Shimon?

But it was taught in a beraita: One who

was

eating figs, left some, and brought them up

the remaining figs

to the roof

in order to dry them there and

make dried figs from them.

Or he was eating

grapes, left some, and brought them up to the roof to make raisins from them -

he may not eat

from them on Shabbat because they are muktzeh,

until he designates

them for eating before Shabbat.

And likewise you say with regard to

one who was eating

peaches and quinces, and all other types of fruit

that do not spoil when brought up for drying: if he brought them up to dry them, they are muktzeh, since he set them aside for drying.

And we analyze:

Who

is the tanna of this beraita?

If you say it is Rabbi Yehuda,

who accepts the law of muktzeh,

that cannot be said.

For obviously they are muktzeh. Indeed,

if where he did not actively set them aside,

but merely placed them in storage, they require designation because Rabbi Yehuda

accepts the law of muktzeh,

where he actively set them aside

by bringing them to the top of the roof to dry -

is it not all the more so

that they are muktzeh? Why, then, did the beraita not state the simpler case of placing them in storage?!

Rather, is it not -

the opinion of Rabbi Shimon,

and it is proven that even fruit that does not spoil at the beginning of the drying process is muktzeh, and that active setting aside alone is sufficient to prohibit it as muktzeh?

And we answer:

Actually -

it is Rabbi Yehuda, and

a person who was

eating

figs and left some

was necessary to teach us

that even then they become muktzeh.

For

it might have entered your mind to say: Since he was eating them as he went along

when he brought them up to the roof, this is not designation, and they should not require designation;

it teaches us

that

once he brought them up to the roof, he diverted his mind from them.

Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi asked Rabbi: