Shabbat 45a — the Talmud in English

This too is logical: Rav -

held in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

For Rav said: One may place a lamp atop a palm tree on Shabbat,

because there is no concern that when the lamp goes out he may use the palm tree that is attached to the ground, for since he set it aside during twilight, it was set aside for the entire day, and he will not come to take it and use the tree.

But,

one may not place a lamp atop a palm tree on a Festival.

For on a Festival it is permitted to take the lamp, and he may come to use the tree that is attached to the ground.

Granted, if you say that Rav held in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda -

this is

understood, what

he distinguished,

that Rav divided

between Shabbat,

on which the lamp is muktze,

and a Festival,

on which the lamp is not muktze.

But if you say that

Rav

held

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

it is difficult -

what difference is there to me between Shabbat and a Festival!?

For in both of them, when the lamp goes out he can take it, and there is concern that he may then come to use the tree.

And we raise a difficulty:

And

if

Rav

with regard to the law of muktze

held in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda?

But they asked Rav: What is the law concerning moving the Hanukkah lamp

the Hanukkah lamp after it went out on Shabbat

from before the comrades,

the Persians, who did not permit lighting it

on Shabbat?

And he said to them

Rav:

It is entirely proper.

And it is demonstrated that he held in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold of muktze.

And we reject this:

A time of pressing circumstances is different.

For Rav Kahana and Rav Ashi said to Rav

[when he answered that it was permitted to move the lamp], rhetorically: And is

this the halakha?

And

he said to them

Rav:

Sufficient

[it is worthwhile, it is appropriate]

to rely upon Rabbi Shimon in a time of pressing circumstances!

And it is demonstrated that when there is no pressing circumstance, Rav ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yohanan: Wheat that one sowed in the ground, and eggs that he

placed

under a hen

so that she would warm them and chicks would emerge from them -

what is

their status; are they muktze according to Rabbi Shimon?

Should we say:

For Rabbi Shimon does not hold of muktze

where he did not set it aside with his hands.

But

where he set it aside with his hands -

he does hold of muktze.

Or perhaps -

is there no difference?

He said to him

Rabbi Yohanan:

There is no muktze according to Rabbi

Shimon

[according to Rashi’s version, one should add: with regard to an object that is fit] -

except for the oil that is in a lamp

of

Shabbat, while it is burning.

For at that time there is a double setting aside:

since it was set aside for its mitzva,

of lighting the Shabbat lamp, and

it was set aside

then also

for its prohibition,

for it is prohibited to take oil from it while it is burning because of the prohibition of extinguishing.

That is to say, only by virtue of a double setting aside—setting aside because of the prohibition of extinguishing and setting aside because of the mitzva of the lamp—does the designation of “muktze” take effect upon an object.

And here it should be noted that although setting aside for a mitzva and setting aside for Shabbat are two entirely different concepts, with different laws,

for “muktze for a mitzva” means that a designation for its mitzva has taken effect upon the object [and this is not a designation merely in thought, but specifically only after a mitzva has been performed with it!], and one may not violate the designation of the object for a mitzva by using it for uses that are not of a mitzva or by deriving from it benefits that are unrelated to the mitzva. Likewise, the object is not prohibited to move.

By contrast, muktze on Shabbat is a matter of the prohibition of moving, and not a matter of violating the object’s designation, and it takes effect through thought alone, without any action being performed with the object that would set it aside.

Nevertheless, the basis of the law is identical in both matters: there is a concept of causing the designation “muktze” to take effect upon an object through the person.

[And Rashi wrote in tractate Sukkah 37b that setting aside for a mitzva is derived from the walls of a sukka, which are prohibited for benefit by Torah law even after the sukka has fallen, and even during the intermediate days of the Festival, since they were set aside for the mitzva of sukka. Although muktze for a mitzva derived from the walls of the sukka is only a rabbinic prohibition.

And apparently his intention is to derive the very concept of a person’s setting aside from the fact that the walls of the sukka become prohibited only because the person set them aside and caused setting aside for a mitzva to take effect upon them, and not because a mitzva exists in them. For if a person sits in a sukka intended merely for shade, but did not designate it for fulfilling the mitzva of sukka, he fulfills through this the mitzva of dwelling in a sukka, but the walls of the sukka do not become prohibited for benefit.

And the Meiri likewise wrote at the beginning of tractate Beitza that there are close to fifty types of muktze on Shabbat and a Festival, and the basis of their derivation is from the setting aside of the sukka, which is prohibited by Torah law throughout all seven days of the Festival even when it has fallen.

And from here it is demonstrated that there is a concept of “setting aside,” whereby a person’s setting aside is apprehended upon the object].

And therefore the Gemara now assumed that according to Rabbi Shimon, only where there is a double setting aside—on account of setting aside for a mitzva and on account of setting aside by virtue of the prohibition—does the designation “muktze” take effect upon an object that the person set aside.

And then, the taking effect of his setting aside has two expressions, in the two different matters:

A. With regard to Shabbat, the object is prohibited to move.

B. With regard to another use, it is prohibited for every use except a use of the mitzva.

And we challenge this:

And

if

he does not hold that Rabbi Shimon causes the designation “muktze” to take effect upon an object that was

set aside by the person

for

the person

its mitzva alone, and that it should be prohibited to use it on account of its being set aside for the mitzva alone?

But it was taught

with regard to the law of muktze for the mitzva of sukka:

If he roofed it

for the sukka

according to its law, and adorned it

with sukka decorations,

with colored cloths,

colored garments,

and with painted sheets, and hung on it nuts, peaches, almonds, pomegranates, and afarkalei

clusters

of grapes, and wreaths of ears of grain, wines, oils, and fine flour

[inside glass vessels] - behold, they are muktze for their mitzva, and

it is prohibited to make use of them

even during the intermediate days of the Festival,

until the conclusion of the last Festival day

of Simchat Torah.

The prohibition against making use of them on the Eighth Day of Assembly and on Simchat Torah is not because of the setting aside for the mitzva, for the mitzva of sukka does not apply then. Rather, it is according to the rule of migo de’itakatzai during the twilight of the beginning of the last Festival day [for if he wishes to eat during twilight, he must eat in the sukka, because perhaps this time is still the Festival of Sukkot], it is set aside for the entire day.

[And see Tosafot, who wrote that this law applies only according to Rabbi Yehuda. And only the preceding law, concerning the setting aside of the sukka decoration during the intermediate days of the Festival, is according to Rabbi Shimon].

And if he stipulated concerning them

that he would use them during the Festival of Sukkot -

everything follows his stipulation.

And the Gemara adds:

And from where is it that

this beraita

is Rabbi Shimon

so that we can prove from it that Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to an object set aside for its mitzva alone?

From this:

For Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef taught before Rabbi Yohanan: One may not take wood from a sukka

that fell

on a Festival

of Passover or of Shavuot. Since the wood was set aside from the eve of the Festival because of dismantling a tent, behold, since it was set aside during twilight, it was set aside for the entire day,

but

one takes

from what is adjacent to it,

such as bundles of wood that he placed next to the sukka but did not set aside for the walls of the sukka.

And Rabbi Shimon permits

taking from the wood of the sukka that fell.

And they agree

the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon

with regard to the Festival sukka

that fell

during the Festival

of Sukkot

that it is prohibited.

And if he stipulated concerning it

that he could use the wood during the Festival -

everything follows his stipulation.

And it is demonstrated from the setting aside of the wood of the sukka that fell that it is prohibited to use it even during the intermediate days of the Festival, that Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to muktze for its mitzva alone.

And we answer: Indeed, Rabbi Shimon holds that there is muktze for a mitzva alone.

But we are saying this: Rabbi Shimon prohibited only

“something resembling the oil in the lamp,” is what we are saying.

For

since it was set aside

then

for its mitzva -

it was set aside

then

for

the duration of

its prohibition.

For as long as there is a prohibition against extinguishing the lamp because it is burning, it is then prohibited to use the oil dripping from it, because during that time it is muktze for its mitzva.

And likewise it is prohibited to move it then, since it is not fit for use at that time, for it is impossible to light it on Shabbat in order to fulfill its mitzva with it [and the prohibition of moving is not because of the person’s setting it aside from moving it on Shabbat, for according to Rabbi Shimon there is no place for such setting aside. Rather, since the setting aside for the mitzva has taken effect, it no longer has a use. And it is muktze by reason of its own nature!]

But once the lamp goes out, it is no longer muktze, neither for its mitzva nor for moving it.

It was also stated: Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: There is no muktze according to Rabbi Shimon except something resembling the oil in the lamp, while it is burning,

for

since it was set aside

then

for its mitzva -

it was set aside for

the duration of

its prohibition.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: There is no muktze according to Rabbi Shimon except dried figs

figs

and raisins

of grapes

alone.

For one takes them up to the roof to dry in the sun, and from the time they lie in the sun for a short while they are unfit for eating until they dry completely. And when the setting aside that he set them aside with his hands is added to this, they are muktze.

And we raise a difficulty: Is it only dried figs and raisins that become spoiled at the beginning of the drying process that are muktze according to Rabbi Shimon,

and

if

nothing else

is muktze according to Rabbi Shimon?

But it was taught: One who

was

eating figs, and left some, and took them up

the remaining figs

to the roof

in order to dry them there and

make dried figs from them.

Or he was eating

grapes, and left some, and took them up to the roof to make raisins from them -

he may not eat

from them on Shabbat because they are muktze,

until he designates

them for eating from the eve of Shabbat.

And likewise you say with regard to

one who was eating

peaches and quinces, and all other types of fruit

that do not become spoiled when they are taken up for drying: if he took them up in order to dry them, they are muktze, since he set them aside for drying.

And we infer:

Who

is the tanna of this beraita?

If you say Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds of muktze.

It is impossible to say this.

For obviously they are muktze. For

if, where he did not set them aside with his hands,

but merely brought them into storage, they require designation, because Rabbi Yehuda

holds of muktze;

where he set them aside with his hands,

taking them up to the top of the roof to dry -

is it not all the more so

that they are muktze? And why did it state specifically that he brought them into storage?!

Rather, is it not -

it is Rabbi Shimon,

and it is demonstrated that even fruit that does not become spoiled at the beginning of the drying process is muktze, and not only dried figs and raisins, for setting aside with one’s hands alone is sufficient to prohibit it on account of muktze.

And we answer:

Actually -

it is Rabbi Yehuda, and

a person who was

eating

figs and left some

it was necessary for him

to teach us that even then they are muktze.

For

it might enter your mind to say: Since he is eating and continuing

at the time that he took them up to the roof, this is not setting aside, and they should not require designation;

it teaches us

that

since he took them up to the roof, he diverted his mind from them.

Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi asked Rabbi: