Shabbat 141b — the Talmud in English

And we clarify:

with what does he scrape it

a new shoe?

Rabbi Abahu said: With the back of a knife

and not with its edge; and an old shoe is forbidden to scrape even with the back of a knife.

A certain old man said to him:

Erase yours

[Erase your Mishna]

before

[because of]

that which Rabbi Hiyya taught

барайту — таннайский источник, не включённый в Мишну

a.

One may scrape neither a new shoe nor an old shoe .

b. And it is forbidden to rub oil on a shoe

because the leather becomes softened, and this is tanning ,

and

therefore

a person shall not anoint

his

foot with oil while it is inside the shoe or inside the sandal.

But, he may rub

it

on his foot

with

oil, and

afterward

place

it

inside the shoe or inside the sandal,

and he need not be concerned about the prohibition of tanning.

And

likewise

a person may rub

his

entire body

with

oil, and

afterward

roll

[roll himself]

on a katbelia

[a surface of leather],

and need not be concerned

because of the labor of tanning.

Rav Hisda said: They taught

that it is permitted to rub one’s foot with oil and afterward place it in a shoe, or to rub one’s body with oil and roll on a katbelia,

only

when one intends

to polish it, but

if one intends

to tan it—

it is forbidden.

And we raise an objection: If he intends

to tan it—

it is obvious

that it is forbidden!

And furthermore,

we raise an objection: Even when he intends only

to polish it—

is there anyone who permits it?

It is certainly forbidden by rabbinic law to polish it, because this resembles tanning!

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows:

Rav Hisda said:

When he intends to tan or to polish, the Sages did not permit it at all; and when he does not intend to do so,

they taught only

that he places oil on his foot in a

quantity

such that this oil can

polish it, but

to place oil on his foot in a

quantity

such that it can

tan it—

it is forbidden .

The Sages taught: A person whose foot is

small

in a shoe

that is

large

for him shall not go out with it, because it falls from his foot, and there is concern that he may carry it four cubits in the public domain.

But he may go out in a large robe

that does not fall from him.

And a woman shall not go out in a worn-out shoe

[torn above], lest she remove it when they mock her, and carry it in her hand in the public domain.

And

likewise

she shall not perform halitza with it

with the yavam initially, since it is not a superior shoe.

And if she performed halitza—

her halitza is valid .

And one may not go out in a new shoe.

And the beraita explains:

With regard to what shoe

new

did they say

that one may not go out?—

a woman’s shoe,

because she is particular not to walk in a shoe that is not suitable for her foot, and she might remove it.

Bar Kappara taught: They taught

that a woman shall not go out in a new shoe,

only

when

she did not go out in it even for one hour before nightfall, but

if

she went out in it on the eve of Shabbat—

it is permitted,

because she already knows that the shoe fits her.

The Gemara brings two contradictory beraitot concerning the law of a shoe on Shabbat and resolves them.

One [beraita] taught: One removes

on Shabbat

a shoe from atop a shoe-last [a form on which the shoe is made], and there is no concern about moving an object of muktze.

[формы, на которой изготовляют обувь], и нет опасения нарушения запрета мукце.

And another [beraita] taught: One does not remove it,

because of muktze.

It is not difficult.

This

the beraita that prohibited it, is according to the view of

Rabbi Eliezer,

who holds that the labor of the shoe was not completed before it was removed , and it is muktze because it does not have the status of a vessel.

This

the beraita that permitted it, is according to the view of

the Rabbis,

who hold that the labor of the shoe was completed while it was still on the form, and it has the status of a vessel.

As we learned: A shoe that is atop a shoe-last—Rabbi Eliezer deems

the shoe pure, because its labor was not completed,

but the Sages deem it impure. [Kelim, chapter 26, mishnah 4]

The Gemara will answer that according to the Sages, the shoe is a vessel whose use is for permitted purposes ,

whereas according to Rabbi Eliezer, the shoe is not a vessel. However, we must also discuss moving the shoe-last, since when one removes the shoe, one also moves it; and it is a vessel whose use is for prohibited purposes. Although it is permitted to move it for its own use, when removing the shoe one is not using it for its own use.

And we raise an objection:

This works out well according to Rava, who said: An object whose use is for prohibited purposes may be moved both for its own use and for the use of its place—

it is permitted

to move it,

properly,

because they move the shoe-last, since this is considered moving it for the use of its place: refraining from moving it prevents the use of the shoe.

But according to Abaye, who said:

only

for its own use

is it permitted,

but

for the use of its place

it is forbidden, what is there to say?

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing?—

with a

shoe-last

that is loose,

so that when one removes the shoe from it, there is no need to move it.

And we support Abaye from a beraita:

For it was taught: Rabbi Judah says: If it was

the shoe-last

loose—

it is permitted.

And we infer:

The reason

that it is permitted is because

the

shoe-last was

loose; but if it was not loose, no,

because of moving the shoe-last, which is a vessel whose use is for prohibited purposes.

And now we raise an objection:

This works out well according to Abaye, who said: An object whose use is for prohibited purposes, for its own use—

it is permitted,

for the use of its place—

it is forbidden, properly

it is forbidden to move the shoe-last for the use of its place.

But according to Rava, who said: Both for its own use and for the use of its place—

it is permitted, why specifically when it is loose? Even when it is not loose as well,

it should be permitted!

And we answer: In truth, according to Abaye, Rabbi Judah is explaining the Rabbis, who hold that the shoe itself is not muktze; and the requirement that the shoe be loose is because of moving the shoe-last. But according to Rava, the requirement that the shoe be loose is because of the shoe itself, and

that statement of Rabbi Judah—

is because of Rabbi Eliezer,

and Rabbi Judah explains that Rabbi Eliezer agrees that with a loose shoe its labor is completed, and it is considered as though they had removed it from the shoe-last. But according to the Rabbis, the shoe is a vessel even when it is not loose, and it is permitted to remove it; and there is no concern about moving the shoe-last, because it is permitted to move a vessel whose use is for prohibited purposes for the use of its place.

And we support Rava:

For it was taught: Rabbi Judah says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: If it was loose—

it is permitted.

We have returned to you, chapter “Tolein.”

Mishna:

1.

A person may take his child, with the stone in his hand

of the child, and the person is not considered to be carrying the stone, which is muktze. And the Mishna is speaking of a courtyard, or of any place where there is no prohibition of carrying out.

2.

And

a person may take

a basket

[a basket] with a stone inside it, as will be explained in the Gemara.

And one may carry

a basket in which there is

impure teruma,

which is muktze, since it is not fit for eating,

with

the teruma

that is pure,

and with

[or with produce]

of non-sacred produce

that are found in that same basket.

3.

Rabbi Judah says: Even

one raises the meduma with one and one hundred.

“Meduma” is a mixture of teruma with non-sacred produce. By Torah law, the teruma is nullified in a majority of non-sacred produce, like all prohibitions, and it is permitted to non-priests. However, the Sages were stringent in its law and said that teruma is not nullified unless the ratio in the mixture between the teruma and the non-sacred produce is one measure of teruma against one hundred measures of non-sacred produce. And since the teruma is not only a prohibition to non-priests but also the property of a priest, one must remove from the mixture an amount corresponding to the teruma that fell into it, and treat it as teruma, even when the teruma was nullified in one hundred. And as long as they have not raised the teruma from the non-sacred produce, it is forbidden to eat from the mixture. According to the Sages, it is forbidden to raise the teruma on Shabbat, just as it is forbidden to rectify untithed produce by separating teruma from it on Shabbat, because this resembles rectifying. And according to Rabbi Judah, it is permitted to raise the teruma, for the reason that will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Rava said

two laws:

1.

If he carried out a live infant, with a purse hanging from his neck, he is liable

for the labor of carrying out

because of

the carrying out of the

purse,

and we do not say that the infant is the one who carried out the purse, and not the person carrying the infant. But for carrying out the infant himself, he is not liable, for the reason that will be explained.

2. If he carried out

a dead infant, with a purse hanging from his neck, he is exempt

entirely.

And the Gemara discusses his words: regarding what Rava said,

“A live infant with a purse hanging from his neck—he is liable because of the purse,”

one must ask:

And let him also be liable

because of

the carrying out of the

infant?

And we answer:

Rava holds like Rabbi Natan, who said

that one who carries out an animal, a beast, or a bird into the public domain—if they were slaughtered, he is liable, but if they were alive, he is exempt, because

“the living carries itself,”

and lightens the burden .

And we object:

And let the purse be nullified in relation to the infant,

because the purse is subordinate to him, and the one carrying the purse should be exempt, since he is exempt for carrying out the infant!

Do we not learn

that one who carries out

the living

from a private domain into the public domain

on a bed is exempt even for the bed,

because

the bed is subordinate to him?

And we answer:

As for a bed in relation to a living being, it is nullified in relation to him,

it is subordinate to him because it serves for carrying him. But

as for a purse in relation to an infant, it is not nullified in relation to him.

For the purse does not assist in the carrying out.

And the Gemara continues to discuss the second law that Rava stated:

“A dead infant with a purse hanging from his neck,”

he is exempt.

Although a purse hanging from the neck of a dead infant also does not serve for carrying him, one is not liable for carrying it, because the heart of the one carrying him is grieved over the infant’s death, the purse is not important to him, and he intends to bury the infant together with the purse. Therefore the purse is subordinate to the infant.

And the Gemara discusses:

And let him be liable because of

the carrying out of the

infant

himself?

And we answer:

Rava—

holds like Rabbi Shimon, who said: Any labor not needed for its own purpose,

such as carrying out a corpse,

one is exempt for it,

because the purpose of the labor is only to remove the object that he does not want, and this is not constructive labor; and carrying out a corpse in order to bury it is also considered a labor not needed for its own purpose, even though the carrying out is for the honor of the dead, as is stated in the chapter “One Who Conceals” [above 94b].

And the Gemara challenges the principal point of Rava’s words:

We learn

in our Mishna:

“A person may take his child

in a courtyard

with the stone in his hand.”

It follows that the carrying of the muktze is attributed to the child and not to his father, unlike Rava, who says that the carrying of the purse is attributed to the one carrying the infant!

The scholars of the house of Rabbi Yannai said:

The permission to carry the infant with the stone in our Mishna is not because there is no prohibition of muktze here at all. Rather, our Mishna is dealing

with an infant who has a longing for his father,

and there is a danger that he will become ill if he does not take him in his arms together with the stone that he is holding. And although there is no danger to life here, nevertheless the Sages permitted the prohibition of muktze because of the danger of illness.