Sanhedrin 9b — the Talmud in English

For if we say that in any manner whatsoever, even if they did not warn, the disqualified witnesses join with the qualified witnesses, and the testimony is nullified because of them, then,

what shall two brothers do,

and

one witness

one

who is not their brother,

who saw someone kill a person?

Are we to say that their standing there, and the brothers’ happening to see the murder, will save the murderer from punishment merely because of their accidental presence at the time of the act!? Rather, certainly one must say that only if they performed an action that joins them to the testimony, such as warning the one committing the transgression, only then do they join, and the entire testimony is nullified.

And Rabbi Yosei disagrees with this and holds that even if the relative or disqualified witness remained silent and did not warn, he likewise joins with them and thereby disqualifies the entire testimony in capital cases. And our Mishna is speaking of a case in which the husband’s witnesses were three or more, and one of them was a relative or disqualified, who remained silent and did not warn the woman. Rabbi Meir holds like Rabbi Yosei, that their testimony is nullified, and therefore it is impossible to judge her with death, but only in monetary

cases, to exempt the husband from payment of the ketuba, and therefore this matter is judged by three. But the Sages hold like Rabbi, that if they did not warn, the testimony remains valid through the remaining, qualified witnesses, and she is judged to death, and therefore a court of twenty-three is required.

7. And the Gemara brings another manner of explaining the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages, such as where the husband brought qualified witnesses that she had committed adultery, except that other people warned her, and the witnesses themselves did not warn her.

And if you wish,

if you wish, it may be explained that the Mishna is speaking of

a case where others warned her

and the witnesses did not warn her.

And they disagree

Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree

in the dispute between Rabbi Yosei and the Sages,

regarding what Rabbi Yosei and the Sages disputed concerning this matter.

For we learned

in a Mishna in tractate Makkot [6b], concerning witnesses who did not warn the defendant, but rather another warned him, and the witnesses saw the one who warned him. The first tanna holds that they are qualified to testify. But

Rabbi Yosei says: A person never is

one who commits a transgression

put to death until his two “witnesses” warn him.

That is, specifically if the witnesses testifying warned him,

as it is stated: “By the mouth of two witnesses

shall a matter be established.” That is, the entire matter—the testimony and the warning—must be established by the mouth of the two witnesses .

Therefore Rabbi Meir holds like Rabbi Yosei, and the woman is not put to death; there are here no capital cases, but monetary cases, to exempt the husband from payment of the ketuba, and it is judged by three. But the Sages hold like the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Yosei, and there are here capital cases for putting the woman to death, and therefore twenty-three are required.

8. And now the Gemara brings another manner of explaining the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages.

Introduction

Witnesses who come to testify in capital cases are interrogated by the court, each not in the presence of the other, through interrogations and examinations [and there is another type of questions, called “inquiries,” and they will be explained elsewhere].

“Interrogations” are the questions with which the witnesses are interrogated, such as “On which day” and “at which hour” the act occurred, and in which place. If they contradict one another in their answers to them, or even if one of the witnesses says, “I do not know”—their testimony is nullified.

“Examinations” are incidental questions upon which the testimony does not depend, such as: Were the garments of the murderer or of the murdered person black or white, or did the fig tree beneath which the woman had intercourse have thick thorns or thin thorns?

Regarding examinations, if the witnesses do not know, their testimony is not nullified. But if they contradict one another, such as one witness said thin and the second said thick, Ben Zakkai holds that their testimony is nullified, while the Sages hold that their testimony is qualified, since the witnesses are not required to pay such close attention to these details.

And in our Mishna, according to this interpretation, it is speaking of the husband’s witnesses, who came to testify concerning the woman that she had committed adultery, being contradicted

in examinations, such as one said that the thorns of the fig tree were thick, and the second said thin. But they were not contradicted in interrogations.

And if you wish,

and if you wish, you may say that our Mishna is speaking of

a case where the

husband’s witnesses

were contradicted in examinations, but were not contradicted in interrogations.

And they disagree

Rabbi Meir and the Sages

in the dispute between Ben Zakkai and the Sages.

For we learned

in a Mishna below [40a]:

It happened that Ben Zakkai examined

the witnesses

concerning fig thorns,

and they contradicted one another, and Ben Zakkai nullified the testimony.

And Rabbi Meir holds like Ben Zakkai, and therefore there is here no capital judgment concerning the woman—for they will not put her to death—but only a monetary judgment of exempting the husband from her ketuba, and this judgment is adjudicated by three. But the Sages hold not like Ben Zakkai, but rather their testimony is accepted even for capital cases, and they will put her to death, and therefore twenty-three are required.

And since the Gemara has explained the law of one who brings an evil name, the Gemara now brings another ruling of Rav Yosef concerning the law of one who brings an evil name.

Rav Yosef explains the law of false witnesses, zomemim, who came to assist the husband of a woman who brings an evil name upon his wife by claiming that she committed adultery. If they are refuted as zomemim, and they are put to death—is it also incumbent upon them to pay money?

And this is the general rule in this matter: It is stated in the Torah [Exodus 21], “And when men fight, and they strike a pregnant woman, and her children emerge, and there is no calamity—he shall surely be punished.” That is, the one causing damage shall pay the value of the offspring to their father. And the Sages expounded [below 79] that only if “there is no calamity” to the woman is the one causing damage liable to pay money to the father of the offspring. But if the woman was killed, he is exempt from paying the value of the offspring, because of “kam lei bid’rabba minei,” that he has a greater punishment, namely the punishment of death for killing the woman, and a court does not impose a monetary obligation where it imposes a death penalty.

But all this is stated only when the death and the money are directed toward one person. However, if the two punishments are divided, directed toward two people—“money to this one, and death to that one”—as will be explained, the court imposes both death and money.

Rav Yosef said:

if the husband brought an evil name upon his wife, after her marriage to him, saying that she had committed adultery while betrothed to him, when she was residing in her father’s house between betrothal and marriage, and

the husband brought witnesses concerning his wife,

who was now married to him,

that she had committed adultery

while betrothed, and he came to make her liable to death, and also to exempt himself from the obligation to pay the value of her ketuba.

and the father brought

of the girl

witnesses, and refuted as zomemim

the husband’s witnesses, and they said: How do you testify that you saw this act, on this day, in this place, when on that day you were with us in another place!?

Thus

the husband’s witnesses are put to death

for their plot to kill the woman,

and they do not pay money,

the value of the ketuba that they sought to cause the woman to lose.

And the reason is that they sought to make the woman liable both to death and to cause her to lose her ketuba, and “kam lei bid’rabba minei” applies to them. Therefore they are exempt from the money. But if

the husband again brought witnesses

other

and refuted the father’s witnesses as zomemim—

the father’s witnesses are put to death,

for plotting to kill the husband’s witnesses,

and they pay

money

to the husband, because they sought to make him liable for one hundred silver coins. And it is not applicable to say, “kam lei bid’rabba minei,” because they are two separate obligations—

money to this one,

to the husband,

and death to that one,

to the witnesses.

And the Gemara brings another law that Rav Yosef stated concerning the laws of testimony.

Rav Yosef said:

A person who comes to testify and says that

so-and-so had intercourse with him

in male-male intercourse

against his will,

against the will of the defendant concerning whom he testifies—then

he,

the one with whom intercourse was performed,

and another,

an additional witness who joins him to testify concerning the one who performed the act,

join together to put him to death,

so that they put the one who performed the act to death on the basis of the testimony of both of them, the one with whom intercourse was performed and the additional witness. And the one with whom intercourse was performed is not disqualified from testimony, since the act was performed upon him against his will, and he is not wicked; therefore he is not disqualified from testimony.

But if the one with whom intercourse was performed testifies that he was not coerced, but rather that he was subjected to intercourse

willingly,

then this person, according to his words,

is wicked. And the Torah said [Exodus 23], “Do not place your hand with a wicked person, to be a witness.” And the Sages expounded:

“Do not place a wicked person as a witness.”

Do not place a wicked person as a witness.

And since according to his words he was subjected to intercourse willingly, he is wicked, disqualified from testimony, and he does not join with another witness to put to death the one who performed the act with him.

This is the view of Rav Yosef. But Rava disagrees with him and holds that even if he was subjected to intercourse willingly, he can join with another to testify concerning the one who performed the act with him.

Rava said: A person is related to himself.

That is, just as a relative is disqualified from testifying concerning his relative, whether favorably or unfavorably, so a person is disqualified from testifying concerning himself, even unfavorably. Therefore he is not trusted to testify concerning himself that he was subjected to intercourse willingly.

And since his testimony concerning himself, that he is wicked, is not accepted, his testimony concerning the one who performed the act can be accepted, and the one who performed the act is put to death on the basis of his testimony. For we divide the trustworthiness of his statement [pelaginan dibura], and we say that he is not trusted concerning himself, to say that he is wicked, but he is indeed trusted concerning his fellow, to say that he performed the act with him.

And now the Gemara brings another innovation of Rava concerning the law of “pelaginan dibura.”

Rava said: