Sanhedrin 9b (ט:) — the Talmud in English

For if we say that in every case, even when they did not issue a warning, the disqualified witnesses join the valid witnesses and the testimony is invalidated because of them, then,

what shall two brothers do,

and

one witness

one

who is not their brother,

who saw someone kill a person?

Shall we say that their standing there and the brothers’ happenstance witnessing of the murder saves the murderer from punishment solely because of their accidental presence at the time of the act? Rather, it must certainly be said that they join the testimony only if they performed an act that joins them to the testimony, such as warning the person committing the transgression, only then do they join the testimony, and the entire testimony is invalidated.

Rabbi Yosei disagrees with this and holds that even if the relative or disqualified witness remained silent and did not issue a warning, he nevertheless joins them and thereby invalidates the entire testimony in capital cases. Our Mishna is speaking of a case in which the husband’s witnesses numbered three or more, and one of them was a relative or disqualified witness who remained silent and did not warn the woman. Rabbi Meir follows Rabbi Yosei, holding that their testimony is invalid, and therefore she cannot be judged liable for death, but only in a monetary case,

to exempt the husband from payment of the ketuba; therefore, this matter is judged by three. The Sages, by contrast, follow Rabbi, holding that if they did not issue a warning, the testimony remains valid through the other, valid witnesses, and she is judged liable for death; therefore, a court of twenty-three is required.

7. The Gemara offers another explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis: the husband brought valid witnesses who testified that she had committed adultery, but other people warned her, and the witnesses themselves did not warn her.

Alternatively,

if you wish, one may explain that the Mishna is speaking of

a case where others warned her

and the witnesses did not warn her.

And they disagree:

Rabbi Meir and the Sages dispute

the dispute between Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis,

concerning the matter over which Rabbi Yosei and the Sages disagreed.

As we learned in a Mishna in tractate Makkot [6b], concerning witnesses who did not warn the defendant, but another person warned him, and the witnesses saw the person issuing the warning: The first tanna holds that they are valid to testify.

The first tanna holds that they are qualified to testify. But

Rabbi Yosei says: A person who violates a prohibition is never

one who commits a transgression

put to death until his two “witnesses” warn him.

That is, specifically when the witnesses testifying against him warned him,

as it is stated: “By the mouth of two witnesses

shall the matter be established.” That is, the entire matter—the testimony and the warning—must be established by the testimony of the two witnesses .

Therefore, Rabbi Meir follows Rabbi Yosei: the woman is not put to death, and this is not a capital case, but a monetary case, to exempt the husband from paying the ketuba, and it is judged by three. The Sages, however, follow the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yosei: this is a capital case involving the woman’s execution, and therefore twenty-three are required.

8. The Gemara now offers another explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages.

Introduction

Witnesses who come to testify in capital cases are interrogated by the court separately, through hakirot and bedikot [and there is another category of questions, called “derishot,” which will be explained elsewhere]. "

“Hakirot” are the questions with which the witnesses are interrogated, such as, “On what day” and “At what hour” did the incident occur, and in what place. If they contradict one another in their answers to these questions, or even if one of the witnesses says, “I do not know,” their testimony is invalid. "

“Bedikot” are peripheral questions, on which the testimony does not depend, such as whether the murderer’s or the victim’s clothes were black or white, or whether the fig tree beneath which the woman committed adultery had thick or thin stalks.

With regard to bedikot, if the witnesses do not know the answers, their testimony is not invalidated. But if they contradict one another, for example, one witness says “thin” and the other says “thick,” ben Zakkai holds that their testimony is invalid, whereas the Sages hold that their testimony is valid, since witnesses are not required to pay such close attention to these details.

According to this interpretation, our Mishna is speaking of a case in which the husband’s witnesses, who came to testify that the woman had committed adultery, were contradicted

in the bedikot, for example, one said that the stalks of the fig tree were thick, and the other said that they were thin, but they were not contradicted in the hakirot.

Alternatively,

if you wish, you may say that our Mishna is speaking of

a case in which

the husband’s witnesses

were contradicted in the bedikot but were not contradicted in the hakirot.

And Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree

Rabbi Meir and the Sages

in the dispute between ben Zakkai and the Rabbis.

As we learned in the Mishna below [40a]:

“An incident occurred in which Ben Zakkai examined

“An incident occurred in which ben Zakkai examined

concerning

the stalks of figs,

the witnesses, and they contradicted one another, so ben Zakkai invalidated the testimony.

Rabbi Meir follows ben Zakkai, and therefore this is not a capital case concerning the woman—for she will not be put to death—but only a monetary case, exempting the husband from her ketuba, and this case is judged by three. The Sages, however, do not follow ben Zakkai; rather, their testimony is accepted even for a capital case, and she is put to death, so twenty-three are required.

Once the Gemara has explained the law concerning one who brings an evil name upon his wife, it now brings another ruling of Rav Yosef concerning this matter.

Rav Yosef explains the law governing false witnesses, edim zomemim, who came to assist the husband of a woman upon whom he brought an evil name by claiming that she had committed adultery. If they are disproved through hazama and are put to death, are they also obligated to pay money?

The general rule in this matter is as follows: The Torah states [Exodus 21]: “And when men fight and they strike a pregnant woman, and her offspring emerge, but there is no fatality—he shall surely be punished.” That is, the one who caused the injury must pay the father the value of the offspring. The Sages expounded [below, 79] that only when “there is no fatality” involving the woman is the one who caused the injury obligated to pay money to the father of the offspring. But if the woman dies, he is exempt from paying the value of the offspring, because of the principle of kam lei bid’rabba minei: he is subject to a greater punishment, namely, the death penalty for killing the woman, and a court does not impose a monetary penalty where it imposes the death penalty.

All this applies only when the death penalty and the monetary payment are directed toward one person. But if the two punishments are separate, directed toward two people—“money to one and death to the other”—as will be explained, the court imposes both the death penalty and monetary payment.

Rav Yosef said:

If, after marrying his wife, the husband brought an evil name upon her, claiming that she had committed adultery while she was betrothed to him, when she was living in her father’s home between betrothal and marriage, and

the husband brought witnesses concerning his wife,

who was now married to him,

who had committed adultery

while betrothed, seeking to make her liable for death and also to exempt himself from the obligation to pay her ketuba.

And the father

of the young woman

brought witnesses and disproved

the husband’s witnesses, saying to them: How can you testify that you saw this act on this day and in this place, when on that very day you were with us in a different place?

Thus,

the husband’s witnesses are put to death

for their plot to have the woman executed,

but they do not pay money,

the value of the ketuba that they sought to cause the woman to lose.

The reason is that they sought both to have the woman sentenced to death and to cause her to lose her ketuba, and the principle of kam lei bid’rabba minei applies to them. Therefore, they are exempt from the monetary payment. But if

the husband then brought additional witnesses

other than the first witnesses,

and disproved the father’s witnesses through hazama—

the father’s witnesses are put to death

for plotting to have the husband’s witnesses put to death,

and they pay [

money ]

to the husband, because they sought to obligate him to pay one hundred silver dinars. It is not applicable to say, “kam lei bid’rabba minei,” because these are two separate obligations—

money to one,

to the husband,

and death to the other,

to the witnesses.

The Gemara brings another ruling that Rav Yosef stated concerning the laws of testimony.

Rav Yosef said:

A person who comes to testify and says that

so-and-so engaged in intercourse with him

in a homosexual act

against his will,

against the will of the defendant about whom he is testifying—then

he,

the person with whom the act was committed,

and another,

an additional witness who joins him in testifying against the perpetrator,

join together to have him executed

that is, the perpetrator is executed on the testimony of the two of them, the person with whom the act was committed and the additional witness. The former is not disqualified from testimony, since the act was committed against his will; he is not wicked, and therefore is not disqualified from testifying.

But if the person with whom the act was committed testifies that he was not coerced, but was subjected to the act

willingly,

then this person, according to his own statement,

is wicked. And the Torah says [

Exodus 23 ] “Do not join your hand with the wicked to be a witness.” And the Sages expounded:

Do not appoint a wicked person as a witness.

Since, according to his own statement, he willingly submitted to the act, he is wicked and disqualified from testimony, and he cannot join another witness to have the person who assaulted him executed.

This is the opinion of Rav Yosef. Rava, however, disagrees with him and holds that even if the person willingly submitted to the act, he can join another witness in testifying against the person who assaulted him.

Rava said: A person is considered related to himself.

That is, just as a relative is disqualified from testifying concerning his relative, whether favorably or adversely, so a person is disqualified from testifying about himself, even adversely. Therefore, he is not believed to testify about himself that he willingly submitted to the act.

Since his testimony about himself, that he is wicked, is not accepted, his testimony concerning the perpetrator can be accepted, and the perpetrator is executed on the basis of his testimony. We divide the credibility of his statement [palginan dibbura], saying that he is not believed with regard to himself, to say that he is wicked, but he is believed with regard to the other person, to say that the other person assaulted him.

The Gemara now brings another novel ruling of Rava concerning the principle of “palginan dibbura.”

Rava said: