Sanhedrin 71b (עא:) — the Talmud in English

Because

the entire verse is superfluous

, it would have sufficed for the Torah to write: “If a man has a wayward and rebellious son, he does not heed his father’s voice or his mother’s voice, and they discipline him, but he does not heed them. And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones...” The two verses, “And his father and mother shall take hold of him and bring him out... And they shall say to the elders of his city: This son of ours...” are superfluous for exposition.

Therefore, from the superfluous verses it is expounded that the Torah was particular that the law of the wayward and rebellious son be carried out precisely as written. If one of the details of the law is lacking—for example, if one of the parents was missing a limb—the entire procedure is not carried out.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And they warn him in the presence of three.”

And we raise a difficulty: Three

why do I need them?

The entire reason witnesses are required is so that he cannot deny that they warned him, while his father and mother are disqualified from bearing witness because they are his relatives—

And if witnesses are required, it is difficult:

two suffice

, as two witnesses suffice for all testimony in the Torah.

And we answer:

Abaye said:

Indeed, three witnesses are not required,

and this is what it means

, that this is the interpretation of our Mishna:

“They warn him in the presence of two”

, so that he will not continue his disgraceful conduct,

“and they flog him in the presence of three”

, judges, as with all those liable to lashes.

The Gemara explains:

Lashes for a wayward and rebellious son—

where is it written

how is this written in the Torah; that is, from which exposition do we derive it?

A

tradition based

on

an exposition,

Rabbi Abahu—

For Rabbi Abbahu said

Rabbi Abbahu expounded this exposition with regard to one who defames his wife, concerning whom we learned in tractate Ketubot (46) that he is liable to lashes:

We learned

a gezerah shavah:

“And they discipline him”—“and they discipline him.”

With regard to a wayward and rebellious son it says “and they discipline him,” and with regard to one who defames his wife it says (Deuteronomy 21): “And the elders of the city shall take the man and discipline him.” Just as a wayward and rebellious son is flogged, so too one who defames his wife is flogged.

And from where do we know that a wayward and rebellious son is flogged?

From “son”

—from what is written concerning him: “son”.

And “son”

is linked through an inference based on identical wording

to “son”

written in the section concerning lashes (Deuteronomy 25):

“And it shall be, if the wicked man is liable to be flogged.”

Thus, the word “son” teaches that he is liable to receive lashes.

We learned in our Mishna:

“If he again committed a transgression, he is judged by twenty-three...”

as it is stated: “This son of ours”—this is the one who was flogged in your presence.

And we are astonished: How do we expound “this son of ours” to teach that the original three must be present—

for is not

this

verse

needed

to expound:

“This”—and not blind men?!

And we answer: There is room to expound both teachings—

If so

, if the verse came only to teach this exposition, “This is the one who was flogged in your presence”—

let the verse write

; the Torah could have written:

“He is our son”

, a wayward and rebellious son. It could then have been properly expounded: “He” is the one who was flogged in your presence—

Why,

then did the Torah write

“this” son of ours,

which implies that they point to him and say, “This is the son!” Therefore, we also expound it to exclude a blind person: if one of the parents was blind, the son is exempt.

Conclude from this

superfluous verse

two

teachings.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues discussing the law of the wayward and rebellious son.

We learned at the beginning of the chapter: The period during which a wayward and rebellious son can be subject to this law lasts until his lower beard has encircled.

If

he fled before his verdict was completed, and afterward his lower beard encircled—

he is exempt

. The court does not judge him, since if he were to commit his disgraceful acts now, he would be exempt.

But if, after

his verdict was completed, he fled, and afterward

his lower beard encircled

, and he has now returned and is in our hands—

he is liable

to death. Once his verdict has been completed, he is regarded as a dead man, and we are no longer concerned with seeking merit on his behalf and saving him.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses a law concerning a gentile, which is unrelated to the law of a wayward and rebellious son, because it wishes to compare it to our matter.

Rabbi Ḥanina said: A gentile

a non-Jew

who blasphemed the Name

while he was a gentile—and this is one of the seven mitzvot commanded to the descendants of Noah—

and afterward converted

—is exempt.

The novel point is that although, had he remained a gentile, he would have been liable to death, once he converted his liability was removed from him.

The reason is:

Since his law changed

, for while he was a gentile he would be judged even on the testimony of a single witness and by a single judge, without warning, whereas now, if he were to do this, he would be judged by witnesses and a Sanhedrin of twenty-three, with warning—

and his

(his) death penalty changed

, for while he was a gentile he would be executed by decapitation—which is the sword—but now, if he were to do this, he would be judged by stoning; therefore, he is exempt.

The Gemara discusses Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement and attempts to prove it from our Mishna.

Could

it be said that it supports him

, that our Mishna supports Rabbi Ḥanina? We learned:

“If he fled before his verdict was completed, and afterward his lower beard encircled”—

he is exempt—

what is the reason

that he is exempt—

is it

not because we say: Since his status changed

—his lower beard encircled—

his status changed?

And this supports Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement.

The Gemara rejects this:

No!

He is not exempt because of the reasoning that “his status changed,”

but rather—

It is different

from

here

, the law of a wayward and rebellious son, because

if he were to perform his acts now

—his disgraceful conduct—

, he would not be liable to execution

, he would not be subject to death at all, as the Torah completely exempted him.

But a gentile who converted, if he were to blaspheme the Name now, would be liable to death. His law changed with regard to witnesses, judges, and warning, and the type of death penalty, but it did not change completely.

Come and hear

, let us prove from our Mishna contrary to Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement:

The final clause of the Mishna states:

“If, after his verdict was completed, he fled, and afterward his lower beard encircled”—

he is liable.

It is evident that despite the change, he is nevertheless not exempt from his punishment.

This is difficult for Rabbi Ḥanina, who holds that a change exempts him. And we answer:

“His verdict was completed”—

is that what you are saying?!

How can you compare him to a wayward and rebellious son once his verdict has already been completed? If

his verdict was completed—

he is a dead man

, he is regarded in our eyes as already dead; therefore, we execute him even though his status changed. But a gentile who converted had not yet received a completed verdict.

The Gemara continues discussing Rabbi Ḥanina’s law.

Come and hear:

We learned in a beraita:

A gentile who struck his fellow

, a gentile like himself,

or

likewise if

he had intercourse with his fellow’s wife and then converted—

he is exempt.

Since, if he were to do so now—to kill a gentile or have intercourse with a gentile’s wife—he would be exempt, as in the case of a Jew who killed a gentile or had intercourse with a gentile’s wife—

If he did so

while he was a gentile

to a Jew

, and he killed a Jewish man or had intercourse with a Jewish woman,

and then converted—

he is liable.

Since, if he were to do so now, he would be liable.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rabbi Ḥanina from the final clause of the beraita:

And why

is he liable? After his conversion his law changed: While he was a gentile, he would not be executed on the testimony of two witnesses, by a Sanhedrin, and following warning, whereas now he is judged by a court, witnesses, and warning. According to Rabbi Ḥanina,

should we not say: Since his status changed—

his status changed?

And we answer: Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement applies to a gentile who blasphemed the Name and converted, for in that case both

his law and

also

his death penalty

changed, and in order to exempt him

we require

both changes—

But this

gentile who struck a Jew or had intercourse with a Jewish woman indeed had

his law changed

, but

his death penalty did not change

, since a Jew who killed a Jew is also liable to death by the sword, just as he was while he was a gentile; the law of his death penalty did not change.

And we raise a difficulty: This answer adequately resolves the case in which he killed a Jew while he was a gentile. But when he had intercourse with a Jewish woman while he was a gentile and then converted, his death penalty also changed, from decapitation to strangulation. Why, then, is he liable?

Granted, in the case of a murderer

, if he killed a Jew, his death penalty did not change, because

initially

, while he was a gentile, his death penalty was

by the sword

, like all death penalties for the descendants of Noah,

whereas now

, if he were to do so, his death penalty would also be

by the sword

, as is the law for a murderer who is a Jew—

But in the case of a married woman

, which the beraita mentioned, his death penalty did change, because

initially

, while he was a gentile, his death penalty was

by the sword, but

if

now

he were to do so, his death penalty would be

by strangulation

, as is the law for a Jew who has intercourse with a married woman.

And what will Rabbi Ḥanina answer? Why is he liable?

And we answer: What the beraita said, “If he did so to a Jew and converted—he is liable,” refers to a case in which he did so

with a betrothed young woman, for in both cases

—whether he did so while he was a gentile or after he converted—his death penalty is

by stoning.

For the law that a betrothed young woman is liable to stoning applies even when a gentile has intercourse with a Jewish betrothed young woman, as explained in the chapter Four Death Penalties (57a).

And we raise a difficulty: This answer is not satisfactory, because the first clause of the beraita can establish the meaning of the final clause. Just as in the first clause of the beraita, “he had intercourse with his fellow’s wife,” certainly does not refer to a betrothed young woman [because the laws of a betrothed young woman do not apply among gentiles, as they have no laws of betrothal; and if he has intercourse with a betrothed woman, he is exempt, since a gentile’s wife becomes forbidden to everyone only through intercourse with her husband], so too, the final clause does not refer to a betrothed young woman.

But

the latter clause, “if he did so in Israel,”

“if he did so with a Jewish woman,”

analogous

to the first clause,

concerning another man’s wife—

is it taught

that way?

The question therefore returns upon Rabbi Hanina: Why did the beraita state in its latter clause that if he did so with the wife of an Israelite, he is liable, since his judgment and his execution have changed, from the sword to strangulation?

And we answer:

Rather,

indeed, the case concerns a married woman—

Nevertheless, his execution has not changed. For although in his gentile state he was liable to the sword, since the sword is more severe than strangulation, strangulation is included within the sword, for

a lesser

death, namely strangulation,

is included within a more severe death. That is, even in his gentile state he was liable to strangulation, except that he was liable to a punishment more severe than strangulation; and from strangulation to strangulation his execution has not changed. Therefore, the beraita stated that he is liable to strangulation.

But in the case of a gentile who blessed the Name, his execution changed from the lesser punishment of the sword to the more severe punishment of stoning, and stoning cannot be included within the sword. For the lesser punishment is included within the more severe one, but the more severe punishment is not included within the lesser one.

And we challenge this:

And we ask:

That works,

this answer—that “a lesser punishment is included within a more severe one”—works

for

the view of

the Rabbis, who say: The sword is more severe

than strangulation. Accordingly, it is properly resolved that his judgment changed only from strangulation to strangulation—

But

it still has not been resolved according to the view of

Rabbi Shimon, who says: Strangulation is more severe

than the sword. According to his view,

what can be said—how will Rabbi Hanina explain the beraita?

For in his gentile state he was liable to the lesser punishment of the sword, whereas now, upon converting, had he done so he would be liable to the more severe punishment of strangulation. Why, then, is he liable, given that his execution changed from a lesser punishment to a more severe one?

And we answer: Rabbi Shimon

holds like the tanna of the school of Manasseh,

who says: Every death mentioned with regard to the descendants of Noah

when they violate the seven mitzvot

is not

the sword

but strangulation—

Therefore, his execution has not changed, since in his gentile state he was liable to strangulation, and now, in his converted state, he is likewise liable to strangulation for the prohibition against adultery.

And we challenge this: According to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that strangulation is more severe than the sword, and who likewise holds that every death mentioned with regard to the descendants of Noah is only strangulation, the beraita is still not resolved, because—

Granted,

in the case of one who engages in intercourse with

a married woman, initially,

in his gentile state, he was liable to

strangulation,

which is the unspecified death mentioned with regard to the descendants of Noah,

but now,

if he did so after converting, he would likewise be liable to

strangulation,

and therefore he is liable, because his execution has not changed—

But

what will Rabbi Hanina answer according to Rabbi Shimon in the case of

a murderer?

For

initially,

in his gentile state, he was liable to

strangulation, and

if

now,

in his converted state, he were liable to

the sword,

as is the law for an Israelite who murdered an Israelite, then his execution has changed. Why, then, is he liable?

And we answer:

A lesser punishment is included within a more severe one.

Even initially, in his gentile state, he was liable to the sword, except that he was also liable to strangulation, which is more severe than it; and now, in his converted state, he is liable to the sword as well. His execution has therefore not changed.

The Gemara brings a beraita in support of Rabbi Hanina’s statement.

Does

perhaps

this beraita

support him—

We learned: A betrothed maiden who

went astray

by committing adultery is executed by stoning;

and afterward,

before she was stoned, after she had been judged—

she reached maturity,

and now, had she committed adultery, she would be judged by strangulation, like any other married woman—

she is judged by strangulation.

And this is subject to analysis:

Why is she not judged by stoning?

After all, she committed adultery while she was a maiden.

Is it not because

we say that

we say:

since her body has changed,

from a maiden to a mature woman,

her execution has changed

as well?

Indeed, it is not possible to exempt her entirely, since even as a maiden she became liable to strangulation, as explained: A more severe death includes the lesser one, and now too she is liable to strangulation; therefore, her execution is not considered to have changed.

But since her body has changed, she is judged by strangulation and not by stoning, even though she did so while she was a maiden and became liable to stoning.

It is thus demonstrated that a change in the body causes a change in the law. And all the more so in the case of a gentile who blessed the Name: Since both his law and his execution changed, he is entirely exempt, in accordance with Rabbi Hanina’s statement.

And we reject this: This version of the beraita—“She went astray and afterward reached maturity; she is judged by strangulation”—is not the correct version.

Rabbi Yohanan said to the tanna,

his student who recited the beraita before him:

Recite:

change the version of the beraita to read:

“She is judged by stoning.”

Just as she was liable while she was a maiden, so is she liable now; and the fact that her body changed does not change her execution.

There is therefore no proof from here for Rabbi Hanina, since it is entirely possible that a gentile who blessed the Name is not entirely exempt, but is judged by the sword—or, according to Rabbi Shimon, by strangulation—as his lesser execution.

Mishna:

A rebellious and wayward son is judged on account of his end,

because the Torah descended to the end of his understanding: He will eventually consume his father’s property, seek his accustomed way of life and not find it, go out to the crossroads, and rob people. The Torah says:

Let him die innocent and not die guilty.

For the death of the wicked

is beneficial to them,

since they no longer add to their sins,

and beneficial to the world,

since the entire land becomes tranquil.

But the death

of the righteous

is bad for them,

because they would have continued to accumulate merits during their lives,

and bad for the world,

because they protected their generation and rebuked the generations.

Wine and sleep for the wicked

are beneficial to them and beneficial to the world,

because as long as they drink and sleep, they do not sin and do not harm people.

And

wine and sleep

for the righteous

are bad for them,

because they are not engaged in Torah study,

and bad for the world,

for if they were engaged in Torah study, the merit of Torah would protect the generation. And when they neglect Torah study, calamity comes upon the world.

Dispersion,

whereby they become separated from one another,

for the wicked

is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world,

because they cannot conspire with one another to devise evil schemes or assist one another.

But for the righteous

it is bad for them and bad for the world.

And conversely:

Gathering for the wicked

is bad for them and bad for the world, whereas for the righteous

it is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world.

Tranquility for the wicked

is bad for them and bad for the world,

because they have leisure to perform wicked deeds.

For the righteous

it is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world.