Sanhedrin 71b — the Talmud in English

Because

the entire verse is superfluous

, it would have sufficed for us had the Torah written: “If a man has a wayward and rebellious son who does not listen to the voice of his father and to the voice of his mother, and they chastise him, but he does not listen to them. And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones...” And both verses—“Then his father and his mother shall seize him and take him out... And they shall say to the elders of his city: This son of ours...” —are superfluous for exposition.

Therefore, from the superfluous verses it is expounded that the Torah was exacting that the law of the wayward and rebellious son be fulfilled precisely, as it is written; and if one of the details of the law is lacking—for example, one of them was maimed—this entire law is not carried out.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And they admonish him in the presence of three.”

And we raise a difficulty: Three

why do I need them?

For the entire reason that witnesses are required is in order that he should not be able to deny that they admonished him; but his father and mother are disqualified from testimony, because they are his relatives—

And if witnesses are required, it is difficult:

Two suffice,

two witnesses are enough for us, as with all testimonies in the Torah.

And we answer:

Abaye said:

Indeed, three witnesses are not required,

and this is what it says,

this is how our Mishna is to be understood:

“They admonish him in the presence of two”

so that he should not continue in his disgraceful deeds,

“and they flog him in the presence of three”

judges, like the other liable for flogging.

The Gemara explains:

“Flogging of a wayward and rebellious son”—

where is it written?

How is it written in the Torah—that is, from which exposition do we derive this?

As

the exposition

of

Rabbi Abbahu

[is derived]—

For Rabbi Abbahu said [

Rabbi Abbahu expounds his exposition with regard to one who brings an evil name, concerning whom we learned in tractate Ketubbot (46) that he is liable for flogging]:

We learned

a gezerah shavah:

“And they chastise him,” “and they chastise him”

—from the wayward and rebellious son. It is stated concerning one who brings an evil name (Deuteronomy 21): “And the elders of the city shall take that man and chastise him,” and it is stated concerning the wayward and rebellious son: “And they shall chastise him.” Just as the wayward and rebellious son is flogged, so one who brings an evil name is flogged.

And from where do we know that the wayward and rebellious son is flogged?

From “son”—

from what is written concerning him: “son.”

And “son”

they learn by a gezerah shavah

from “son”

written in the passage concerning flogging (Deuteronomy 25):

“And it shall be, if the wicked man is a son of flogging.”

Thus, “son” comes to teach that he is liable for flogging.

We learned in our Mishna:

“If he again corrupted his ways, he is judged by twenty-three...”

as it is stated: “This son of ours”—this is the one who was flogged before you.

And we wonder: How do we expound “this son of ours” for this exposition, that the first three should be present—

Is it not that

this

verse

is needed for him

to expound:

“This,” and not blind men?!

And we answer: There is room to expound both expositions—

If so,

if the verse had come to teach us only this exposition: “This is the one who was flogged before you” —

let the verse write

the Torah could have written:

“He is our son”

the wayward and rebellious one; and it would properly be expounded: “He” is the one who was flogged before you—

What

is the reason the Torah wrote

“this” son of ours,

whose meaning is that they point at him with a finger: This is the son! Therefore we also expound it to exclude a blind man: if one of them was blind, he is exempt.

Learn from it

from this superfluous verse,

two

expositions.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues to discuss the law of the wayward and rebellious son.

We learned at the beginning of the chapter: The time of the wayward and rebellious son is until the lower beard surrounds.

If

he fled before his judgment was concluded, and afterward the lower beard surrounded—

he is exempt,

the court does not judge him, since if he were now to perform his disgraceful deeds, he would be exempt.

But if,

after

his judgment was concluded he fled, and afterward the lower beard surrounded,

and he returned and is now in our hands—

he is liable

for death. Since his judgment was concluded, he is like a dead man, and we are no longer concerned to seek merit for him and save him.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses a law among the laws of a descendant of Noah—and it does not belong to the law of the wayward and rebellious son—because it wished to compare it to our matter.

Rabbi Ḥanina said: A descendant of Noah

a gentile

who blessed the Name

while in his gentile status—and this is one of the seven mitzvot with which the descendants of Noah were commanded—

and afterward converted—

he is exempt.

And the novelty is that although, had he remained in his gentile status, he would have been liable for death, once he converted, his liability was removed from him.

And the reason is:

since his law changed,

for while in his gentile status he would be judged even on the testimony of one witness and by one judge, without admonition, whereas now, if he were to do this, he would be judged by witnesses, a Sanhedrin of twenty-three, and with admonition—

and

his death penalty changed,

for while in his gentile status he would be judged by decapitation—which is by the sword—whereas now, if he were to do this, he would be judged by stoning; therefore he is exempt.

The Gemara discusses Rabbi Ḥanina’s words and attempts to prove his words from our Mishna.

May we

say that it supports him,

that our Mishna supports Rabbi Ḥanina? We learned:

“He fled before his judgment was concluded, and afterward the lower beard surrounded”—

he is exempt—

what is the reason

why is he exempt—

Is it

not because we say: Since his law changed

and the lower beard surrounded—

has he changed?

And this is assistance to Rabbi Ḥanina’s words.

And the Gemara rejects:

No!

He is not exempt because of the reasoning of “he changed,”

but—

different

is different

here,

the law of the wayward and rebellious son, because

if he were to perform [these deeds] now,

his disgraceful deeds,

he would not be subject to a death penalty

—he would not be liable to death at all, for the Torah exempted him entirely—

whereas a descendant of Noah who converted, if he were to bless the Name now, would be liable for death. Rather, his law changed with regard to witnesses, judges, and admonition, and the type of death, but it did not change entirely.

Ta shma,

let us prove from our Mishna contrary to Rabbi Ḥanina’s words:

The Mishna said in the final clause:

“If, after his judgment was concluded, he fled, and afterward the lower beard surrounded”—

he is liable.

It is evident that despite the fact that he changed, he was nevertheless not exempt from his punishment.

And this is difficult for Rabbi Ḥanina, who holds that a change exempts him ? And we answer:

“His judgment was concluded”—

are you saying?!

How can he be compared to the wayward and rebellious son when his judgment has already been concluded? If

his judgment was concluded—

he is a dead man

he is regarded by us as dead; therefore we execute him even though he changed , whereas the descendant of Noah who converted has not yet had his judgment concluded.

The Gemara continues to discuss Rabbi Ḥanina’s law.

Ta shma:

We learned in a beraita:

“A descendant of Noah who struck his fellow”

a gentile like himself,

and

likewise if

he had relations with his fellow’s wife, and converted—

he is exempt.

Since, if he were to do so now—to kill a gentile or to have relations with a gentile’s wife—he would be exempt, as is the law of an Israelite who killed a gentile or had relations with a gentile’s wife—

If he did so

while in his gentile status

to an Israelite,

and killed an Israelite or had relations with an Israelite’s wife,

and converted—

he is liable.

Since, if he were to do so now, he would be liable.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty against Rabbi Ḥanina from the final clause of the beraita:

And why?

Why is he liable? After all, upon his conversion his law changed: while in his gentile status he would not be executed on the testimony of two witnesses and before a Sanhedrin and with admonition, whereas now he is judged with a court of twenty-three and admonition; and according to Rabbi Ḥanina,

let us say: since he changed—

has he changed?

And we answer: Rabbi Ḥanina’s words apply to a descendant of Noah who blessed the Name and converted, for then both his

law and

also

his death penalty changed; and in order to exempt him

we require

we need both changes—

both of these changes—

But this one,

the descendant of Noah who struck an Israelite or had relations with an Israelite’s wife, indeed

his law changed,

but

his death penalty did not change,

for an Israelite who killed an Israelite is also liable for death by the sword, and so too when he was a gentile; the law of his death penalty did not change.

And we raise a difficulty: Indeed, this answer properly resolves the matter when he killed an Israelite while in his gentile status. But when he had relations with an Israelite’s wife while in his gentile status and converted, his death penalty also changed, from the sword to strangulation; so why is he liable?

Granted, a murderer,

if he killed an Israelite, his death penalty did not change, because

initially,

while in his gentile status, his death penalty was

by the sword,

like all death penalties of descendants of Noah,

but now,

if he were to do so, his death penalty would also be

by the sword,

as is the law of a murderer in Israel—

but a married woman,

which the beraita mentioned: here his death penalty did change, because

initially,

while in his gentile status, his death penalty was

by the sword, but

if

now,

if he were to do so, his death penalty would be

by strangulation,

as is the law of an Israelite who has relations with a married woman?

And what will Rabbi Ḥanina answer? And why is he liable?

And we answer: What the beraita said, “If he did so to an Israelite and converted—he is liable,” refers to one who did so

with a betrothed young woman, for both this and that

whether he did so while in his gentile status or after he converted—his death penalty is

by stoning.

For the law of a betrothed young woman, for whom they are liable for stoning, applies even to a gentile who has relations with a betrothed Israelite young woman, as is explained in chapter Four Deaths (57a).

And we raise a difficulty: This answer does not work well, for from the first clause of the beraita it is possible to prove something concerning the final clause. Just as in the first clause of the beraita, “he had relations with his fellow’s wife,” it certainly does not refer to a betrothed young woman [for among gentiles there is no law of a betrothed young woman, since they have no laws of betrothal; and if he has relations with a betrothed woman, he is exempt, while a gentile’s wife is forbidden to the entire world only through intercourse with her husband], so too, in the final clause it does not refer to a betrothed young woman.

But

the latter clause, “

if he did so in Israel,”

analogous

to the first clause,

concerning another man’s wife—

is it taught

as a difficulty?

And the question returns upon Rabbi Hanina: Why did the beraita write in the latter clause that if he did so with a Jewish woman, he is liable, seeing that his law and his form of execution have changed, from the sword to strangulation?

And we answer:

Rather,

indeed, it is speaking of a married woman—

And nevertheless his form of execution has not changed, because although in his gentile status he was liable to the sword, since the sword is more stringent than strangulation, strangulation is included in the sword, because a death

that is lenient—

and that is strangulation—

has a place within a more stringent death,

is included in the more stringent death. That is to say, even in his gentile status he was liable for “strangulation,” except that he was liable for more than strangulation; and from strangulation to strangulation his form of execution did not change. Therefore the beraita said that he is liable to strangulation.

But in the case of a son of Noah who blessed the Name, his form of execution changed from the lenient sword to stoning, which is more stringent than it, and stoning does not have a place within the sword. For the lenient is included in the stringent, but the stringent is not included in the lenient.

And we raise an objection:

That works—

this answer, “the lenient has a place within the stringent,” works

for

the view of

the Rabbis, who say: the sword is more stringent

than strangulation; therefore it is well resolved that his law changed only from strangulation to strangulation—

But

it is still not resolved according to

Rabbi Shimon, who says: strangulation is more stringent

than the sword; and according to him,

what can be said—

how will Rabbi Hanina explain the beraita?

For in his gentile status he was liable to the lenient sword, and now, when he converted, if he were to do so he would become liable to the more stringent strangulation; and why is he liable? His form of execution has changed from a lenient one to a stringent one.

And we answer: Rabbi Shimon

adopts the view of the tanna of the school of Menashe, who says: Every death stated concerning the sons of Noah

when they transgress the seven commandments

is not

the sword

but strangulation—

And therefore his form of execution did not change, for in his gentile status he was liable to strangulation, and now, in his converted status, he is also liable to strangulation for the prohibition of a married woman.

And we raise an objection: According to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that strangulation is more stringent than the sword, and who also holds that every death stated concerning the sons of Noah is only strangulation, the beraita is still not resolved, because—

Granted

in the case of intercourse with

a married woman, initially

in his gentile status he was liable to

strangulation,

and this is the unspecified death stated concerning the sons of Noah;

but now,

if he did so after he converted, he is also liable to

strangulation,

and therefore he is liable, because his form of execution did not change—

But

what will Rabbi Hanina answer according to Rabbi Shimon, in the case of a

murderer?

For

initially,

in his gentile status, he was liable to

strangulation, and

if

now,

in his converted status, he were liable to

the sword,

as is the law of a Jew who murdered a Jew, then his form of execution has changed; and why is he liable?

And we answer:

The lenient has a place within the stringent,

for initially, in his gentile status, he was also liable to the sword, except that he became liable as well to strangulation, which is more stringent than it; and now, in his converted status, he is liable to the sword, and his form of execution did not change.

The Gemara brings a beraita in support of Rabbi Hanina’s words.

Does

perhaps say

that this beraita

supports him—

We learned: A betrothed maiden who

acted licentiously,

committed adultery, and her execution is by stoning,

and afterward,

before they stoned her, after they had judged her—

she reached maturity,

and now, if she were to act licentiously, she would be judged by strangulation like the rest of married women—

she is judged by strangulation.

And it is necessary to examine:

For stoning, what is the reason she is not

judged, seeing that she committed adultery in her maidenhood?

Does

it not mean that

we say:

Since her body changed,

from a maiden to a mature woman,

her execution changed

as well?

It is indeed so that she cannot be completely exempted, since even in her maidenhood she became liable to strangulation, as explained: a more stringent death includes the lenient one with it; and now she is also liable to strangulation, so it is not called a change in her form of execution—

But since her body changed, therefore she is judged by strangulation and not by stoning, even though she did so in her maidenhood and became liable to stoning—

And it is thereby proven that a change of the body causes a change. And all the more so in the case of a son of Noah who blessed the Name, whose law and whose form of execution also changed; he is therefore completely exempt—according to Rabbi Hanina’s words.

And we reject this: This version of the beraita: “She acted licentiously and afterward reached maturity; she is judged by strangulation,” is not a correct version.

For Rabbi Yohanan said to the tanna,

his student who recited the beraita before him:

Recite!

Change the version of the beraita:

“She is judged by stoning.”

Just as she is liable in her maidenhood, so she is liable now; and the fact that her body changed does not change her form of execution. And there is no proof from here for Rabbi Hanina, because it is entirely possible that a son of Noah who blessed the Name is not completely exempt, but is judged by the sword [and according to Rabbi Shimon, by strangulation], his lenient form of execution.

There is therefore no proof from here for Rabbi Ḥanina, since it is entirely possible that a Noahide who blasphemed is not entirely exempt, but is judged by decapitation—and according to Rabbi Shimon, by strangulation—his less severe execution.

Mishna:

A stubborn and rebellious son is judged on account of his end

because the Torah descended to the end of his understanding: in the end he will consume his father’s property, seek his accustomed habits and not find them, go out to the crossroads, and rob people . The Torah said:

Let him die innocent and let him not die guilty .

For the death of the wicked—

is beneficial to them,

since they no longer continue to sin,

and beneficial to the world,

since the entire land becomes quiet.

But death

for the righteous—

is bad for them,

for they would have continued to increase merits during their lives,

and bad for the world

for they protected their generation and rebuked the generations.

Wine and sleep for the wicked—

are beneficial to them, and beneficial to the world,

for as long as they drink and sleep, they do not sin and do not harm people.

And

wine and sleep

for the righteous—

are bad for them,

for they do not engage in Torah,

and bad for the world,

for if they were engaged in Torah, the merit of Torah would protect the generation. And when they neglect Torah, calamity comes to the world.

Dispersion,

where they separate from one another,

for the wicked—

is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world,

for they cannot consult with one another about evil schemes or assist one another.

But for the righteous—

it is bad for them, and bad for the world.

And conversely:

gathering for the wicked—

is bad for them and bad for the world, but for the righteous—

it is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world.

Quiet for the wicked—

is bad for them and bad for the world,

for they have free time to perform wicked deeds.

For the righteous—

it is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world.