Sanhedrin 41b — the Talmud in English

and established it in his name,

and established this halakha in his name.

And therefore Rabbi called him in this Mishna “ben Zakkai,” because this halakha was stated by Rabbi Yohanan during the period when he was still a student.

When he was learning,

when he was still learning—

“ben Zakkai” he would call him

Rabbi, the arranger of the Mishnayot, would call him,

like a student sitting before his teacher.

When he was teaching,

and when he was already teaching, then Rabbi, the arranger of the Mishnayot,

would call him

would call him

“Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai.”

When he called him

when we find that Rabbi called him in the Mishna

“ben Zakkai”—

on account of the earlier state,

because he stated the words when he was still a student,

and when he called him

and when we find that Rabbi called him in the Mishna

Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai—

on account of the present state,

because he stated the words after he had already been appointed a judge and a teacher of halakha.

We learned:

“It happened that he examined, etc. ... What is the difference between inquiries and examinations?”

What difference is there in their laws? Regarding

“inquiries,”

if one witness

says, “I do not know”

how to answer one of the questions—

their testimony is invalid,

whereas regarding

“examinations,”

if one witness

says, “I do not know,” and even if two say, “We do not know”—

their testimony stands.

What

is the novelty in this, that

even if two say

“We do not know,” their testimony stands?

It is obvious!

For the tanna has already taught us

that when one says, “I do not know,” their testimony stands;

if so,

when two say it, too, their testimony stands!

For the second who joins him in saying “I do not know” neither adds nor detracts from the testimony.

Rav Sheshet said:

The clause “and even if two say, etc.”

refers to the beginning,

to inquiries, concerning which we learned at the beginning: if one witness says “I do not know” how to answer one of the inquiries, their testimony is invalid.

And this is what it says,

and this is how the words of the Mishna in the latter clause are to be interpreted:

in inquiries, even

if there were three witnesses,

two

of them

say, “We know,” and one says, “I do not know”—

their testimony is invalid.

According to whom

according to whose view is this halakha stated?

According to Rabbi Akiva

[in Makkot 5b],

who likens three

witnesses

to two,

as it is written [Deuteronomy 17:6]: “By the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall the one who is to die be put to death.” Rabbi Shimon learns from this an analogy between three witnesses and two witnesses: just as two are not executed until both of them are found to be conspiring witnesses, so three are not executed until all three of them are found to be conspiring witnesses. And Rabbi Akiva adds to Rabbi Shimon’s words that they were likened even for stringency: just as with two witnesses, if one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified, their testimony is invalid, so with three, if one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified, their testimony is invalid.

It is explained in the words of Rabbi Shimon [and Rabbi Akiva as well, who adds to him and agrees with him] that if it is impossible to make one of the witnesses into a conspiring witness, their testimony is invalid. Therefore here, when one of the witnesses says “I do not know” and it is impossible to make him into a conspiring witness, their testimony is invalid.

Rava said:

It is impossible to interpret the clause “and even if two say, etc.” as Rav Sheshet’s words, that it was stated regarding inquiries: even if two say “We know,” whenever one witness says “I do not know,” their testimony does not stand, because

but it teaches, “their testimony stands,”

and according to Rav Sheshet’s interpretation the wording of the Mishna must be changed, and it must read: “Their testimony is invalid.”

Rather, Rava said: This is what it says:

this is how the words of the Mishna are to be interpreted: the wording

“even

two say, etc.” does not come to introduce a law concerning examinations, but comes to introduce a law

concerning inquiries.

And this is the meaning of the Mishna: What is the difference between inquiries and examinations? With inquiries, if there are only two witnesses, and one of the witnesses says “I do not know,” their testimony is invalid. But with examinations, if one of the witnesses says “I do not know,” their testimony stands. The same law applies if both witnesses say “I do not know” concerning examinations: their testimony stands, because this is still testimony that can be refuted, through the testimony that they gave concerning the inquiries. And even with inquiries, we find a case in which one of the witnesses says “I do not know” and their testimony stands: for example, if there were three witnesses, and among them

two say, “We know,” and one says, “I do not know”—

their testimony stands,

since there are still two witnesses among the three whom it is possible to make into conspiring witnesses; the testimony is upheld through those two.

According to whom—

not according to Rabbi Akiva,

who holds that if it is impossible to make one of the three witnesses into a conspiring witness, the testimony of all of them is invalid.

Rav Kahana and Rav Safra learned tractate Sanhedrin in the academy of Rabba—

they learned the laws of Sanhedrin from Rabba.

Rami bar Hama encountered them,

he met them,

Rami bar Hama.

He said to them: What have you said about it in Sanhedrin at the academy of Rabba?

What novelty have you said concerning the laws of Sanhedrin that you learned from a great person such as Rabba? Surely you have many novelties to innovate concerning it.

They said to him,

Rav Kahana and Rav Safra:

And what have we said about it in ordinary Sanhedrin,

and if we had not learned these laws from such a great sage, what is there to ask about it?

And what difficulty do you have?

He said to them,

Rami bar Hama: I have a difficulty

from that which it teaches,

in our Mishna:

“What is the difference between inquiries and examinations?”

What difference is there in their laws?

Regarding

inquiries,

if one witness

says, “I do not know”

how to answer one of the questions—

their testimony is invalid,

and the defendant and the witnesses are released.

Whereas regarding

examinations,

if

one says

witness

“I do not know,” and even if two say, “We do not know”—

their testimony stands.

Since, both this and that

both inquiries and examinations

are by Torah law,

the inquiries are learned from the verse: “And you shall investigate and examine,” and the examinations are learned from “correct,” which requires that the words of the witnesses correspond in the examinations.

If so,

what is different about inquiries, and what is different about examinations?

Why are their laws different?

They said to him,

Rav Kahana and Rav Safra:

This is how you compare them!

The inquiries cannot be compared to the examinations, and their purposes are entirely different!

With inquiries,

where they testify concerning the place and the time, if

one says, “I do not know”—

their testimony is invalid,

because

it has become

for it is

testimony that you cannot refute,

for if the witnesses do not testify concerning the precise place and time, it is no longer possible to refute this testimony and say to the witnesses that they were at another place at that time.

But

examinations,

which do not concern the place and time, if

one of them says, “I do not know”—

their testimony stands,

because

it is testimony that you can refute.

For concerning the place and time, they all testified, and the refutation does not depend on the examinations, because it is not applicable to say “You were with us” concerning the examinations, since they do not concern the place and time.

He said to them,

Rami bar Hama:

If so, you have said about it

if this is how you said to learn and innovate concerning it—

you have said much about it

you have said many good things about it.

They said to him,

Rav Kahana and Rav Safra:

Because of our master’s goodness we say much about it,

because you are good and humble and acknowledge us; because of this, we are able to say many good things about it. But

because of our master’s contentiousness,

if you wished to challenge us and raise difficulties against us—

we would say nothing about it, not even one thing,

we would not know how to answer you even one thing.

We learned in the Mishna:

One says:

“On the second day of a certain month, the event occurred.” And one says, “On the third day of the month,” but both say that it was on the same day of the week—for example, if one says: “On Wednesday, the second of Kislev, the event occurred,” and the second says: “On Wednesday, the third of Kislev, the event occurred”—their testimony stands, for both are referring to the same day, and there is no contradiction here. Rather, the one who says “on the second of the month” knows that the previous month was full, thirty days, and the first day of the new month was the thirtieth day of the previous month, whereas the other thinks that the previous month was deficient, twenty-nine days, and according to his calculation that day was the third day of the month.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

How far?

Up to what date of the month can people who do not know whether the previous month was full or deficient be mistaken, so that it is possible to attribute the matter to one of the witnesses not knowing and erring in the calculation of one day?

Rabbi Aha bar Hanina said that Rabbi Asi said that

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: Until the majority of the month.

But from the majority of the month onward—for example, if one witness says, “The event occurred on the twentieth of the month,” and one witness says, “The event occurred on the twenty-first of the month”—we do not attribute it to one of the witnesses being mistaken and not knowing whether the previous month was full or deficient, because after the majority of the month has passed, he certainly had time to hear.

Rava said: We, too, learned this in our Mishna:

we, too, learned this in our Mishna: one

witness says, “On the third

day of the month the event occurred,

and one

of the witnesses

says, “On the fifth

day of the month the event occurred”—

their testimony is invalid,

since there is a difference of two days between them, they contradict one another, for with regard to two days a person does not err.

And apparently this is difficult:

But why?

Why does a person not err by two days?

Let us say

let us say

that this

witness was

aware of two full months,

that the two preceding months were full, thirty-day months,

and this

second witness

was not aware of two full months!

And since this was so, he erred in counting the month by two days.

Rather, is it not

proven from the Mishna that a person does not err concerning two months,

because in its majority

after the majority of the month has passed, he certainly

knew

already that the previous month was full, thirty days.

Rabbi Aha said to him: It is impossible to infer this from the Mishna, because

I will always say

I say

to you

that

even in the majority

of the month,

also

there are people who still

did not know

that the previous month was full, thirty days.

And through the shofar

and when they would sound the shofar at the time of the sanctification of the month, on the day on which the month begins, whether the previous month was full or whether the previous month was deficient,

he knew

when the new month began.

And the reason that a person errs concerning the last month, whether it was full or deficient, but does not err concerning the last two months, is that

with one sounding of the shofar

with one sounding of the shofar,

we say that he erred,

we attribute it to the witness not having heard and therefore erring in the date by one day. But

with two soundings of the shofar,

with two soundings of the shofar,

we do not say that he erred

we do not say that he erred and did not hear the shofar twice, and therefore erred in the date by two days.

Another halakha stated by Rabbi Aha bar Hanina in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

And Rabbi Aha bar Hanina said that Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yohanan said: How far

up to what date from the beginning of the month

do we recite a blessing over the new moon

the blessing of the moon?

Until its defect is filled

of the moon! But afterward he cannot bless and say “Who renews the months,” for the moon is already old and not new.

And how much?

And what is the latest date in the month on which one may bless over the moon?

Rav Yaakov bar Idi said that Rav Yehuda said: Until seven

days from the beginning of the month one may bless over the moon.

The scholars of Nehardea say: Until sixteen

days from the beginning of the month .