Sanhedrin 112a — the Talmud in English

And we conclude:

This is difficult.

That is, it is difficult to reconcile the wording of the verse with this opinion, according to which one does not divide a city between two tribes. But with regard to each individual place, this is not a refutation.

A dilemma was raised before them:

If

the inhabitants of the city were led astray

by themselves—

what is

the halakha?

And the sides of the dilemma are:

Does the verse state: “Men went out from your midst, etc.,

and led astray

the inhabitants of their city,”

the Merciful One said,

indicating that a wayward city is created specifically when others lead its inhabitants astray,

and not

in a case

where they were led astray by themselves?

Or perhaps, even if they were led astray by themselves,

the city becomes a wayward city?

Come and hear

a proof from our Mishna, where we learned that if

women and minors led them astray,

they are considered individuals,

and the city does not become a wayward city.

And

if a city becomes a wayward city when its inhabitants were led astray by themselves,

why

when women and minors led them astray are they considered individuals? Disregard the women and minors,

and let them be considered as though they had been led astray by themselves!

And we reject this:

These,

those who were led astray by themselves,

followed only their own individual selves ,

being drawn after their own judgment. And since this is so, they are deeply attached to idolatry, and it is proper that their status should be that of a wayward city.

That is not the case with

these,

those whom women and minors led astray, who

followed only the women and minors [

were drawn after the judgment of those women and minors], and are not especially attached to idolatry.

We learned in our Mishna: “And they are not executed, etc.,” and

until the majority of the city has been led astray.

How do we act?

How can the majority of the city be made to be considered led astray, when witnesses and warning are required for each individual?

Rav Yehuda said:

When two or three people are seen to have been led astray and to have worshipped idolatry, they are not stoned immediately, as is the law regarding individuals who worshipped idolatry.

Rather,

they are judged

for stoning,

and they are imprisoned

in prison. And likewise, if another two or three people are seen worshipping idolatry,

they are judged and imprisoned.

In the end, they calculate whether a majority has been formed. If indeed a majority of those worshipping idolatry has been formed, their status is that of a wayward city: they are executed, and their property is destroyed.

Ulla said to him:

If you act in this manner, postponing the execution of all of them after their verdict has been completed until it becomes clear whether there is a majority,

you will thereby delay the judgment of these people!

Rather, Ulla said: They are judged

everyone who is found worshipping idolatry,

and

immediately

they are stoned,

and likewise each time:

they are judged and stoned.

They are all considered individuals until they reach half of the city’s inhabitants.

From that point onward, it becomes clear retroactively that the majority of the city’s inhabitants were led astray, and they begin to judge them by the sword, and their property is destroyed.

It was stated: Rabbi Yohanan said: They are judged and stoned; they are judged and stoned.

And Reish Lakish said:

Since it is necessary to judge all of them on the same day, so as not to delay the judgment,

they increase the number of courts for them,

so that testimony regarding all of them can be received on one day and their verdicts can be completed on that same day; they then determine whether the majority was led astray or not.

And we wonder:

Is that so? But didn’t Rabbi Hama bar Yosei say that Rabbi Oshaya said:

It is written: “When there is found among you, etc., a man or a woman, etc., who goes and worships other gods, etc.,

then you shall take that man or that woman

etc., to your gates, and you shall stone them with stones and they shall die”?

“Your gates” refers to a lesser Sanhedrin of twenty-three, which judges capital cases. And this is how they expound the verse:

“A man and a woman,”

individuals—

you

bring out to your gates

to judge them there and complete their judgment. But

you do not bring out the entire city to your gates;

rather, they are judged by the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one!

Rather: They increase the number of courts for them and examine their cases,

and in this manner determine whether the majority of them was led astray.

And

if this is indeed the case, then

they bring them up [

they raise them]

to the Great Court, and complete their judgments and execute them [

and complete their judgments and execute them].

“You shall surely strike the inhabitants of that city, etc.”

The Sages taught:

The caravan of donkey drivers and the caravan of camel drivers

traveling from place to place,

and

lodged

the members of the caravan

within it [

within the city],

and they were led astray with the city—if they stayed there for thirty days,

they are considered inhabitants of the city, and therefore

they too are killed by the sword, and their property is destroyed,

like all the inhabitants of a wayward city.

But if the members of the caravan stayed there

for less than this [

less than thirty days], then the law is that

they are stoned, and their property is spared,

like individuals who worship idolatry.

And we raise a contradiction

from the Mishna in tractate Nedarim, where we learned as follows:

How much

time

must

a person reside

in a city, and be considered like

all

the inhabitants of the city,

in order to contribute money to the needs of the city?—

Twelve months.

It follows that a person is considered one of “the inhabitants of the city” if he stayed there for twelve months, whereas here we said that after staying for thirty days he is already considered an inhabitant of the city!

Rava said: This is not difficult. This

requirement to reside there for twelve months applies

in order to become one of the people of the town,

that he should be considered one of “the people of the city.”

Whereas

this

requirement of only thirty days’ residence applies

in order to become one of the residents of the town,

to be considered one of “the residents of the city.” And with regard to a wayward city, it is sufficient that he be one of the city’s residents, as it is stated in the verse: “You shall surely strike the inhabitants of that city, etc.”

There is proof that there is a distinction between the meaning of “the people of the city” and “the residents of the city”:

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it was taught: One who is prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from the people of the city [

who said: “The produce of the city’s people is konam to me if I derive benefit from the people of the city”],

if

there is a person in the city who

stayed there for twelve months—

it is forbidden

for the person under the vow

to derive benefit from him.

But if there is a person there who stayed in the city

for less than this—

it is permitted

for the person under the vow

to derive benefit from him.

Whereas

in

the case where he prohibited himself from deriving benefit from

the residents of the city [

who said: “The produce of the residents of the city is konam to me if I derive benefit from the residents of the city”],

if

there is a person in the city who

—

it is forbidden

for that person under the vow

to derive benefit from him.

But any person who stayed in the city

for less than this—

—

for the person under the vow

to derive benefit from him.

Thus, in order to be considered “one of the people of the city,” one must stay in the city for at least twelve months, whereas in order to be considered “a resident of the city,” it is sufficient to have stayed there for thirty days.

“You shall surely strike the inhabitants of that city, etc.,

you shall utterly destroy it and all that is in it, etc.,

and you shall gather all its spoils into its open square and burn with fire the city and all its spoils in their entirety, for the Lord your God; and it shall remain a heap forever, never to be rebuilt.”

The Sages taught: “You shall utterly destroy it and all that is in it” —

excluding the property of the righteous that is outside it,

meaning that if there were righteous people in that city who did not worship idolatry, and they had property deposited with others elsewhere, it is not destroyed together with the property of the wicked.

“And all that is in it”—

to include the property of the righteous that is

located

within it [

that is inside the city], which is also destroyed together with the property of the wicked. The reason will be explained below.

“Its spoils”—

but not spoils of Heaven.

What constitutes spoils of Heaven will be explained below.

“And all its spoils”—

to include the property of the wicked that is outside it,

which is also destroyed together with all the property of the city.

Rabbi Shimon said: Why did the Torah say

that

the property of the righteous within it should be destroyed?

Because

what caused

the righteous

to reside within it [

within such a city, populated by wicked people]?

Their property,

since their livelihood came from there!

Therefore,

even

their property is destroyed,

despite the fact that they are righteous.

The Master said: “And you shall gather all its spoils”—

to include the property of the wicked that is outside it.

Rav Hisda said: And

this applies specifically

to

property located near the city, which can be

gathered into it

on the same day that all the spoils of the city are gathered into it and burned. But the property of the wicked located far away, which cannot be gathered into it, is not destroyed.

Rav Hisda said: Deposits belonging to the inhabitants of a wayward city are permitted.

And we inquire about this:

What are the circumstances?

In what case is this statement referring?

If you say

!

the

inhabitants of

another city that are in it [

and are located inside the wayward city],

it is obvious that they are permitted,

since

they are not the spoils

of the wayward city

!

Rather,

perhaps it is referring to property

belonging to them,

—

that is found [

and is located]

in another city?

If

the property is located near the city,

so that it can be gathered into it—

why is it permitted?

And if

it is referring to a case where

it cannot be gathered into it—

he already said this once [

Rav Hisda already stated this point once before]! For above he said that the derivation from the verse “And you shall gather all its spoils” that the property of the wicked outside it is destroyed applies specifically when it can be gathered into the city!

And we explain:

No. Actually,

it is referring to property

belonging to another city that was deposited in it. And what are the circumstances here? For example, the bailee, an inhabitant of the wayward city, accepted [

accepted upon himself]

responsibility for it.

Lest you say [

perhaps you would say]:

Since he accepted responsibility for it,

it is considered his [

it is considered as though the property were his], and it would be destroyed together with all the property of the city,

it teaches us

Rav Hisda that this is not so, and this property is not destroyed.

Rav Hisda said: An animal

owned by partners,

half of which belongs to

one of the inhabitants of

the wayward city, and half of which belongs to

an inhabitant of

another city—

is forbidden

to derive benefit from, and its status is that it must be burned, like all the property of the wayward city.

Whereas

dough

owned by partners,

half of which belongs to a wayward city and half of which belongs to another city—

is permitted.

What is the reason?

What is the rationale for the distinction between an animal and dough?

With regard to an animal:

Since it is impossible to eat an olive-bulk of meat without slaughtering it, and with regard to this animal, which belongs to the wayward city, even if it is slaughtered, the slaughter is of no effect, since it is destined to be killed, and through this slaughter one fulfills the law of its death, therefore

it is considered as though it had not been divided [

as though the animal had not been divided between the two partners]. Since even the portion that does not belong to the wayward city is not permitted through its slaughter, for when one cuts one of its slaughtering סימנים while slaughtering it, this is not considered slaughter, but rather the prescribed killing of an animal belonging to a wayward city; therefore, it cannot be permitted through this slaughter.

But that is not the case with regard to

dough:

since at any time the partners can divide it between them,

it is considered

as though it had been divided [

as though they had already divided it between them], and therefore it is not forbidden.

Rav Hisda raised a dilemma: With regard to an animal of a wayward city, can slaughter benefit it by purifying it from the status of an unslaughtered carcass [

can its slaughter be effective in purifying it from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass]?

And the sides of the dilemma are:

For it says: “You shall utterly destroy it and all that is in it, and its animal,

by the sword, the Merciful One said” [

the Torah said], and if so,

it makes no difference

whether

one slaughters it

with a knife,

it makes no difference

whether

one kills it [

by killing it] with a sword: in both cases, it is considered to have been killed, as required in the case of a wayward city, and its slaughter is not considered ordinary slaughter that permits it from the prohibition of an unslaughtered carcass;

or perhaps,

only if one kills it with a sword, not by slaughter, which would permit it, does it become an unslaughtered carcass. But if one slaughters it properly, although it remains forbidden to eat, since it is forbidden to derive benefit from it, nevertheless,

since one slaughtered it—

the slaughter benefits it

by purifying it from the status of an unslaughtered carcass?

What is the halakha?

And we conclude:

The matter remains unresolved.

Rav Yosef raised a dilemma: The hair of righteous women

in a wayward city,

what

is its status? Is it included in “And you shall gather all its spoils, etc., and burn it with fire,” so that it must be cut off and burned, or not?

Rava said:

It follows from Rav Yosef’s dilemma, in which he was uncertain only about the hair of righteous women, that

this

hair

of wicked women—

surely

is forbidden?

But

“you shall gather

etc.,

and burn” is written,

indicating that this applies specifically to

that which requires only gathering and burning.

That is, something that can be gathered and burned immediately, with no further action required.

This excludes this,

the women’s hair,

which requires detaching

from the women’s heads,

and

only then can one perform upon it

gathering and burning!

Rather, Rava said:

Rav Yosef’s dilemma concerns

a wig

.

What are the circumstances?

In what case was Rav Yosef uncertain?

If

it is a case

where the wig is attached

to the woman’s hair

on her body —

и не площадь, устроенную только теперь, после того как жители города были совращены.

then

it is considered like her body,

and just as she herself, and likewise the clothing she wears, are not judged as the property of the inhabitants of the wayward city, so too this hair that she wears is not included!

Rather,

it is necessary to state the dilemma in a case where the wig is

hanging on a peg [

as Rashi and Meiri explained. But the Yad Ramah wrote that the wig is on her head, although it is not attached with wax or the like, but only with a pin, like a peg placed behind the ears, from which the hair is hung]. And the sides of the dilemma are:

Is the wig

considered like the property of the righteous within it [

considered like the property of the righteous that is inside the city, whose status is like the property of the wicked inhabitants of the city]—

and

therefore

it is destroyed [

its status is that it is destroyed together with all the property of the city],

or perhaps, since

the woman regularly

goes in and out [

entering and leaving while wearing the wig], although on this occasion it was not on her head, nevertheless she always has it in mind, and

it is considered like her garment.

And we conclude:

The matter remains unresolved.

It is written:

“And you shall gather all its spoils into the midst of its open square, etc.”

The Sages taught:

If

it does not have

that city

an open square—

it does not become a wayward city. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says:

If

it does not have an open square,

they make

one for it

now.

With regard to what do they disagree?

One Master,

Rabbi Yishmael,

holds: “Its open square”

means from the outset [

an open square that it had originally]

is what is indicated,

and not one created only now, after the inhabitants of the city were led astray.

And the other Master,

Rabbi Akiva,

holds: “Its open square”

means an open square that was made

now [

at this time]

is also indicated.