Rosh Hashanah 6a — the Talmud in English

For

from

the exposition

of Ben Azzai it follows

, this matter is learned:

For it was taught

in a

beraita, Ben Azzai says:

A sacrifice that they slaughtered with the intention of eating it after its permitted time becomes “pigul,” as explained in Leviticus 7:18.

And it is said there concerning this sacrifice: “It shall not be accepted. The one who offers it, it shall not be reckoned for him. It shall be pigul!”

And the word “it” is superfluous, because from the beginning of the verse it is speaking about a sacrifice that they slaughtered with the intention of eating it after its permitted time, and it is self-evident that the continuation of the verse also refers to it.

And this is how Ben Azzai expounded it in the

“it”

—what does it teach

? What does this superfluity come to teach us?

Since it is said

[Deuteronomy 23]: “And when you make a vow,

do not delay fulfilling it.”

I might understand that one who delays his vow also

—since the prohibition of delaying the time has been made applicable to his sacrifice, this sacrifice too is included

in “it shall not be accepted,”

which is said concerning pigul, which is an invalidating thought of delaying the time of eating the sacrifice, and the sacrifice will be invalid.

The verse therefore says

—for this reason it says concerning pigul

“it.”

To tell you that only one who offers

it

with the thought of delaying the time of eating it, he is

within

the category of

“it shall not be accepted,” and one who delays his

vow is not within the category of

“it shall not be accepted.”

And by force of this objection, the Gemara says that indeed the verse “and there will be sin within you” did not come to teach that the sacrifice itself is valid, for this we already know from the exclusion “it,” as we learned in the

beraita

above in the name of Ben Azzai: “

And there will be

sin within you”

—but not sin within your wife!

This teaches that the woman is not punished because her husband transgressed “do not delay.”

And the verse needs to inform us of this, because

it might enter your mind

that one might think

since Rabbi Yohanan said—and some say

[and it is possible that]

Rabbi Elazar

said this:

A man’s wife dies only when they demand from him money

that he is obligated to pay,

and he does not have it

to pay. And as

it is stated

[Proverbs 22:27]:

“If you have nothing with which to pay

[your debt]—

why should

the Holy One

take your bed

[your wife]

from beneath you?”

I might say: In this sin of not delaying also

I would say that because of the sin of not delaying, whereby a person delays paying his debt to God, it is also said that

his wife dies.

Therefore

it teaches us

the verse that a man’s wife does not die because of the sin of “do not delay.”

Thus far the Gemara dealt with explaining the verse [Deuteronomy 23:22]: “When you make a vow to the Lord your God, do not delay fulfilling it.”

And now the Gemara deals with the verse stated later in the passage [there, verse 24]: “

You shall observe what emerges from your lips and perform as you vowed to the Lord your God, a freewill offering, which you spoke with your mouth.”

The Sages taught: “What emerges from your lips

—this is a positive commandment.

For presumably the intention of the verse is to say: What emerges from your lips—fulfill it!

“You shall observe”

—this is a prohibition.

For it is forbidden to delay paying the vow, since everywhere that “guard yourself,” or “lest,” or “do not” is stated in the Torah, this is a prohibition.

“And perform”

under compulsion! And from here there is

a warning to the court that “they shall make you perform,”

that they compel you to fulfill your vow.

“As you vowed”

—this is a vow,

where he said, “It is incumbent upon me to bring such-and-such a sacrifice.”

“To the Lord your God,”

these words are superfluous, and from here they expound to include obligatory sacrifices

—these are sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings and peace-offerings.

“A freewill offering”

—according to its plain meaning:

one who says, “This animal is for such-and-such a sacrifice.”

“Which you spoke,”

these words are superfluous, and they came to include another thing that has a portion belonging to the Most High

—these are consecrated property for the repair of the Temple!

Since the verse already included above the consecrated property of the altar, we must expound these words with regard to consecrated property for the repair of the Temple.

“With your mouth,”

this word too is superfluous, and from it we learn

—this is charity.

These are the words of the

beraita. And we learned from the verse three commandments: A. a positive commandment. B. a prohibition. C. a commandment to the court that they “make you perform” [compel you]. And the Gemara below objects that these three commandments have already been stated in the Torah in other places:

The Master said

in the

beraita: A.

“What emerges from your lips”

—this is a positive commandment.

And it is difficult:

Why do I need

this verse?

After all,

from “and you shall come there”

[to the Temple]

“and there you shall bring

your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices” [Deuteronomy 12:5–6]

it follows

; we learned this positive commandment! B.

б.

“You shall observe”

—this is a prohibition,

and it is difficult:

Why do I need

this verse? After all,

from “do not delay fulfilling it” it follows

; we learned this prohibition! C.

эта запрещающая заповедь!

“And perform”

—this is

a warning to the court that they shall make you perform,

that they compel you to bring your obligations at their proper time.

And it is difficult:

Why do I need

this verse? After all,

from “he shall offer it” it follows

; we learned this law, from that

for it was taught

in a

beraita: It is stated [Leviticus 1:3] concerning a burnt-offering: “If his offering is a burnt-offering from the herd, a male without defect he shall offer it. At the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he shall offer it.”

And the words

“he shall offer it”

are superfluous, for it was already stated, “he shall offer it”!

Rather, this verse

teaches that

the court

compels him

to bring his sacrifice.

One might

say that the court compels him

against his will?

The verse therefore says

[further in the verse]:

“For his acceptance.”

How is it possible

to compel him for his acceptance?

They compel him until he says, “I am willing!”

And we answer: Indeed, each of the three commandments in the

beraita [A. positive commandment. B. prohibition. C. warning to the court that they shall make you perform] was mentioned in the Torah twice.

One time it speaks in the manner

that he says

, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a sacrifice,”

and

he still

has not separated

[it has not been separated].

And one time it speaks in the manner that he has already

сказана в случае, когда он уже

separated it, and

he still

has not offered it

[it has not been offered].

And it is necessary,

and the verse needs to inform us of each of these two cases, because one case cannot be learned from the other:

For if it had informed us

that the verse speaks only in the case where he

said but did not separate

, I would say that specifically in such a case it is forbidden to delay bringing the sacrifice [and only in it are these three commandments stated],

because he has not fulfilled his statement,

for he has not fulfilled his word at all.

But if he separated it but did not offer it, I might say: Wherever it is

—it is in the treasury of the Merciful One.

I would say that wherever the sacrifice is located, it is as though it is in the domain of the Most High, for every place in the world is “the domain of the Most High”; therefore there is no prohibition against delaying bringing the sacrifice to the Temple.

Therefore

it is necessary.

And if it had informed us

that the verse speaks only of

separating but not offering

, I would say that only in this case it is forbidden to delay bringing the sacrifice, because

he is keeping it with him,

he holds a sacrifice in his possession and does not offer it.

But if he said but did not separate it,

and there is no sacrifice in his possession,

I might say: A statement

is nothing!

I would say that there is no prohibition against delaying his vow, since he has no property of the Most High, but only the obligation of a vow.

Therefore

it is necessary.

The verse had to teach us the three commandments [positive, prohibition, and the commandment of compulsion] in both cases.

And we object:

Can you say

that it is possible to establish one of these verses only in the case

where he said but did not separate

, and I would know from it only the delaying of a vow of “It is incumbent upon me to bring a sacrifice,” but I would not know from it the delaying of a freewill offering of “This is a sacrifice”? After all, both verses speak of a person who has already separated it!

But

, in the verse “What emerges from your lips you shall observe and perform,”

a freewill offering is written

explicitly in it: “As you vowed to the Lord your God, a freewill offering.”

And concerning the verse of “do not delay,” we learned through a gezerah shavah in the

beraita above [5b] that it also speaks of a freewill offering. And now the Gemara proves from a Mishna in tractate Kinnim that “a freewill offering” means “I have separated it but have not offered it,” in one who says, “This animal is a sacrifice,” for he has already separated it.

And we learned

in a Mishna in tractate Kinnim [1:1]:

What is a vow

? One who says, “It is incumbent upon me

to bring a

burnt-offering,”

and he did not separate the animal at the time of his vow.

And what is a freewill offering

?

? One who says, “This

animal

is a burnt-offering,”

who consecrates the animal at the time of his statement.

And what

is the practical difference

between a vow and a freewill offering?

A vow

, if he separated a sacrifice after making the vow, in order to fulfill his vow, and the sacrifice

died

or

was stolen

—

—he is responsible for it.

And he is obligated to bring another sacrifice to fulfill his vow, for he said, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a sacrifice,” and did not bring it.

But

a freewill offering,

if it

died or was stolen

he is not responsible for it,

for he did not obligate himself to bring a sacrifice, but only consecrated this particular animal, and said, “This is a sacrifice.” Therefore, when the animal dies, no obligation rests upon him.

And we learned from the words of the Mishna that “a freewill offering” means one who says, “This is a sacrifice,” that is, the animal is already separated at the time of his statement.

And from here there is a difficulty concerning what we said, that one verse speaks in the case where he said but still did not separate. For “a freewill offering” is mentioned in both verses!

He said

—he answered—

Rava: It can be found

that there is a “freewill offering” even in the case where he said, “It is incumbent upon me,” and still did not separate it.

And

for example, where he said, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering

on the condition that I am not responsible for it,”

that when I separate it, I will not become responsible for it.

And since he is not responsible for it, it is within the category of a freewill offering.

And in this manner the donation mentioned in one of these verses is to be established.

We learned in a beraita:

“With your mouth”—

this is charity.

To teach that the mitzvot stated in the verse [positive commandment, prohibition, enforcement by the court] were also said concerning charity.

Rava said: And charity,

is different from the other matters mentioned in the verse, in that

he becomes liable concerning it immediately.

As soon as he is able to give the charity to the poor, and he does not give it—he transgresses the prohibition of “Do not delay.”

What is the reason,

what is the reason that concerning charity one transgresses immediately—

for the poor are present.

For the poor are present everywhere, and there is no need to seek them out at a distance, and he can give them charity at any time. This is not so with offerings, which cannot be offered except in Jerusalem.

And we object:

Is it obvious!

It is plain and self-evident that there is an obligation to give the charity immediately; why did Rava need to teach us such an obvious matter?

And we answer:

It might have been said,

perhaps you would say,

since it is written in the context of offerings,

since charity is mentioned with regard to “Do not delay” together with offerings, therefore one does not transgress concerning it

until there pass over it [

until there pass over it]

three pilgrimage festivals, as with offerings.

He teaches us this,

Rava teaches us that even though charity is mentioned together with offerings, nevertheless there is a difference between them:

There, it is that the Merciful One made them dependent

specifically with regard to offerings the verse made their obligation dependent

on the pilgrimage festivals.

But here,

with charity,

no! For the poor are common.

For the poor are found close to a person at all times. Therefore he transgresses concerning it immediately.

Rava said:

Even though the opinion of the Sages [above, 4b] is that one does not transgress “Do not delay” until after three pilgrimage festivals, nevertheless, already before that,

once one pilgrimage festival has passed over it,

over the offering,

one pilgrimage festival—

he transgresses a positive commandment.

As it is stated [Deuteronomy 12:5–6]: “And you shall come there [to the Temple on the pilgrimage festival], and there you shall bring your burnt offerings and your sacrifices.”

He objects

with a contradiction to Rava’s words from the Mishna in Eduyot [7:6]:

a.

Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Pappias testified

before the Sages

concerning the offspring

of an animal of

peace-offerings,

that it too would be consecrated with the sanctity of its mother, and

would be offered as a peace-offering.

b.

Rabbi Pappias said: I testify that we had a cow

pregnant

belonging to peace-offerings,

and after the cow gave birth to an offspring, we offered the mother,

and ate it,

that cow

on Passover.

And

since the offspring of an animal of peace-offerings is also consecrated with the sanctity of peace-offerings,

we ate

the

offspring

under the status of

peace-offerings—

on the festival.

And the unqualified “festival” mentioned in the Mishna is the festival of Sukkot.

But according to Rava, who said, “Once one pilgrimage festival has passed over it, he transgresses a positive commandment,” it is difficult: how did Rabbi Pappias delay the offspring after Passover and not offer it until Sukkot?

Granted,

it is indeed understandable why

they did not offer it on Passover,

the offspring, because

perhaps,

it may be said

it was lacking time,

for it was born on Passover and eight days had not passed over it. And an animal is not offered before the eighth day after its birth [Leviticus 22:27].

But,

this testimony of Rabbi Pappias—that they ate its offspring on the festival of Sukkot—is difficult:

Its offspring was born on Shavuot—

how did they delay it!?

How, when the festival of Shavuot arrived, did they delay the offspring and not offer it, but continued delaying it until the festival of Sukkot,

and they transgressed concerning it

and it passed over them

with a positive commandment!

For one pilgrimage festival had passed over it and they had not offered it!

Rab Zevid said,

an answer

in the name of Rava: