Rosh Hashanah 28a — the Talmud in English

1.

He heard part of a teki'a in a pit, and part of a teki'a at the edge of the pit—

he has fulfilled his obligation.

The Gemara now assumes that the listener stood at the edge of the pit, while the one blowing stood in the pit; he began to blow, and emerged from the pit during the teki'a, and completed it outside.

It follows that he heard half of an invalid teki'a [an echo from the pit], and half of a valid teki'a [outside the pit]].

]And they fulfill their obligation through it, because one who hears part of a valid teki'a has fulfilled his obligation [and below the Gemara challenges this].

2. He heard

part of a teki'a before dawn arose, and part of a teki'a after dawn arose—

he has not fulfilled his obligation!

Because the time for blowing the shofar is during the day, as it is stated: “It shall be a day of sounding for you.” And the Sages, of blessed memory, expounded [Megilla 20b]: “day” and not night. And before dawn it is night.

He said

he challenged

him, Abaye:

What is different there,

in that one who blows part of a teki'a before dawn arose and part after dawn arose does not fulfill his obligation, because

I require the entire teki'a to be within the time of obligation, and there is not.

Since the entire teki'a must be within the “obligation,” such that one can fulfill the obligation through the entire teki'a, and one does not fulfill the obligation through a teki'a in part of which it is impossible to fulfill the obligation, even though in the other part of the teki'a one could fulfill the obligation,

for one must hear a complete teki'a through all of which one fulfills the obligation!

If so,

here too,

also one who hears a teki'a part of which was in the pit and part of which was outside the pit

I require the entire teki'a to be within the time of obligation, and there is not!

For when hearing the part of the teki'a that was inside the pit, it is impossible to fulfill the obligation, and the difficulty is: Why did the listener here fulfill his obligation?

Rabba answered him:

How can these cases be compared?!

What is the comparison between the two cases?!

There,

the one who hears a teki'a part of which was before dawn arose did not fulfill his obligation because

night is not a time of obligation at all,

and it follows that the beginning of the teki'a is not a teki'a of a mitzva [it is not a teki'a within the “obligation”]]”.

But

here,

here, one who hears part of a teki'a in a pit has fulfilled his obligation because the

pit—

is a “place of obligation.”

For the teki'a in the pit is effective

for those standing in the pit itself. See note.

And since the entire teki'a is a teki'a of a mitzva, those standing outside can fulfill their obligation by hearing part of this teki'a.

And we challenge:

Does this mean,

you must necessarily say,

that Rabba holds: one who heard the end of a teki'a without the beginning of a teki'a—

has fulfilled his obligation. [For this is why the one who heard part of a teki'a outside the pit fulfilled his obligation.]

For this is why one who hears part of the tekia outside the pit fulfills his obligation.]

And consequently,

it must be inferred from this that one who also hears

the beginning of a teki'a without the end of a teki'a has fulfilled his obligation.

For there is no difference between the end of the teki'a without its beginning and its beginning without its end!

Come and hear,

come and hear a proof not in accordance with your words, for we learned in a Mishna [below, 33b]:

In the time of the Mishna, they would blow during the Additional Prayer of Rosh Hashanah only three orders of teki'a-teru'a-teki'a [teki'a, teru'a, teki'a]: one order for Kingships, one order for Remembrances, and one order for Shofarot.

And the Mishna below says that a person cannot blow one long teki'a as two, so that the long teki'a should count for two teki'ot: for the last teki'a of the order of Kingships and for the first teki'a of the order of Remembrances.

For we learned:

If he blew the first,

the first teki'a in the order of Kingships according to its law, and afterward blew a teru'a according to its law, and afterward blew the teki'a following the teru'a,

and extended,

and lengthened

the

teki'a

second

that follows the teru'a

as

like

two

teki'ot, so as to fulfill through it the obligation of two teki'ot [one at the end of the first order of teki'a-teru'a-teki'a, and the second at the beginning of the second order]—

it is not in his possession,

it does not count for him

except

one teki'a

only [and he fulfilled one order of teki'a-teru'a-teki'a].

and he has completed one series of tekia-terua-tekia].

And why?

Why does he have only one?

For since you said that one can fulfill the obligation through half a teki'a—

let it count for two!?

Let the second teki'a count in place of two teki'ot!

Rather, from here there is proof that one cannot fulfill the obligation through half a teki'a [and this is not in accordance with your words].

And we answer: Indeed, one can fulfill the obligation through half a teki'a, but

the teki'ot are to be divided from one another—

we do not divide them.

We do not divide one teki'a in order to fulfill through it the obligation of two teki'ot.

The Gemara brings another proof that one does not fulfill the obligation through half a teki'a:

Come and hear,

come and hear from what we learned in a Mishna:

One who blows into a pit, or into a cistern [a fenced-off place on the ground],

an enclosed place on the ground],

or into a large barrel

a large barrel—

If the sound of the shofar

is clear

he heard—

he has fulfilled his obligation.

But if the sound of an echo,

an echo,

he heard—

he has not fulfilled his obligation.

It is implied to the Gemara that he has no possibility of fulfilling his obligation even though at first he hears only the sound of the shofar, and only later in the teki'a, when the sound of the echo arrives, the sound of the teki'a becomes mixed with the sound of the echo and he does not hear the sound of the teki'a properly.

And one must ask:

And why

does he not fulfill his obligation by hearing the sound of the shofar at the beginning of the teki'a, before the sound of the echo became mixed into it?

For indeed, when he hears the sound of an echo together with the sound of the shofar, he does not fulfill his obligation, because two sounds are not heard simultaneously.

But,

let him fulfill his obligation,

that he fulfilled his obligation

at the beginning of the teki'a, before

before

the sound becomes mixed,

before the sound of the shofar became mixed with the echo!

And we conclude: Indeed, one who hears half a teki'a has not fulfilled his obligation.

And

when Rabba said,

and what Rabba said, “He heard part of a teki'a in a pit and part of a teki'a at the edge of the pit, he has fulfilled his obligation,” applies only

to one who blows and ascends—

for himself!

In the case of one who blows for himself and not to enable others to fulfill their obligation, and during his teki'a he ascended from the pit. For he himself has a complete teki'a, since while he is in the pit he hears not the sound of an echo but the sound of the shofar itself [as above, 27b], and consequently there is here a complete valid teki'a, for both while he is still in the pit and when he emerges outside the pit, his blowing and his hearing are valid.

And we challenge:

If so,

if indeed the matter concerns one who blows for himself, whose entire teki'a is valid,

what is there to say,

what did Rabba come to teach? It is obvious that he has fulfilled his obligation!

And we answer:

Lest you say,

perhaps you would say,

sometimes he brings out his head, while the shofar is still in the pit, and the sound becomes mixed.

For there is concern lest he bring out his head before he has brought out the shofar, and at that time the sound of the shofar will become mixed with the sound of the echo, since he is outside the pit while the shofar is in the pit, and then he does not fulfill his obligation.

He teaches us this

that there is no concern for this.

Rav Yehuda said: With the shofar of an

animal

olah

that they detached from the animal during its lifetime—

he should not blow, because the animal is sacred.

because the animal has sacred status.

And if he blew

inadvertently —

he has fulfilled his obligation.

Whereas

with the shofar of a shelamim-offering—

he should not blow.

And if he blew

inadvertently—

he has not fulfilled his obligation.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

An olah—

is subject to me'ila

during its lifetime, because it is most holy; and one who derives benefit from most holy offerings inadvertently commits me'ila, and is obligated to pay the principal and an additional fifth and to bring a guilt-offering, as explained in the Torah [Leviticus 5:14–16].

And

since he committed me'ila with it,

having become obligated to pay its value under the law of me'ila—

it goes out

it went out

to unconsecrated status.

And at the time that he blows, he does not transgress, because the shofar had already become unconsecrated.

But

shelamim,

which are lesser holiness,

are not subject to me'ila,

for one does not commit me'ila with them during their lifetime because they belong to their owners, and only after slaughter does one commit me'ila with the sacrificial portions belonging to the Most High, and therefore

a prohibition

alone

is imposed upon them,

it rests upon them, but they do not have the law of me'ila!

And

therefore,

they do not go out to unconsecrated status,

they do not become unconsecrated through using them, and since they have not become unconsecrated, whenever he blows with them he transgresses a prohibition, and his blowing is in the category of “a mitzva that comes through a transgression,” and therefore he has not fulfilled his obligation.

And here the case is one in which he detached the shofar from the ram during its lifetime. But if he detached it after the sprinkling of the blood, there is no me'ila even with an olah, neither with its hide nor with its horns, because they belong to the kohanim.

Rava challenged it:

Why did one who blows with the shofar of an olah fulfill his obligation? For

when [when]

does he

did he commit me'ila—

after he blew,

only after he blew and derived benefit from the shofar! But

when he was blowing—

he was blowing in violation of a prohibition!

For at the time he blew he transgressed a prohibition, because the shofar had not yet become unconsecrated, and this is a mitzva that comes through a transgression!

Rather, Rava said: Both this one and that one,

both one who blows with the shofar of an olah and one who blows with the shofar of a shelamim—

has not fulfilled his obligation!

For at the time of the blowing he transgressed.

Afterward,

afterward Rava retracted, and

said: Both this one and that one—

has fulfilled his obligation.

Since

mitzvot—

were not given for benefit.

The mitzvot were not given to Israel so that they would derive benefit from fulfilling them; rather, they were given as a yoke upon their necks. It follows that he did not derive any benefit from the consecrated property through his blowing with the shofar, and there is no mitzva that comes through a transgression here.

Rav Yehuda said: With the shofar of idolatry,

which was used for idolatry, and which is forbidden for benefit, as explained in tractate Avoda Zara [51b]—

he should not blow.

Because it is repulsive.

And if he blew

with it—

he has fulfilled his obligation.

For “mitzvot were not given for benefit,” and one who blows with a shofar does not derive benefit from it. Therefore, he has not transgressed.

With the shofar of a condemned city,

a city whose majority of inhabitants worshipped idolatry, and the worshippers of idolatry, their women, and their children are killed [Maimonides, Laws of Idolatry 5:6], and the property of all the people of that city is burned [Deuteronomy 13:17; and Maimonides there]. And with the shofar belonging to the people of that city—

he should not blow.

And if he blew—

he has not fulfilled his obligation

even after the fact.

What is the reason?

A condemned city,

whose entire property is destined to be burned is considered as burned. And consequently, already now it is considered as though

its measure is crushed.

It is crushed and lacking its measure.

]And a shofar must have a measure, so that one can hold it in his hand and see it protruding on either side [as above, 27b].

Rava said: One who is mudar hanaa from his fellow,

one who prohibited himself by a vow from deriving benefit from his fellow—

it is permitted

for his fellow

to blow for him

to enable him to fulfill his obligation of

a mitzva teki'a,

because mitzvot were not given for benefit.

And likewise,

one who is mudar hanaa from a shofar.

One who prohibited himself by a vow from deriving benefit from a shofar—

it is permitted

for him

to blow with it a mitzva teki'a,

because mitzvot were not given for benefit.

And in the course of speaking about one who is mudar hanaa, for whom it is permitted to blow a shofar for him because mitzvot were not given for benefit, the Gemara brings additional examples that Rava stated for this law:

And Rava said: One who is mudar hanaa from his fellow.

One who prohibited himself from deriving benefit from his fellow, and was impure with corpse-impurity, so that the waters of purification must be sprinkled upon him on the third day and on the seventh day in order to purify him [as explained in the Book of Leviticus 19:11–12]—

His fellow

sprinkles upon him the waters of purification during the rainy season.

Because there is no benefit of washing from the coldness of the water in them, but only the benefit of fulfilling the mitzva, and mitzvot were not given for benefit.

But he may not

sprinkle upon him

during the hot season,

since besides the fulfillment of the mitzva [which is not considered benefit], he also has bodily benefit from the washing, and this benefit is forbidden to him.

And likewise

one who is mudar hanaa from a spring,

who prohibited himself from deriving benefit from the spring—

he immerses in it an immersion for a mitzva during the rainy season

because mitzvot were not given for benefit.

But he may not

immerse

during the hot season,

because his body derives benefit from the water.

We learned in a Mishna: One who was passing behind a synagogue, or whose house was adjacent to a synagogue, and heard the sound of a shofar or a Megilla—if he directed his heart, he has fulfilled his obligation; and if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation.

And one must examine the words of our Mishna: Does it concern intention to fulfill the mitzva, or intention to hear the teki'a?

For the clarification of the matter, the Gemara brings here the discussion before us, which considers whether mitzvot require intention in order to fulfill the obligation, and within it they also discuss the words of our Mishna:

They sent to him

the Sages a matter of halakha

to Shmuel’s father:

One who

was compelled

against his will,

and ate matza

under compulsion on Passover—

has fulfilled

the obligation of the mitzva of eating matza [and immediately it will be explained who compelled him].

And we raised it as a difficulty:

Who compelled him?

Who was this who compelled him to eat matza?

If you say that a demon compelled him

if it is said that a demon, which brings a person to madness, compelled him, and he ate matza at that time, and afterward, within the time of his obligation, he became well, how is it possible that he fulfilled his obligation?

And it was taught in a beraita:

One who is

at times sane,

sometimes sound in mind,

at times

and sometimes he is

insane—

When he is sane—

he is like an intelligent person in all his matters,

and he is obligated in all the mitzvot of the Torah.

And

when he is insane—

he is like an insane person in all his matters,

and he is exempt from all the mitzvot stated in the Torah.

And since, when he is insane, he is exempt from all the mitzvot of the Torah, if so, when a demon of madness compelled him and he ate matza, he was not obligated in any mitzva at all then. It is therefore as though he ate matza on the other days of the year, in which case he certainly did not fulfill his obligation!

Rav Ashi said:

The matter concerns a sound person who is obligated to eat matza,

whom Persians compelled

to eat matza, and he fulfilled his obligation, and he does not need to return and eat matza a second time.

Rabba said: This tells us

this statement [“he compelled him and he ate matza”] teaches us that

one who blows

the shofar on Rosh Hashanah

for

the sake of

song—

has fulfilled his obligation!

Even though he did not intend to fulfill the mitzva of blowing the shofar. For even the one whom the Persians compelled did not intend to eat matza for the sake of the mitzva, and nevertheless he fulfilled his obligation.

And we were astonished:

It is obvious

that one who blows for the sake of song has fulfilled his obligation, for

it is the same thing!

This is exactly analogous to the case of one whom they compelled and who ate matza, so why did Rabba have to trouble himself to teach us such an obvious matter? And we answer:

What might you have said

perhaps you might have said that specifically in the eating of matza intention is not required, because

there

in the eating of matza,

“The Merciful One said, ‘Eat matza.’”

That is to say, the mitzva of matza is a mitzva concerning eating,

and he did eat.

And after all, he derived benefit from the eating.

Therefore his eating is considered eating, even though he ate it because of compulsion and is not included in “one who is occupied [with something else]”.

For we learned: One who is occupied with fats and eats them without intending [to eat them], and likewise one who is occupied with forbidden sexual relations, is liable to a sin-offering, because “he thereby derives benefit” [unlike one who is occupied with prohibitions that do not depend on eating and benefit, for one who is occupied with them is exempt].