Rosh Hashanah 28a (כח.) — the Talmud in English

a.

He heard part of a tekia in a pit, and part of the tekia at the edge of the pit—

he has fulfilled his obligation.

The Gemara now assumes that the listener was standing at the edge of the pit, while the one sounding the shofar was standing in the pit. He began sounding the tekia, then emerged from the pit during the tekia, and completed it outside.

It follows that he heard half of an invalid tekia [the sound from within the pit] and half of a valid tekia [outside the pit].

And they fulfill their obligation with it, because one who hears part of a valid tekia has fulfilled his obligation [and below, the Gemara raises an objection to this].

b. He heard

part of a tekia before dawn, and part of the tekia after dawn—

he has not fulfilled his obligation!

Because the time for sounding the shofar is during the day, as it is stated: “It shall be a day of sounding for you.” And the Sages interpreted [Megilla 20b]: “A day,” and not a night. Before dawn, it is night.

He said

[Abaye] challenged

him:

What is different there, concerning one who sounds part of a tekia before dawn and part of it after dawn, such that he has not fulfilled his obligation, because

you require the entire tekia to be within the period of obligation, and that is not the case?

Because I require the entire tekia to be within the period of obligation, and that is not the case.

Since the entire tekia must be within the “period of obligation,” so that one could fulfill his obligation through the entire tekia, one cannot fulfill his obligation through a tekia part of which cannot be used to fulfill the obligation, even though through the other part of the tekia he could fulfill the obligation.

For one must hear a complete tekia through which he fulfills his obligation—in its entirety!

If so,

here too,

even one who hears a tekia part of which was in the pit and part of which was outside the pit,

I require the entire tekia to be within the period of obligation, and that is not the case!

For with regard to hearing the part of the tekia that was inside the pit, one cannot fulfill his obligation; so the question arises: Why, in this case, did the listener fulfill his obligation?

Rabba answered him:

Can this be compared?

What is the comparison between the two cases?!

There,

one who hears a tekia part of which was before dawn has not fulfilled his obligation because

night is not a time of obligation at all,

and it follows that the beginning of the tekia was not a tekia of a mitzva [it was not a tekia within the “period of obligation”].

But

here,

in this case, one who hears part of the tekia in a pit has fulfilled his obligation because the

pit

“is a place of obligation.”

For the tekia sounded in the pit is effective

for those standing in the pit itself. See note.

And since the entire tekia is a tekia of a mitzva, those standing outside can fulfill their obligation by hearing part of this tekia.

And we challenge this:

Is that to say,

you are necessarily saying

that Rabba holds: One who hears the end of a tekia without the beginning of the tekia—

has fulfilled his obligation.

[For this is why one who hears part of the tekia outside the pit has fulfilled his obligation.]

And consequently,

it should be inferred from this that one who hears

the beginning of a tekia without the end of the tekia has fulfilled his obligation.

For there is no difference between the end of a tekia without its beginning and its beginning without its end!

Come and hear,

come and hear a proof not in accordance with your statement, for we learned in a Mishna [below, 33b]:

In the period of the Mishna, they sounded during the Musaf prayer of Rosh HaShana only three series of tekia-terua-tekia [tekia, terua, tekia]: one series for Malchuyot, one series for Zichronot, and one series for Shofarot.

And the Mishna below says that a person cannot sound one long tekia as though it were two, so that the long tekia would count for two tekiot: the final tekia of the Malchuyot series and the first tekia of the Zichronot series.

As we learned:

If he sounded the first one,

the first tekia in the Malchuyot series in the proper manner, and afterward sounded the terua in the proper manner, and then sounded the tekia following the terua,

and extended

and prolonged

the

tekia

second

following the terua

as

though it were

two

tekiot, so that he could fulfill his obligation through it for two tekiot [one at the end of the first tekia-terua-tekia series and the second at the beginning of the second series]—

it is not in his power;

it counts for him

only

as one

tekia

[and he has fulfilled his obligation for one tekia-terua-tekia series].

And why?

Why does it count for him as only one?

For once you have said that one can fulfill his obligation through half a tekia,

let it be divided into two!?

Let the second tekia count for him as two tekiot!

Rather, from here there is a proof that one cannot fulfill his obligation through half a tekia [and this is contrary to your statement].

And we answer: It is indeed possible to fulfill one’s obligation through half a tekia, but

the tekiot of a series

we do not divide one from another.

We do not divide one tekia so that it can be used to fulfill the obligation for two tekiot.

And the Gemara brings another proof that one does not fulfill his obligation through half a tekia:

Come and hear,

come and hear from what we learned in a Mishna:

One who sounds into a pit, or into a cistern

[an enclosed place on the ground],

or into a large barrel

a large container—

if he heard the sound of the shofar

clearly,

he heard it—

he has fulfilled his obligation.

But if he heard the sound of an echo,

an echo,

he heard it—

he has not fulfilled his obligation.

The Gemara understands that he cannot fulfill his obligation even though at first he hears only the sound of the shofar, and only later in the tekia, when the sound of the echo begins, the sound of the tekia becomes mixed with the sound of the echo and he no longer hears the sound of the tekia properly.

And the question arises:

But why

does he not fulfill his obligation by hearing the sound of the shofar at the beginning of the tekia, before the sound of the echo became mixed with it?

For although when he hears the sound of the echo together with the sound of the shofar he does not fulfill his obligation, because two sounds cannot be heard simultaneously,

but

let him fulfill it,

let him fulfill his obligation

at the beginning of the tekia, before

before

the sound becomes mixed,

before the sound of the shofar becomes mixed with the echo!

And we conclude: Indeed, one who hears half a tekia has not fulfilled his obligation.

And

when Rabba said,

and what Rabba said—“Heard part of a tekia in a pit and part of a tekia at the edge of the pit, he has fulfilled his obligation”—refers only to

one who sounds and emerges

for himself!

That is, one who sounds for himself and not in order to enable others to fulfill their obligation, and who emerged from the pit while sounding. He himself has a complete tekia, since while he was in the pit he did not hear the sound of an echo, but only the sound of the shofar itself [as above, 27b]. Consequently, there is a complete valid tekia here, since both while he was still in the pit and after he emerged outside the pit, his sounding and hearing were valid.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if indeed the case concerns one who sounds for himself, so that his entire tekia is valid,

what is the point of saying this?

What is Rabba teaching us? It is self-evident that he has fulfilled his obligation!

And we answer:

Lest you say,

perhaps you would say:

Sometimes he removes his head while the shofar is still in the pit, and the sound becomes mixed.

There is reason for concern that he might remove his head before removing the shofar, and at that moment the sound of the shofar will become mixed with the sound of the echo, since he is outside the pit while the shofar remains in the pit; in that case, he would not fulfill his obligation.

It teaches us

that there is no reason for such concern.

Rav Yehuda said: With the shofar of an

animal designated as an

olah

that was torn from the animal while it was alive—

one should not sound it,

because the animal is sacred.

But if he sounded it

unintentionally —

he has fulfilled his obligation.

But

with the shofar of a shelamim offering—

one should not sound it.

But if he sounded it

unintentionally—

he has not fulfilled his obligation.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

An olah

is subject to the laws of me’ila

during its lifetime, because it is kodshei kodashim, and one who unintentionally derives benefit from kodshei kodashim commits me’ila and is obligated to repay the principal plus one-fifth and bring a guilt-offering, as explained in the Torah [Leviticus 5:14–16].

And

once he has committed me’ila with regard to it,

having become obligated to repay its value under the laws of me’ila,

it goes out

it goes out

into ordinary property.

And when he sounds it, he is not committing a transgression, because the shofar had already become ordinary property.

But

shelamim,

which are kodashim kalim,

are not subject to the laws of me’ila,

because one does not commit me’ila with regard to them during their lifetime, since they belong to their owners; only after slaughter does one commit me’ila with regard to the sacrificial portions belonging to the Most High. Therefore,

a prohibition

alone

rests upon them,

but they are not subject to the laws of me’ila!

And

therefore,

they do not become ordinary property,

they do not become ordinary property through use, and since they have not become ordinary property, as long as he sounds them he is transgressing a prohibition. His sounding is therefore a mitzva performed through a transgression, and consequently he has not fulfilled his obligation.

This refers to a case in which he tore the shofar from the ram while it was alive. But if he tore it off after the blood had been sprinkled, even in the case of an olah there is no me’ila, neither with regard to its hide nor with regard to its horns, because they belong to the kohanim.

Rava challenged this:

Why did one who sounded a shofar of an olah fulfill his obligation? For

when

[at what point]

did he commit me’ila?

Only after he sounded it,

only after he sounded it and derived benefit from the shofar! But

when he was sounding it,

he was sounding it in violation of the prohibition!

For while he was sounding it, he was transgressing, because the shofar had not yet become ordinary property; this is therefore a mitzva performed through a transgression!

Rather, Rava said: Both this one and that one,

both one who sounds a shofar of an olah and one who sounds a shofar of shelamim,

has not fulfilled his obligation!

For at the time of the sounding he committed a transgression.

Subsequently,

Rava retracted his statement and

said: Both this one and that one—

has fulfilled his obligation.

Since

mitzvot

were not given for benefit.

The mitzvot were not given to Israel so that they would derive benefit from fulfilling them; rather, they were given as a yoke to place upon their necks. It follows that he derived no benefit at all from sacred property by sounding the shofar, and this is not a mitzva performed through a transgression.

Rav Yehuda said: With a shofar of idolatry,

one that was used for idolatry and is forbidden for benefit, as explained in tractate Avoda Zara [51b]—

one should not sound it,

because it is repulsive.

But if he sounded it

with it—

he has fulfilled his obligation.

For “mitzvot were not given for benefit,” and one who sounds a shofar does not derive benefit from it. Therefore, he has not committed a transgression.

With a shofar of a condemned city,

a city whose majority of inhabitants worshipped idolatry, in which case those who worshipped idolatry, as well as their wives and children, are killed [Rambam, Laws of Idolatry 5:6], and the property of all the inhabitants of that city is burned [Deuteronomy 13:17; and Rambam there]. And with a shofar belonging to the inhabitants of such a city—

one should not sound it.

But if he sounded it—

he has not fulfilled his obligation,

even after the fact.

What is the reason?

A condemned city,

whose entire property is destined to be burned, is considered as though it has already been burned. Consequently, from now it is already considered as though

its measure has been crushed.

Its measure has been reduced.

And a shofar must have a required measure, so that one can hold it in his hand and see it protruding on either side [as above, 27b].

Rava said: One who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from his fellow,

that is, one who prohibited himself by a vow from deriving benefit from his fellow—

is permitted

to his fellow

to sound for him

in order to enable him to fulfill his obligation of

the mitzva of sounding the shofar,

because mitzvot were not given for benefit.

Likewise,

one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from a shofar,

that is, one who prohibited himself by a vow from deriving benefit from a shofar—

is permitted

to him

to sound a tekia with it as a mitzva,

because mitzvot were not given for benefit.

And since we have spoken of one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit and may have a shofar sounded for him because mitzvot were not given for benefit, the Gemara brings additional examples that Rava stated concerning this principle:

And Rava said: One who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from his fellow.

That is, one who prohibited himself from deriving benefit from his fellow, and who had become impure through contact with a corpse and requires sprinkling with waters of purification on the third and seventh days in order to purify himself [as explained in Leviticus 19:11–12]—

his fellow

may sprinkle the waters of purification upon him during the rainy season.

For he does not derive the pleasure of bathing from the cold water; he derives only the benefit of fulfilling the mitzva, and mitzvot were not given for benefit.

But not

may he sprinkle them upon him

during the hot season,

since, besides fulfilling the mitzva [which is not considered benefit], he also derives physical pleasure from the bathing, and this benefit is forbidden to him.

Likewise,

one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from a spring,

who prohibited himself from deriving benefit from the spring—

may immerse in it as a mitzva immersion during the rainy season,

because mitzvot were not given for benefit.

But not

may he immerse

during the hot season,

because his body derives pleasure from the water.

We learned in a Mishna: One who was passing behind a synagogue, or whose house was adjacent to a synagogue, and who heard the sound of a shofar or a Megilla—if he directed his heart, he has fulfilled his obligation; but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation.

And one must analyze the statement of our Mishna: Does it refer to directing one’s intention to fulfill the mitzva, or to intending to hear the tekia?

To clarify this matter, the Gemara cites here the discussion before us, which considers whether mitzvot require intention to fulfill one’s obligation; within it, the Gemara also discusses the statement of our Mishna:

They sent word to him

the Sages sent a halakhic matter

to Shmuel’s father:

One who

was forced

against his will,

and ate matza

under compulsion on Pesach—

has fulfilled

the mitzva of eating matza [and it will immediately be explained who forced him].

And we raise a discussion concerning this:

Who forced him?

Who was it that forced him to eat matza?

If you say that a demon forced him:

If it is said that a demon, which causes a person to become insane, forced him, and he ate matza at that time, and afterward, within the period when he was obligated, he recovered, how could it be that he fulfilled his obligation?

But it was taught in a beraita:

One who is

at times mentally sound,

sometimes being sound of mind,

at times

and sometimes being

insane—

when he is mentally sound—

he is like a mentally competent person in every respect,

and he is obligated in all the mitzvot of the Torah.

And

when he is insane—

he is like an insane person in every respect,

and he is exempt from all the mitzvot stated in the Torah.

And since, when he is insane, he is exempt from all the mitzvot of the Torah, if so, at the time when a demon forced him in his insanity and he ate matza, he was not obligated in the mitzva at all. It is therefore as though he had eaten matza on the other days of the year, in which case he certainly would not have fulfilled his obligation!

Rav Ashi said:

This is referring to a sound person who is obligated to eat matza,

whom Persians forced

to eat matza, and he fulfilled his obligation and need not eat matza a second time.

Rabba said: This indicates

This statement [“he was forced and ate matza”] teaches us that

one who blows

the shofar on Rosh HaShana

for

the sake of

music—

has fulfilled his obligation!

Even though he did not intend to fulfill the mitzva of blowing the shofar. For even the one whom the Persians forced did not intend to eat matza for the sake of the mitzva, and nevertheless he fulfilled his obligation.

And we raise an objection:

Obviously

one who blows for the sake of music has fulfilled his obligation, for

it is the same thing!

This is exactly comparable to the case of one whom they forced and who ate matza, so why did Rabba have to trouble himself to teach us such an obvious matter? And we resolve:

Lest you say

that perhaps you would say that specifically in the case of eating matza no intention is required, because

there

in the case of eating matza,

“The Merciful One said: Eat matza.”

That is, the mitzva of matza is a mitzva involving eating,

and he did eat.

And he derived benefit from the eating.

Therefore his eating is considered eating, even though he ate it because he was forced, and he is not included in the category of one who is merely engaged in an act without awareness, known as "one who is occupied with something else".

For we learned: One who is occupied with eating forbidden fats and eats them without intending to do so, and likewise one who is occupied with forbidden sexual relations, is liable to bring a sin-offering, because “he nevertheless derived benefit” [unlike one who is occupied with acts involving prohibitions that are not dependent on eating and deriving benefit, in which case one who is merely occupied with something else is exempt].