Pesachim 88a — the Talmud in English

Ulla said

there is another reason why the Holy One, blessed be He, exiled Israel to Babylonia:

so that they would eat ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

dates,

which are plentiful in Babylonia.

And engage in Torah study.

Ulla,

who lived in Eretz Yisrael,

happened to come

to

Pumbedita.

They brought him a basket of dates,

a basket of dates was brought before him.

He said to them,

he asked them:

How many like these can be bought for a zuz?

How many dates of this kind can one buy for one zuz?

They said to him: Three

three

for a zuz.

He said,

Ulla said:

A full basket of honey for a zuz

—one can obtain a jar full of honey for a single zuz,

and

even so

the Babylonians do not engage in Torah study!

That is, he criticized them for not studying Torah as befits the abundance of their food. [Based on the Maharsha].

That night—

they caused him suffering.

That night Ulla felt pain in his intestines as a result of eating the dates.

Ulla changed his mind

and said: A full basket of a deadly poison

costs a zuz in Babylonia.

A jar full of deadly poison can be bought in Babylonia for a zuz.

And

even so,

the Babylonians do engage in Torah study.

And Rabbi Elazar said: What is the meaning of that which is written:

in connection with the Third Temple, which will be built in the future:

“And many peoples shall go, and they shall say: Come, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the House of the God of Jacob

and He will teach us of His ways.”

Is the Lord

the God of Jacob

alone, and not

the God of Abraham and Isaac?!

Why, then, is only the God of Jacob mentioned?

Rather,

this is the meaning of the verse:

Not like Abraham, of whom it is written

that he prayed at the site of the Temple, and Scripture called it

“a mountain.” As it is stated:

“And Abraham called the name of that place ‘The Lord will see,’

as it is said today: On the mountain of the Lord it shall be seen.”

The term “mountain” implies an uninhabited place, corresponding to the First Temple, which ultimately was destroyed [the commentators in Ein Yaakov].

And not like Isaac, of whom it is written

that he prayed at the site of the Temple, and Scripture called it

“a field,”

as it is stated

in Genesis 24:63:

“And Isaac went out to meditate in the field

at eventide.”

The term “field” likewise implies an uninhabited place, corresponding to the Second Temple, which ultimately was destroyed.

Rather, like Jacob, who called it a house,

as it is stated:

“And he called the name of that place Beth-El.”

A house is an inhabited place, corresponding to the Third Temple, which will exist forever [the commentators in Ein Yaakov. See also the Maharsha].

Rabbi Yohanan said: Great is the day

of the ingathering

of the exiles, like the day on which heaven and earth were created.

As it is stated:

in Hosea 2:2:

“And the children of Judah and the children of Israel shall be gathered together, and they shall appoint for themselves one head, and they shall go up from the land, for great is the day of Jezreel.”

“The day of Jezreel” is the day of the ingathering of the exiles . As it is translated there: “the day of their gathering”—the day of their assembly.

And the verse called the ingathering of the exiles “a day” [the day of Jezreel].

And it is written

in the account of Creation:

“And there was evening and there was morning, one day.”

This teaches you that the ingathering of the exiles, which is called “a day,” is comparable to the “day” written concerning the creation of the world.

We learned in the Mishna:

An orphan for whom the trustees slaughtered

may eat wherever he wishes.

It was already explained above that the tannaim disagree in several places in the Talmud as to whether there is bereira. That is, when something is not clarified now and becomes clarified only later, do we say that the matter is retroactively clarified, so that from the outset it had been designated for this purpose?

In our Mishna, two trustees slaughtered a Paschal offering on behalf of the orphan. At the time of slaughter, it was not clear which of them the orphan wished to join. Only afterward did it become known which one he wished to join.

And we infer from this:

Can you conclude from it that there is bereira!

Since it became clear now which of them the orphan wished to join, we say that retroactively, from the time of slaughter, he had been registered for this offering!

And we reject this:

Rabbi Zeira said:

Our Mishna can in fact be established according to the one who says that there is no bereira. Nevertheless, the orphan may eat wherever he wishes, because it is stated: “And they shall take for themselves, each man, a lamb according to the house of his fathers, a lamb for a household.”

And the Sages expounded:

“A lamb for a household”—

in any event.

The man, the head of the household, takes a lamb for all the members of the household, and does not require their consent in order to register them for it.

The Sages taught:

It is stated:

“A lamb for a household”—

this teaches that a person may bring and slaughter on behalf of

for

his minor son or daughter,

for whom he is obligated to provide education.

And

likewise

on behalf of

for

his Canaanite male or female slave,

who are dependent upon him —

whether with their knowledge or without their knowledge.

But he may not slaughter on behalf of his adult son or daughter, nor on behalf of his Hebrew male or female slave, nor on behalf of his wife, except with their knowledge.

Another beraita was taught: A person may not slaughter on behalf of his adult son or daughter,

nor

on behalf of his Hebrew male or female slave, and

nor

on behalf of his wife, except with their knowledge.

But he may slaughter on behalf of his minor son or daughter, and on behalf of his Canaanite male or female slave, whether with their knowledge or without their knowledge.

And in the case of all of them for whom they slaughtered

themselves,

and

also

their master slaughtered on their behalf—

they fulfill their obligation through their master’s offering, but they do not fulfill it through their own offering. Except for the woman,

because

she can object,

as she may not wish to be registered for it.

We challenge this: The beraita implies that only the woman can object, whereas the others cannot object. This is difficult—

how is a woman different,

in what way does a woman differ from an adult son or daughter, or from a Hebrew male or female slave? After all, they too may be slaughtered for only with their knowledge!

Rava said:

What the beraita taught, “except for the woman,” means

a woman and anyone comparable to her.

A woman and all those comparable to her, for whom one may slaughter only with their knowledge, because all of them can object.

We challenge the wording of the beraita:

The matter itself is difficult: You said, “Except for the woman, who can object.”

And one may infer from this:

The reason is that she objects,

the reason that the woman does not fulfill her obligation through her husband’s offering is specifically that she explicitly objected.

If she does not object,

but if she did not object,

she fulfills it

through

her husband’s offering!

And

this is difficult:

But the first clause teaches

“not on behalf of his adult son or daughter

nor on behalf of his wife, except with their knowledge.” This implies that if he slaughtered without asking, she does not fulfill her obligation.

That is, if he slaughtered without explicitly asking the woman for her opinion, she does not fulfill her obligation through this Paschal offering!

And we answer:

What does “except with their knowledge” mean

as written in the first clause of the beraita?

It does not mean that they said, “Yes.”

It does not specifically mean that they explicitly said, “We wish to do so.”

Rather,

even

without any statement,

we assume that this is their intention.

And

to exclude a case in which they said, “No,”

to exclude a case in which they explicitly said no, for only then may they not be registered against their will.

We challenge this:

But

this is the wording of the beraita:

“All of them for whom they slaughtered, and their master slaughtered on their behalf, fulfill their obligation through their master’s offering.”

For

it implies that the case is

without any statement. And it teaches

:

“except for the woman,”

which implies that even when there was no statement, if she slaughtered and her husband slaughtered, she does not fulfill her obligation through her husband’s offering

because she can object!

Rava said

in answer:

Once they slaughtered

themselves,

you have no

greater objection than this!

Since the woman slaughtered an offering herself, she thereby demonstrated that she did not intend to fulfill her obligation through her husband’s offering.

We learned in the Mishna:

A slave jointly owned by two partners

may not eat from either of them.

Rav Einai the Elder raised an objection to Rav Naḥman:

We learned in the Mishna: A slave jointly owned by two partners may not eat from either of them.

But it was taught in a beraita:

In the case of a slave jointly owned by two partners,

“if he wishes, he eats from this one; if he wishes, he eats from that one.”

But the Mishna and the beraita contradict one another!

He said to him

Rav Naḥman said:

Einai the Elder!

And some say—

some say that Rav Naḥman called him:

“Black jug!”

A black earthenware vessel—a term for Torah scholars, who suffer because of their Torah study and do not launder their clothes. [Rashi, Avoda Zara 16b].

From you and from me the halakha will be established,

through your question and the answer that I shall give you, the teaching—the established halakha—will emerge.

This is what must be said:

The Mishna

[which states that a slave jointly owned by two partners may not eat from either of them] speaks

of a case where they are particular.

Each of the partners is particular that the slave should not benefit from the other. Therefore, the slave may not eat with either one, because the other partner objects to his share being used to benefit from a Paschal offering that does not belong to him.

The beraita

[which states that if he wishes he eats from this one, and if he wishes he eats from that one] speaks

of a case where they are not particular with one another.

The partners do not object if one of them benefits from the other, and each is agreeable to the slave eating wherever he wishes .

We learned in the Mishna:

One who is half-slave and half-free may not eat from his master’s offering.

And we infer from the Mishna:

It is only from his master’s offering that he may not eat.

And this implies:

But he may eat from his own offering!

We challenge this:

But it was taught in a beraita: He may eat neither from his own offering nor from his master’s offering!

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

Here,

in the beraita, it is

according to the first Mishna.

Whereas

here,

the Mishna, is

according to the latter Mishna.

And it proceeds to explain:

As we learned:

Gittin 41a:

“One who is half-slave and half-free works for his master one day and for himself one day. These are the words of Beit Hillel.