Pesachim 78a (עח.) — the Talmud in English

Rather:

the Gemara retracts its previous assumption that impurity is merely overridden in the case of a communal offering and requires the tzitz to effect acceptance. Rather, impurity is permitted in the case of a communal offering, and therefore our Mishna can accord even with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua:

It is not difficult:

when

here

the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua—that when the flesh and the sacrificial portions, or the remnants of the meal-offering, became impure, one does not sprinkle the blood—was stated, it was referring

to an individual offering. Since the tzitz does not effect acceptance either for the sacrificial portions or for the portions designated for consumption, one therefore may not sprinkle the blood, because: “If there is no flesh, there is no blood.”

But

here, in our Mishna,

it is

a communal offering

that is under discussion. In that case impurity is “permitted,” and the tzitz need not effect acceptance; consequently, one may sprinkle the blood even though the flesh became impure.

And similarly, our Mishna is explained by the statement that the two loaves are brought in a state of impurity. Although the tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption, in the case of a communal offering they sacrifice in a state of impurity even without the tzitz effecting acceptance, since impurity is “permitted” in the case of a communal offering.

And we further explain:

Shall we say that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei:

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: The tzitz effects acceptance for portions designated for consumption.

Rabbi Yosei says: The tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption.

And

it entered the mind

of the scholars of the study hall:

Since Rabbi Yosei says: The tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption,

surely

he agrees with Rabbi Yehoshua, who says: We require both

flesh and blood, and if there is no flesh, there is no blood.

For if this were not so, with regard to what did Rabbi Yosei innovate that the tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption? It is obvious that the tzitz does not effect acceptance for impure flesh in the sense that it would be permitted to eat it in a state of impurity, and Rabbi Eliezer did not disagree about this either. Rather, it must refer to a case in which the flesh became impure while the blood remains. One might say that through the acceptance effected by the tzitz, the flesh is considered as though it still exists, and one may therefore sprinkle the blood. It is with regard to this that Rabbi Yosei said: The tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption, and therefore one does not sprinkle the blood.

And since this is so,

shall we now say that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei!

For according to Rabbi Yosei: “If there is no flesh, there is no blood,” and “If there are no remnants, there is no handful”; and according to his view, “the tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption

; and if our Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, how can they bring communal meal-offerings that contracted intrinsic impurity? The tzitz is needed to effect acceptance, but the tzitz does not effect acceptance for the remnants, and if there are no remnants, there is no handful

.

And we reject this:

No,

it is not as we said—that according to Rabbi Yosei, “If there is no flesh, there is no blood.” Rather,

Rabbi Yosei agrees with Rabbi Eliezer, who says: “There is blood even though there is no flesh,”

and our Mishna is accordingly well explained even according to Rabbi Yosei.

And we ask:

If so,

according to Rabbi Yosei, the impurity of the flesh does not prevent the sprinkling of the blood,

for what halakhic purpose

[for what matter] did Rabbi Yosei say:

The tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption,

[as has already been explained]?!

The Gemara answers:

And according to your reasoning

[and according to your method]: You maintain that the issue of whether the tzitz effects acceptance for portions designated for consumption has practical significance only with regard to sprinkling the blood when the flesh became impure, and only according to the one who holds, “If there is no flesh, there is no blood.”

But

Rabbi Eliezer, who says: The tzitz effects acceptance

for portions designated for consumption, also presents you with a difficulty, for

since Rabbi Eliezer himself said:

“

There is blood even though there is no flesh,”

if so,

for what halakhic purpose does the tzitz effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption?

After all, without the tzitz effecting acceptance, he can sprinkle the blood?!

Rather,

they disagree about whether the tzitz effects acceptance for portions designated for consumption with regard to the following matters, [but according to both of them, “There is blood even though there is no flesh”]: [

Introduction:

a. If one entertains a thought of piggul concerning an offering—for example, if at the time of slaughter he intended to sprinkle the blood, burn the sacrificial portions, or eat the flesh after the allotted time—the entire offering is piggul, and one who eats from it is liable for karet.

b. An offering concerning which one entertained a thought of piggul does not acquire the status of piggul until all of the offering’s permitting rites have been performed. This is what they said: “Like the acceptance of a fit offering [an offering that did not become piggul, which achieves acceptance through the sprinkling of the blood], so is the acceptance of a disqualified offering [piggul—to teach that it does not acquire the status of piggul until it achieves acceptance through the sprinkling, which is the final one of all its permitting rites].”

c. The sprinkling of the blood establishes the status of piggul only when the offering was fit at the time of sprinkling, had one not entertained a thought of piggul. But if there was another disqualification in the offering, such as its having become impure, it does not acquire the status of piggul that would render one who eats it liable for karet. Even if only the flesh was impure at the time of sprinkling, one who eats from the flesh is not liable for karet on account of piggul, since there was another disqualification in it.

d. With regard to offerings of the most sacred order, there is misuse of consecrated property if one derives benefit from them, because they are “the sacred things of the Lord.” However, offerings of the most sacred order that are permitted to be eaten by priests, once their blood has been sprinkled and they have become permitted for the priests to eat, are no longer “the sacred things of the Lord,” and there is no misuse of consecrated property in them.

e. If an offering had a disqualification, such as if all or part of it became impure, and one sprinkled its blood, the sprinkling of the blood does not remove it from the status of an object subject to misuse of consecrated property. This concludes the introduction.]

a.

To establish

the impure portions designated for consumption

with

the status of

piggul [Rashi]. (99)

b.

Or,

to remove

the impure portions designated for consumption

from the status of misuse of consecrated property—this is what

the two

disagree

about: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yosei, whether the tzitz was effective in rendering them as though they were pure, so that the sprinkling was effective in establishing their status as piggul and removing them from the status of misuse of consecrated property.

Rabbi Eliezer holds: The tzitz effects acceptance for it,

for the flesh, even though it is a portion designated for consumption,

and it renders it

the tzitz

as pure, and it establishes it

the sprinkling

as piggul,

rendering one who eats it liable for karet.

And

so

it removes it

[removes it] the sprinkling from the impure flesh

from the status of misuse of consecrated property,

because the tzitz was effective in rendering it as though it were pure.

But Rabbi Yosei holds: The tzitz does not effect acceptance for it,

for the flesh, since it is a portion designated for consumption,

and it does not render it

the tzitz

as pure, and

since this is so,

it does not establish it

the sprinkling

as piggul, and it does not remove it

the sprinkling

from the status of misuse of consecrated property,

and the sprinkling was effective only to fulfill the owners’ obligation.

Rav Mari raised an objection:

How can you say that our Mishna accords even with Rabbi Yosei, who holds that the tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption?

Even if

[that is so]

Rabbi Yosei agrees with Rabbi Eliezer,

who says, “There is blood even though there is no flesh,” there is still a difficulty:

Granted, offerings

that became impure may be sacrificed in the case of a communal offering, since

there is blood

for which the tzitz effects acceptance with regard to its impurity. Although the tzitz does not effect acceptance for the flesh—according to Rabbi Yosei, who holds that the tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption—we have already explained that according to Rabbi Yosei there is blood even though there is no flesh.

And the meal-offering of the

omer offering also

is readily explained as being brought in a state of impurity, since

there is a handful

for which the tzitz effects acceptance. Although it does not effect acceptance for the remnants, there is a handful even though there are no remnants.

And

the showbread also

is readily explained as being brought in a state of impurity, since

there are bowls

of frankincense [which they placed on the Table, and burning the bowls permits the bread, just as burning the handful permits the meal-offering], and the acceptance effected by the tzitz was effective in permitting them to be sacrificed on the altar. Thus, the mitzva of the showbread was fulfilled even though the loaves were impure.

But

with regard to what we learned in our Mishna, that

the two loaves

are brought in a state of impurity, since they contain only “portions designated for consumption,” for which the tzitz does not effect acceptance according to Rabbi Yosei,

what is there to say

to explain this in accordance with Rabbi Yosei?!

And if you would say:

Our Mishna is not discussing the two loaves brought on their own, without the two sheep, since with regard to those it is not appropriate to say that they are brought in a state of impurity, because the tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption.

Rather, our Mishna is discussing the two loaves brought together with the two sheep, and the acceptance effected by the tzitz was effective

for bringing

them

and

which ones are they

[literally, “who are they,” i.e., which offerings are brought with them]?

The communal peace-offerings

[i.e., the two sheep] brought together with the loaves, whose blood is sprinkled to permit them to be eaten. The two loaves have thereby been permitted, and they permit the new grain in the Temple, even though they are impure?

It is impossible to explain it this way, for

if so,

our Mishna, which enumerates the things brought in a state of impurity—namely, the omer, the two loaves, the showbread, the communal peace-offerings, and the goats of the New Moons—

would amount to four,

since the communal peace-offerings and the two loaves would be counted as one,

and

if

we

“five”

things brought in a state of impurity

learn?!

Rather,

our Mishna is indeed in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who holds that the tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions designated for consumption, and

Rabbi Yosei holds: Impurity is permitted in the case of a communal offering,

so that the tzitz need not effect acceptance at all.

And we ask: How can you say that Rabbi Yosei holds that impurity is permitted in the case of a communal offering?

But it is taught in a baraita:

One of these

is the priest who burns the red heifer, whom they separated to the Chamber of the House of Stone in the Temple courtyard seven days before burning the heifer [and in tractate Yoma, on page 2, the reason for the separation is explained].

And one of these

is the High Priest, whom they separated to the Chamber of Parhedrin seven days before the Yom Kippur service performed by him [and there the reason for the separation is explained]:

They

sprinkled upon him

to purify him

all

those

seven

days (100)

from all sin-offerings

[the ashes of the red heifer, which is called a “sin-offering”; from each and every heifer they would set aside a small amount of the ashes for safekeeping in the Temple courtyard, Rashi, Yoma]

that were there

in the Temple, in order to purify them from possible impurity imparted by a corpse,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says: They do not sprinkle upon him

for all seven days

but

on the

third

day after their separation

and the seventh

day after their separation

only.

And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Yosei holds that impurity is permitted in the case of a communal offering,

if so,

why do I need sprinkling at all

for the High Priest who performs the Yom Kippur service, in order to purify him? After all, initially it is possible to use a priest who is impure, since the Yom Kippur offerings are communal offerings whose time is fixed, and their impurity is permitted in the case of a communal offering?!

Rather, you must conclude that Rabbi Yosei holds that impurity is merely overridden in the case of a communal offering, and it is permitted only with difficulty. Therefore, initially the service must be performed by a pure priest.

Rather, it is clear

[it is evident] that

our Mishna

is

not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

The Gemara now returns to explain Rabbi Yosei’s statement in the baraita cited above [77b].

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: And

is

Rabbi Yosei a document that validates the claims of both parties

[that is, has anyone ever seen a document that validates both the plaintiff and the defendant]?!

As it is taught

[this is the baraita cited above]:

Rabbi Yosei said: I see the validity of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement with regard to offerings, and the validity of Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement with regard to offerings, and the validity of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement with regard to meal-offerings, and the validity of Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement with regard to meal-offerings.

The statement of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to offerings: He would say: There is blood even though there is no flesh.

The statement of Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to offerings: He would say: If there is no blood, there is no flesh; if there is no flesh, there is no blood.

The statement of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to meal-offerings: He would say: There is a handful even though there are no remnants.

And the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to meal-offerings: He would say: If there are no remnants there, there is no handful; if there is no handful, there are no remnants.

It follows that Rabbi Yosei agrees with two tannaim, while each of them holds an opinion that contradicts the opinion of the other.

He said to him,

Abaye to Rav Pappa:

“It stands to reason”

is what

Rabbi Yosei

said. That is, Rabbi Yosei did not intend by his statement to say whether the words of one or the other constitute the halakha. He intended only to say that it stands to reason that Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer disagreed both with regard to offerings and with regard to meal-offerings. And

when

Rabbi Yosei

was speaking about offerings

[when Rabbi Yosei taught their dispute with regard to offerings],

he said: It stands to reason that just as they disagree

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua

with regard to offerings, they likewise disagree with regard to meal-offerings.

And when

he was speaking

Rabbi Yosei

about meal-offerings, he said: It stands to reason that just as they disagree with regard to meal-offerings, they likewise disagree with regard to offerings, [and see the note ].

He said

: “It is difficult:

to him

Rav Pappa said to Abaye:

Granted

what you said:

When he is discussing offerings, he said: It stands to reason that just as they disagree with regard to offerings, they likewise disagree with regard to meal-offerings!

And because

the main verses—

from which Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer derived their positions—

were written with regard to offerings,

it is that they are

written [as was explained above, on page 77], and therefore Rabbi Yosei had to say that even with regard to meal-offerings, about which no verses were stated, they likewise disagree.

as was explained above, on page 77], and therefore Rabbi Yosei had to say that they also disagree with regard to meal offerings, even though no verses were stated concerning them.

Rather,

what you said in explaining Rabbi Yosei’s words:

When he is discussing meal-offerings, (and

he said: It stands to reason that just as they disagree with regard to meal-offerings, they likewise disagree with regard to offerings—

is difficult:

But the main verses were written with regard to offerings,

so why should we derive them from meal-offerings?!

Rather,

we answer the difficulty differently: “Rabbi Yosei is granting the document to both parties";

and in fact, “I find,” which Rabbi Yosei said, is to be understood literally, meaning that he agrees with their statements.

Nevertheless,

there is no difficulty:

How does Rabbi Yosei grant the document to both parties? This is what he is saying:

I find the words of Rabbi Eliezer

with regard to offerings and meal-offerings,

in

the place where

the meat became impure

or the remainder of the offering.

And

I find the

words of Rabbi Yehoshua

with regard to offerings and meal-offerings,

in

the place where the meat was

lost or burned.

The reason is that when the meat becomes impure, he can sprinkle the blood, because the tzitz effects acceptance on behalf of the meat, as though it had not become impure; this is not so when the meat was lost or burned.

And we raise a difficulty:

With regard to its becoming impure, what is the reason

that Rabbi Yosei found Rabbi Eliezer’s words acceptable? Obviously,

it is because the tzitz effects acceptance.

But this cannot be said, because

you have heard Rabbi Yosei

above

say: The tzitz does not effect acceptance on behalf of what is to be eaten?!

Rather, there is no difficulty,

and this is what Rabbi Yosei said:

I find the words of Rabbi Eliezer, in

the case where the meat or the remainder of a

communal

offering became impure, as he proceeds to explain the reason.

And

I find the words of Rabbi Yehoshua

in the case where the meat or the remainder became impure

in

an

individual offering [and the same law applies when it was lost or burned, whether in the case of an individual offering or a communal offering].

and the same law applies when it was lost or burned, whether in a private offering or in a communal offering].

And we raise a difficulty:

With regard to a communal offering, what is the reason

that Rabbi Yosei found acceptable the words of Rabbi Eliezer, who deemed it valid? Obviously,

because impurity is permitted in the case of a communal offering.

Consequently, the tzitz need not effect acceptance, and he sprinkles the blood even though the tzitz does not effect acceptance on behalf of what is to be eaten. But in the case of an individual offering, even when the meat became impure and was not lost, he does not sprinkle the blood, because the tzitz does not effect acceptance on behalf of what is to be eaten. But there is still the following difficulty:

First, you have heard Rav Yosei say that impurity is merely deferred in the case of a communal offering

[as the Gemara demonstrated above], and if so, the tzitz is required to effect acceptance even in the case of a communal offering. Yet according to Rabbi Yosei, the tzitz does not effect acceptance on behalf of what is to be eaten. How, then, can he sprinkle the blood when the meat became impure?!

Furthermore, if

what Rabbi Yosei said, “I find the words of Rabbi Eliezer,” means

in the case of a communal offering,

then what is the meaning of what he said, “I find the words of ‘Rabbi Eliezer’”? Is

Rabbi Eliezer

the only one who

deems it valid

in the case of a communal offering,

and not Rabbi Yehoshua?!