Pesachim 76b (עו:) — the Talmud in English

в разделе 57]. Rav said:

fat kosher meat that one roasted

in one oven

with lean nevela meat,

even if each of them was on a separate spit and they were far from one another, nevertheless the kosher meat is

forbidden.

That is to say: it is unnecessary to state that if the nevela meat was fat and the kosher meat was lean, the kosher meat is forbidden, because the fat meat emits an aroma, and it enters the meat with which it is in the oven and renders it forbidden.

Rather, even if the nevela meat was lean and did not emit an aroma, the kosher meat is nevertheless forbidden if it itself was fat.

And

And what is the reason?

Because

they cause one another to become flavorful

they cause one another to become flavorful: the aroma emitted by the fat meat enters the lean meat and imparts flavor to it, and then an aroma emerges from the lean meat toward the fat meat and renders it forbidden].

And Rav’s reason is that he holds: aroma is significant.

And Levi said: even lean kosher meat that one roasted with

fat nevela meat,

it is

permitted,

because the aroma emerging from the nevela and entering the kosher meat does not render it forbidden.

And

And what is the reason?

Because

it is merely aroma, and aroma is not significant.

Levi applied a ruling in practice in the house of the Exilarch

Levi issued a practical ruling in the house of the Exilarch]

with a

lean animal

and another animal

a fat [pig], “which were roasted in an oven, and the incident came before Levi, who permitted it” [Rashi], because aroma is not significant]. (60)

An objection was raised to Levi, who holds that aroma is not significant:

against Levi, who holds that aroma is not legally significant:

From that which was taught in a beraita:

One may not roast two Paschal offerings

of two groups

together, because of intermixture,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

Does this not mean,

that because of “intermixture,” namely

intermixture of flavors,

the flavor of the Paschal offering of one group enters the Paschal offering of the other group, with the result that the flavor of one group’s Paschal offering is eaten by the other group, which is forbidden, since the Paschal offering may be eaten only by its registered members?

We have therefore learned that this flavor, which is merely aroma, is significant, and it is forbidden to feed it to those who are not its registered members,

and this is difficult for Levi?!

And we reject this:

No,

not as you said, that “intermixture” means intermixture of flavors! Rather, it is forbidden for this reason:

because of intermixture of physical substances

the body of the Paschal offering and not its flavor], because there is concern that the Paschal offerings might become mixed up and they might exchange them, giving one group’s Paschal offering to the other group, thereby failing to fulfill the mitzva of the Paschal offering; furthermore, the Paschal offering would then be eaten by those who are not its registered members.

We support our interpretation:

so too, it is reasonable, from the fact that it teaches

in the

in the latter clause

of the beraita: one may not roast two Paschal offerings

“even a kid and a lamb.”

And

if you say, as long as you interpret

because of

the intermixture of

physical

bodies, this is why it teaches a novel point in the beraita:

a novel point in the beraita:

even a kid and a lamb

are forbidden, because although the concern that they might exchange them is remote, since the species are different, nevertheless it is forbidden, lest they fail to notice that each group took a species that does not belong to it.

But if you say,

that one should interpret

“because of intermixture of flavors”,

the question arises: what novelty is there in the matter that it is forbidden to place even a kid and a lamb in the oven?!

For

what difference is there between a kid and a lamb, and a kid and a kid,

if we forbid them because of absorption of flavors?

Rather, by force of necessity, the reason for the beraita is: because of intermixture of physical substances.

And once we have supported our interpretation, we return and raise a difficulty against Rav:

but what then, by force of necessity—

since it teaches “even a kid and a lamb”—

it is forbidden because of intermixture of physical substances, but intermixture of flavors is permitted!

And if so,

let us say that this is a refutation of Rav,

who holds that aroma is significant, since according to him one must forbid even because of intermixture of flavors?!

As was stated: Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Reish Lakish: with hot bread— whether wheat or barley— and an open barrel, everyone agrees that it is forbidden, because the aroma of the wine enters the bread, and according to everyone aroma is significant. With cold bread and a barrel whose mouth is covered closed with a cover], everyone agrees that it is permitted, even with barley bread, because according to everyone the aroma of the wine does not emerge from a closed barrel when the bread is not hot and absorptive. The tannaim disagreed among themselves only: . in the case of hot bread and a sealed barrel. In the case of cold bread and an open barrel. The basis of their dispute is whether the aroma of the wine enters the bread in this situation. Rabbi Meir forbids all bread, Rabbi Yehuda permits all bread because it does not absorb, and Rabbi Yosei distinguishes between wheat bread and barley bread, because it is the nature of barley to absorb. And since this is so, as everyone agrees that where the aroma of wine enters teruma the bread is forbidden, everyone must likewise agree regarding nevela meat and kosher meat that the kosher meat is forbidden, in accordance with Rav’s opinion. For: this— kosher meat and nevela meat roasted together in an oven— is likewise like hot bread and an open barrel— in which the aroma enters the bread according to everyone— analogous, because in the case of nevela meat and kosher meat, the aroma certainly enters from the nevela into the kosher meat when they are roasted together in an oven; and if so, according to everyone it is forbidden. Rabbi Yirmeya

answered

Rabbi Yirmeya: Here—

in the beraita that stated “even a kid and a lamb” [Rashi]—

what are we dealing with? It is a case where they roasted them

in one oven

in two pots,

and in any such case the aroma of one Paschal offering does not enter the other. Therefore, their prohibition is only because of intermixture of physical substances, as the Gemara proceeds to explain the words of the beraita.

Before the Gemara explains the beraita according to this answer, it raises an objection to it:

But

can it enter your mind to interpret the beraita as referring to two pots?

Do they roast the Paschal offering in a pot [Rashi]?

Rather, say:

they roasted them in one oven

in a manner resembling two pots,

meaning that they roasted them on two spits in one oven, but separated them with a large mound of coals or ash, so that the aroma does not enter from one Paschal offering into the other.

And this is what it says

in the beraita:

One may not roast two Paschal offerings together because of

the

intermixture;

and it explains:

What intermixture?

It is

intermixture of flavors.

And even if

they roasted them

in a manner resembling two pots,

so that you cannot forbid them for this reason,

for

indeed

there is no intermixture of flavors,

they are nevertheless

forbidden because of intermixture of physical substances.

And

it is not only that we forbid roasting resembling two pots, in the case of a kid and a kid, because of intermixture of physical substances; rather,

even a kid and a lamb

are likewise forbidden, because even with two different species there is a prohibition because of intermixture of physical substances, as explained.

Rav Mari said:

this dispute between Rav and Levi as to whether aroma is significant

is subject to a dispute between tannaim,

as they already disputed this matter:

For we learned in a Mishna:

one who removes hot bread

from the oven

and places it on the mouth of a barrel of teruma wine:

Rabbi Meir forbids

the bread to be eaten by non-priests, because the aroma of the wine enters the bread while it is hot.

And Rabbi Yehuda permits,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain his reason.

And Rabbi Yosei permits with regard to

bread

made of wheat, and forbids with regard to

bread

made of barley, because barley absorbs

the aroma of the wine, but wheat does not.

Does this not mean,

as we said, that

it is a dispute between tannaim

as to whether aroma is significant:

one master—Rabbi Yehuda—

Rabbi Yehuda—

holds: aroma is not significant,

and therefore it is permitted.

And the other master—that is, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei—

that is, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei—

holds: aroma is significant,

but they disputed regarding wheat bread as to whether the aroma of the wine is absorbed by the bread.

And we conclude:

According to Levi,

who holds that aroma is not significant,

it is certainly a dispute between tannaim

who disputed his position, because Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree with him; and if there is a tanna who holds like him, then only Rabbi Yehuda holds like him.

But

according to Rav,

can

we say that it is a dispute between tannaim,

must Rabbi Yehuda necessarily disagree with Rav and hold that aroma is not significant?

Rav could say to you:

actually,

everyone

agrees that

agrees that aroma is significant.

For, is it not the case that

it was stated concerning that Mishna

that the tannaim disagreed only as to whether the aroma of the wine enters the bread or not?!

As was stated:

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Reish Lakish:

With hot bread—

whether wheat or barley—

and an open barrel, everyone agrees that it is forbidden,

because the aroma of the wine enters the bread, and according to everyone aroma is significant.

With cold bread and a barrel whose mouth is covered

closed with a cover],

everyone agrees that it is permitted,

even with barley bread, because according to everyone the aroma of the wine does not emerge from a closed barrel when the bread is not hot and absorptive.

The tannaim disagreed

among themselves

only:

.

in the case of hot bread and a sealed barrel.

B. With

in the case of cold bread and an open barrel.

The basis of their dispute is whether the aroma of the wine enters the bread in this situation. Rabbi Meir forbids all bread, Rabbi Yehuda permits all bread because it does not absorb, and Rabbi Yosei distinguishes between wheat bread and barley bread, because it is the nature of barley to absorb.

And since this is so, as everyone agrees that where the aroma of wine enters teruma the bread is forbidden, everyone must likewise agree regarding nevela meat and kosher meat that the kosher meat is forbidden, in accordance with Rav’s opinion.

For

this—

kosher meat and nevela meat roasted together in an oven—

is likewise analogous to hot bread and an open barrel—

where the aroma enters the bread according to everyone—

because it is analogous,

for in the case of nevela meat and kosher meat, the aroma certainly enters from the nevela into the kosher meat when they are roasted together in an oven; and if so, according to everyone it is forbidden.

Rav Kahana, son of Rav Ḥinnana the Elder, taught:

Bread that was baked together with a roast

of meat

in an oven may not be eaten with kutḥa

that contains milk, since the bread absorbed the aroma of the meat.

There was this fish [

fish]

that was roasted together with meat [roasted with meat in an oven], and

in an oven, and

Rava of Parziqaya prohibited eating it with kutḥa [

Rava prohibited eating this fish with kutḥa that contains milk], because of the aroma of the meat that the fish absorbed.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: Even

to eat that fish that was roasted together with the meat

with salt [

with salt],

is also prohibited

since the fish absorbed the aroma of the meat,

because it is dangerous [

dangerous] to eat meat and fish together

with regard to aroma [

see note ]

and with regard to another matter

leprosy.

Mishna:

Individual offerings, or even communal offerings whose time for bringing them is not fixed, are not brought in a state of ritual impurity.

Therefore, if the priests were impure, they do not sprinkle its blood and they do not burn its sacrificial portions; and it is unnecessary to say that the impure [priests or owners] are prohibited from eating it.

If the blood of these offerings was impure, it is not sprinkled; if their sacrificial portions were impure, they are not burned upon the altar; and it is unnecessary to say that if the meat was impure, it may not be eaten.

If the blood of the offerings was pure and the priests were pure, but all the meat and sacrificial portions were impure, the tannaim disagreed whether the blood is sprinkled upon the altar, as will be explained in the sugya before us.

But if the owners were impure, they send their offerings and have them sacrificed [according to Rashi and other Rishonim], except for the Paschal offering and the festival peace-offering.

b. Communal offerings, or even individual offerings whose time for bringing them is fixed, are brought in a state of ritual impurity.

When we say everywhere that impurity is deferred or permitted “in the community,” this does not depend on the community at all, but rather on offerings whose time is fixed, even if they are individual offerings; rather, since most communal offerings have a fixed time, the matter was attributed to the community [later authorities].

Therefore, if the priests were impure, they sprinkle its blood and burn its sacrificial portions, but they do not eat it. Some say that it may not be eaten in a state of impurity, while others say that it may not be eaten even in purity, as will be explained in the Mishna.

If the blood of these offerings was impure, it is sprinkled upon the altar; if their sacrificial portions were impure, the sugya before us will explain whether they are burned upon the altar; if the meat was impure, it may not be eaten; if all the meat and sacrificial portions were impure, the sugya before us will explain whether their blood is sprinkled.

c. The Paschal offering has special laws, some stringent and some lenient:

For the Paschal offering is not sacrificed when the owners are impure, whereas other offerings are sacrificed when the owners are impure.

Although the Paschal offering is an offering whose time is fixed, it does not possess the permission that other offerings have to be brought in a state of impurity, and impurity was permitted in its case only when the majority of the community was impure.

With regard to eating, however, it is more lenient than other offerings, as will be explained in the Mishna before us. Introduction].

Five offerings

that are communal offerings intended to be eaten

are brought

they

in a state of impurity, but

nevertheless

are not eaten in a state of impurity,

since their primary purpose is not eating but the rectification of another matter, as will be explained [Meiri].

The words of the Mishna that we learned, “they are not eaten in a state of impurity,” may be explained in two ways:

a. To teach you that although impurity is deferred with regard to the sprinkling of the blood and the sacrificial service, it is not deferred with regard to eating while the person is impure [whether priests or owners] or while the meat is impure.

b. Our Mishna comes to teach something further: The offering whose impurity was deferred and whose blood was sprinkled in a state of impurity is permitted only with regard to the sprinkling of its blood and the burning of its sacrificial portions, but eating the offering—even if the meat was pure, and even by priests who were pure—is not permitted, since its blood was sprinkled in a state of impurity [and the sugya before us will be explained in this manner, since this is clearly implied by Rashi’s method in Zevaḥim 99b, as the later authorities wrote; see note ].

And these are they:

a. The meal-offering of

the Omer

brought on the sixteenth of Nisan from barley: a tenth of an ephah of fine barley flour. A handful is taken and burned, and the remainder is eaten by the priests like the remnants of all meal-offerings. Its primary purpose is not eating, for the primary purpose of bringing the Omer is to permit the new grain to ordinary people; therefore, it is not eaten in a state of impurity [Meiri].

b.

The two loaves

brought on Shavuot together with the communal peace-offering: a tenth of an ephah of fine wheat flour in each of them. One is eaten by the High Priest, and the other is divided among all the priestly watches. Their primary purpose is not eating, but permitting meal-offerings to be brought from the new grain [Meiri].

c.

The showbread

twelve loaves every Shabbat, each consisting of two-tenths of an ephah. The old loaves are removed, and they are divided by the outgoing and incoming priestly watches together with the High Priest, and they eat them that day. Its primary purpose is not eating, but having the Table stand in honor and splendor; it remains there for the amount of time in which it can be properly eaten, namely seven days [Meiri].

d.

The communal peace-offerings,

which are the two Shavuot lambs, brought as peace-offerings. Their sacrificial portions are burned, and the meat is eaten by the priests [and there are no communal peace-offerings other than these; the other communal offerings are either burnt-offerings or sin-offerings]. Their primary purpose is not eating, but permitting the two loaves to be eaten by the priests [Meiri].

e.

The goats of the New Moons,

which are brought as sin-offerings [for the additional offering] and are eaten by the priests. Their primary purpose is not eating, but atoning for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred offerings [Meiri] . As for the other communal offerings, although they are brought in a state of impurity, it is not applicable to say of them that they are not eaten in a state of impurity, since they are not eaten at all, even when brought in a state of purity: some are burnt-offerings, which are entirely burned for God, and some are inner sin-offerings, whose meat is entirely burned.

But

the Paschal offering that was brought in a state of impurity,

it

is eaten in a state of impurity,

even by those who are impure.

The reason that the Paschal offering differs from other offerings in being eaten in a state of impurity is that

the command

to sacrifice the Paschal offering

was originally given only for eating,

as the verse states in the passage concerning the Paschal offering: “according to his eating.” Since this is the primary purpose of the Paschal offering, when the Torah came to permit it to be brought in a state of impurity, it certainly permitted it so that it could be eaten.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Five offerings are brought in a state of impurity but are not eaten in a state of impurity:

And we explain:

“Five”

to exclude what?

That is, why did the Mishna mention the number of offerings that are brought in a state of impurity but are not eaten in a state of impurity? The tanna could have taught simply: Communal offerings are brought in a state of impurity and are not eaten in a state of impurity.

And we explain: The number comes

to exclude the festival-offering

of the fifteenth

of Nisan, and likewise all the other festival-offerings, to teach you that a festival-offering does not override impurity.

And this is a novel point, for

it might have entered your mind to say: Since it is a communal offering,

for although each individual is obligated in the festival-offering, nevertheless, since it “comes through an assembly” [it is brought through the gathering of people on the festival], it is called a communal offering,

and its time is fixed [

its time is fixed], therefore:

it should override

the

impurity.

Therefore,

our Mishna teaches us

that it does not override impurity.

And the reason is:

Since it has

the festival-offering

make-up days throughout the seven

days for one who did not sacrifice his festival-offering at its fixed time, this offering consequently

does not override Shabbat,

since its time is not fixed [Meiri; see note ],

and since it does not override Shabbat, it does not override

either

impurity.

We ask:

And let it also teach

in our Mishna:

the goats

of the sin-offerings brought as the additional offerings of

the festivals,

for these too are brought in a state of impurity and are not eaten in a state of impurity, since their primary purpose is not eating?!

And we answer:

This

has already

been taught to him

in our Mishna:

the communal peace-offerings,

to teach you that even offerings of blood [whose blood is sprinkled upon the altar] are not eaten in a state of impurity. You therefore learn by extension that the goats of the festivals are also not eaten in a state of impurity.

We challenge our answer:

If so, the goats of the New Moons—

which are offerings of blood—

should also not be taught

in the Mishna,

for it has already taught

the matter

through the communal peace-offerings?!

They said,

you will answer, members of the academy: