Pesachim 75a (עה.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

There

the vinegar was weak from the outset. That is why one may scald with it, since

it has

the sharpness of the fruit itself

[the sap of the fruit’s flavor is still present in it]. And although it became weakened on its own and its flavor deteriorated, it still draws out [or congeals, according to the views that disagree with Rashi] the blood, since its power remains within it.

But

here

the vinegar with which they scalded once: afterward

the sharpness of the fruit itself is no longer present,

because the first meat has already absorbed it.

We learned in the Mishna:

One may not roast the Paschal offering

not on a spit and not on a grill. Rabbi Tzadok said: An incident occurred involving Rabban Gamliel, who said to his slave Tavi: “Go and roast the Paschal offering for us on the grill.” And we question this: It follows that the

incident

cited by the Mishna does not support what is stated in the Mishna, but rather

contradicts it. For the Mishna prohibits roasting on a grill, whereas Rabban Gamliel instructed that it be roasted on one; and the wording of the Mishnayot is not normally arranged in this manner?!

We explain:

A passage is missing from our Mishna,

and this is what it teaches:

And if it is a perforated grill,

meaning: one makes an iron frame around the fire and places the spit—with one end resting on one side of the frame and its other end resting on the other side of the frame—above the fire. The Paschal offering is thus suspended between the two sides of the frame and does not touch the hot iron at all.

It follows that it is

permitted

to roast the Paschal offering on it.

And Rabbi Tzadok said,

to support this ruling:

An incident occurred involving Rabban Gamliel, who said to his slave Tavi: “Go and roast the Paschal offering for us on the grill”—the

perforated one.

The [grill was]

perforated.

If one fired an oven with the peels of orla fruit, which are forbidden for benefit, and baked bread in the fired oven, Rabbi and the Sages disagreed about the matter.

Rabbi’s opinion: the bread is forbidden to eat. This is because Rabbi holds that “there is benefit from the wood in the bread”—that is, the flame baking the bread emerges from the wood before it becomes ash, while it is still forbidden, and that wood is what improved the bread. Therefore, the bread itself is also forbidden.

The Sages’ opinion: the bread is permitted.

This is because the Sages hold that “there is no benefit from the wood in the bread”—that is, the flame baking the bread emerges from the wood only after it has burned and become ash, and the ashes of items forbidden for benefit are permitted (24) [as the beraita cited above, on page 26b, states and as Tosafot explain there].

In light of this:

Rav Ḥinnana bar Idi asked Rav Adda bar Ahava:

An oven that was fired with peels of orla, and after it was fired they

raked them out

from its coals,

and baked bread in it,

using the heat in the oven produced by the orla wood.

According to the one who forbids—when the wood was not raked out of the oven—

what

is the ruling when it was raked out?

He said to him,

Rav Adda bar Ahava:

Even according to the one who forbids it when the wood was not raked out of the oven, he concedes that when it was raked out

the bread is permitted,

since the baking is not performed by the fire of the forbidden wood itself, but by the heat remaining in the oven.

He said—in astonishment—

to him,

Rav Ḥinnana bar Idi to Rav Adda bar Ahava:

But did Rav Ḥinnana the Elder not say in the name of Rabbi Asi, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

An oven that they fired and raked out, and one roasted the Paschal offering in it—

this is not

“roasted by fire.”

Because it is

stated

with an apparent redundancy in the wording of the verse. It is written in the passage concerning the Paschal offering:

“Roasted by fire”

“roasted by fire”

twice,

to teach you that it is called “roasted by fire” only when the wood has not been raked out of the oven, and it is roasted by the heat of the fire now produced by the wood.

But if the oven was raked out and there is only heat here, and no fire, one may not roast the Paschal offering in it, even though this heat derives from the fire that was produced.

We have therefore learned from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words:

The reason is that the Torah revealed

“roasted by fire”

“roasted by fire”

twice; had the Torah not revealed this, I would have said

that even when the wood and the flame are no longer present in the oven, nevertheless

“roasted by fire”

it is.

And if so, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words prove that the heat remaining in the oven from the flame is equivalent to the fire itself.

Since this is so, just as if he had baked the bread with the forbidden wood itself, while the fire was emerging from it, the bread would have been forbidden according to Rabbi, so too, even if he already raked out the wood, we regard the heat remaining from it in the oven as the fire of the wood itself, and the bread baked in it is forbidden.

He said—he answered

to him,

Rav Adda bar Ahava: Indeed, it can be inferred from here that logically we should regard the heat in the oven as the fire itself!

Nevertheless,

the Torah revealed there,

in the case of the Paschal offering, that the heat in the oven is not equivalent to the fire itself,

and

we then

derive from it, by analogy, with regard to the entire Torah, that its status is not that of the fire itself; therefore the bread is permitted.

And if you wish, say there is another way to reject the argument: Rabbi Yoḥanan did not have to derive from the redundancy that logically the heat in the oven should be regarded as the fire itself!

Rather,

there, in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement concerning the Paschal offering,

the reason is that the Torah wrote

“roasted by fire”

twice,

and it is for this reason alone that it is forbidden to roast it with the heat of the oven.

Had the Torah not written

“roasted by fire”

twice, to exclude this, it would have been permitted to roast it with the heat of the oven—for another reason:

For

I might have said:

The Torah insists on

“fire,”

and even if it was raked out

of the oven and the wood was removed,

it too is

“roasted by fire”

it is, since if one places a garment in the heat of the oven it will burn and become charcoal; thus the heat itself is a product of “fire.”

But here, with regard to the wood of orla, we have no logical basis for including the heat of the oven.

For although we say that the heat of the oven is called “fire,” it is nevertheless not the “fire” of the wood, since the wood and its flame have already disappeared.

Here the Torah insists on

the forbidden wood itself, and it is no longer present [and is already gone], and this is not the fire of the forbidden wood, but a new fire.

The Sages taught: If one cut

the Paschal offering—making cuts in two or three places in order to hasten its roasting [but not completing the cuts, so that the Paschal offering was still entirely one piece, Rashi]—

and placed it upon glowing coals

[Likkutei Halakhot]:

also

Rabbi says: I say that this

“is ‘roasted by fire,’”

even though he did not roast it directly over fire, but upon coals.

Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised

an astonished objection

to Rav Ḥisda:

Did

Rabbi really

say that coals are also

“fire”

they are, so that the verse “roasted by fire” is fulfilled with regard to the Paschal offering?!

And he raised a contradiction

from a beraita that proves that coals are not considered “fire”:

Introduction:

Two types of leprous afflictions are set out in the Torah in the passage of Tazria; they develop on human skin through the heat of the flesh [“which becomes heated, and a lesion grows in it,” Meiri]:

a. Leprosy that develops on the skin because of a

“boil.”

b. Leprosy that develops on the skin because of a

“burn.”

A boil results from heat generated in the flesh because of a blow or the like.

A burn results from the heat of fire.

All their laws are identical, and the verse distinguishes between them only to teach that they are two separate afflictions.

The practical difference is as follows: If there was approximately half a gris measure of an affliction [an affliction the size of a gris is the measure of an affliction] in a boil [which results from a blow], and beside it another approximately half a gris measure of an affliction in a burn [which results from fire], they do not combine to form the measure of an affliction, since they are two separate afflictions, and neither affliction by itself contains the requisite measure.

As it was taught in a beraita: It is written in the passage concerning afflictions: “Or if there is flesh in whose skin there is

a burn by fire.” We learn from this that a lesion caused by “fire” is treated as a “burn,” and not as a “boil.”

I have derived only one burned by fire,

which is treated as a “burn.”

If one was burned by a coal,

or burned by hot ashes [hot ash], or by hot lime [limestone is quarried, fired, and dried in a furnace; when the stones then come into contact with water, they cause the water to boil], or

by hot gypsum [a type of lime]

that is hot,

or by anything that comes from fire.

A burn results from the heat of fire.

All their laws are the same; the Torah distinguishes between them only to teach that they are two separate afflictions.

The Gemara explains parenthetically the words of the beraita: “

Anything that comes from fire”—

to include hot water heated by fire [water heated over a fire].

From where

do we know that one burned by such water, when an affliction appears on him, is treated as a “burn” and not as a “boil”?”

[The practical difference is that if half the measure of an affliction from one of these sources combines with half the measure of an actual burn by fire, he is treated as a leper.]

The verse states: “Burn,”

“burn”—

it includes.

That is, the word “burn” appears several times in the passage concerning “burns by fire,” and this comes to teach you that even those caused by fire but not by actual fire—if the skin is burned by them, the affliction that appears on it is treated as a “burn.””

Rav Aḥadvoi raises his difficulty on the basis of this beraita.

For we learn from this beraita:

The reason

that even these are treated as a “burn” is

because the Torah included

“burn, burn.”

Had it not

been that the Torah included

“burn, burn,”

a burn caused by a “coal” would not have been treated as a “burn.”

This is because the Torah said “burns by fire.” It follows from here that

coals

are not fire.

If so, this is difficult for Rabbi, who said with regard to “roasted by fire” that it is permitted to roast the Paschal offering upon coals; yet we have learned from here that coals are not “fire”?!

He said—he answered

to him,

Rav Ḥisda to Rav Aḥadvoi:

A wooden coal

is indeed such that

the verse was not needed to include it,

for this coal is included within “fire,” as Rabbi said.

Rather,

the verse was needed to include a “coal,” as the beraita teaches:

a metal coal [metal heated in fire until it becomes like a coal, Zevaḥ Toda; see Sefat Emet].

And metal coals

indeed

are not

“fire”;

it is.

We nevertheless question the beraita, which required a special inclusion to include a coal—even if it came only to include a metal coal:

But with regard to a priest’s daughter

who committed adultery,

as it is written,

“She shall be burned by fire,” and

even so

Rav Mattana said: They would make a lead wick for her [they would melt lead and cast it into her mouth].

Thus, even a metal or lead coal heated by fire is considered like “fire,” and the verse “she shall be burned by fire” is fulfilled?!

And we answer:

It is different there,

with regard to the priest’s daughter. That is, in general, you cannot consider a metal coal to be fire; rather, in the case of the priest’s daughter too there is a redundancy in the verse in order to include a metal or lead coal heated by fire.

Rather, when the verse was needed

to include a “coal,” as the beraita teaches, it was

For

it is written:

“She shall be burned by fire,”

whereas it could have said merely “by fire” and stopped [Rashi; Tosafot explain that it could have said “she shall die by fire”].

Rather, it is written

“she shall be burned”

in order

to include all burnings caused by fire.

But in fact, a metal coal is not included within “fire.” Therefore the verse had to include it both with regard to a burn and with regard to the execution by burning of a priest’s daughter.

And we question:

But

all the more so, actual fire itself

can effect the execution by burning of the priest’s daughter, since “fire” is the primary meaning of the verse!

If so, why did they burn her by means of a lead wick?

And let us surround her

with

bundles of branches [tree branches], ignite the fire with them,

and burn her [burn her with them].

And we answer: It is impossible to burn her by means of actual fire, because it is derived [learned by a gzera shava] that the term

“burning”

used with regard to the priest’s daughter, as it is written, “she shall be burned by fire,” is derived from the term

“burning, concerning the sons of Aaron,” which the Torah states in the passage of Shemini: “And the sons of Aaron, Nadav and Avihu, each took his fire pan, placed fire in them, and put incense upon it; and a fire went forth from before the Lord and consumed them, and they died.

“And your brothers, the entire House of Israel, shall mourn the burning that the Lord has burned” [Rashi, Sanhedrin].

We therefore learn:

Just as there,

with regard to the sons of Aaron,

the burning of the soul

occurred,

while

the body remained and was not burned—for this is what the Sages received as a tradition: two strands of fire entered their nostrils—

so too here,

in the execution by burning of a priest’s daughter, one does not burn the body by means of fire; rather, she is put to death through

the burning

of the

soul alone,

while

the

body itself

remains.

Therefore, they killed the priest’s daughter with a lead wick, and not by actual burning through surrounding her with branches.

The difficulty still remains: Why specifically a lead wick?

Let us give her the priest’s daughter, the death penalty through

hot water heated by fire [water boiled over a fire], since this too does not burn the body, and only the soul is burned?! And we answer: It is impossible to burn her through hot water heated by fire,

because of

what

Rav Naḥman taught!

For Rav Naḥman said: The verse states,

“And you shall love your fellow as yourself,”

teaching us:

Choose for him a pleasant death,

whereas killing through hot water heated by fire is not a pleasant death, since it does not hasten her death sufficiently and she consequently suffers [Meiri].

And we question:

But once there is

what

Rav Naḥman said, “Choose for him a pleasant death,” then the

gzera shava cited above, which teaches that she should not be burned by fire—

why is it necessary?!

After all, we know in any event that it is impossible to burn her by fire, since this is not a pleasant death?!

in the execution by burning of the daughter of a koen, the body is not to be burned by fire. Rather, she is to be put to death through

They said—the scholars of the academy answered: We need both teachings—“And you shall love your fellow as yourself,” and the gzera shava from the sons of Aaron—to learn that she should not be burned by roasting in fire. For based on the law of “And you shall love your fellow as yourself” alone,

if not

the

gzera shava

were joined to it, we would not know that she should not be burned by actual fire.

For

I might have said: Burning of the soul while the body remains

is not burning!

Therefore, had the gzera shava also not been stated, we would have forced ourselves to say:

If it is because of

what

Rav Naḥman said, that one must fulfill “And you shall love your fellow as yourself,” we would not abolish the burning of the body, which alone is the burning mentioned in the Torah. Rather,

we would greatly increase her bundles of branches [we would place many bundles of branches in the fire]

so that she would die quickly,

so that she would die swiftly and not suffer much, in order to fulfill “And you shall love your fellow as yourself.”

because of that

which

Rav Naḥman taught!

As Rav Naḥman said: The verse states

“You shall love your fellow as yourself,”

teaching us:

Choose for him a pleasant death,

whereas killing her through water heated by fire is not a pleasant death, since it does not hasten her death sufficiently and she consequently suffers [Meiri].

And we ask:

But since there is

what

Rav Naḥman

said, “Choose for him a pleasant death,” then the

derivation from an identical expression

above, teaching that she should not be burned by fire—

why do I need it?!

We know this in any event, since burning her by fire is impossible because it is not a pleasant death?!

gzera shava

The members of the academy said

in response: We need both teachings—“You shall love your fellow as yourself” and the derivation from the sons of Aaron—to learn that she must not be burned by roasting in fire. For based on the rule “You shall love your fellow as yourself” alone,

if not

together with the derivation from an identical expression,

we would not know that she should not be burned by actual fire.

Because we might have

thought: Burning of the soul while the body remains intact

is not burning!

Therefore, had the derivation from an identical expression also not been stated, we would have forced the matter and said:

If it is because of

what

Rav Naḥman

said—that one must fulfill “You shall love your fellow as yourself”—we would not abolish the burning of the body, which alone is the burning mentioned in the Torah. Rather,

we would add many bundles of branches

[we would place many bundles of branches in the fire]

so that she would die quickly,

so that she would die swiftly and not suffer greatly, in order to fulfill “You shall love your fellow as yourself.”

we would increase for her many bundles of branches [

we would place many bundles of branches in the burning]

so that she would die quickly,

so that she would die quickly and not suffer much, in order to fulfill “And you shall love your fellow as yourself.”

and therefore the gezera shava as well is necessary:

this comes to teach us

that even the burning of the soul while the body remains intact is considered burning!

And since we have learned from the gezera shava that you may burn her either by burning the body or by burning the soul alone, you can now again derive, by means of the reasoning of Rav Naḥman, that we require “You shall love your fellow as yourself”: You must burn her specifically by burning her with a wick of lead, since in this way “You shall love your fellow as yourself” is fulfilled more than by roasting her in fire, even when she is burned quickly [explained according to Rashi’s interpretation here and in Sanhedrin 52a]. And now the Gemara returns to what we said: The verse added “you shall burn” concerning the burning of a priest’s daughter in order to include other burnings that are not by actual fire, and we ask:

But

since you ultimately include even other burnings, then why do I need what the verse wrote

“in fire”

you shall burn her,

what need have I of it

? The verse should state only “you shall burn her,” and that would suffice!

And we explain: The verse stated “in fire” to teach you that she may be burned only by something produced by fire,

excluding

burning her by pouring into her mouth

lead in its original state,

that is: lead extracted from the ground, which is hot at the time it emerges; she may not be put to death with it, but only with lead heated by fire.

But still

said

to him

Rabbi Yirmeya to Rabbi Zeira:

Is it so that

wherever it is written “in fire”

“you shall burn her,”

we say that the addition “you shall burn her”

is intended to include every burning caused by fire,

as we say concerning a priest’s daughter?!

But concerning the bulls that are burned [

the inner bulls, whose flesh is not eaten but is burned outside Jerusalem, such as the bull of the anointed priest and the bull for the unwitting communal sin]

it is written concerning them

“And he shall burn it on wood in fire,”

so the verse stated “in fire” and also stated “he shall burn,” and we should have included every burning caused by fire.

But

if we

are taught

in a beraita:

“In fire”

and not in hot lime, and

likewise

not in hot gypsum,

then we clearly do not expound the addition “he shall burn” to include every burning caused by fire?!

He said

in response

to him,

Rabbi Zeira to Rabbi Yirmeya:

How can these cases be compared

[Are the verses comparable?!]:

There, concerning a priest’s daughter, it

is written

first

“in fire,” and

afterward

it is written

“you shall burn her,”

and therefore we expound the inclusion of “you shall burn her”

to include every burning caused by fire.

But

here, concerning the bulls that are burned,

it is

written: “And he shall burn it on wood in fire.”

The verse first stated “he shall burn,” and

finally

“fire,”

to teach us:

fire, yes

[indeed, one burns with it],

but nothing else, no.

And we ask: But

there,

concerning the bulls that are burned,

a burning at the end is also written there, as it is written

in that verse: