Pesachim 69a (סט.) — the Talmud in English

And

if

Rabbi Eliezer

held that this is not a kal va-homer, since, according to his view,

a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzva is preferable to him

to a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of an optional matter. Therefore, specifically on a Festival the Sages did not permit a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of the joy of the Festival, which, in Rabbi Eliezer’s view, is merely optional. But a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a mitzva, when the mitzva itself overrides Shabbat, they did permit.

It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer said

another kal va-homer:

And if the requirements of a mitzva that follow slaughter override Shabbat,

such as scraping out its innards, even after

the mitzva

of slaughtering the Paschal offering —

should the requirements of a mitzva that precede slaughter not override Shabbat,

so that they will be able to fulfill the mitzva itself?

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

This is not a kal va-homer, and your argument, “If the requirements of a mitzva that follow slaughter override Shabbat after the mitzva has been performed, should the requirements of a mitzva that precede slaughter not override Shabbat,” is not a valid inference.

Rather, the law is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua.

For

when you say, ‘If the requirements of a mitzva that follow slaughter override Shabbat’

the reason for the matter is

that

already

slaughter has overridden Shabbat,

and the Sages were not stringent about preventing the performance of the procedures required after slaughter.

But can you

say

that

the requirements of a mitzva that precede slaughter should override Shabbat—

even though

slaughter has not overridden

yet

Shabbat?

And

another

additional argument Rabbi Akiva made was: Shabbat should not be overridden for the sake of the requirements of the mitzva of the Paschal offering, because

perhaps the sacrifice will be found to be unfit, and it will turn out that he desecrated Shabbat retroactively.

We raised a difficulty:

If so,

if there is concern that the sacrifice may be found to be unfit,

it should not be slaughtered either,

because

perhaps the sacrifice will be found to be unfit, and it will turn out that he desecrated Shabbat retroactively!?

And we answer:

Rather, this—

the concern that it may be found to be unfit—

he said to him

Rabbi Akiva to Rabbi Eliezer

at the outset.

And he refuted his argument

as we asked: If so, one should not slaughter the Paschal offering, lest it be found to be unfit and it turn out that he desecrated Shabbat.

And afterward he said this to him

argument,

“If the requirements of a mitzva were overridden…”

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva replied and said: Sprinkling proves the point,

as it is for the sake of a mitzva, yet it is [prohibited] as a rabbinic prohibition, and it does not override Shabbat.

Rabbi Eliezer rejected this and said that he was himself arguing about permitting sprinkling: If slaughter, which is a primary category of labor, overrides Shabbat, then sprinkling, which is only a rabbinic prohibition, certainly should override Shabbat.

Rabbi Akiva then argued: Or reverse it! [That is, slaughter, which is a primary category of labor, should not override Shabbat by a kal va-homer from sprinkling, which involves only a rabbinic prohibition, and nevertheless does not override Shabbat].

It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva, you have answered me with regard to slaughter,

with a ridiculous argument, and on its basis you have attempted to uproot a matter of Torah law. For slaughter overrides Shabbat because the verse says “at its appointed time,” and you knew that your argument was incorrect; therefore, your punishment will be—

by slaughter shall be his death.

He said to him: Rabbi, do not deny me,

do not deny what you yourself taught me,

at the time of the judgment,

at this time when we are engaged in judgment!

For

this is what I have received from you: Sprinkling—

is a rabbinic prohibition.

And it does not override Shabbat!

Therefore I presented before you a kal va-homer from sprinkling, which is prohibited, to slaughter, so that slaughter should not override Shabbat.

I did this in order to prompt you to recall that it is obvious to me that sprinkling does not override Shabbat, and that you had taught this to me; then you would retract what you said, “And concerning it I argue,” to permit sprinkling on Shabbat.

We raised a difficulty:

But since he,

Rabbi Eliezer,

had taught him,

taught Rabbi Akiva that sprinkling does not override Shabbat,

what is the reason that he retracts his position?

Why did Rabbi Eliezer retract and permit sprinkling?

Ulla said: When Rabbi Eliezer taught him

that sprinkling does not override Shabbat,

it was sprinkling

for the sake of eating

teruma

on Shabbat that he

taught him.

For

the separation of

teruma itself does not override Shabbat.

And

Rabbi Akiva likewise, when he challenged him

Rabbi Eliezer with a kal va-homer, inverting the argument and saying that slaughter should not override Shabbat—from

sprinkling for the sake of teruma he challenged him.

It is a mitzva, and it

is prohibited only

as a rabbinic prohibition,

and nevertheless sprinkling does not override Shabbat; all the more so slaughter, which is a labor, should not override Shabbat. In this way Rabbi Akiva wished to remind Rabbi Eliezer that he had heard from him that sprinkling for the sake of eating teruma, despite being sprinkling for the sake of a mitzva, does not override Shabbat.

Rabbi Akiva argued that the same law applies to sprinkling for the sake of offering the Paschal sacrifice.

But he,

Rabbi Eliezer, who was offended by Rabbi Akiva’s words,

held:

From

sprinkling for the sake of the Paschal offering,

which is permitted, and concerning which he had not taught Rabbi Akiva that it was prohibited,

Rabbi Akiva was challenging him.

Rabbi Akiva.

Rabba raised an objection

from a baraita, from which it is evident that Rabbi Akiva derived a kal va-homer from sprinkling for the sake of the Paschal offering, and not from sprinkling for the sake of eating teruma:

Rabbi Akiva replied

to Rabbi Eliezer

and said

to him:

The sprinkling for one rendered impure by a corpse proves the point, when his seventh day falls on Shabbat, and

this was

on Passover eve, which is a mitzva and is a rabbinic prohibition—

and it does not override Shabbat!

And Rabba demonstrates:

Rather, certainly

it follows that it was obvious to Rabbi Akiva that sprinkling for the sake of offering the Paschal sacrifice is prohibited, to the extent that he argued from this very case to Rabbi Eliezer, that the prohibition of

sprinkling for the Paschal offering was taught to him

by Rabbi Eliezer, that it does not override Shabbat.

And now the Gemara explains:

But since he had taught him

Rabbi Akiva that sprinkling is prohibited even for the sake of the Paschal sacrifice,

for what reason did Rabbi Eliezer challenge

Rabbi Akiva?

Rabbi Eliezer’s teaching had been uprooted from his memory.

And Rabbi Akiva came to remind him of his teaching.

We raised a difficulty:

Why did he not say to him

Rabbi Akiva to Rabbi Eliezer

explicitly

that he himself had taught him this, and why did he need to hint to him?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Akiva held

that

it is not proper conduct

to remind him explicitly that he had erred and forgotten.

And now the Gemara explains the matter of sprinkling on Shabbat:

And sprinkling—

what is the reason that it does not override Shabbat?

Since,

after all,

the carrying

of water

is merely an ordinary act,

then

it should override Shabbat for the sake of the Paschal offering.

Rabba said: It is a decree lest one take it,

the water used for sprinkling,

and carry it four cubits in the public domain.

We raised a difficulty:

But according to Rabbi Eliezer—

let him carry it!

For Rabbi Eliezer said: The requirements of a mitzva override Shabbat.

They said

in answer:

This applies

to what Rabbi Eliezer said, that the requirements of a mitzva override Shabbat,

when the person himself is fit,

as, for example, an infant who is fit to be circumcised on Shabbat,

and the obligation

rests

upon him,

except that one must bring a circumcision knife for him through the public domain in order to circumcise him with it.

But here, where the person himself is not fit,

since he is impure,

the obligation does not rest upon him,

and his sprinkling is not a requirement of a mitzva.

Rabba said: According to the view of Rabbi Eliezer,

who holds that wherever the person is not presently fit, the procedures that would prepare him are not considered even requirements of a mitzva,

a healthy minor

whose time for circumcision is on Shabbat and who need not be washed in hot water before circumcision in order to make him fit for circumcision—

one may heat hot water for him

in order

to strengthen him,

to make him healthy and strong before circumcision,

and circumcise him on Shabbat.

For he is fit for him,

for circumcision, and consequently it is permitted to override Shabbat even for the sake of its requirements, to strengthen and fortify him.

But

a sick minor,

who will be fit for circumcision only if he is washed in hot water—

one may not heat hot water for him to strengthen him and circumcise him.

For

now

he is not fit for him,

he is not fit to be circumcised.

Rava said: But if he is healthy—

why does he need hot water to strengthen him?

Rather, Rava said: Everything

is “non-sacred”

in relation to circumcision.

Therefore,

both a healthy minor and a sick minor—

one may not heat hot water for him to strengthen him and circumcise him on Shabbat, for he is not fit.

For if they are not washed before circumcision in hot water, it is impossible to circumcise them. Therefore, heating the water is not considered a requirement of a mitzva at all, and even according to Rabbi Eliezer the hot water must be prepared before Shabbat.

Abaye raised an objection:

We learned in a baraita:

An uncircumcised man who did not circumcise

himself on Passover eve

is liable to receive karet,

because he failed to prepare himself to be fit for the offering of the Paschal sacrifice,

the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

But here, the person himself is unfit, and yet it teaches that he is liable to receive karet.

Apparently, the obligation rests upon him

to prepare himself, and the same applies to one who is obligated to purify himself. If so, his sprinkling should override Shabbat, since he is obligated to purify himself!

Rabba said: Rabbi Eliezer holds

that although an uncircumcised man and one impure from a corpse are both unfit to offer the Paschal sacrifice, a distinction must be made between their obligations to make themselves fit.

An uncircumcised man is obligated to circumcise himself, whereas one impure from a corpse is not obligated to purify himself [through sprinkling on the seventh day, when it falls on Passover eve that occurs on Shabbat].

And Rabbi Eliezer distinguishes in this manner based on what he holds in several other laws.

1.

One may not slaughter

the Paschal sacrifice

or

one may not

sprinkle

its blood

on

one who is

impure with impurity imparted by a creeping animal.

That is, later, in the Gemara, they disagree [on page 80b] whether one slaughters the Paschal sacrifice on behalf of one impure with impurity imparted by a creeping animal, who can immerse during the day and be pure in the evening and eat the Paschal sacrifice, or whether, if he had not immersed at the time of the slaughter of the Paschal sacrifice, he is deferred to the Second Pesaḥ.

One impure from a corpse whose seventh day falls on Passover eve is also included in this dispute, since he too can receive sprinkling and become fit in the evening to eat the Paschal sacrifice.

And since the later dispute concerns one impure with impurity imparted by a creeping animal, the Gemara stated that Rabbi Eliezer holds in this dispute that one does not slaughter on behalf of one impure with impurity imparted by a creeping animal. The same is true according to Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one impure from a corpse: one does not slaughter on behalf of either of them, but both are deferred to the Second Pesaḥ.