Pesachim 65a (סה.) — the Talmud in English

And we raised an objection:

And the olah itself—

from where do we know this?

From where did they learn that its blood is given only in a place beneath which there is a yesod?

And we answer:

The verse says in the passage concerning the sin-offering of a leader: [Leviticus 4:25] “And the priest shall take some of the blood of the sin-offering with his finger, and put it on the horns of the altar of the olah, and its blood he shall pour

toward the base of the altar of the olah”

.

And why did the verse lengthen its wording by saying, “toward the base of the altar of the olah”? It would have been appropriate to say, “toward the base of the altar,” and it would have been understood on its own that the reference is to the altar of the olah, since earlier in the verse it says, “and put it on the horns of the altar of the olah.”

Rather, necessarily, this is what the verse said: “Toward the base of the altar”—make it the base of “the olah.”

Apparently,

we learn from here that

an olah requires a yesod.

And from here they learned by means of a gezera shava that the Paschal offering also requires a yesod.

We learned in the Mishna:

The first group departed,

and the second group entered. The second departed, and the third entered.

The tanna

taught in the Tosefta:

It,

the third group,

is called the group of the indolent.

And we challenge this:

But is it not unavoidable!?

After all, they cannot do without there being a third group, since it is a mitzva for there to be three groups. If so,

what could they have done,

what were the members of the third group supposed to do, such that they are called the group of the indolent because of their reluctance?

And we answer:

Even so,

although in reality it is impossible to manage without the third group, nevertheless

they should have hastened themselves.

Each of them is commanded to urge himself not to be counted among the members of this group.

As it was taught: Rabbi says: The world cannot exist without perfumers,

people who prepare perfumes, whose scent is pleasant,

and without tanners,

who process hides and whose smell is foul.

Fortunate is one whose occupation is perfumery; woe to one whose occupation is tanning.

And the world cannot exist without males and without females.

Fortunate is one whose sons are males; woe to one whose children are females.

And likewise, it is impossible to manage without a first, second, and third group. But fortunate is one who is in the first group, and woe to one who is in the third group.

We learned in the Mishna:

Its procedure on a weekday,

so is its procedure on Shabbat. Except that the priests wash the Temple courtyard [on Shabbat] without the approval of the Sages.

And we raise an objection:

Without whose approval?

Who were the Sages who did not approve of washing the courtyard on Shabbat?

Rav Hisda said: It is without the approval of Rabbi Eliezer

.

For Rabbi Eliezer maintains that one who sweeps the ground on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. Therefore, even in the Temple, once the act is not required for the service of the Most High, it is forbidden to wash the ground, since this act resembles sweeping the ground.

For if you say it is according to the Rabbis,

that if you say that the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer concerning sweeping the ground are the Sages referred to in our Mishna,

they say that it is a rabbinic prohibition,

as they maintain that one who washes the ground is prohibited by rabbinic decree because of a shevut.

And there is no shevut in the Temple,

as they did not decree the prohibitions of shevut in the Temple.

What is it?—

Where is that dispute in which Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagreed?

As it was taught: One who milks

an animal on Shabbat is liable because of the labor of “extracting,” as he separates the milk from the animal’s udders, and it is prohibited because it is a derivative of threshing. For threshing consists of separating the grain from the straw [Shabbat 95a].

And one who curdles,

who sets milk in an animal’s stomach to make it into cheese, and is liable because this is selecting, as he separates the cheese from the water in the milk [Shabbat 95a].

And one who makes cheese,

gathers the flakes of milk [cheese curds] to make them into a solid block of cheese. This is according to the Arukh [cited in the Mesoret HaShas, Shabbat 95a]. And he is liable because of building [Shabbat, there].

For all of these, the measure establishing liability for a sin-offering is

the size of a dried fig.

One who sweeps

the house,

and one who sprinkles,

pours water on the earth covering the floor of his house so that dust will not rise [Rashi, Shabbat 95a],

and one who removes honeycombs

from the hive—all of these are prohibited by Torah law, as follows.

Therefore, if he performed them

unintentionally on Shabbat, he

is liable to bring a sin-offering.

For one who performs a labor on Shabbat intentionally, after being warned, is liable to stoning; when he acts unintentionally, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

If he acted intentionally on a Festival, he

receives forty lashes,

since one who performs labor intentionally on a Festival receives lashes. But if he acted unintentionally, he is exempt,

the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

For Rabbi Eliezer maintains that one who sweeps the house and one who sprinkles are liable because of building, since by sweeping or sprinkling he levels depressions in the ground. And one who removes honeycombs is liable because of reaping [as he separates the honey from the place where it formed and grew]. As it is stated [I Samuel 14]: “And he dipped it into the honeycomb.” The verse calls the hive a “honeycomb”; and just as one who plucks from a forest is liable, so too one who plucks honey from a hive is liable [Shabbat 95a].

And the Sages say: Both this,

Shabbat,

and that,

a Festival—

is not

the case that sweeping, sprinkling, and removing honeycombs are prohibited by Torah law,

but only because of shevut,

by rabbinic decree.

And the Sages agree that one who milks, makes cheese, or curdles is prohibited by Torah law.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Eliezer, washing the Temple courtyard on Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law because it levels depressions [and although the floor of the courtyard was made of marble, there were depressions between one slab and another. Tosafot ].

But according to the Rabbis, washing the ground is prohibited only because of rabbinic shevut, like sweeping the house, and they did not decree shevut in the Temple.

Rav Ashi said: You may even say

say] that the priests washed the courtyard

without the approval of the Sages,

who disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer and maintained that washing is prohibited because of shevut; nevertheless, they did not permit it on Shabbat.

And our Mishna

is the opinion of Rabbi Natan.

As it was taught: Rabbi Natan says: A shevut that is necessary—

that it is necessary to violate it for the sake of the sacrificial service—

they permitted.

A shevut that is not necessary

for the sacrificial service—

they did not permit.

Therefore, washing the courtyard is prohibited, since it is not for the sake of the sacrificial service.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: He would fill a cup

with the mixed blood and cast one sprinkling on the altar. But the Sages did not concede this to him.

It was taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: He would fill a cup with the mixed blood

of the Paschal offerings, whose blood had spilled onto the floor, so that

if the blood of

one offering

of them

spilled and they did not cast it on the altar,

this cup would be found,

the cup that he had filled with the mixed blood, and when they cast it, it

renders it fit.

For the blood of that offering whose blood spilled is mixed into the mixed blood, and it was cast onto the altar.

The Sages said

to

Rabbi Yehuda: Only blood that was received in a vessel and afterward spilled onto the ground is valid if it was gathered and cast onto the altar.

But blood that spilled from the animal’s neck onto the ground without having first been received in a vessel, and was afterward gathered into a vessel, is invalid.

And

the blood of the mixed offerings

was it not received in a vessel

before it spilled, and its casting is invalid?!

And we challenge this:

From where did they know?

From where did the Sages know that the mixed blood spilled onto the ground without having been received in a vessel?

And we answer:

Rather, this is what they said to him [

this is what the Sages said to Rabbi Yehuda]:

What is your remedy in casting a cup of mixed blood? You must be concerned

perhaps it was not

the blood

received in a vessel,

but rather it spilled onto the ground from the animal’s neck. If so, even if he fills a cup with the mixed blood, the matter does not leave the realm of uncertainty, because perhaps the blood is invalid and the offering was not rendered fit, and you have consequently cast invalid blood.

He said to them,

Rabbi Yehuda:

I too did not say

that the mixed blood is effective in every circumstance,

but rather

only

when it was received in a vessel.

And we say that the blood of the offering that spilled had already been received in a vessel beforehand.

And we challenge this:

And from where did

Rabbi Yehuda know that the blood of the offering was received in a vessel before it spilled? After all, it is possible that this offering, which you seek to render fit through this casting, had its blood spill from the animal’s neck, and its casting is invalid. Rabbi Yehuda seeks to rectify the offering and remove it from uncertainty, but it has still not left the realm of uncertainty.

And we answer:

Priests are vigilant!

That is, they are careful not to spill the blood before receiving it in a vessel, and therefore there is no concern that the blood spilled from the animal’s neck.

We explained the Sages’ challenge and Rabbi Yehuda’s answer according to Rashi’s first interpretation, that the Gemara here is speaking about the same offering whose blood spilled, and that we seek to render it fit through the mixed blood. The Sages asked: From where do we know that this blood was received in a vessel? Rashi wrote that this interpretation is primary.

But Rashi cites another interpretation: that the Gemara’s challenge and answer concern the mixed blood. This is the meaning of the Gemara:

Rather, this is what they said to him,

the Sages said to Rabbi Yehuda: The mixed blood on the floor of the courtyard—

perhaps

all of it

was not received in a vessel?

was not received in a vessel?

He said to them: I too did not say

to fill a cup

except in

a place where they know that it

was received in a vessel.

And afterward the Gemara challenges: Was blood that was invalid, such as blood of the residue, not also mixed into it?

And according to this interpretation as well, the continuation of the Gemara concerns all the mixed blood on the floor, and not only the blood of the offering whose blood spilled.

And we challenge this:

If

the

priests are vigilant, and take care that none of the blood spills before it is received in a vessel—

why does it spill?

Why did Rabbi Yehuda fear that the blood of one of the offerings spilled after it had been received in a vessel? The priests should also have been careful about this?!

And we answer:

Because of their vigilance, they perform

the service hastily, as they hurry and rush to perform the mitzva and run with the vessel in their hands to the altar,

it spills

the blood [

it spills] after it is already inside the vessel.

There are five types of blood.

Some of them are blood through which the soul departs [as a result of taking this blood, the animal dies], and some of them are not blood through which the soul departs.

Concerning the prohibition against eating blood, it is stated [in Leviticus 17:10–11]: “Any person of the House of Israel and of the stranger who resides among them who eats any blood—I shall set My face against the soul that eats the blood, and I shall cut it off from among its people. For the soul of the flesh is in the blood, and I have assigned it to you upon the altar to atone for your souls; for it is the blood that atones for the soul.”

And Rashi explained: “For the soul of the flesh” of every creature “is in the blood”; it depends upon it. Therefore, I gave it upon the altar to atone for the human soul. Let one soul come and atone for the soul.

And since the Torah said concerning one who eats blood and is liable to karet, “For the soul of the flesh is in the blood,” the Sages learned that there is liability to karet only for blood through which the soul departs.

And from the end of the verse, “for it is the blood that atones for the soul,” they learned that one casts the blood of offerings, which come to atone for a person, only when it is blood through which the soul departs.

And now we challenge Rabbi Yehuda:

But the blood of the residue,

through which the soul does not depart,

would spill onto the ground from many Paschal offerings. And the blood of the residue was mixed into it,

with the valid blood spilled from one offering [according to the concern]. And it is nullified by the majority; so what benefit can there be in casting the mixed blood?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yehuda follows his own reasoning,

his own method,

as he said:

“The blood of the residue”—

it is fully valid blood.

It is complete blood, and all the laws stated concerning blood through which the soul departs were also stated concerning the blood of the residue. It is valid to cast it on the altar.

As it was taught

in the Tosefta:

The blood of the residue—

one who eats it is not liable to karet.

For concerning karet it is stated: “For the soul of the flesh is in the blood.” The blood of the residue is excluded, since it is not the blood through which the soul departs.

But one transgresses

a prohibition

by eating it, because the prohibition against eating blood is stated five times in the Torah. From this they expounded that five types of blood are included, and one transgresses a prohibition by consuming them. One of them is “the blood of the residue” [Keritot 21b].

Rabbi Yehuda says: The blood of the residue is subject

to karet.

And although concerning karet it is written, “For the soul of the flesh is in the blood,” Rabbi Yehuda includes the blood of the residue in the liability to karet. For it is stated at the beginning of the verse, “any blood”—“any” includes the blood of the residue [Keritot 4b].

And since Rabbi Yehuda equates the blood through which the soul departs with the blood of the residue with regard to karet for eating blood, we learn from his words that with regard to casting the blood of an offering as well, they should be equated. For in that same verse, karet is stated concerning unconsecrated meat, and atonement [casting] concerning consecrated offerings.

And we challenge this:

But Rabbi Elazar said: Even though Rabbi Yehuda equated the blood through which the soul departs with the blood of the residue, making one liable to karet for both, nevertheless

Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to atonement

through the casting of the blood

that

the blood of the residue

does not effect atonement.

As it is stated: “For it is the blood that atones for the soul.”

As it is stated: “For it is the blood that effects atonement by means of the life.”

As it is stated: “For it is the blood that atones through the soul.”