Pesachim 53b (נג:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, say:

this is what they sent him:

You are close

to

feeding the Jewish people sacrificial meat outside!

For you are feeding them something resembling sacrificial meat outside.

The Gemara now raises a difficulty: It may be inferred from here that specifically a

whole-roasted kid is forbidden to eat,

because it resembles the flesh of the Paschal offering and may be confused with it.

But

non-whole-roasted

roasted meat does not appear like eating sacrificial meat outside. And this is difficult for Rav, who prohibits saying, “This meat is for Passover,” even regarding a kid that is not whole-roasted, as he maintains that any meat may be confused with the Paschal offering.

They said

in the beit-midrash, to resolve the difficulty:

A whole-roasted

kid, which resembles the Paschal offering,

is no different

if one

said

of it, “This is for the Paschal offering,”

and is no different

if one

did not say

this about it: It is forbidden to eat it.

But that which Rav said, that even meat

that is not whole-roasted

may be confused with the Paschal offering, applies specifically if he

specified

and said, “This is for the Paschal offering,”

then

it may be confused with the Paschal offering. Therefore, it is forbidden to say this.

But if he

did not specify

anything about it,

it does not

become confused with the Paschal offering.

Rav Aḥa taught this baraita

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon!

That is, it was not Rabbi Yosei who cited the incident involving Todוס the Roman, but rather Rabbi Shimon.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection to this: Granted, according to the one who teaches it in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, it is understandable.

But according to the one who teaches

this

baraita in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, is it understandable?!

But didn’t we learn:

A voluntary meal-offering comes only from wheat. And if one said, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal-offering from barley,” he must bring it from wheat!

Since he said, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal-offering,” he became obligated to bring an appropriate meal-offering. Although he continued his statement by saying, “from barley,” his primary intention is understood from the beginning of his words, as we maintain: “We grasp the first expression.”

And Rabbi Shimon exempts him

entirely from bringing a meal-offering,

because he did not make his donation in the manner of those who make donations!

Rabbi Shimon maintains that a person is also understood according to the conclusion of his statement, since his intention applies as well to what he finished saying, “from barley.” He thought that a meal-offering could be brought even from barley, and that was his intention. Consequently, there is nothing in his statement.

If so, this is difficult: How could Rabbi Shimon say, with regard to a whole-roasted kid, that it is “close to eating sacrificial meat outside”?

After all, even if he had explicitly consecrated the whole-roasted kid for the sake of the Paschal offering, it would not have become consecrated. For certainly, at the time of its roasting it is already impossible to consecrate it as an offering. And whenever one does not make his donation in the manner of those who make donations, there is nothing in his statement.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And

does it

follow that the one who teaches

the incident involving Todוס the Roman

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

in the name of Rabbi Yosei,

is it

really

understandable?

But Rava said: Rabbi Shimon,

who exempted one who said, “It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal-offering from barley,”

stated it in accordance with the approach of Rabbi Yosei.

As Rabbi Yosei said:

Rabbi Yosei

said: A person is also understood according to the conclusion of his statement!

Rabbi Shimon, too, holds this. Therefore, he reasoned that certainly his intention was to donate barley.

And as we learned: If one says, “This is the substitute for an olah, the substitute for a shelamim,” it is the substitute for an olah, because we grasp the first expression—these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says: If this was his intention from the outset, since it was impossible for him to utter both designations simultaneously, and he therefore uttered them one after the other, if, when he said “olah,” he had already intended to say “shelamim” as well, both designations take effect. Both sanctities apply to it simultaneously. Therefore, it must be left until it develops a blemish, and then it is sold. With half the proceeds he brings an olah, and with the other half he brings a shelamim.

Is it not the case that, since Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rabbi Yosei,

also

Rabbi Yosei agrees with Rabbi Shimon

and holds that whenever one does not make his donation in the manner of those who make donations, there is nothing in his statement?!

If so, it is difficult: How could Rabbi Yosei say, with regard to a whole-roasted kid, that it is close to eating sacrificial meat outside? After all, it is not the manner of those who make donations to consecrate it after slaughter.

And we answer:

No,

that is not so.

Rather, indeed,

Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rabbi Yosei

that “a person is understood according to the conclusion of his statement,” but

it does not

necessarily follow that

Rabbi Yosei agrees with Rabbi Shimon

with regard to one who donates a barley meal-offering. Rabbi Yosei always maintains that he is obligated to bring a wheat meal-offering. Although, generally, he maintains that a person is understood according to the conclusion of his statement, here we assume that he certainly intended a wheat meal-offering, since a person does not utter his words in vain. Therefore, he also prohibited a whole-roasted kid on the night of Passover, because it resembles eating sacrificial meat outside.

For if he had explicitly consecrated the whole-roasted kid and said, “This is a Paschal offering,” we would not say that, since he did not consecrate it while alive in the manner of those who consecrate offerings, there is nothing in his statement. Rather, we would interpret his words as meaning that he consecrated its value for the sake of a Paschal offering, intending to sell it and bring a Paschal offering with the proceeds, since a person does not utter his words in vain.

A dilemma was raised before them:

Why did they refrain from excommunicating him for instituting the practice of eating whole-roasted kids?

Was it

because Todוס the Roman was a great man,

and they did not excommunicate him out of deference to him?

Or

was it because he

was a man of power,

and they feared his power?

And we resolve it:

Come and hear: Todוס the Roman expounded this further:

This indicates that he expounded teachings and was a great man, and therefore they did not excommunicate him. And this is what he expounded:

What did Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah see that led them to submit themselves to sanctify the Name of God,

and not bow to Nebuchadnezzar’s statue?

Is it not an established principle regarding all the mitzvot that one should transgress rather than be killed, as we derive from the verse, “These are the mitzvot that a person shall perform and live by them”: “and live by them,” but not die by them?

Rather,

they derived a kal va-homer from the frogs

in Egypt:

And if frogs, which are not

themselves

commanded to sanctify the Name of God,

nevertheless

it is written concerning them: “And they shall come up and enter your house, and your ovens, and your kneading bowls.”

And

indeed,

when are kneading bowls

[dough]

found beside an oven?

You must say: When the oven is hot.

It follows that the frogs submitted themselves to death and entered the hot ovens in order to fulfill the command of God.

And if so,

we

[Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah],

who are commanded

we are

to sanctify the Name of God—

all the more so

we should submit our lives for this!

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said:

Todוס the Roman

used to provide merchandise for the pockets of Torah scholars,

giving them goods so that they could profit from them.

This, too, teaches us that he was a great man.

As Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Anyone who provides merchandise for the pockets

of

Torah scholars merits sitting in the heavenly academy. As it is stated: “For in the shadow of wisdom

[one is] in the shadow of money”!

Since he benefited Torah scholars with his money, he enters within the domain of wisdom.

Mishna:

In a place where the custom is to light the lamp

on the eve of Yom Kippur so that it will remain lit

on the night of Yom Kippur, one lights.

And in a place where the custom is not to light

the lamp then,

one does not light.

And

everywhere,

one lights

a lamp that will remain lit on the night of Yom Kippur

in synagogues and study halls, in dark alleyways, and for the sick.

Gemara:

The tanna taught: Both

those

who said to light

the lamp on the eve of Yom Kippur

and both

those

who said not to light it—

both intended the same thing!

The purpose of all of them was to refrain from marital relations, which are forbidden on Yom Kippur.

Those whose custom was to light did so so that the lamp would separate them from marital relations, since a person does not engage in marital relations by lamplight.

And those whose custom was not to light held that without a lamp one would refrain from it even more, since when the lamp is lit he sees his wife and desires her.

Rav Yehoshua said: Rava expounded

the following verse concerning this:

“And all your people shall be righteous; they shall inherit the land forever,

the branch of My planting, the work of My hands, in which to glory.”

Both

those

who said to light, and both

those

who said not to light, both intended only the same thing—

to refrain from something forbidden.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One recites the blessing over fire

—the blessing “Who creates the lights of fire”—

only at the conclusion of Shabbat, since

then it is the time of

the beginning of the creation

of fire

itself.

A certain elder said to him, and some say

that

Rabba bar bar Ḥana

said to Rabbi Yehuda:

Correct!

You have spoken well.

And

likewise

Rabbi Yoḥanan said

that one recites the blessing “Who creates the lights of fire” only at the conclusion of Shabbat.

Ulla was riding

on

a donkey and traveling. Rabbi Abba was traveling on his right

side.

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana

was walking

on his left.

Rabbi Abba said to Ulla:

Is

it certainly

correct that I heard,

that you say in the name of Rabbi

Yoḥanan: One recites the blessing over fire only at the conclusion of Shabbat, since

it is then the time of

the beginning of its creation?!

Ulla turned around and looked at Rabba bar bar Ḥana with displeasure

[Ulla turned around and looked at Rabba bar bar Ḥana with an angry expression], because he thought that Rabba bar bar Ḥana had said this in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Ulla did not agree that this was Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason.

Rather, he maintained that one recites the blessing then because it is the time when permission to kindle fire has just been renewed, after kindling fire was forbidden throughout Shabbat; now one benefits from the ability to kindle it and use it.

According to this reason, one also recites the blessing over fire at the conclusion of Yom Kippur.

He said to him,

Rabba bar bar Ḥana:

I did not say

anything about the matter of the blessing “Who creates the lights of fire”

when I said

something in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

Rather, I said this

with regard to another matter

when I said

something in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan. They mistakenly extracted from my words as though I had stated in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name a reason for the blessing over fire at the conclusion of Shabbat.

For a tanna taught before Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: When Yom Kippur occurs on Shabbat,

even in a place where they said not to light

the lamp on Yom Kippur when it occurs during the week,

they light

it when Yom Kippur occurs on Shabbat,

for the honor of Shabbat.

And concerning this I said:

And

he answered and added,

Rabbi Yoḥanan after him,

in response to the words of the tanna who taught Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s statement before him:

But the Sages prohibit

lighting the lamp even in honor of Shabbat when Yom Kippur occurs on it, in a place where the custom is not to light.

Ulla said to him: Let this be so!

That is, in this matter I concede, for this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said.