Pesachim 48a — the Talmud in English

“From the two hundred” —

from the remainder of two hundred

wine

that remained in the pit.

And the verse refers to wine for libations, as, for example, when wine of orla became mixed with permitted wine. For although the permitted [wine] is greater than the forbidden [wine], the forbidden [wine] is not nullified by a majority until there is in the permitted wine two hundred times the wine of orla.

And so long as it has not been nullified in two hundred, one does not bring from it for libations.

And this is what it says: Bring this wine for libations only if, after they remove from the wine the quantity of wine of orla, there will still remain in the pit a quantity of wine equal to two hundred parts of permitted wine against it.

From here [it follows] concerning orla, that it

is

nullified

only

by

a majority of

two hundred

parts of permitted [wine] against it.

“From the drink of Israel” —

one brings to the altar only

from

that which is

permitted to an Israelite

for eating.

From here they said: one does not bring libations from tevel.

For it is forbidden for an Israelite to eat.

One might [say], he should not bring

to the altar on Shabbat and a Festival

from muktzeh?

You said: What

forbidden [status] does the

tevel

have that is distinctive

in that its intrinsic prohibition caused it

to be forbidden [for the reason that its prohibition is inherent in it, and not because of any external factor] —

so too every

thing

whose intrinsic prohibition caused it

is not offered on the altar.

The prohibition of muktzeh is excluded, for its intrinsic prohibition did not cause it to be forbidden; rather, the prohibition of another matter caused it to be forbidden, namely, the prohibition of Shabbat.

And Abaye concluded his objection:

And if you say

that

the prohibition of muktzeh

the prohibition

is by Torah law —

why is it offered on the altar?

What difference is it to me

if

it is an intrinsic prohibition

it is,

and what difference is it to me

if

it is a prohibition

because of

another matter

is it? For in every case it is not among that which is permitted to an Israelite.

And furthermore

he raised an objection to him:

Is it not you [

Rabba ]

who said,

there is

a division of labors for Shabbat,

that if one performed several labors on Shabbat in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for a sin-offering for each and every labor separately, even though all of them were included in one warning. And we derive this from verses.

But

there is no division of labors for a Festival,

for if one performed several labors on a Festival intentionally, he is flogged only once, since he violated only one negative commandment, “You shall not perform any labor.”

If so, how does it teach that one who cooks on a Festival is liable for two, both because of cooking and because of muktzeh? For if he performed two labors together, he is flogged only once.

Rabba said to him:

Rather, remove

the prohibition of

kindling

on a Festival,

and insert

in its place the prohibition of using

wood of an asherah.

For he cooks with wood of an asherah [a tree that was worshipped for idolatry], which is forbidden for benefit.

And the warning

for benefit from idolatry is

from here:

as it is written,

“Nothing from the banned thing shall cling to your hand.”

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Abaye:

if it is speaking of one who kindles wood of an asherah —

let him also be flogged because of

“You shall not bring an abomination into your house,”

and why is he flogged only five times? For he violated six negative commandments.

Rather, remove

the prohibition of

kindling

on a Festival,

and insert

the prohibition of kindling

consecrated wood.

And the warning

for one who burns consecrated wood is

from here:

as it is written,

“And their sacred poles you shall burn in fire; you shall not do so to the Lord your God,”

for it is forbidden to destroy wood consecrated to the Lord your God.

Rami bar Ḥama said: This

dispute

between Rav Ḥisda and Rabba

concerning ho’il” —

is the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua.

For Rabbi Eliezer,

who said concerning the separation of impure ḥalla on a Festival, “Do not designate it until it is baked,”

held:

so long as he has not yet separated ḥalla from the dough, it is permitted to bake all of it as loaves.

And although they will necessarily not eat all the loaves that he bakes from it, since one of them will be separated as ḥalla and become forbidden to eat, it seemingly follows that on the Festival he is laboring with regard to that loaf which will be separated as ḥalla without the need of food for a person.

Nevertheless, it is permitted to bake all the loaves, because

we say: Since

if he wishes, he will not separate one complete loaf as ḥalla, but will break off a little from each and every loaf and separate it as ḥalla.

Therefore, each loaf is considered independently fit for eating, and it is permitted to bake it.

And Rabbi Joshua held, we do not say

“Since.”

And since ultimately he is going to separate one complete loaf as ḥalla, and it will not be fit for eating, it follows that part of his baking is not for the need of food for a person; therefore, it is forbidden for him to bake anything.

Rav Pappa said:

They do not necessarily disagree in this.

For

perhaps,

according to everyone, in general we do not say “Since.”

Rabbi Eliezer said there that we say

“Since” only

because

at the time that they enter

the dough

into the oven, each and every one is fit for him individually.

And even if ultimately he will separate one complete loaf as ḥalla, now each one must be considered separately, that it will be fit for eating, for he will not separate that one as ḥalla, but its fellow.

But here,

when he bakes from a Festival for Shabbat after he has already finished his meal,

for

only

for guests is this bread fit,

but

for him it is not fit,

for he certainly will not need to eat it, and now, at the time that he bakes, he has no invited guests to eat it —

say: here too, we do not say “Since

and if guests happen to come to him, it will be fit for him.”

And

so

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said:

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua do not disagree in the dispute between Rav Ḥisda and Rabba. And he said this for another reason:

Perhaps not

this

is

their dispute. Rather, according to everyone, we say, “Since guests happen to come, it is fit for him.”

Rabbi Joshua said there that we do not say

“Since,”

and he prohibited baking all the dough,

only

because

there is

a loaf

one

that will ultimately be separated as ḥalla. And since it is impure, it is fit

neither for him nor for guests.

And we do not say that perhaps he will break off a little from each and every one and separate it, since that is not the usual way to do so; rather, one separates one complete loaf as ḥalla.

But here,

when he bakes from a Festival for Shabbat,

since at least

his baking is fit

for guests

when they happen to come to him —

say: here too, we say

“Since

and if guests happen to come to her, it is fit for her.” For it is a common matter that guests will happen to come to him.

The Sages said

of the statement of Rami bar Ḥama [who linked the dispute between Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer to the dispute between Rabba and Rav Ḥisda]

before Rabbi Yirmeya and Rabbi Zeira.

Rabbi Yirmeya accepted it,

and agreed that Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer disagree in the dispute between Rabba and Rav Ḥisda concerning “Since.”

And

Rabbi Zeira did not accept it,

and held that they do not disagree in this.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira:

This matter is

a matter that has been difficult for us and has continued,

we have found this matter difficult and again found it difficult already

for many years [

years ] —

In what do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua disagree?

Now that they said it

the Sages

in the name of a great man

like Rami bar Ḥama, that they disagree concerning “Since,”

and

if

we will not accept it

from him that indeed they disagree in this?!

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

And

if so,

how could I accept it?

For

behold

we learned: Rabbi Joshua said

to Rabbi Eliezer:

According to your words,

that all the dough should be baked before separating the ḥalla,

he thereby transgresses

through this

because of

“You shall not perform any labor”!

For one of them will certainly ultimately be separated as ḥalla, and will not be fit for eating. It follows that he baked something that does not have the status of “food for a person.”

And Rabbi Eliezer was silent before him,

and did not answer him anything.

And if it is so

that Rabbi Eliezer’s reason is because of ho’il,

let him say to him: My reason is because of ho’il

and if he breaks off from each and every one, it follows that each of them is fit for eating.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him,

Rabbi Yirmeya:

But according to your reasoning,

it is still difficult

from that which we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer said to

Rabbi Joshua:

According to your words —

that you say he should leave the ḥalla without baking it until evening —

he thereby transgresses

with regard to it

because of

“It shall not be seen”

and “It shall not be found”!

And Rabbi Joshua was silent before him,

Rabbi Joshua.

Yet Rabbi Joshua should have answered him, “This is not the leaven concerning which one is warned.” Nevertheless, he did not answer him.

If so,

here too

it is not difficult why

Rabbi Eliezer did not answer him

Rabbi Joshua, [saying] that his reason is because of “Since.”

And we object:

But

there is no proof from there. For Rabbi Joshua was not silent before him; rather,

Rabbi Joshua answered him

Rabbi Joshua

in the Mishna

so.

For we learned: This is not the leaven concerning which one is warned because of

“It shall not be seen”

and “It shall not be found.”

And we answer:

Rather,

this is what Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira:

Just as

Rabbi Joshua was silent before him

Rabbi Joshua

in the beraita, and answered him in the Mishna, so too, say that Rabbi Eliezer was silent

Rabbi Eliezer

in the Mishna, and answered him in another teaching,

that his reason is because of “Since.”

And besides this, they disagree whether one transgresses with regard to the leavened ḥalla “It shall not be seen,” or not.

According to Rabbi Eliezer, one transgresses with regard to it because “the benefit of possession is money.” And according to Rabbi Joshua, one does not transgress with regard to it because “the benefit of possession is not money,” as explained at the beginning of our discussion.

It was taught: Rabbi says: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

and do not designate it until it is baked.

And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: The halakha is in accordance with Ben Beteira,

and place the ḥalla in a cold place until evening, so that it will not become leavened.

We hold that on Passover it is forbidden to knead a large dough at one time, since it is impossible to guard it from becoming leavened.

And

up to

how much

is

the measure

of the

dough

that one can guard from becoming leavened, and is permitted to make it?

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: With

flour of

wheat

up to two

kav. And with

flour of

barley

up to

three kav.

For wheat flour becomes leavened more quickly than barley flour, and it is more difficult to guard it from becoming leavened.

Rabbi Natan says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The opposite of these matters:

with barley, two kav, and with wheat, three kav, because barley becomes leavened more quickly.

And we object:

But was it not taught: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says:

it is permitted to knead flour

of wheat

up to

three kav

at one time.

And with barley, four kav!

And this contradicts what he said in the beraita above: “With wheat, two kav; with barley, three kav.”

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This

which teaches “three with wheat and four with barley” speaks of produce

of the ḥasikhta type [

thin and inferior ears].

This

which teaches “with wheat, two, and with barley, three” speaks

of

produce

of superior quality [

fine ]. For the flour produced from two kav of fine wheat is equivalent to that produced from three kav of inferior wheat.

Rav Pappa said: Learn from this that inferior ḥasikhta wheat is inferior to superior wheat more than inferior ḥasikhta barley is inferior to superior barley!

The disparity between inferior and fine wheat is greater than the disparity between inferior and fine barley.

For whereas there,

with wheat, the difference between them is

a third.

For the flour produced from the inferior wheat is one-third less than the quantity produced from the fine wheat.

And

whereas

here,

with barley, the difference is only

a quarter.

For the flour produced from the inferior barley is only one-quarter less than the quantity produced from the fine barley.

And there is a practical difference with regard to buying and selling.

Rav said: A kav

of

Mellugna [

a place-name ] is the measure of dough whose kneading is permitted

for Passover!

But with more than this, it is impossible to guard it from becoming leavened.

And likewise

it is the measure of dough

for

the obligation of

ḥalla.