Pesachim 48a (מח.) — the Talmud in English

“From the two hundred” -

from the remainder of two hundred

measures of wine

that remained in the pit.

The verse is referring to wine for the libations, and to a case where wine of orla became mixed with permitted wine. For although the permitted wine is more abundant than the prohibited wine, the prohibition is not nullified by a majority until there is in the permitted wine two hundred times the amount of the orla wine.

And as long as it has not been nullified by two hundred, one may not bring any of it for the libations.

And this is what it is saying: Bring this wine for the libations only if, after they remove from the wine an amount equal to the orla wine, there still remains in the pit an amount of wine consisting of two hundred parts of permitted wine corresponding to it.

From here it is derived concerning orla, that

it is

nullified

only

by

a majority of

two hundred

parts of permitted wine corresponding to it.

“From the drink of Israel” -

one may bring to the altar only

from

that which is

permitted to an Israelite

to eat.

From here they said: One may not bring libations from tevel.

Since it is prohibited for an Israelite to eat.

One might think that he may not bring

to the altar on Shabbat and a Festival

from muktze?

You said: What

is distinctive about the prohibition of

tevel

is that

the prohibition inherent in it caused it

to be prohibited [that is, the reason for its prohibition is inherent in it and not due to any external factor] -

so too, every

thing

whose inherent prohibition caused it

cannot be offered on the altar.

The prohibition of muktze is excluded, since its inherent prohibition did not cause it to be prohibited; rather, the prohibition of another matter caused it to be prohibited, namely, the prohibition of Shabbat.

And Abaye concluded his objection:

And if you say

that

the prohibition of muktze

is a

Torah prohibition - why may it be offered on the altar?

why is it offered on the altar?

What difference is there

if

it is an inherent prohibition

or

what difference is there

if it is a

prohibition

due to

another matter? In either case, it is not from that which is permitted to an Israelite.

is it? For in every case it is not among that which is permitted to an Israelite.

Furthermore,

he raised an objection to him:

It is you

Rabba]

who said that

there is

a distinction between labors on Shabbat,

such that if one performed several labors on Shabbat unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for each labor separately, even though all of them were included in a single warning. And this is derived from verses.

But

there is no distinction between labors on a Festival,

such that if one performed several labors on a Festival intentionally, he is liable for only one set of lashes, since he violated only one prohibition: “You shall not perform any labor.”

If so, how can it teach that one who cooks on a Festival is liable for two, both because of cooking and because of muktze? If he performed two labors together, surely he is liable to only one set of lashes.

Rabba said to him:

Rather, remove the prohibition of

the

kindling

on a Festival,

and insert in its place the prohibition against using

the

wood of an asheira.

For he is cooking with the wood of an asheira [a tree that was worshipped as idolatry], which is prohibited for benefit.

And the warning

against deriving benefit from idolatry is

from here:

as it is written,

“And nothing from the banned property shall cleave to your hand.”

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Abaye:

If it is discussing one who kindles the wood of an asheira -

let him also be flogged because of

“You shall not bring an abomination into your house,”

and why is he flogged only five times? He has violated six prohibitions!

Rather, remove the prohibition of

the

kindling

on a Festival,

and insert the prohibition of kindling

the

wood of consecrated property.

And the warning

against burning consecrated wood is

from here:

as it is written,

“And you shall burn their sacred trees with fire; you shall not do so to the Lord your God,”

as it is prohibited to destroy wood consecrated to the Lord your God.

Rami bar Ḥama said: This

dispute

between Rav Ḥisda and Rabba concerning the principle of “since”

is the

dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua.

Rabbi Eliezer,

who said with regard to separating impure ḥalla on a Festival, “Do not designate it by name until it has been baked,”

held that as long as he has not yet separated ḥalla from the dough, he may bake all of it as loaves.

so long as he has not yet separated ḥalla from the dough, it is permitted to bake all of it as loaves.

And although it is certain that they will not eat all the loaves that he bakes from it, since one of them will be separated as ḥalla and prohibited for eating, it would appear that he is laboring on the Festival with regard to that loaf which will be separated as ḥalla without a need related to food.

Nevertheless, he may bake all the loaves, because

we say: Since if he wishes, he need not separate one whole loaf as ḥalla; rather, he can take a small piece from each loaf and separate them as ḥalla.

Therefore, each loaf is considered fit for eating on its own, and he may bake it.

And Rabbi Yehoshua held that we do not say

“since.”

And since ultimately he is destined to separate one whole loaf as ḥalla, and it will not be fit for eating, it follows that part of his baking is not for a food-related need. Therefore, he may not bake anything.

Rav Pappa said:

They did not necessarily disagree about this.

For

perhaps everyone agrees that, in general, we do not say “since.”

according to everyone, in general we do not say “Since.”

Rabbi Eliezer stated there that we say

“since” only because

of the fact that

at the time that they are put

the dough

into the oven, each one is fit for him personally.

Even if ultimately he will separate one whole loaf as ḥalla, at present each one must be considered individually, as one that will be fit for eating. He will not separate that one as ḥalla, but rather its fellow.

But here,

when one bakes from a Festival for Shabbat after he has already finished his meal,

since

only

for guests is this bread fit,

but

it is not fit for him personally,

since he certainly will not need to eat it, and at the time he bakes it he has no guests prepared to eat it -

say that here too we do not say “since,”

that if guests happen to come to him, it will be fit for him.

And

so

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said:

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree in the dispute between Rav Ḥisda and Rabba. He said this for another reason:

Perhaps this

is not

the

dispute between them. Rather, everyone agrees that we say, “Since guests happen to come, it is fit for him.”

Rabbi Yehoshua stated there that we do not say

“since,”

and prohibited baking the entire dough,

only because

there is

one

loaf

single,

which will ultimately be separated as ḥalla. And since it is impure, it is fit

neither for him nor for guests. And we do not say that perhaps he will take a small piece from each one and separate them, since that is not the normal practice; rather, one separates one whole loaf as ḥalla.

But here,

when one bakes from a Festival for Shabbat,

since at least

the baking

is fit for guests

when they happen to come to him -

say that here too we say

“since

if guests happen to come to him, it is fit for him.” For it is common that guests may happen to come to him.

The Sages stated the teaching of Rami bar Ḥama

before

Rabbi Yirmeya and Rabbi Zeira.

Rabbi Yirmeya accepted it,

and agreed that Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer disagreed in the dispute between Rabba and Rav Ḥisda concerning “since.”

And

Rabbi Zeira did not accept it,

and held that this was not the basis of their disagreement.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira:

This matter is

a matter that has been difficult for us and has persisted,

for we have already struggled with this matter and returned to struggle with it

for many years

years] -

over what do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree?

Now that the Sages have stated it

in the name of

a great man,

Rami bar Ḥama, that they disagree concerning “since,”

and

why

should we not accept it

from him, that this is indeed the basis of their disagreement?!

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

And

why

should I accept it?

For

we

learned: Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer

:

According to your

view, that the entire dough should be baked before separating the ḥalla,

he thereby transgresses

this

because of

“You shall not perform any labor”!

Since one of them will certainly ultimately be separated as ḥalla and will not be fit for eating, it follows that he baked something that does not qualify as food.

And he was silent before him,

and Rabbi Eliezer did not answer him anything.

And if it is so,

that the reason of Rabbi Eliezer is based on “since,”

let him say to him: My reason is based on “since,”

that if he takes a piece from each one, it follows that each one is fit for eating.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him:

Rabbi Zeira,

but according to your reasoning,

there is still a difficulty from

what we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua

:

According to your

view - that you say he should leave the ḥalla without baking it until evening -

he thereby transgresses

concerning it

because of

“It shall not be seen”

and “It shall not be found”!

And he was silent before him,

Rabbi Yehoshua.

Rabbi Yehoshua should have answered him: “This is not the kind of leaven concerning which one is warned.” Nevertheless, he did not answer him.

If so,

here too

it is not difficult why

Rabbi Eliezer did not answer him,

Rabbi Yehoshua, that his reason was based on “since.”

And we raise an objection:

But

there is no proof from there. For Rabbi Yehoshua was not silent before him; rather,

Rabbi Yehoshua answered him

in

the Mishna

as follows:

As we learned: This is not the kind of leaven concerning which one is warned because of

“It shall not be seen”

and “It shall not be found.”

And we answer:

Rather, this is what Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira:

Just as

Rabbi Yehoshua was silent before him

in the beraita, and answered him in the Mishna,

so too, say that Rabbi Eliezer was silent before him

in the Mishna, and answered him in another baraita,

whose reason is based on “since.”

that his reason is because of “Since.”

And in addition, they disagree over whether one transgresses the prohibitions of “It shall not be seen” with regard to the leavened ḥalla, or not.

According to Rabbi Eliezer, one transgresses concerning it because “the benefit of ownership has monetary value.” According to Rabbi Yehoshua, one does not transgress concerning it, because “the benefit of ownership has no monetary value,” as explained at the beginning of our sugya.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

and do not designate it by name until it has been baked.

And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: The halakha is in accordance with ben Beteira,

and place the ḥalla in cold water until evening, so that it will not become leavened.

It is established for us that on Passover it is prohibited to knead one large dough at one time, since it is impossible to guard it from becoming leavened.

And

up to

what

is the

measure

of

dough

that one can guard from becoming leavened and is permitted to make?

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: With

flour of

wheat,

up to two

kav. And with

flour of

barley,

up to

three kav.

For wheat flour becomes leavened more quickly than barley flour, and it is more difficult to guard it from becoming leavened.

Rabbi Natan says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The matters are reversed:

with barley, two kav, and with wheat, three kav, because barley becomes leavened more quickly.

And we raise a difficulty:

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says:

It is permitted to knead

wheat

flour up to

three kav

at one time.

And with barley, four kav!

And this contradicts what it says in the earlier beraita: “With wheat, two kav; with barley, three kav.”

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This

teaching, which says “three with wheat and four with barley,” is referring to grain that is

thin

thin and inferior stalks].

This

teaching, which says “with wheat, two; and with barley, three,” is referring

to

grain that is

superior [fine]. For the flour produced from two kav of fine wheat is equivalent to that produced from three kav of inferior wheat.

Rav Pappa said: Learn from this that inferior thin wheat is inferior to superior wheat more than inferior thin barley is inferior to superior barley!

The difference between inferior and fine wheat is greater than the difference between inferior and fine barley.

For there,

with wheat, the difference between them is

one-third.

The flour produced from the inferior wheat is one-third less than the amount produced from the fine wheat.

And

if

here,

with barley, the difference is only

one-quarter.

The flour produced from inferior barley is only one-quarter less than the amount produced from fine barley.

And there is a practical difference with regard to buying and selling.

Rav said: A kav

of

Meluqna'a [a place name] is the measure of dough permitted for kneading

for Passover!

But more than this cannot be guarded from becoming leavened.

And

this is also the measure of dough

for

the obligation of

ḥalla.